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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The effects of causal and contrastive
connectives
Before he was three years old, Jefta Lagerwerf discovered the exciting
use of the phrase toch wel! (‘but it is!’). On bicycle rides with his parents,
he often approaches a guarded level crossing. Shortly before they get
to it, the tension starts to rise: are the crossing barriers going to come
down, are the red lights going to flash, and are the alarm bells going
to ring, because there is a train approaching the level crossing? His
parents warn him that there may not be a train coming at all. When,
at last, a train does come, Jefta calls out: toch wel! (‘but there is!’). This
use of toch wel is called a denial of expectation. Jefta denies his parents’
expectation that nothing will happen.
The starting point of this thesis is an analysis of the denial of expec-
tation, expressed by the Dutch connectives hoewel and maar, and their
English counterparts although and but. The expectation, and Jefta’s re-
action, can be expressed in one sentence by using although or but, as
the example in (1) shows.
(1) Although the level crossing is empty, a train is coming.
An interesting difference between the sketched situation and this sen-
tence, is that the warning ‘there may not be a train coming’ has dis-
appeared from the sentence in (1). Nevertheless, the phrase a train is
coming still denies the expectation that there may not be a train com-
ing. Apparently, this expectation can be derived from the utterance in
(1). From the utterance, an implication can be derived: ‘normally, if
a level crossing is empty, no train is coming’. The implication under-
lying the sentence in (1), makes the relation between the main clause
and the although clause a causal relation. A denial of expectation is a
coherence relation that expresses contrast as well as causality.
Causality, or rather, what is expressed by causal connectives, will be
one of the central topics of this thesis. As a philosophical notion, it
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was studied by philosophers like Locke (1632) and Hume (1739). An
overview of more recent philosophical thoughts about causation and
conditionals can be found in Sosa (1975). In this thesis, causality will
be studied because causal relations are central to the understanding of
discourse. Linguistic recognition as well as recognition of real world
knowledge will be analyzed, in order to explain how causality is ex-
pressed in a coherence relation.
Coherence relations may be divided in two groups, according to
Kehler (1994): common topic and coherent situation relations. Asher
(1993) makes a distinction between structural and non-structural re-
lations. Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1992) distinguish additive
from causal relations. These distinctions are very similar: coherent
situation, non-structural and causal relations are the same kind of co-
herence relations. In this thesis, it will be assumed that this group is
characterized by the property of expressing causality (below, the other
group will be characterized). By making a detailed analysis of how
causality in coherence relations is recognized, this thesis contributes to
the study of discourse coherence.
This thesis will give a detailed analysis of connectives that express
causality. In the example treated above, using toch wel gave rise to the
same coherence relation as using although in (1). The expectation that
was denied can be regarded as a causal relation between a proposition
derived from the although clause and the negation of a proposition de-
rived from the main clause. Although is thus regarded as expressing
both causality and contrast. Besides although, causal connectives like
because will be analyzed.
The Dutch toch wel in the example above, needed a translation in
English with a connective: but there is. In studies of discourse coherence
or intentions in discourse, adverbs and connectives are often regarded
as markers of coherence: they are called cue phrases (e.g. Grosz and Sid-
ner, 1986) or discourse markers (e.g. Schiffrin, 1987). Redeker (1990,
p. 372) claims that discourse markers need to be defined functionally:
a discourse marker is a linguistic expression that is used to signal the rela-
tion of an utterance to the immediate context. In this thesis, the choice
is made to select one grammatical class, namely connectives. The re-
lation of utterances containing these connectives with the immediate
context will be analyzed linguistically. This relation is characterized by
the lexical meaning of connectives. The analysis of connectives might
have consequences for the lexical meaning of adverbs, but it will not
be a topic of this thesis. More descriptive analyzes of connectives and
adverbs can be found in Knott (1995); Degand (1996).
In order to define lexical meaning of connectives, formal semantic
approaches will be studied. In the end, definitions will be proposed
that make use of several developments in discourse theory and logic. It
has been claimed that but has a conventional implicature (e.g. Grice,
1975; Gamut, 1982b). Here, the claim will be made that connectives
like although bear presuppositions in the form of an implication. In the
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past years, theories of presupposition have been developed into more
discourse oriented theories (Gazdar, 1979; Heim, 1982; Van der Sandt,
1982; Geurts, 1995; Beaver, 1995). The definitions proposed here will
profit from this development. These definitions could be formulated
thanks to the development of a theory of non-monotonic logic (Asher
and Morreau, 1991).
If a detailed analysis of lexical meaning of connectives is possi-
ble, the relation between connectives and coherence needs to be well-
defined. The meaning of causal and contrastive connectives has been
analyzed by, amongst others, Lakoff (1971), Van Dijk (1977), Ko¨nig
(1986), Sidiropoulou (1992) and Kehler (1994). They did not relate
their analysis to analyzes of coherence relations that were inferred on
other grounds than the presence of a connective. Hobbs (1985), Mann
and Thompson (1988) and Sanders et al. (1992) do not use connec-
tives in their definitions of coherence relations. It is correct to leave
connectives out of the definitions of coherence relations, for most co-
herence relations can be inferred without lexical marking. There is an
omission in both the study of connectives and the study of coherence:
it has not been investigated whether or not the use of a connective
makes a difference in the way the inference of a coherence relation
is made. A formal and restricted approach of inferring coherence re-
lations is defined in the work of Lascarides and Asher (e.g., Lacarides
& Asher, 1991; Asher, 1993; Lascarides, Copestake & Briscoe, 1996).
They pay special attention to the relations between the inference of
coherence, and relations between lexical items in the lexicon. But in
these publications, lexical meaning of connectives is not defined. By
defining lexical meaning of connectives, it will become possible to de-
fine the difference between coherence with and without explicit lexical
marking by connectives. The procedure of inferring a relation between
associated lexical items in the lexicon by using connectives is different
from the procedure that is proposed for inferring a relation between
associated lexical items without using connectives.
In studies of the creation of discourse structure, the group of ad-
ditive, common topic, or structural relations is characterized by the
systematic way a topic of discourse is enriched with new information
every time a new sentence enters the discourse. This group of relations
is studied especially by researchers trying to give a formal and restrictive
account of the incremental update of information in small pieces of dis-
course (Pru¨st, 1992; Asher, 1993; Sanders and van Wijk, 1996; Schilper-
oord, 1996). The causal, coherent situation or non-structural group is
analyzed by researchers studying representations of narrative discourse
(e.g. Trabasso and Van den Broek, 1985; Van den Broek, 1994). The
main differences between both approaches is that the former tries to
come to a linguistic analysis of discourse representation, while the lat-
ter tries to give a psycholinguistic analysis of a mental representation of
the discourse. In this thesis, insights from the psycholinguistic study of
causality in discourse will be added to the linguistic study of discourse
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representation.
In this thesis, causal relations will be studied in the framework of a
formal and restrictive discourse structure theory (namely, Pru¨st, 1992).
Non-causal relations are often characterized by updating a topic with
every new sentence; causal relations do not seem to be strictly follow-
ing a topic update strategy. What effect causal relations do have on
discourse structure, has not been established yet. The effect of causal
relations on discourse structure will be investigated with the help of
so called propositional anaphors. Since discourse structure determines
possible antecedents for anaphors that refer to propositions in their
context, this phenomenon can be used as an instrument for detecting
discourse structure.
In sum, it is the purpose of this thesis to give an analysis of the lex-
ical meaning of causal or contrastive connectives in terms of presup-
positions, resulting in a definition of the inference of coherence using
causal connectives, and an analysis of the effect of causal coherence
on discourse structure, appearing from the reference of propositional
anaphors. The central question in this thesis will be:
how does lexical meaning of causal connectives affect discourse
coherence and structure?
The answer consists of several steps. First, an analysis is given of causal
and contrastive interpretation of connectives, in terms of the coher-
ence relations they express. Secondly, lexical meaning of a causal or
contrastive connective is analyzed as invoking a presupposition in the
form of an implication. Thirdly, causal coherence is derived differently
using causal connectives: causal connectives check lexical knowledge,
in order to derive a coherence relation. Fourthly, causal coherence re-
lations have a different effect on discourse structure than additive rela-
tions.
1.2 Research questions
In this section, four questions will be formulated concerning the anal-
ysis of lexical meaning of connectives, coherence and discourse struc-
ture.
The first question concerns the description of causal coherence re-
lations. A systematic account of a naturally defined group of causal
connectives seems to be difficult. Hovy (1990) estimates that approx-
imately 350 coherence relations have been defined in the literature.
There are a lot of coherence relations that may be identified with each
other, because they cover the same phenomena (for instance, Purpose
and Goal-Instrument refer to the same relations). But also different
coherence relations may share a property, for instance the property
of causality. A study of the interpretation of causal connectives may
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give the possibility to find shared properties of coherence relations.
Sweetser (1990) identifies a group of connectives that might be consid-
ered causal, but within this group, different interpretations of causal
connectives arise. Causal connectives can be interpreted as content,
epistemic or speech act. These interpretations can be connected with a
theory of properties shared between relations, namely Sanders, Spooren
and Noordman (1992,1993). They define a classification, or taxonomy,
of coherence relations. Four properties, called cognitive primitives,
characterize coherence relations. One of those primitives is the Basic
Operation: the coherence relation is either causal or additive. Another
primitive is the Source of Coherence: the relation is either semantic
or pragmatic. Semantic interpretation is identified with content; prag-
matic interpretation is identified with both epistemic and speech act
interpretation (Sanders et al., 1993). The primitive of Polarity defines
either a contrast or a positive relation. The primitive Order (non-basic
or basic) is only applied to causal relations. As a result, 12 classes are
distinguished by four two valued primitives. This makes it possible to
refer to a class of ‘causal relations’, including contrastive causal rela-
tions (like the one in (1)), consisting of well-defined sub-classes.
Given the taxonomy of Sanders et al. (1992), it is possible to gen-
eralize over groups of coherence relations in a systematic way. One
might, however, question the accuracy of some of the distinctions. Is
the cognitive primitive Source of Coherence specific enough, or should
epistemic and speech act interpretations be distinguished? A second
question concerns the precise classification of some coherence rela-
tions: is a contrastive relation like Concessive opposition pragmatic?
Is it causal or additive? A third question relates to the criteria used
for the assignment of some relational property to the mental repre-
sentation. A relation is causal if the mental representation contains a
causal relation. This is determined by knowledge of the world. How
is this knowledge of the world characterized? These questions may be
summarized as: what interpretations of causal or contrastive relations
should be distinguished?
The second question zooms in on a detailed analysis of the linguis-
tic properties of the interpretation of connectives, in order to explain
their different interpretations distinguished in the answer of the first
question. A detailed linguistic analysis of the interpretation of causal
connectives explains how causal coherence is realized by causal con-
nectives. The second question is: how is lexical meaning of causal
connectives represented?
The third question is based on the fact that causal connectives are
not needed to infer a causal relation. The reason why it is generally
assumed that a causal coherence relation is only indicated, instead of
fully determined, by connectives like because, is that coherence rela-
tions may be inferred without connectives. In (2), a causal relation is
expressed.
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(2) Theo was exhausted. He had run to the university.
Sanders et al. (1992) define a coherence relation between two utter-
ances as follows. The term ‘coherence relation’ is taken from Hobbs
(1979).
A coherence relation is an aspect of meaning of two or more
discourse segments that cannot be described in terms of the
meaning of the segments in isolation. In other words, it
is because of this coherence relation that the meaning of
two discourse segments is more than the sum of the parts
(Sanders et al., 1992, p. 2)
It is generally assumed that the coherence relation in (1) is indicated by
although. On the other hand, a coherence relation is defined as being
more than the sum of the parts. This ‘extra’ meaning is derived from the
contents of two related sentences, or it is indicated by a connective.
Is there a difference between these two ways of obtaining the extra
meaning?
The inference of coherence relations without linguistic indication
has been studied in a formal and restrictive way in the approach initi-
ated in Lascarides and Asher (1991). They try to show that a coherence
relation, whether or not expressed by a connective, comes forth sys-
tematically out of the propositional meaning in two related clauses.
Some combinations of words lead to causal relations, other combina-
tions do not. In (2), the meaning of the word exhausted may be associ-
ated causally with the meaning of run. This way of inferring coherence
is quite complex, and it needs a lexicon in which those relations can
be specified. It would be easier if the causal relation were given. In
that case, the meanings of the words can be adjusted to the causal re-
lation. This is possible using a connective. The third research question
is thus defined as: how is lexical knowledge exploited when a causal
connective is used to indicate causal coherence?
The fourth question concerns discourse structure. A central prob-
lem in the study of discourse structure is how anaphors find their an-
tecedents in context. Much attention has been paid, in formal theo-
ries, to anaphors with a nominal antecedent (Kamp and Reyle, 1993;
Muskens, 1996). The presupposition theory of Van der Sandt (1982) is
also a theory of the nominal antecedents of definite descriptions.
In Maes (1991) and Givo´n (1992), very detailed analyzes of sorts of
nominal anaphors are given. Less attention has been paid to anaphors
that have a concept, proposition, event, situation or state as an an-
tecedent. Deictic pronouns (Webber, 1991), some VP anaphors (Pru¨st,
1992), abstract object anaphors (Asher, 1993) and situation anaphors
(Fraurud, 1992) have in common the property that their antecedent
is not a specific linguistic element in the context, but some represen-
tation of a part of the information that is gathered by the context.
Discourse theories like the Linguistic Discourse Model (Polanyi, 1988;
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Pru¨st, Scha & Van den Berg, 1994) try to explain the construction of
the antecedent representations. Relational coherence plays a role in
this construction. The role of additive relations has been described,
but the role of causal and contrastive relations has not received much
attention (except for the analysis of Contrast in Asher, 1993). By study-
ing the effect of causal relations on the formation of representations of
antecedents, discourse structure will be better understood. The fourth
research question is: how do causal relations affect discourse structure?
In sum, the research questions are:
1. what interpretations of causal or contrastive relations should be
distinguished?
2. how is lexical meaning of causal connectives represented?
3. how is lexical knowledge exploited when a causal connective is
used to indicate causal coherence?
4. how do causal relations affect discourse structure?
To give a first impression of the type of answers the reader may expect
in this thesis, a rough outline will be given of the answers and the way
they connect to the central question.
The answer to the first question defines the types of interpretations
causal connectives express. The interpretations of the connectives dis-
cussed in chapter 2 are, in general, recognized as coherence relations
indicated by connectives. These interpretations need to be reflected
in the answer to the second question, where an analysis in terms of
presuppositions will represent the lexical meaning of causal connec-
tives. Given the lexical meaning of connectives, the answer to the
third question will be that there is a difference in inference of coher-
ence relations when connectives are present or absent. This difference
did not play a role in the answer to the first question, but the answer to
the second question predicts that the relation between causal connec-
tives and coherence relations is more specific than just assuming that
connectives indicate coherence. The difference is especially found in
the interaction between the propositional contents of an utterance and
the way in which lexical meanings from the utterance are combined in
the lexicon. Without connectives, causality must be derived from the
way lexical items are used in the sentences, and by application of world
knowledge; using causal connectives, the causal relation is already indi-
cated, and interpretations of lexical items are selected according to the
causal relation. The answer to the fourth question is that a causal rela-
tion changes the possibilities for propositional anaphors to refer to an
antecedent that has been constructed in the context. Having answered
these questions, the central question can be answered: lexical mean-
ing of causal connectives affects discourse coherence using presuppo-
sitions, and causal coherence relations affect discourse structure, by
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having another effect on antecedents of propositional anaphors than
additive coherence relations.
An approach of discourse analysis that did not receive attention in this
chapter, but will return in several chapters as complementary, is dis-
course analysis on the basis of argumentation (e.g. Ducrot, 1980; Van
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992). Argumentation takes standpoints of
speakers (or argumentative orientation) as a starting point of the anal-
ysis. In the analyses performed in the chapters 3 and 5, argumentative
orientation will be taken as pragmatic manipulations of the proposed
representations. For a good understanding of discourse processes, the
analysis of argumentative orientation is indispensable. It did not fit in
the scope of this thesis, however.
Question 1 is answered in chapter 2, where the linguistic description
of connectives in Sweetser (1990) will be taken as a starting point in
the description of different relations, in order to compare them with
the distinctions made in the classification of Sanders et al. (1992).
Question 2 is answered in chapter 3, which gives an analysis of the
lexical semantics of causal connectives. This chapter is an extension
of the analysis in Lagerwerf and Oversteegen (1994). Question 3 is an-
swered in chapter 4, where the lexical theory of Lascarides, Copestake
& Briscoe (1996) is used to analyze the effect of causal connectives on
the inference of coherence relations using the lexicon. Question 4 is
answered in chapter 5, where the Linguistic Discourse Model (Polanyi,
1988; Pru¨st et al., 1994) will be used to show the effect of causal coher-
ence in discourse structure. This chapter is an extension of Lagerwerf
(1996).
Chapter 2
Causal and contrastive
relations
2.1 Introduction
In De Volkskrant, a Dutch newspaper, the example in (1) was found
in an obituary of Greta Garbo.1 First, the preceding context is given,
accompanied by a glossed translation. The sentence under discussion
is presented next, accompanied by a word by word translation.
(1) Zij was al een legende tijdens haar leven en haar mythe groeide
door haar volstrekt geı¨soleerde bestaan in een flat te New York.
In 1951 werd zij Amerikaans staatsburger, drie jaar later kreeg zij
een ere-Oscar.
‘She was already a legend during her life and her myth grew by
her completely isolated existence in a New York apartment. In
1951 she became an American citizen, three years later she
received an Oscar of honour.’
Hoewel
Although
Greta
Greta
Garbo
Garbo
de
the
maatstaf
yardstick
werd
was
genoemd
called
van
of
schoonheid,
beauty,
is
has
zij
she
nooit
never
getrouwd
married
geweest.
(been.)
The sentence of the film critic who wrote the obituary did not just
express an assertion, according to some readers. Several letters were
sent in, blaming him for implying that beautiful women will always
marry. Peculiarly, none of them allowed for the possibility that this
was just their interpretation, although it is not explicitly stated in the
text.
The reason why readers noticed that implicit information was con-
veyed in (1), was the unacceptability of this information. An implicit
1The image of the newspaper might be compared to The Guardian and/or The New
York Times, and the Spanish El Pais. This example was found in the edition of April
17th, 1990 (taken from Sanders et al., 1993).
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statement like ‘if a woman is beautiful, she will marry’, is not unani-
mously shared among readers of the newspaper. With respect to the
sentence in (1), however, readers should accept this implicit statement
together with the understanding of the assertion itself. Reversely, read-
ers assumed that the writer was inviting them to accept the implicit
statement as common knowledge. This made them angry enough to
send in letters to the newspaper.
Another connective capable of conveying implicit information in
the same way, is maar (‘but’). In a television news programme, (2) was
uttered.2
(2) The Artist Formerly Known as Prince is gisteren in zijn
woonplaats getrouwd.
The Artist Formerly Known as Prince was married yesterday at
his residence.
Prince
Prince
heeft
has
vele
many
liefdes
love-affairs
gehad,
had,
maar
but
is
has
nog
yet
nooit
never
getrouwd
married
geweest.
(been.)
The implicit information conveyed in (2b) is: ‘if a man has had many
love-affairs, he will have been married.’ Also in this case, the implicit
information is noticed because it is not widely accepted that having
many love-affaires leads to marriage.3
The fact that the use of hoewel in (1) or maar in (2) is annoying
people, gives reason to believe that something went wrong in the co-
operation between writer and reader. In other words, the Cooperative
Principle (Grice, 1975) seems to be violated. This principle consists of
maxims of good conversation. Whenever a maxim is violated, a con-
versational implicature might repair it. When conversational implica-
tures do not work, the Cooperative Principle allows for a reinterpreta-
tion of what has been said: it might have been irony or metaphor.4
This is not the case here. Still, it should be possible to identify a viola-
tion of one of Grice’s maxims, and explain why it has not been repaired
in some way or another.
Maxims of the Cooperative Principle are applied to what has been
stated in the utterance, according to Grice’s (1975) definition of ‘say-
ing’.5 Given this definition, no information is missing in what has been
2Veronica Nieuwslijn Variety, February 15th, 1996.
3In (2), a concessive interpretation is possible too. This interpretation will be dis-
cussed in section 2.3.
4In chapter 3, Grice’s theory will be treated in more detail. The Cooperative Princi-
ple and its maxims are given in chapter 3, section (3.1).
5Cf. Grice (1975, p. 44-45): what someone has said is closely related to the conven-
tional meaning of the words (the sentence) that have been uttered. In his example: He
is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, the speaker has committed himself, by virtue of
the meaning of the words, that his being brave follows from his being an Englishman.
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said in(1), the writer is not saying what he believes to be false, nor does
he lack evidence for what he has said (Greta Garbo was beautiful, and
she did not marry - cf. footnote 5). What was said in (1) is not obscure,
ambiguous, prolix or disorderly. This means that the maxims appear
to have been obeyed. Consequently, no conversational implicature has
been invoked. So, it is unexplained why the Cooperative Principle is
violated.
A speculative answer to this problem might be the following. An-
noyance is caused by the circumstance that the statement ‘beautiful
women will marry’ is treated as if it were old information: information
that is part of the knowledge shared between writer and reader. This
implicit information is necessarily part of this shared knowledge, since
it has to have been accepted in order to accept the assertion made in
the utterance. Readers will notice that information has become avail-
able, for which the writer does not present evidence (namely, ‘beauti-
ful women marry’). However, they can not dismiss this information by
applying some conversational implicature, because it is treated as if it
were already old (or: given). So, the dubious prejudice will be noticed,
and readers will be affronted by it, but they can not change it.
Following Grice’s (1975) line of reasoning, the acceptance of the
implicit information in (1) and (2) has been realized by conventional
implicature. Although and but, and their Dutch counterparts hoewel and
maar, have a conventional implicature, that takes the implicit informa-
tion from the connected clauses, and turns it into shared knowledge.
It is interesting to know that Grice indeed assumes the existence of a
conventional implicature for but, although this specific analysis is not
his.
In chapter 3 of this thesis, the idea of a conventional implicature
(or, as will be argued: presupposition) for but and although will be
worked out and extended to a restricted set of connectives. Before the
motivation for this idea can be given, the interpretations of causal or
contrastive relations should be described specifically, in answer to the
first research question given in chapter 1. Meaning aspects of connec-
tives are analyzed in order to prepare for a detailed proposal in the
next chapter. In recent literature, the meaning of connectives, and
their discourse functions, have been described in detail. The analyses
of Sweetser (1990) and Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1992,1993)
will be taken as a starting point.
Sweetser (1990) has argued for an analysis of connectives as polyse-
mous lexical items. She distinguishes three domains of interpretation,
when a connective is used: a content domain, an epistemic domain,
and a speech act domain. The application of these distinctions will be
discussed below.
But the speaker only said that he is an Englishman, and he is brave. In other words,
the conventional implicature of therefore does not belong to what has been SA ID (while
conventional meaning does). In chapter 3, sections 3.5 and 3.9, analyzes of because
and so are given, from which the analysis of therefore can easily be derived.
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A connective often gives expression to a coherence relation. San-
ders, Spooren & Noordman (1992), already introduced in chapter 1,
define four specific features of coherence relations in such a way that
a taxonomy of relations can be made systematically, by assigning each
feature a positive or negative value. Thus, sets of coherence relations,
sharing specific feature values can be created. Sanders et al. (1992) have
called the features ‘cognitive primitives’. In determining a coherence
relation between two text segments, this relation is either:
1. additive or causal,
2. negative or positive,
3. representing its segments in basic order or not,
4. semantic or pragmatic.
When all four choices have been made, a coherence relation is identi-
fied. The combination of all possible feature values results in the defi-
nition of twelve coherence relations.6 These systematic definitions can
express coherence relations easily. For instance, it follows from the def-
inition that there should be contrastive additive, as well as contrastive
causal relations, and not just a set of independently defined contrastive
relations. Familiarity between coherence relations is now represented
in a well-defined taxonomy.
Sweetser’s (1990) interpretations of connectives in the content do-
main would correspond to coherence relations with the feature value
‘semantic’ in Sanders et al. (1992). Her interpretations in the epistemic
and the speech act domain would both correspond to the feature value
‘pragmatic’. This correspondence raises the question how epistemic,
speech act and pragmatic interpretation are related. On which resem-
blance between epistemic and speech act domain does the definition
of the pragmatic feature rely? How relevant are their differences to as-
signment of the pragmatic feature value? Does the difference between
interpreting connectives (Sweetser, 1990) and interpreting coherence
relations justify mapping of interpretations in two domains onto one
feature value? These questions will lead, in section 2.2, to more specific
definitions of epistemic and speech act interpretation of connectives,
resulting in a clear relation between these two interpretations and a
definition of the pragmatic feature.
Contrastive relations, expressed by but or although, have the value
‘negative’ in the framework of Sanders et al. (1992). Their taxonomy
expresses that negative relations may be either additive or causal, and
either semantic or pragmatic (basic order will be left out of the dis-
cussion, at this point). This means, that it should be possible to find
6Four features having two values should give, mathematically, sixteen possible re-
lations. Sanders et al. (1992) define only twelve relations, since additive relations are
indetermined for their order.
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four different relations expressing contrast, which should correspond
to the characteristics that have been given. It will not be difficult to
find more than four interpretations of contrast in the literature, but an
analysis of those relations in terms of Sanders et al. (1992) might be
quite complicated. In section 2.3, an attempt is made to come to such
an analysis
A problem, not directly related to Sanders et al. (1992), arises when
the coherence relations are related to meanings of connectives. In spe-
cific contexts, the determination of the interpretations may be differ-
ent. Are there differences between although and but in the kind of in-
terpretation that they may support? A discussion of this problem will
also be given in section 2.3.
How causal relations are accepted, is a difficult problem, even when
they are indicated by causal connectives. To accept a causal relation,
one has to refer to causal knowledge, but it is difficult to define or de-
scribe causal knowledge. And yet, language users use causal knowledge
to make correct interpretations of connected clauses. Why is (3a) ac-
ceptable, but not (3b)?
(3) a. Greta never married, because she wanted to be left alone.
b. ?Greta never married, because she wanted to have children.
In sentence (3a), a causal relation is accepted between wanting to be left
alone, and not marrying. In (3b), a causal relation between wanting to
have children, and not marrying is not accepted. But the (non) accep-
tance of these relations does not seem to be well-motivated. You can be
left alone within a marriage, if you want to, so that is not a complete
motivation for not marrying. Reversely, you do not need to be married
to have children, so that would make the inference of some other re-
lation possible. The problem is solved when a list of ‘accepted causes’
and ‘not-accepted causes’ is made. However, this would become quite a
list. Moreover, the list would be different on any occasion, depending
on context and circumstances. This will be explained in section 2.4,
where definitions will be formulated that make a distinction between
causal and non-causal relations.
2.2 Epistemic and speech act interpretation
2.2.1 Epistemic interpretation
Sweetser (1990) analyzes connectives as polysemous lexical items.7 In
general, connectives can be interpreted in three ways, exemplified in
7In this section, systemic functional literature like Halliday (1985) and Martin
(1992) is not discussed. Their distinction between ideational, interpersonal and tex-
tual interpretation relates to the same phenomena, however. Since the aim of the
next chapter is to motivate a formal semantic proposal from a cognitive point of view,
this distinction will be disregarded. See Oversteegen (1995) and Degand (1996) for an
analysis of causal connectives in systemic functional terms.
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(4) (taken from Sweetser, 1990, p.77).
(4) a. John came back because he loved her.
b. John loved her, because he came back.
c. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on.
The example in (4a) is, according to Sweetser (1990), an interpretation
in (what she calls) the content domain, which means that the rela-
tion refers to real-world causality. Her example in (4b) is interpreted in
(what she calls) the epistemic domain, which means that the relation is
one of observation and conclusion, rather than a real-world causality.
The example in (4c) refers to (what she calls) the speech act domain,
which means that the relation is between a speech act and the speaker’s
justification or motivation for performing this speech act.
The three domains mentioned here are conceptual domains. Sweet-
ser (1990) claims that these domains should be regarded as metaphor-
ical domains (like the complex conceptual metaphors in Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980): use of a conjunction in a domain different from the
content domain is metaphorical use of that conjunction.8 This meta-
phorical use is rarely noticed, because metaphorical use of conjunction
has been conventionalized, in due course. This is why Sweetser (1990)
speaks of polysemous meanings of connectives.
The content domain is a mental internal model of the sociophysi-
cal world; the epistemic domain is a world of reasoning processes. The
conjunction in (4b) must be interpreted with respect to reasoning pro-
cesses instead of real world causality. The epistemic domain contains
premisses and conclusions, and relations between them. The conjunc-
tion in (4c) must be interpreted in a domain that contains speech acts
and qualifications, justifications or motivations of speech acts. This
framework, presented in Sweetser (1990), is not adopted in the analy-
sis presented below. However, the intuition that the interpretations of
(4a-c) are semantically related, and that they refer to different levels of
interpretation, will be shared with Sweetser (1990).
The different readings in (4) can be distinguished by means of para-
phrase. Sweetser’s (1990) paraphrases look like the paraphrases in (5).9
(5) a. The fact that he loved her caused the fact that John came back.
b. From the fact that he came back, I conclude that John loved
her.
c. I ask what you are doing tonight, because I want to suggest
that we go to this good movie.
8Sweetser’s (1990) analysis may also be stated in terms of Fauconnier’s (1985) men-
tal spaces (cf. Sweetser, 1990, p. 74).
9Sweetser (1990) does not introduce a uniform procedural way of paraphrasing the
utterances. In (5a) and (5b) the paraphrase is made conform a (simple) systematic pro-
cedure, which is completely consistent with Sweetser’s paraphrases. (5c) is Sweetser’s
paraphrase.
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In (5a), it has been made explicit that two facts are interpreted in the
content domain. In (5b), a conclusion is explicitly drawn from a fact:
this means that (4b) should be interpreted in the epistemic domain. In
(5c), a speech act (I ask) has been made explicit, together with a mo-
tivation for performing that speech act, which means that (4c) should
be interpreted in the speech act domain.
Sanders et al. (1992) define semantic and pragmatic interpretation
in relation to locutionary and illocutionary meaning. Only a connec-
tion between two locutionary meanings can have the feature value ‘se-
mantic’. Whenever illocutionary meaning is expressed in one clause or
in both clauses, the feature value is set to ‘pragmatic’. The paraphrase
in (5a) establishes a relation between two facts. This can be interpreted
as relating two locutionary meanings. Therefore, the relation in (4a) is
semantic. In (5b), a fact is related to a conclusion. This can be indi-
cated as connecting locutionary meaning with illocutionary meaning.
Therefore, the relation in (4b) is pragmatic. In (5c), a speech act (I ask)
is connected with some inference of what has been said in the because
clause of (4c). This may be interpreted as connecting two illocutionary
meanings. Therefore, the relation in (4c)is pragmatic.
Whereas Sanders et al. (1992) assign the coherence relations in both
(5b) and (5c) as pragmatic, Sweetser (1990) is interpreting the connec-
tive in (5b) epistemically and the connective in (5c) in the speech act
domain. These choices are in agreement with each other: concluding
from facts, as well as motivating speech acts may be seen as illocution-
ary meaning.
Not all cases are clear, however. For instance, it is not always obvi-
ous why connectives are interpreted as epistemic, rather than semantic.
The differences in paraphrase between (5a) on the one hand, and (5b)
and (5c) on the other, are quite clear. But looking back at (4a-c), the
difference between (4a) and (4b) seems to be rather small. Which prop-
erties of the utterances in (4a/b) make the difference? Sweetser (1990,
p.77) says:
Example [(4b)] does not most naturally mean that the return
caused the love in the real world; in fact, under the most rea-
sonable interpretation, the real-world connection could still
be the one in [(4a)], though not necessarily. Rather [(4b)] is
normally understood as meaning that the speaker’s knowl-
edge of John’s return (as a premise) causes the conclusion that
John loved her.
The discriminating factor between the interpretation of (4a) and (4b)
seems to be the way in which the real-world connection is established.
When this connection is possible between the contents of both propo-
sitions, it is a content interpretation; When it is impossible between
the contents of the propositions, it is an epistemic interpretation.
In (4b), the comma represents a difference in intonation that marks
the epistemic interpretation, so the difference between content and
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epistemic interpretation is marked explicitly. The relation with a real-
world connection is not established between the propositions them-
selves.
The example in (4b) gives rise to two questions concerning epis-
temic interpretation:
1. Is it sufficient to make a lack of real-world connection between
the propositions decisive for epistemic interpretation?
2. How are real-world connections involved in epistemic relations?
With respect to the first question: other aspects of the interpretation of
the utterance play a role too. It appears to be possible to have context
change the acceptance of a real-world connection, even if the utterance
remains the same. Consider, for instance, (6).
(6) a. When the whole family is together, you can see how different
we are. Bill is always funny. John is shy, because he blushes very
quickly.
b. Some bodily reactions can have nasty effects on people. For
example, John is shy because he blushes very quickly.
In (6a), context determines (especially through the presentation of how
different we are as a conclusion) that a justification for a conclusion is
presented. In that case, an interpretation like ‘from the fact that John
blushes very quickly, I conclude that he is shy’ is more likely than an
interpretation like ‘The fact that John blushes very quickly causes the
fact that he is shy’. So, in (6a), epistemic interpretation is preferred.
In (6b), the sentence in italics is exemplifying the general statement
in the preceding sentence. Here, the interpretation ‘The fact that John
blushes very quickly causes the fact that he is shy’ is more likely. The
difference in context is determining the difference in interpretation
between (6a) and (6b). So, the combination of real world knowledge
and influence of the context determines the interpretation of a because-
conjunction as content or epistemic.
In (6a), a conclusion is drawn from an observation. The conclu-
sion, John is shy, is warranted because the observation, he blushes very
quickly, is relevant to the conclusion. There is some real-world connec-
tion needed between observation and conclusion: ‘if you are shy, you
blush very quickly’. If this real-world connection were missing, the
conclusion would not be validated, and the epistemic interpretation
on the basis of this real-world connection would be impossible.10
The real-world connection needed for the content interpretation of
(6b) is: ‘if you blush very quickly, you will become shy’. This is an
assumption that will be commonly accepted, just as its reversal given
above. The interpretation of (6b) is making use of this real-world con-
nection, instead of switching to an epistemic interpretation using the
10See also section 2.4, where a detailed analysis of real-world connection is given.
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other warrant. From the differences between (6a) and (6b), it can be
concluded that real world knowledge about the propositions in the sen-
tence is not directly responsible for the choice between epistemic and
content interpretations. Context controls the difference between the
two interpretations, rather than world knowledge related to a sentence
on its own.
The second question refers to a more fundamental problem con-
cerning epistemic interpretation. Suppose that some relation is estab-
lished by recognizing an observation-conclusion pattern, or by a lack of
real-world connection. Then, it still must be possible to find a causal re-
lation that supports the observation-conclusion relation. According to
Sanders et al. (1992), argument-claim or claim-argument relations are
causal, and a relation can not be causal unless there is some real-world
connection. In example (6a), the real-world connection appears to be
reversed to the real-world connection in (6b). The epistemic paraphrase
‘from the fact that John blushes very quickly, I conclude that he is shy’
can be made on the basis of the real-world connection that ‘if you are
shy, you blush very quickly’. The inferential derivation from the real-
world connection to the observation-conclusion is called ‘abduction’.
In (5b), the impossibility of a real-world connection when the relation
is read in a cause-effect interpretation, leads to a mapping from effect
to observation, and from cause to conclusion: the (unreal) cause ‘John
loved her’ and the (unreal) effect ‘John came back’ are turned into an
observation ‘John came back’ and a conclusion ‘John loved her’. This
abductive reasoning is invalid, but very common in normal life. It con-
nects epistemic interpretation to causal relations systematically.
Degand (1996) makes use of this proces of abduction when she de-
fines epistemic interpretation. The formulation P > Q refers to a defea-
sible implication between P and Q, the propositions between which a
(causal) coherence relation is supposed to hold.11
“(...) Given the fact that it is not valid to reason straightfor-
wardly from P > Q (...) to Q > P (...), the relation expressed
in [‘Theo was exhausted because he was gasping for breath’]
should be reinterpreted in a more restricted, subjective way.”
(Degand, 1996, p. 131).
The ‘more restricted, subjective way’ refers to an observation-conclusion
relation. So, Degand (1996) argues that the process of abduction is in-
herent to epistemic interpretation. To account for an interpretation
in a more restricted, subjective way, the speaker of the utterance is in-
volved in the interpretation of the utterance: it is the observer’s, hence
the speaker’s conclusion.
“It is the speaker who draws a conclusion expressed in the
main clause on the basis of a premise functioning as evi-
11See the chapter 3 in this thesis for an explanation of the use of >. Its definition is
taken from Asher and Morreau (1991).
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dence expressed in the subclause.” (ibid.).
This is the observation already made with respect to (6). The way De-
gand (1996) defines the speaker’s conclusion as a result of abductive
reasoning, introduces world knowledge again as the basis for epistemic
interpretation. However, this line of reasoning is only valid when all
epistemic interpretations are characterized by abduction. So, the ques-
tion is: is it true that only the abductive process indicates the speaker’s
restricted conclusion? Consider the example in (7).
(7) De
The
straat
street
wordt
is getting
nat,
wet,
want
because
het
it
regent.
is raining.
‘From the fact that it is raining, I conclude that the street is
getting wet.’
The paraphrase of the meaning of (7) is given after the English trans-
lation. It can be applied to the Dutch, as well as the English sentence.
One important difference is that Dutch want invites epistemic interpre-
tation, whereas English because does not have a preference for either
epistemic or content interpretation. When the paraphrase is correct,
it can not be related to a real-world connection by applying abduction
on what is expressed by the paraphrase in (7). For this would render
the real-world connection ‘if the street is getting wet, it is raining.’ Be-
sides the fact that this is a standard example of a connection that does
not hold in the real world, it is not the connection that has been used
interpreting (7): the speaker concludes that the street is getting wet on
the grounds that ‘if it is raining, the street is getting wet.’
So, it is not the abduction process that yields epistemic interpreta-
tion, but the speaker’s restriction on the consequence of the causal re-
lation between the propositions connected by the coherence relation.
In example (6), the restriction was indicated by context, and in the
Dutch example in (7), the connective want was indicating restricted in-
terpretation (also cf. Spooren and Jaspers, 1989; Oversteegen, 1995).
The English example in (7) shows that an utterance (especially out of
context) may be ambiguous between the two interpretations.12 Abduc-
tive reasoning is only possible in epistemic interpretation (but not the
other way around).
Spooren and Jaspers (1989) and Oversteegen (1995) claim that the
difference between Dutch epistemic want (‘because’) and content om-
dat (‘because’) interpretation is due to different perspectives. In an
epistemic interpretation, the conclusion is drawn by the speaker, on
the basis of an observation that may be shared by reader and speaker.
The speaker restricts the conclusion, by making himself responsible for
drawing the conclusion from the observation (hence, epistemic inter-
pretation may be called restricted interpretation: acceptance of the in-
terpretation of an utterance is not shared among all participants of the
12Of course, comma intonation makes an epistemic interpretation preferred in (7).
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discourse). The speaker’s conclusion in an epistemic interpretation is
in fact a perspectivized proposition. Its interpretation is restricted to
the speaker. This supports the idea that interpretation in the epistemic
domain amounts to interpretation in a part of the content domain, not
equally accessible for every participant of the discourse. In a content
interpretation, there is no difference in perspective of the two clauses:
two facts are presented as such. Interpretation in a content domain is
interpretation in a domain that is equally accessible for every partici-
pant of a discourse.13
There is another reason for taking restricted interpretation as a defin-
ing characteristic of epistemic interpretation. In Sweetser (1990), non-
causal connectives are considered to be interpreted in the epistemic
domain too. In Sanders et al. (1992), additive as well as causal relations
can be pragmatic, which suggests that non-causal coherence relations
can be interpreted epistemically. Abductive reasoning is not possible
when two propositions are connected by a non-causal coherence rela-
tion. Restricted interpretation, however, is still defining both causal
and non-causal epistemic coherence relations. This will be demon-
strated in section 2.3.
In the next chapter of this thesis, the difference between epistemic
and content interpretation will not be taken as a difference in kind of
domain, but as a different way of structuring one domain. The intro-
duction of a speaker’s conclusion makes it possible to allow for restrict-
ing the interpretation of the conclusion to parts of a domain, and not
the domain as a whole.
As epistemic interpretation identifies a speaker’s conclusion, illocu-
tionary meaning is expressed. Therefore, epistemic interpretation is
pragmatic rather than semantic.
A last remark on the speaker’s conclusion is that it is connected with
another discourse function: epistemic interpretation corresponds to ar-
gumentative use of an utterance. Not only is the speaker restricting the
scope of what he claims, he also indicates that it is his standpoint that
he wants to argue for. This aspect of the use of Dutch want and other
epistemic markers is analyzed in, among others, Houtlosser (1995).
2.2.2 Speech act interpretation
In this section, a defining characteristic for speech act interpretation
will be given in such a way that assignment of the value ‘pragmatic’
is accounted for. A problem is that Sweetser’s (1990) paraphrases ex-
pressing speech act interpretations do not seem to be connected with
the utterance in a predictable way. In (8a), Sweetser’s example, cited in
(4c), is repeated along with her paraphrase in (8b), already cited in (5c).
13Both Spooren and Jaspers (1989) and Oversteegen (1995) do not claim that omdat
may only be used in a content interpretation, nor do they claim that perspective shift
may only concern the main clause.
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(8) a. What are you doing tonight, because there’s a good movie on.
b. I ask what you are doing tonight, because I want to suggest
that we go and see this good movie.
Which parts of Sweetser’s (1990) paraphrase in (8b) provide defining
characteristics of interpretation in the speech act domain? The para-
phrase is making the speech act interpretation explicit: (8b) is inter-
preted in the content domain, and the differences between paraphrase
and utterance are indicative for speech act interpretation. In this case,
I ask and I want to suggest are possibly characteristic for speech act in-
terpretation.
The utterance what are you doing tonight in (8a) is embedded by I
ask in the paraphrase in (8b). Notice that the question form was al-
ready given in the utterance in (8a), by means of the interrogative what.
Marking the subclause with I want to suggest seems to indicate another
speech act. This is, however, not an essential part of the paraphrase.
Basically, it is enough to give the paraphrase the form: ‘I ask P, because
Q’. The explanation in because is now aimed at I ask, and not at the
content of the clause embedded in it. So, because Q is motivating the
speech act, and nothing more is needed for the recognition of a speech
act interpretation. The paraphrase in (8b) is complicated, because a lot
of other inferences were made explicit: that there’s a good movie on has
to be interpreted as an encouragement to go and see the movie is not
essential to the speech act interpretation. In fact, a speech act interpre-
tation will already be recognized by the paraphrase in (8c).
(8) c. I ask what you are doing tonight, because I have an alternative
(for it).
In (8c), a motivation of a speech act is made explicit. This is enough to
decide for an interpretation in the speech act domain.
A speech act interpretation is the only possibility in (8a). A ques-
tion beginning with what can not be answered directly with an answer
that should be interpreted as a cause in the content domain. This is
illustrated in (9).
(9) A: ‘What are you doing tonight?’
B: #‘Because I am going out for dinner’
Speaker B gives an infelicitous answer to the question of speaker A, due
to the occurrence of because in the answer. An interpretation of (9) as
if it were said by one speaker, would be impossible too, unless an in-
terpretation in the speech act domain were made. So, the interrogative
form is a clear indication of a speech act interpretation in (8a).
Besides the occurrence of I ask, there is another characteristic of
interpretation in the speech act domain in (8c). In the alternative para-
phrase given in (8c), for it is easily inserted, where it refers to the propo-
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sition expressed by the main clause. The main clause is used autony-
mously in the paraphrase.14. The autonymous use of the main clause
has as an effect that the main clause is motivated as a speech act, and
not as an assertion. In general, autonymy is a defining characteristic of
speech act interpretation. Quite often, an anaphoric reference to the
clause representing the speech act is present in the utterance itself. In
other cases, like (8c), it is possible to apply it to the paraphrase. The
because-clause is justifying the uttering of the main clause, taking the
main clause autonymously.
As for (8a), speech act interpretation is linguistically marked by the
question form of the main clause. In general, speech act interpretation
seems to be marked explicitly by linguistic clues like interrogative or
imperative form of the speech act. In her chapter 4, Sweetser (1990)
presents 24 examples of a speech act interpretation of a conjunction,
two of which are not explicitly marked. The marked ones are indi-
cated by either intonation (2), quotation (2), performative predicate or
phrase (3), interrogative form (7), imperative form (8). All nine exam-
ples of causal conjunction with speech act interpretation were explic-
itly marked.
The unmarked examples from Sweetser (1990) are presented in (10).
(10) a. King Tsin has great mu shu pork, but China First has good dim
sum.
b. George likes mu shu pork, but so do all linguists.
These Chinese food examples seem to indicate speech act interpreta-
tion only implicitly. In (10a), Sweetser (1990) observes an apparent self-
contradiction by the speaker, ‘who seems to be simultaneously propos-
ing two mutually exclusive options’. In (10b), Sweetser (1990) assumes
a clash of conversational implicatures. ‘I tell you that George likes mu
shu pork’ should be informative. This statement becomes uninforma-
tive if it is asserted that all linguists like mu shu pork. So, the contrast is
between speech act implicatures instead of facts. Sweetser (1990) calls
the proposing of mutually exclusive options, as well as the clashed con-
versational implicatures, ‘indirect speech acts of suggestion’.
The interpretation of (10) may be analyzed in an alternative way.
The utterance in (10a) might be an indirect answer to a question like:
‘which restaurant should we go to?’ This possibility indicates the inter-
pretation of a Concession. Concession is characterized by an inferred
proposition that serves as a direct answer to the question: ‘we should go
to China First’. The first part of (10a) represents an argument against,
and the second an argument in favor of this proposition (cf. Abraham,
14A constituent is used autonymously, when it is possible to use quotation marks for
the constituent, indicating that it does not have its usual grammatical function, but is
an object of conversation. De Jong, Oversteegen & Verkuijl (1988) analyze autonymy
as object language in a meta language expression.
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1979; Dascal and Katriel, 1977). The same analysis, which will be pre-
sented in section 2.3, may be applied to (10b). Since no speech act
will be identified in this analysis, (10a) and (10b) are not examples of
speech act interpretation. It will be argued that Concessions always
have an epistemic interpretation.
In the analysis of contrast in section 2.3, a proposition represent-
ing a conclusion might be found in ‘George has a peculiar taste’. The
first clause in (10b) is an argument in favour, and the second an argu-
ment against this proposition (unless all linguists share the property of
having a peculiar taste).
The two examples of unmarked speech act interpretations Sweetser
(1990) presents (in (10)), are not considered as speech act interpreta-
tions in the analysis adopted here. In her own analysis, they are ‘in-
direct speech acts of suggestion’, which seem to be rather weak speech
act interpretations.
Given this short inventory of Sweeter’s (1990) speech act exam-
ples.15, speech act interpretation seems to be marked obligatorily by ex-
plicit linguistic markers, like quotation of the speech act clause, a ques-
tion or imperative form of the speech act clause, performative predi-
cates, or intonation. In the paraphrase it will be possible to refer to
the speech act clause by means of an anaphor. In causal relations, the
speech act is always represented by the claim, whereas the motivation
of the speech act is always motivated by the argument.
Explicit clues do not include the ‘I tell you ...’ or ‘I ask...’ formu-
lation itself. In (11), the interpretation is content rather than speech
act.
(11) I say you are stupid, because you are.
The real-world connection that is at stake here, is one of justifying
speech acts: if someone is X, I may say that he is X.’ But because this
justification is explicit here, it is a ‘real-world justification’, and not
part of the speech act domain.
2.2.3 Conclusion
The definition of the pragmatic value of Sanders et al. (1992) encom-
passes both the definitions of epistemic interpretation and speech act
interpretation. In epistemic interpretation, a speaker’s conclusion is re-
stricting the interpretation to what the speaker believes to be true. This
indicates illocutionary meaning, and may thus be called pragmatic. In
speech act interpretation, a speech act is justified by taking one of the
clauses as the speech act, commenting on the speech act in the other
15The set of examples Sweetser (1990) provides is taken as canonical.
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clause. This also indicates illocutionary meaning, and thus the prag-
matic feature value.16
Despite the pragmatic value for both speech act and epistemic inter-
pretation, they differ considerably. Epistemic interpretation amounts
to the identification of the speaker’s conclusion. Markers for epistemic
interpretation are found in context or connective. What they mark is
the speaker’s position, c.q. a change of perspective. Epistemic interpre-
tation does occur in unmarked cases too: in that case, lack of an imme-
diate real-world connection may invoke abduction. This is only possi-
ble when a speaker’s restricted conclusion is derived. Epistemic markers
often indicate perspective, and their interpretation is argumentative.
Speech acts are explicitly marked. Mostly, one of the clauses is
marked as a speech act, by an interrogative or imperative form, or quo-
tation marks. In paraphrase, it is possible to embed this clause in a
speech act verb, which turns it into an autonymous clause, and refer to
it by means of an anaphor in the other clause. The speech act clause is
justified or motivated by the other clause.
In this thesis, speech act interpretations and epistemic interpreta-
tions will be treated differently. Because the (linguistic, contextual or
knowledge based) indication of these interpretations differs consider-
ably, a detailed semantic analysis of the connectives that express these
interpretations must represent these differences.
2.3 Three Kinds of Contrast
In this section, three kinds of contrast will be distinguished. In the
literature on the interpretation of but, there are more proposals than
just three. The most important proposals are listed below.17
 Denial of expectation (Lakoff, 1971)
 Semantic opposition (Lakoff, 1971)
 Concession (Abraham, 1975; Dascal and Katriel, 1977)
 Argumentative use (refutation) (Anscombre and Ducrot, 1977)
 Parallel contrast (Cohen, 1971; Blakemore, 1987)
 Rectification (Dascal and Katriel, 1977)
16On the other hand, Oversteegen (1997, p. 59) claims that from her perspective,
little can be gained by treating belief cases [i.e., epistemic interpretation] and speech act
cases as equivalent.
17In the bulleted list, each kind of interpretation is followed by the introductory
work on this interpretation. The cited authors do not exclusively choose for the in-
terpretation they are associated with: they introduced the interpretation next to other
interpretations. The names for the interpretations are not always the same as the orig-
inal ones.
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 Conversational marker (Schiffrin, 1987; Redeker, 1990)
From these interpretations, only the first three will be maintained in
the next chapters (following Spooren, 1989). The other interpretations
can be brought down to one of the first three, or they occur in types of
language use not studied in this thesis. Specifically, argumentative use
of but boils down to concession; parallel contrast may either be con-
cession or semantic opposition; rectification is a specific and restricted
use of contrast; the functional meaning aspect of conversational mark-
ers is referring to other meaning properties than those analyzed in this
chapter.
In each of the next three sections, one interpretation of but will
be introduced, next to other interpretations, and differences and re-
semblances will be discussed. Besides, epistemic interpretation of con-
trastive connectives will be analyzed, as well as causal interpretation of
some contrastive relations.
2.3.1 Denial of expectation
The utterance in (1) is what has been called a ‘denial of expectation’
(Lakoff, 1971). The sentence following although leads to an expecta-
tion: ‘if a woman is beautiful, she will marry’. This expectation is
denied by the second clause: ‘she never married’. Using hoewel, this in-
terpretation is preferred. There are occurrences of hoewel that support
other interpretations. At the same time, there are other connectives
and adverbs that may have a denial of expectation interpretation too.
For instance, in (2b), the use of maar/but denies the expectation that
‘having many love-affairs leads to marriage’.
Lakoff (1971) introduced denial of expectation by presenting dif-
ferent usages of but, and distinguishing between denial of expectation
and semantic opposition. A sentence like John is tall but he is no good at
basketball, ...is composed of an assertion plus a presupposition, and the
two functioning together are what condition the use of but. (Lakoff,
1971, p. 133). The conjunction as a whole is asserted, and the pre-
supposition is: if someone is tall, then one would expect him to be good at
basketball. (ibid.). No specifications are given for a procedure to for-
mulate the presupposition from the utterance. Lakoff (1971) presents
some problematic cases too, in which it is more difficult to formulate a
presupposition (e.g., in (12)).
Reactions to Lakoff’s (1971) proposal concerned her problematic ex-
amples that could neither be semantic opposition, nor denial of expec-
tation. A concessive interpretation of contrast was introduced (Abra-
ham, 1975). For instance, instead of accepting the implication that
‘having many love-affairs leads to marriage’ with respect to (2b), one
could also assume that Prince has had many love-affairs is an argument
in favor of the claim ‘Prince is looking for his true love’, whereas ‘he
never married’ is an argument against the claim ‘Prince is looking for
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his true love.’ The introduction of concessive interpretation makes it
possible to demarcate denial of expectation and other contrastive in-
terpretations more precisely. Concessions will be discussed in section
2.3.3, together with some examples that seem to be difficult to classify
as one or the other.
Lakoff (1971) analyzes as an apparent counterexample to her anal-
ysis, (12a) (taken from Lakoff, 1971, p.138).
(12) a. George likes Peking Duck, but all linguists are fond of Chinese
food.
b. I say to you that George likes Peking Duck, but I really don’t
have to say this, because all linguists are fond of Chinese food.
The paraphrase of (12a) in (12b) expresses that the contrastive rela-
tion is actually between speech acts, and that the but clause is violating
the expectation ‘if one says something, then it is worthwhile to say
it’. The clause all linguists are fond of Chinese food motivates the denial
of this expectation. However, Lakoff’s (1971) analysis is not in accor-
dance with the assumptions about speech act interpretation made in
this chapter. In section 2.2.2, it was argued that speech act interpreta-
tion is recognized because it is explicitly indicated, and that one clause
is interpreted as a speech act, whereas the other is justifying or gainsay-
ing it. In (12a), there is no explicit indication; in (12b), the denial is
itself motivated by the contents of the clause (introducing a second co-
herence relation by using because), whereas the contents of the second
clause should be gainsaying the speech act itself. In other words, the
derivation of (12b) involves too much inferences that are not directly
related to the utterance.
A concessive interpretation of the claim: ‘George has a peculiar
taste’ (‘George likes it, so he must have a peculiar taste’; ‘all linguists
do, so he does not have a peculiar taste’) would provide an alternative
interpretation for (12a), following quite strict interpretation schema.
Again, see the section on concession for an explanation of concessive
interpretation.
A reanalysis of (12a) as a concession has consequences for the anal-
ysis of denial of expectation: not only a denial of expectation and a
semantic opposition need to be distinguished. The interpretation of
concession accounts for some of the ‘odd’ examples in Lakoff (1971).
Given these three interpretations, the interpretation of denial of ex-
pectation may correspond more directly to the contents of the clauses
of the utterance. In (1), the expectation is an implication with an an-
tecedent derived from the first clause (Greta Garbo was called the yard-
stick of beauty is turned into ‘if a woman is beautiful’), and a consequent
derived from a denial of the second clause, (she never married is turned
into ‘she will marry’). When it is not possible to derive the expecta-
tion from the two connected clauses, another interpretation has to be
found. This means, that the ‘problematic’ examples such as (12) are
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not denials of expectation. The other interpretations have not been in-
troduced yet, so the discussion of problematic examples is postponed
to the next sections.
Sanders et al. (1992) apply their cognitive primitives to the repre-
sentation of propositions, derived from corresponding clauses in the
utterance. The expectation is reflected in this representation. The ex-
pectation relation itself is an implication: the expectation for (1) is ‘if
someone is called the yardstick of beauty, she will marry.’ This gives
the feature value ‘causal’ to a denial of expectation.
A denial of expectation has the feature value negative, since the
expectation is derived by negating one of the clauses in its utterance.
So, a denial of expectation is a negative causal relation, in terms of
Sanders et al. (1992).
Is a denial of expectation semantic or pragmatic? In (13), three
denials of expectation are presented. (13a) is adapted from Noordman
and Vonk (1992), (13b) is borrowed from Sweetser (1990) and (13c) is
adapted from Sanders et al. (1993).18
(13) a. Connors didn’t use Kevlar sails although he expected little wind.
b. Mary loves you very much, although you already know that.
c. Theo was not exhausted, although he was gasping for breath.
The adaptation of (13a) is the substitution of the original because
for although, with a negation added to the main clause. In the sentence
Connors used Kevlar sails because he expected little wind, the causal rela-
tionship is considered semantic. That is, even for people who do not
know of the properties of Kevlar sails, it will be assumed by most read-
ers that there is some content relation between kind of sail and type of
wind. In the although-case, this is the same: the relationship between
sails and winds will be causal as well. So, denials of expectation can be
negative causal semantic relations. Can they be pragmatic too? Two
cases are considered: speech act, and epistemic interpretation.
A speech act case is presented in (13b), taken from Sweetser (1990).
Instead of giving a justification of the uttering of the first clause of
(13b), although expresses the violation of such a justification. In para-
phrase, the expectation is: ‘if I say: “Mary loves you very much”, you
do not already know that’. Normally, one utters clauses to inform peo-
ple; in this case, Mary loves you very much is uninformative (as stated
in you already know that), but it is said anyway. So, the speech act vari-
ant of a denial of expectation is the violation of the justification of a
speech act. Notice that in the paraphrase, the phrase I say can be found,
as well as an anaphor referring to the clause that functions as speech
act (namely, that refers to “Mary loves you very much”).
(13c) is an adaptation of a because sentence again: Theo was ex-
hausted because he was gasping for breath (taken from Sanders et al.,
18Similar examples and argumentation are found in Lagerwerf and Oversteegen
(1994) and Oversteegen (1997).
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1993). This causal relation can only be interpreted epistemically. A
correct paraphrase of the because sentence would be: ‘From the fact
that someone is gasping for breath, I conclude that he is exhausted’.
This is also the expectation of (13c). The conclusion: he is exhausted is
denied in (13c). The connection in the world that has to be recognized
for a correct interpretation of the expectation, has to be: ‘if someone is
exhausted, he is gasping for breath’.
A denial of expectation is thus interpreted as negative, causal, and
either semantic or pragmatic. In the case of pragmatic interpretation,
speech act, as well as epistemic interpretation occur. Although-clauses
occur in front of the main clause or follow it, so the order of a denial of
expectation may be basic or non-basic (the order of the propositions in
the expectation is taken as basic). Denials of expectation expressed by
but are always basic in order, as the (denying) but-clause is always the
second clause. The conclusions drawn here for the English facts on but
and although are similar for Dutch maar and hoewel, respectively.
In the sections on semantic opposition and concession, the distinc-
tions between the interpretations will become more clear.
2.3.2 Semantic opposition
An example of semantic opposition is given in (14a) (in Dutch), and in
(14b) (in English).
(14) a. Greta was alleen, maar Prince was getrouwd.
b. Greta was single, but Prince was married.
Semantic opposition can be separated from the other interpretations
by using although instead of but, as is shown in (15).
(15) a. ?Hoewel Greta alleen was, was Prince getrouwd.
b. ?Although Greta was single, Prince was married.
Neither (15a) nor (15b) are acceptable, and it appears to be part of the
semantics of although that it is not possible to express a semantic oppo-
sition.
The main difference in interpretation between semantic opposition
and other contrastive interpretations, is that [s]emantic oppositions are
about two entities in the domain of discussion, and denials of expectation
and concessive oppositions are about one entity in the domain (Spooren,
1989, p. 56). The opposition between being single and being married is
predicated over two different arguments. This restriction predicts the
unacceptability of (16).
(16) #Greta was single, but she was married.
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Two predicates are applied to one argument in (16), which causes a
direct contradiction. However, it is not always contradiction that ex-
plains the unacceptability of a semantic opposition predicated of one
entity, as (17) shows.
(17) #Greta was lonely but she was alone.
Here, it would be a tautology instead of a contradiction. But this can
not be a logical tautology (analogous to the logical contradiction in
(16); Greta was lonely and she was alone is not unacceptable. The logical
meaning of but is a conjunction, and not a contrast. So, in a semantic
opposition, there must be a contrast, but it may not be a contradiction.
If two predicates are about one entity, it is difficult to meet such a
condition.
Blakemore (1987) claims that semantic incompatibility of the pred-
icates is not necessary for the contrast interpretation that is at stake
here. In the appropriate circumstances, chess and skiing could express
a semantic opposition, as shown in (18) (taken from Blakemore, 1987,
p. 132).
(18) Mary likes skiing. Anne plays chess.
Even without the use of but, a contrast can be inferred between the
activities of Mary and Anne. According to Blakemore (1987), a parallel
intonation pattern can be recognized in (18), giving emphasis to both
skiing and chess. This parallel intonation pattern is the same in the
examples (14)-(17). So, semantic contrast is dependent on an intona-
tion pattern that puts the two predicates next to each other, together
with the instruction to find some contrast between the predicates. It is
this instruction, that makes (16) and (17) unacceptable: because both
predicates apply to the same entity, the result of the contrast is con-
tradiction (in (16)), or it can not be found (in (17)). Because of the
intonation pattern, other interpretations are excluded.
In the introduction of this section, an interpretation ‘Parallel con-
trast’ was mentioned. In Asher (1993), the effects of Parallel contrast
on discourse structure are analyzed. He assumes that Contrast rela-
tions need a Parallel structure to derive contrast between discourse seg-
ments. Parallel structure, and parallel intonation are two sides of the
same coin. In order to achieve parallel intonation, predicates must be
parallel in constituent structure.
The properties of Parallel contrast and semantic opposition are in
fact the same. When two clauses connected by but are parallel, the in-
terpretation of the sentence needs to be semantic opposition. That is,
between predicates, a contrast is derived, and two parallel arguments
of the predicates may not refer to the same entity. Given these restric-
tions, the semantic oppositions in (19) can be accounted for.
(19) a. John is tall but Bill is small.
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b. On Mondays Mat plays volleyball but on Thursdays he plays
hockey (taken from Oversteegen, 1997).
c. It was Bill the boss fired, but it was John the boss hired.
In (19a), parallel intonation on the predicates tall and small makes
them contrastive, and John and Bill are referring to different entities.
In (19b), it is shown that other constituents than subjects or objects
can serve as the distinct entities. The contrastive predicates are applied
to the days on which Mat is performing his sport. Again, this effect is
in agreement with parallel intonation. In (19c), it is the focus position
of the cleft sentence that identifies the distinct entities Bill and John.
Notice that this structure is submitted to parallel intonation too.
Semantic opposition is associated with parallel contrast. This ex-
plains the problem of the unacceptability of (17). There is a parallel in-
tonation, so other interpretations are excluded, but Greta and she refer
to the same entities, which make the sentence unacceptable. Parallel
contrast does not explain the acceptability of (20), however.
(20) Greta was not lonely, but she was alone.
The interpretation of (20) is one of correction, rather than contrast be-
tween predicates. In the introduction, this interpretation was called
‘Rectification’. Dascal and Katriel (1977) introduce this corrective vari-
ant to account for the distribution of two Hebrew connectives, ela and
aval. Both connectives translate with English but. In (20), but is used
in the ela-sense, i.e. in a corrective use.
Corrective use of but is a specific construction, because the predi-
cate in the first clause needs to be denied. Normally, but has the truth
conditional meaning of the conjunct and: both conjuncts need to be
true. Here, both conjuncts are true, only because of the use of not in
the first conjunct. There always has to be an explicit lexical negation
in the first conjunct. The predicate lonely may not be applied to Greta,
since it is not true (which is corrected in the but clause), according to
the speaker.
Corrective use of but will not be analyzed in this thesis, because
it does not express a genuine coherence relation. The gap that the
negated predicate leaves in the interpretation of the sentence, is filled
with the other predicate. Once the sentence is interpreted its propo-
sitional content is just: ‘Greta is alone’. The relation is one between
predicates, rather than between clauses. Dascal and Katriel (1977) state
that the interpretation of ela is always made between the same layers
of meaning. When an utterance p ela q has been done,
p contains the denial of its focal element, and the focal ele-
ment in q is believed by the speaker to be a replacement for
the element denied in p. (Dascal and Katriel, 1977, p.171).
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The replacement of one focal element (the predicate) for the other, has
as a result that one proposition remains. As for the first constituents
(Greta and she), Dascal & Katriel (1977) propose that a presupposition in
the form of an existential statement ensures the interpretations of both
entities in the same domain for both propositions. The propositions are
thus structurally related. Again, this means that the sentence in (17) is,
in the end, expressing one proposition rather than a relation between
two propositions.
Semantic opposition is not a causal relation, for the derived proposi-
tions do not have a causal connection. The relation between the predi-
cates single and married may have implicational properties (‘If someone
is single, she is not married’). This knowledge is, however, only the
expression of an antonymous relation between predicates, not a causal
relation between propositions. In terms of Sanders et al. (1992), lack of
a causal relation between propositions means that a coherence relation
is additive.
As the term already indicates, semantic opposition is considered
semantic, rather than pragmatic. ‘Semantic’ in ‘semantic opposition’
refers to a relation of contrast between the predicates. Semantic oppo-
sition is not epistemic, since there is no speaker’s conclusion. There
are no speech act cases either. Marking a speech act through quotation
marks, interrogative or imperative form would abandon the parallel in-
tonation pattern, which is a condition for a semantic opposition. So,
because a semantic opposition can not express illocutionary meaning,
it is always semantic (i.e. relating two locutionary meanings, or: in-
terpreted in the content domain).19 This view on semantic opposition
is contrary to Sweetser (1990). Arguments against Sweetser’s view are
given in Oversteegen (1997).
The characterization of semantic opposition is thus negative, ad-
ditive and semantic (no basic order being specified in additive rela-
tions).20
2.3.3 Concession
Denial of expectation and semantic opposition are rather restricted in
their interpretation: a causal relation between two propositions, re-
lated to the connected clauses, should be available as an expectation
to be denied, and a parallel intonation pattern, applying two contrast-
ing predicates on two different entities should be available for semantic
opposition.
19Other interpretations of intonation patterns, e.g. Rooth (1992), are called prag-
matic, in the sense that the meaning aspects of these interpretations are non-truth-
conditional. The semantic/pragmatic distinction in Sanders et al. (1992) does not
refer to truth-conditional properties.
20The fact that but is fixed for order in the utterance is not relevant here. What
does count is the fact that the propositional contents of a semantic opposition can be
interchanged, without creating an unacceptable sentence. In other words, semantic
opposition is symmetric, whereas denial of expectation is asymmetric.
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Do these strict definitions mean that the category of concession is
taken to be the sloppy category, in which anything goes? The answer
is yes and no. On the one hand, it will be possible to give an indepen-
dent and clear definition; on the other hand, there are borderline cases
with both denial of expectation and semantic opposition that need to
be discussed. Discussion of these examples will show that the defini-
tions are doing quite well: it will be possible to classify every example
properly.
First, a definition of concession will be given with respect to the
example in (21) (taken from Spooren, 1989, p. 82).
(21) A: Shall we take this room?
B: It has a beautiful view, but it is very expensive.
B’s answer may be analyzed as the presentation of both an argument in
favor of a claim, and an argument against it. The claim is given in the
context, in this case in the question of A: ‘we take this room’. The first
argument, It has a beautiful view, leads to the claim itself; the second
argument, it is very expensive, leads to a negation of the claim. Spooren
(1989) shows in an experiment that people tend to take the but clause
as more important: B’s answer is, in the end, negative. Spooren’s (1989)
‘asymmetry hypothesis’ agrees with the analysis of McKeown and El-
hadad (1991), in which the argumentative orientation of the first clause
of a but sentence is weaker than the second clause.21 McKeown and El-
hadad (1991) would say that the clause introduced by but expresses the
‘directive act’ of the conjunction.
The interpretation of concession is characterized by a contextually
determined ‘tertium comparationis’: the claim for which both a posi-
tive and a negative argument is provided.22 In a conjunction p but q,
the tertium comparationis is a third proposition r. Both p and q provide
an argument related to r, but one of the arguments leads to :r, and the
other to r. The argument provided by q will always be stronger than
the argument provided by p, according to Spooren (1989). Because two
arguments are needed for this concessive interpretation, r can not be
identified as p or q.
A concession interpretation can be found whenever a relevant yes-
no question before the but conjunction is asked appropriately, with the
propositional content of the question as tertium comparationis. This
21The argumentative orientations of both clauses are compared on a scale, repre-
senting the measure of what is relevant in the argument (cf. Ducrot, 1980). The first
clause has a lesser degree than the second clause in a but sentence, if the scales are
commensurable.
22Instead of ‘concessive opposition’ (cf. Spooren, 1989), the term ‘concession’ will
be used. Concessive interpretation is originally the name for the interpretation of
English even though and although or Dutch al and hoewel. In Ko¨nig (1986), the interpre-
tation he assigns to although is called concessive, but represents what is called denial
of expectation here.
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question represents a context in a direct way: the answer must be un-
derstood as relevant to the question. Using questions, it can be demon-
strated that context determines the interpretation of a but sentence to a
large extent. This can be demonstrated by an example from Moeschler
(1989), translated into English in (22).23
(22) The weather is nice, but I’m tired.
Moeschler (1989) argues (against the assumption that the meaning of
but is responsible for the interpretation, as Ducrot (1980) claims), that
there are two possible tertia comparationis in (22): r might be under-
stood as ‘let’s go out’ in a context in which someone asks the speaker
whether he wants to go out, and r might be understood as ‘I’m happy’,
for instance when someone asks: what’s the matter?. In the first context,
the speaker admits that the weather is nice, but he chooses to stay at
home, for he is tired. In the second context, the speaker admits that
he is should be happy, but he is too tired to be happy. Thus, contexts
determine the interpretation of a concession significantly.
Concessions are easily confused with denials of expectation. Often,
conjunctions are ambiguous between denial of expectation and con-
cession. For instance, in (2), the denial of expectation may be replaced
by a concession (example repeated here in English version).
(2) The Artist Formerly Known as Prince was married yesterday at his
residence.
Prince has had many love-affairs, but he never married.
The context is relating to marriage. If instead, the context were a ques-
tion, for instance: ‘Did Prince look for his true love?’, then from clause
p, ‘Prince has had many love-affairs, one can infer: ‘so he did look for his
true love’. From the second clause, he never married, one can infer: ‘so
he did not look for his true love.’
Concessions are, more than denials of expectation, sensitive for
their context. For instance, in (23), a concession is made with another
tertium comparationis.
(23) Famous artists are often insecure about important decisions in
life. Some of them remain indecisive until the last moment.
Prince has had many love-affairs, but he never married.
A relevant question, such as ‘Does Prince make important decisions?’
could be inserted between context and but sentence in (23). This would
render a tertium comparationis ‘he makes important decisions’, which
is established for the first clause and denied for the but-clause. The
23The original example is from Moeschler and de Spengler (1982): Il fait beau, mais je
suis fatigue´ (donc je ne sors pas) (‘The weather is nice, but I’m tired, (so I won’t go out)’).
In Moeschler (1989), different contextualizations are applied to Il fait beau, mais je suis
fatigue´.
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previous tertium comparationis, ‘Prince is looking for his true love’, is
not consistent with the context in (23).
To a certain extent, context may affect the interpretation of a denial
of expectation too, but the expectation is quite constant in different
contexts, compared to a tertium comparationis. According to Overstee-
gen (1995), main clauses of denials of expectations do not share their
discourse topic with the preceding context to the same extent as main
clauses of concessions. A denial of expectation for the but-sentence in
its context in (23) would be rather irrelevant. The discourse would not
be very coherent.24
Concessions may be expressed using although. An example is given
in (24).
(24) A: Is Theo healthy?
B: Although Theo is gasping for breath, he is not exhausted.
In B’s answer in (24), two arguments are provided in favor of, or against
the claim that Theo is healthy. ‘Theo was gasping for breath, so he is
not healthy’ is the inference made on the basis of the first clause; ‘he
was not exhausted, so he is healthy’ on the basis of the second.
Sidiropoulou (1992) discusses a borderline case between denial of
expectation and concession on the basis of (25) (taken from Sidirop-
oulou, 1992, p.206). She distinguishes Shared Implicature Concession
(SIC) and a Speaker’s Attitude Concession (SAC). A SIC is inferred when
a background assumption is violated. A SAC is inferred when a speaker
is able to assign a positive evaluation to one clause, and a negative to
the other. A SAC is, at the same time, defined as not violating any back-
ground assumption, because in this interpretation no relevant back-
ground assumption is made.25 Consider the example in (25).
(25) Although he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music.
(25) might be SIC or SAC, according to Sidiropoulou (1992). The back-
ground assumption, needed for a SIC, is thought of as a conversational
implicature, stated as a generic sentence, like in (250).
(250) Viennese people like music.
24It is, of course, possible to read the denial of expectation independent of its con-
text. But that would only demonstrate the relative context-independency of a denial
of expectation.
25In her article, Sidiropoulou (1992) tries to analyze SIC and SAC in terms of distri-
butions of the entities mentioned in an although sentence (namely, (25)). Distribution
of the entities in a SIC would correspond to universal quantification of the variable
quantified for both predicates; distribution of the entities in a SAC would correspond
to existential quantification of the variable quantified for both predicates. This anal-
ysis is left out of the discussion, for it is not clear what the consequences are for her
analysis in terms of background assumptions.
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In terms of denial of expectation, the background assumption repre-
sents the expectation. Sidiropoulou (1992) claims that this background
assumption is not necessarily made. For example, if the speaker is
simply ‘looking for’ or ‘interested in’ Viennese people who like music (Sidir-
opoulou, 1992, p.206), a SAC is derived.26 In fact, this means that SAC
is determined by context, just like concession.
If (25) were contextualized with a question, for instance from some-
one interested in Viennese people who like music, or someone who is
looking for them, a context is provided in which the speaker should
be just expressing his attitude towards the state of affairs expressed in
each of the two clauses. At the same time, this would be a context in
which a concession might be identified. Consider (26).
(26) A: Does John from Vienna like music?
B: Although he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music.
Speaker B expresses his attitude towards the state of affairs by saying
that John is Viennese (positive) and that he does not like music (nega-
tive). Therefore, one could argue, (26) is a SAC. One may also apply a
speaker’s assumption like (250). In that case, B’s answer violates the as-
sumption. It is dependent on whether or not the speaker’s assumption
is made in the context of (26).
The definition of concession is more precise in the case of (26). A’s
question in (26) renders a tertium comparationis that is similar to the
negation of the second clause of B’s answer: ‘John from Vienna likes
music’ (:r) is the same as ‘he likes music’ (q).27 This is not possible in
concessions: a tertium comparationis may not be identified with one
of the connected clauses. Rather, the interpretation of B’s answer is a
denial of expectation, since a suitable expectation is derived, given the
context in (26).
Sidiropoulou (1992, p. 212) has a negative and a positive criterion
for recognizing a SAC. The negative criterion is that [i]t is assumed that
a SIC reading is possible whenever an implication is calculable. Given this
criterion, a SIC reading is possible in (26). She argues that (25) can be
interpreted as a SAC, given the positive criterion: [t]he main distinguish-
ing characteristic of a SAC is some type of positive or negative evaluation,
regardless of the speaker’s assumptions about the underlying implications of
the propositions involved (Sidiropoulou, 1992, p. 206). As demonstrated
with regard to (26), a tertium comparationis may not be derived from
26Being simply ‘looking for’ Viennese people who like music with respect to (25)
does still express a denial of expectation, in my view. A search for Viennese music
lovers can be made using a conditional ‘if he is Viennese, then he likes music.’ This
conditional is an expectation, in the sense that if someone appears to be Viennese,
it will be checked whether he is a music lover, due to the search for Viennese music
lovers. It is not an expectation in the sense that the speaker really expects everyone
from Vienna to be a music lover.
27He in he likes music refers, of course, to John, of whom it is established in the first
clause that he lives in Vienna.
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one of the conjuncts, but can only be a contextually motivated state-
ment. This means that the definition of concession is more restrictive
than the definition of SAC.28
Are there any questions that turn B’s answer in (26) into a conces-
sion? Consider (26).
(27) A: Is John a regular visitor of the Viennese Opera?
B: Although he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music.
In (27), the first clause of B’s answer might be an argument towards
the conclusion that ‘John is a regular visitor of the Viennese Opera’
(tertium comparationis), and the second clause is an argument towards
the conclusion that it is not the case that ‘John is a regular visitor of
the Viennese Opera’. So, under more restricted contextual conditions,
a concession is possible too for (25).
Concession and denial of expectation are often both possible in but
sentences, as well as although sentences. Context determines when con-
cession is derived. This restriction is more explicit than Sidiropoulou’s
(1992) contextual restrictions on SAC interpretation.
According to Spooren (1989), concession and denial of expectation
differ from semantic opposition in that the conjuncts in a denial of
expectation or concessive opposition are ‘about’ one entity.29 There
are, however, but sentences that seem to have parallel intonation and
two different topics, but can be interpreted as concessions. An example
is (10a), repeated below.
(10) a. King Tsin has great mu shu pork, but China First has good dim
sum.
Notice that an interpretation of semantic opposition is not excluded
with respect to (10a). The restaurant entities King Tsin and China First
are different, and they appear to have different properties with respect
to the meals that they serve. It is clear, however, that such an oppo-
sition does not express ‘indirect speech acts of suggestion’, as Sweetser
(1990) calls them.
According to Spooren (1989), semantic oppositions can be distin-
guished from concessions and denials of expectation by presenting
them as an answer to a question: the former can only be an answer to
28Perhaps Sidiropoulou (1992) has to be understood in such a way, that the back-
ground assumption is still available, but not as a generic statement. When one is
just ‘looking for’ or ‘interested in’, the background assumption is not representing a
generic statement, but a mere conjunction: ‘There is a Viennese who likes music.’ This
interpretation of a background assumption for a SAC will not be allowed as a tertium
comparationis (for an argument for both r and :r must be possible), nor as an expec-
tation. Besides, a SAC was characterized as not having a background assumption, so
this solution is not possible for a SAC either.
29McKeown and Elhadad (1991) call this aboutness ‘thematization’.
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a Wh-question (a question introduced by an interrogative pronomen),
the latter can only be an answer to a yes-no question. Consider (28).
(28) A: ‘Which restaurant is better?’
B: King Tsin has great mu shu pork, but China First has good dim
sum.
The Wh-question in (28) makes a semantic opposition inevitable. Two
entities are compared with respect to their properties. Notice that par-
allel intonation is still possible here, due to the same structure of both
conjuncts. This parallel intonation invites A to look for contrast be-
tween great mu shu pork and good dim sum (following Blakemore, 1987).
This will be a quite individual contrast.
A yes/no question is possible too, as (29) shows.
(29) A: Shall we go to King Tsin?
B: King Tsin has great mu shu pork, but China First has good dim
sum.
From A’s question, a tertium comparationis can be inferred: ‘we are
going to King Tsin.’ The first clause of B’s answer is an argument in
favour of the tertium comparationis, and the second clause is an argu-
ment against it. In such a reading, B’s answer is a concession, resulting
in the suggestion to go to China First (following Spooren’s (1989) asym-
metry hypothesis).
This means that context may force a concession interpretation on
constructions that seem typically semantic oppositions. As far as (10)
is concerned, a concession interpretation appears to be more natural,
since argumentation is involved. The most plausible context for (10)
is one in which a decision ought to be taken to go to one or the other
restaurant.
Representing argumentation is characteristic for concession. The
tertium comparationis represents an argumentative orientation. In the
argumentation theory of Anscombre and Ducrot (1977), this aspect of
the interpretation of but is taken to be central. Both clauses represent
arguments with respect to this argumentative orientation. The argu-
mentation is expressed by comparing the values of what has been ex-
pressed in the clauses on scales like: ‘the more proposition A is the
case, the more proposition B is the case,’ with respect to a sentence
A but B. Their analysis is not directly connected to the analysis given
in the next chapter of this thesis. Instead of adopting the argumenta-
tive approach, Gricean implicatures will be involved in the analysis. In
Kalokerinos (1995), ‘Gricean theories’ are compared with the argumen-
tative approach.
The use of but to refute an argument is an aspect that has been dis-
cussed in argumentation theories more than in semantic and pragmatic
theories. Snoeck Henkemans (1992) gives examples of argumentation
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in which but is used to refute counter-arguments. One of these exam-
ples is given in (30) (taken from Snoeck Henkemans, 1992, p. 133).
(30) I think the library should stay open on Sundays, because that
would give people an opportunity to make use of it. They say that
they don’t have enough personnel to keep it open on Sundays,
but if a system of working shifts were introduced there would be
no problem at all.
The conjunct They say ... Sundays is a counter-argument to the cen-
tral claim that the library should stay open on Sundays. This counter-
argument is refuted by the but conjunct if a system ... at all. The con-
cession interpretation fits in nicely with this refutation. The tertium
comparationis is ‘the library can be open on Sundays’. The counter-
argument is opposing to this claim, whereas the but conjunct is in fa-
vor of the claim. The asymmetry of but explains why the but-clause
provides the stronger argument (cf. Spooren, 1989). As a result, the
counterargument is not valid anymore in the argumentation for the
central claim that the library should stay open on Sundays. The dif-
ference between refutation of counter-arguments and concession is the
aim of the analysis. In concessions, one clause is giving the best ar-
gumentation. In refutations the same happens, but it overrules the
other argument in the larger structure of the argumentation as a whole.
Refutation will be regarded as concession, for the consequences of con-
cession on a larger scale of argumentation will not be studied in this
thesis.
Is it possible to apply the distinction between semantic and prag-
matic interpretation to concession? In order to answer this question, it
is interesting to look back at (26), repeated here.
(26) A: Does John from Vienna like music?
B: Although he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music.
In (26), an epistemic denial of expectation is the most likely interpreta-
tion. The expectation is: ‘From the fact that John comes from Vienna,
I conclude that he likes music’. The expectation is denied in the main
clause of the although sentence. In (26), the real-world connection sup-
porting the expectation is not obtained by abduction. As shown before,
this was not a necessary condition for epistemic interpretation. Chang-
ing the context into ‘is John a regular visitor of the Viennese Opera?’
(in (27)) makes the interpretation of concession possible. In this in-
terpretation, a conclusion is drawn that John does not often visit the
Viennese Opera. This is B’s conclusion, drawn from a positive and a
negative argument in (27). The presence of a speaker’s conclusion in
the mental representation of B’s answer makes the interpretation epis-
temic. So, while (26) and (27) differ with respect to their interpretation
of the contrastive relation, they are both epistemic.
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The example in (10a), where concession seemed more natural than
semantic opposition, is epistemic too: the use of a semantic opposi-
tion in such an argumentative way makes a concession more plausible.
With respect to (29), conclusions are drawn from two facts: ‘King Tsin
has great mu shu pork’, and: ‘China First has good dim sum’. The con-
clusions are: ‘so we are going to eat at King Tsin’, and: ‘so we are not
going to eat at King Tsin.’ If the intended meaning of the speaker were
paraphrased, this would be the result: ‘from the fact that King Tsin has
great mu shu pork, I conclude that we should eat there, and from the
fact that China First has good dim sum, I conclude that we should eat
there’. Given the assumptions that semantic opposition is semantic,
and concession epistemic, concession is more natural in (10a): argu-
mentative use calls for a speaker’s conclusion and hence epistemic in-
terpretation. This might be problematic for the recognition of semantic
opposition, but not for concession.
In the tertium comparationis, a speaker’s conclusion will be rep-
resented by definition, and in the clauses, arguments in favor of or
against this conclusion are given. Therefore, the interpretation of con-
cession is always connected with epistemic interpretation.
Concession is, in terms of Sanders et al. (1992), an additive rela-
tion. Other epistemic relations that were presented, were causal rela-
tions. Notice that the paraphrase of the intended speaker’s meaning is
a conjunction, and that applying abduction, in the way Degand (1996)
describes it, is impossible. This is because no causal relation is inferred,
but a conjunction on the basis of causal inferences (namely, from clause
to tertium comparationis). As a consequence, concession is an additive
relation (cf. Sanders et al., 1992, p. 20).
The characterization of concession is now complete, and in agree-
ment with Sanders et al. (1992,1993): concession is a negative, prag-
matic, additive relation.
2.3.4 Conclusion
In the analysis of the three kinds of contrast, three different interpre-
tation schemes were presented. Denials of expectation are typically
causal: they need an implication between propositions, directly related
to the conjuncts of but and although. Semantic oppositions are deter-
mined by their parallel intonation and structure: two contrasting pred-
icates are applied to two different entities. Concessions always form a
tertium comparationis, and their clauses form arguments in favor and
against this proposition. Concessions mostly concern one entity, but
in the appropriate conditions, a semantic opposition (about two en-
tities) might be interpreted as a concession. The cognitive primitives
could be applied to each interpretation.
Other contrastive interpretations were reduced to one of these inter-
pretations, or they were identified as a type of language use that is not
studied in this thesis. One interpretation is not discussed: the function
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of but as a conversational marker. This interpretation of but will return,
in chapter 5.
2.4 Causal Relations
Epistemic interpretation was identified as the speaker’s conclusion, and
contextual factors or certain connectives could indicate epistemic in-
terpretation. In section 2.2, determination of epistemic interpretation
of causal relations was often related to the recognition of a real-world
connection. There are cases in which the recognition of a real-world
connection is the only way to distinguish semantic and epistemic in-
terpretation of causal relations. In (31), because is used three times to
indicate a causal relation.
(31) a. Theo was exhausted, because he had run to the university.
b. Theo was exhausted, because he was gasping for breath.
c. ?Theo was exhausted, because he had been resting all day.
Intuitively, a semantic causal relation is expressed in (31a). In (31b), an
epistemic relation is expressed. (31c) is unacceptable. In section 2.2, it
was already established that because did not discriminate between epis-
temic and semantic interpretations. From the sentences in (31) it can
be read that there are preferences for a certain interpretation, depen-
dent on the propositional content of the clauses. Although analyzes of
sentences like (31) have already been made in this chapter, the prob-
lem of determining causality as a real-world connection has not been
addressed yet.
What determines the difference between (31a) and (31b), is the
acceptance of a real-world connection: ‘if you run, you become ex-
hausted’, is accepted as a real-world connection in (31a). In (31b),
however, an analogous real-world connection is not accepted: ‘if you
are gasping for breath, you are exhausted’ does not express a cause and
effect sequence of events in the real world. Here, the if clause is not
expressing a cause for the exhaustion. The consequence will be turned
into a speaker’s conclusion: ‘from the fact that you are gasping for
breath, I conclude that you are exhausted’. It is possible to recognize
a cause and effect in this paraphrase: ‘if you are exhausted, you are
gasping for breath’. This recognition of the conclusion as a cause for
an observed fact is called abduction. It is not a logically valid deduc-
tion. In (31c), the real-world connection is unacceptable: ‘#if you rest
all day, you become exhausted’.
This analysis seems plausible, but one question remains for all three
interpretations in (31): how are cause and effect determined in each
sentence? The interpretations depend on the recognition of cause and
effect, but how cause and effect are determined is not clear. In this sec-
tion, the notion of a real-world connection will be analyzed. This will
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not lead to a conclusive answer, but insight in the differences between
(31a) (31b), and (31c) will be gained.
2.4.1 A definition of causality
An explanation of why a sequence of events (in our case, the interpre-
tation of an utterance referring to two events) is causal, appeals to the
knowledge that is applied to make an interpretation of this sequence.
In his interpretation of Hume (1739), Mackie (1974) specifies properties
of causation. Hume specifies three elements in our perception of cau-
sation: succession, contiguity and necessary connection (Kehler, 1995,
takes this distinction as a starting point for classifying coherence rela-
tions). Mackie (1974) claims that only Hume’s necessary connection
is inevitably part of causality, next to other properties Hume did not
mention.
In analysing causality, Mackie (1974) uses concepts of sufficient
and necessary conditions, incompleteness of causes and causal prior-
ity. These notions will be introduced first. Then, Mackie’s proposal will
be presented. Finally, the proposal will be applied to the sentences in
(31).
The notions of necessary and sufficient conditions are defined with
respect to an implication. This is done in (32) (adapted from Bonevac,
1987).
(32) With respect to an implication p ! q:
a. ‘p is a sufficient condition for q’ means that the occurrence of
p always goes together with the occurrence of q.
b. ‘q is a necessary condition for p’ means that the omission of q
never goes together with the occurrence of p.30
At first glance, it is not obvious how these definitions may help to de-
fine causality. Mackie (1974) illustrates the notions of necessity and
sufficiency by comparing three machines, that provide bars of choco-
late when a shilling is inserted in their slots. To make the example
more up to date, a chip card is inserted, and a cup of coffee comes out
when the card has enough value.31 The performance of two of these
machines, L and M , will be discussed now; machine K will be discussed
below.
Machine M always produces a cup of coffee when a chip card is
inserted. It even produces sometimes a cup of coffee without the inser-
tion of a chip card, or with the insertion of an empty chip card. There is
30If p is both a necessary and sufficient condition for q, p and q are equivalent. Sup-
pose that (p! q) (p is a sufficient condition for q), and that p is a necessary condition
for q: (:p ! :q). Application of Modus Tollens gives: (q ! p). The assumption of
both (p! q) and (q ! p) gives (p$ q).
31Specific reference is made to the machines at the University of Twente: the only
act is the insertion of the card, no buttons need to be pushed.
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no known reason for the spontaneously produced cups of coffee. With
respect to M , inserting the chip card is sufficient for the appearance of
a cup of coffee. M meets the ‘sufficiency criterion’.
Machine L will not produce a cup of coffee unless a chip card is
inserted with enough value. From time to time it may occur that a chip
card is inserted but coffee is not produced. With respect to L, inserting
the chip card is necessary for the appearance of a cup of coffee. L meets
the ‘necessity criterion’.
Mackie (1974) states that, contrary to Locke (1632), Hume’s (1739)
‘relations of ideas’ (causal relations) can not be made certain by us-
ing the method of induction. This knowledge will remain probabilistic
knowledge. With respect to M , this means that after many cups of
coffee, users are able to tell which machine has the properties of M .
By observing every insertion, and coming to the conclusion that there
are no exceptions to the rule that insertion results in coffee, one may
assume that the sufficiency criterion is met. This process is called in-
duction.
According to Mackie (1974), Hume (1739) says that the truth of
a necessary condition can only be established by deduction and very
direct experiential knowledge (which is not coffee machine experience,
because the electronic circuits of the machine are not directly observed),
but not by induction. This means that the properties of L, can not be
achieved by induction: the insertion of the card does not give coffee
in every case, and not inserting the card does not have any effect.32 To
decide that this machine meets the necessity criterion, users need to
know beforehand that it is necessary to insert the card.
The problem Hume describes is mainly a scientific problem. The
problem formulated with respect to (31a) was, how to accept a relation
as causal? If causal relations were characterized by necessary condi-
tions, and necessary conditions were as strictly defined as Hume de-
mands, only few causal relations would be claimed to hold and thus
expressed in natural language. But with respect to the use of coffee ma-
chines, the same problem occurs: knowledge of the relation between
chip card and coffee is important, for users want to be capable of get-
ting coffee out of the machine. And they know the relation on the basis
of relatively little evidence, for they insert the chip card in the expec-
tation to get a cup of coffee. So, the problem of causality in everyday
use or language use, needs to be relativized.
Summarizing, the problem is that causality in natural language is
less motivated than causal knowledge specified with respect to the cof-
fee machines. Is a definition of causality in natural language possible?
And is it possible to derive from this definition the difference between
epistemic and semantic causal interpretation? Mackie (1974) presents -
32The observation could be that whenever coffee comes out of the machine, a card
should have been inserted. This is, however, not induction in the strict sense Hume
used it.
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essentially - a proposal that might answer these questions.
Mackie (1965) proposes to allow for causal knowledge as incomplete
knowledge. That is, an effect may have several causes, that do not ap-
ply in every situation in which the effect occurs. For instance, a service
engineer can check the machine by having it produce a cup of coffee,
without inserting a chip card. It is not likely that the insertion of a
chip card was a necessary condition to obtain this cup of coffee, or: to
obtain a cup of coffee within these circumstances. In a complete set of
causes, both the service engineer and the chip card should be present,
but within specific circumstances, only one of these causes is realized.
Mackie (1974) proposes to look at causality on two levels: one repre-
senting a ‘total cause’ for an effect, which contains all causes possible
on every occasion; the other is causality ‘within the circumstances’: a
specific cause, fitting within the circumstances is taken to be the cause
for the effect. This means that every causal relation - in everyday use -
will contain incomplete causes, but they will be accepted as complete
causes within the circumstances.
Mackie’s proposal makes the sufficiency criterion, abandoned by
Hume, relevant again for causality. The argument that induction never
leads to certain knowledge is not denied, but as Hume already ex-
plained, induction provides psychologically (i.e. not scientifically) at-
tractive explanations. So, on the basis of few occurrences, people often
decide that insertion of the chip card is enough to get a cup of coffee
from the machine. When this relation has become part of the knowl-
edge of a user of the machine, the relation between chip card and the
machine producing a cup of coffee is determined by causal priority.
A cause is causally prior to its effect. This means, that the relation
between cause and effect can not be reversed. Applied to the coffee
machines, the implication ‘if a card is inserted, a cup of coffee is pro-
duced’, means that the insertion of a card is causally prior to a cup of
coffee. The appearance of a cup of coffee is not causally prior to the
insertion of a card. Relating causal priority to the implication p ! q
in (32), p is causally prior to q, but q is not prior to p. So, a sufficient
condition for the occurrence of an event may be causally prior to the
event.
The incompleteness of causes leads to the definition of an INUS
condition for results, presented in (33) (taken from Mackie, 1965)
(33) A is an INUS condition of a result P if and only if, for some X and
for some Y, (AX or Y) is a necessary and sufficient condition of P,
but A is not a sufficient condition of P and X is not a sufficient
condition of P.
This definition is defining the relation between the complete cause of
a result, in all circumstances, and a cause given some specific circum-
stances. If the whole disjunction (AX or Y) were a conjunction (AX
and Y) it would represent the complete cause, that holds for all circum-
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stances, for all occurrences of P.33 The disjunction may consist of more
disjuncts than just two. Within some circumstance, a so-called cause
A is an ‘Insufficient but Necessary’ (IN) part of a condition AX which
is itself ‘Unnecessary but Sufficient’ (US) for the result. If all the dis-
juncts expressing an US condition for P would apply, the disjunction
as a whole is both necessary and sufficient. So, A is IN for AX, and AX
is US for P.
At this point, it has to be noticed that the use of the term ‘necessary’
IN is different from the definition given in (32). Necessary part of a
condition refers only to the fact that without this part, the condition
would not be sufficient for P. The definition ‘necessary condition’ for
P would express that omittance of the disjunction (AX or Y) in (33)
as a whole can not go together with an occurrence of P. The phrase
‘necessary part’ refers to (A) in the US condition (AX).
The definition may be applied to the coffee machine example. Sup-
pose that A is a predicate that refers to the insertion of a chip card, and
Y is the check of the service engineer. Further, X contains the infor-
mation that the machine always works. In the narrowly defined coffee
machine world, (AX or Y) is the complete cause for P (i.e. the machine
always produces a cup of coffee). The disjunction is both a necessary
and a sufficient condition, for the machine will work both with a chip
card and by a check of a service engineer, and the production of a cup
of coffee always involves the insertion of a chip card into a working
machine, and the check of a service engineer. Within more specific
circumstances, however, it might be the case that the service engineer
is not around. It is not a complete cause anymore: a user that inserts
his chip card in the machine is not fulfilling a necessary condition nor
a sufficient condition. It might be the case that the machine does not
work, so the condition is not sufficient. It might also be the case that
the production of a cup of coffee did not take place because a chip card
was inserted, but for another reason that can not be traced because the
disjunction is incomplete. The condition is not necessary either.
Still, Mackie (1974) calls the relation between AX and P causal (but
incomplete). The reason for this is that A is a necessary part of AX (or:
A is an INUS condition), where AX is an US condition for P within the
circumstances. In terms of real world knowledge, this means that A
is causally prior to P. The nature of causal priority is not exactly clear,
but it is this property that makes the relation A ! P asymmetrical.
The asymmetry is demonstrated in the observation that A is temporally
prior to P. Causal priority is in the nature of the events (cf. Mackie,
1974, p.160-192).
Going back to natural language, the assumption is that interpreting
an utterance containing a causal connection amounts to recognizing
33Notice that it would not be possible to take a conjunctive complete cause for the
occurrence of one result: one cup of coffee is usually not produced by both a chip
card and a service engineer checking it. Because Mackie (1974) aims at the analysis of
specific causes within their circumstances, a disjunction of causes is needed.
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an INUS condition for a result. The circumstances or context in which
the utterance is made narrow down the complete disjunction into the
US condition containing the necessary part (i.e., into AX containing
A). This will be applied to the examples in (31).
First, assumptions have to be made about the complete cause of
being exhausted (i.e., AX or Y in (33)): the disjunction of being in a
bad condition, running to places, or gasping will suffice for demon-
stration purposes: other causes might be disjunctively added (except
conditions forming disjuncts that can never be a sufficient condition
for the result). So, suppose that A is representing Theo’s having run to
the university, with X representing the additional knowledge that the
distance to the university is far enough to get exhausted. Y represents
Theo’s gasping, and Z is Theo’s being in bad condition.
As for (31a), the disjunction is narrowed down to the INUS con-
dition that Theo has run to the university, with the additional infor-
mation that it is a large distance (together: AX), which makes the
INUS condition sufficient within the circumstances. The interpretation
within the circumstances is explicitly brought back to this disjunct, for
the because clause gives us this information, and there is no further
common ground. Of course, one is free to assume that disjunct Z is
true as well, but there is no specific information to justify that assump-
tion. Within the circumstances, AX represents a sufficient condition
for P.
Given the assumption that AX is sufficient for P, A is causally prior
to P. A is defined as the INUS condition for P. Thus, the recognition
of an INUS condition indicates a semantic causal interpretation of an
utterance containing because.
Does the same definition hold for epistemic causal interpretations?
In (31b), the relation is narrowed down to Y: Theo’s gasping. Since
it occurs as a disjunct in the complete cause for P, it is sufficient. And
this might well be true as long as it is known, within the circumstances,
that every time Theo is gasping, he is exhausted (and it does not matter
whether he is exhausted for other reasons). But Y does not contain a
necessary part, like AX. There is no part of Y causally prior to the result.
Rather, the event expressed in the result might well be causally prior to
the event expressed in Y. If the events of Y and P were ordered according
to, for instance, their simplicity of explanation, the exhaustion is prior
to gasping: it is difficult to reason back from gasping to exhaustion
whereas the exhaustion might be easily translated into lack of oxygen
and the lungs providing oxygen to the blood. Reversing this takes the
‘need for oxygen’ out of the explanation, which makes it difficult to
speak of an explanation of the exhaustion in terms of gasping. This
makes it possible to make a definition of epistemic interpretation in
terms of causality: Y is, within the circumstances, a sufficient condition
for P, but not it contains no necessary part, causally prior to P. If P
were a condition for Y, P would be an INUS condition. Therefore, the
relation is called epistemic.
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Within the circumstances, the because clause in (31c) is not inter-
preted as a sufficient condition: therefore, the relation is not inter-
preted as causal. Possibly, there are contexts in which a sufficient con-
dition could be found, with or without a necessary part.
From the analysis of (31), the following definition can be derived:
 a relation is causal when there is, within the circumstances, an
INUS condition for the result;
 a relation is not causal when there is no sufficient condition for a
result.
Given this definition, causal interpretations of sentences containing a
causal connective like because can be distinguished:
 a sentence that contains a clause representing a cause is inter-
preted as semantically causal only if an INUS condition is recog-
nized.
 a sentence that contains a clause representing a cause is inter-
preted as epistemically causal, when the alleged cause is a suffi-
cient condition for the result, while not containing a necessary
part.
Epistemic interpretation involves the introduction of a speaker’s con-
clusion. The causal relation is not between facts: from the fact, a con-
clusion is derived. Epistemic interpretation thus ‘revalidates’ causal pri-
ority: the fact is causally prior to the conclusion.
Causal priority, in combination with the INUS condition, is crucial
for content interpretation, whereas epistemic interpretation is charac-
terized by lack of causal priority, resulting in revalidation of causal pri-
ority in a fact-conclusion relation.
A fact-conclusion relation may be understood as a causal relation.
The proposition expressed in the conclusion may be interpreted as
causally prior to the proposition expressing the fact. This reversal of
cause and effect is called abduction. Abduction is characteristic for the
epistemic interpretation of causal relations. It is not necessary, how-
ever, to apply abduction to a causal relation, in order to interpret it as
epistemic. Contextual factors may make an epistemic interpretation of
a causal relation more plausible. In those cases, the relation will be con-
sidered as semantically causal by the definitions above, but the relation
will be understood as epistemic on other grounds (see section 2.2).
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an answer was given to the first question formulated
in chapter 1: which interpretations of causal or contrastive relations
should be distinguished? Causal relations were found in a pragmatic
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and contrastive interpretation. Pragmatic interpretations could be di-
vided into a group of epistemic interpretations of causal relations, and
speech act interpretations of causal relations. Contrastive relations
were found in causal and additive interpretations, and in semantic or
pragmatic interpretations. The causal contrastive relation is called de-
nial of expectation. This relation may be interpreted semantically and
pragmatically: the latter as epistemic interpretation or as speech act
interpretation. Two additive contrastive relations are distinguished: se-
mantic opposition and concession. Semantic opposition is semantic
and concession is pragmatic (and occurs only in epistemic interpreta-
tion).
Epistemic interpretation was analyzed by comparing Sweetser (1990)
and Sanders et al. (1992). Interpretation in the epistemic domain
(Sweetser, 1990) is analyzed as pragmatic interpretation, because it rep-
resents a speaker’s conclusion, and thus connects illocutionary mean-
ing with locutionary meaning (which defines pragmatic interpretation
in Sanders et al., 1992). An analysis of epistemic interpretation, relating
it to the process of abduction, is regarded as an important phenomenon
in the interpretation process, but not essential for the interpretation
process: without abduction, epistemic interpretation is still possible.
Speech act interpretation also connects illocutionary meaning with
locutionary meaning, and is thus regarded as pragmatic. Speech act
interpretations appear to be linguistically marked. In speech act in-
terpretation, the uttering of a clause is justified (or a justification is
violated) by the other clause. An intrinsic part of the speech act in-
terpretation is the recognition of a clause as a speech act. Linguistic
marking is concerned with marking a clause as a speech act: quotation
marks, interrogative form or imperative form of the speech act clause
are often used to mark it. In a systematic paraphrase of speech act in-
terpretations, the speech act clause is embedded by a speech act verb;
the other clause refers to the speech act clause, taking it autonymously.
Contrastive interpretations were described in three different inter-
pretation schemes: denial of expectation, semantic opposition and
concession. In a denial of expectation, an expectation is derived from
the utterance by combining the propositional content of the although
clause (or the first clause of a but conjunction) with the negation of
the propositional content of the other clause: this expectation is vio-
lated, because the main clause in an although sentence or the but clause
negates the second part of the expectation. The expectation is an impli-
cation: a denial of expectation is causal, next to contrastive. A semantic
opposition is characterized by parallel intonation and structure. The
parallel form is an instruction for the predicates to find a contrast in
their lexical meanings. This contrast is applied to the first constituents
of the parallel structures. Essential for concession is the formation of
a tertium comparationis on the basis of contextual information. One
clause forms an argument against, the other in favor of the tertium
comparationis. A semantic opposition is always about two similar en-
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tities; a denial of expectation is not represented as typically about one
or two entities. A concession may occur in both variants: in parallel
structure as well as not typically about one or two entities. Typical
of concession are contextual influence on the interpretation and the
argumentative orientation.
If contrastive interpretations are related to cognitive primitives (San-
ders et al., 1992), they are characterized as follows:
 semantic, additive, negative: semantic opposition
 semantic, causal, negative: content denial of expectation
 pragmatic, additive, negative: concession
 pragmatic, causal, negative: epistemic/speech act denial of expec-
tation
Indeed, it is possible to classify the interpretations in four distinct cat-
egories, using the cognitive primitives. It is interesting to note that
if pragmatic negative relations (concession and epistemic denial of ex-
pectation) are taken together, Sidiropoulou’s (1992) SAC is represented.
Her SAC is defining a natural class of coherence too.
The causality of a coherence relation depends on the acceptance of
an INUS condition for a result.34 When epistemic interpretation of a
causal relation is not marked by context or linguistic markers, it can be
recognized by the lack of causal priority of the INUS condition to the
result. Epistemic interpretation revalidates causal priority by taking
the result as a speaker’s conclusion, thus making the fact (the INUS
condition) causally prior to the conclusion (the result).
In this chapter, connectives were used to express coherence rela-
tions. In fact, no distinction was made between connective meaning
and coherence relation. In the next chapter, focus will be on the mean-
ing of connectives. Given all the different interpretations of causal
connectives, it might be difficult give a comprehensive lexical mean-
ing definition of such connectives. Sweetser’s claim that they are pol-
ysemous needs further analysis: her domains are systemically related,
but what these relations look like has not been made clear. A repre-
sentation of these meanings of connectives in formal language would
make their systematic relation more clear. In Chapter 3, an attempt is
made to come to an account of these meaning properties, using formal
devices from discourse semantics and pragmatics.
34Result is interpreted here as the consequence of an implication: both the coherence
relations Explanation and Result presume an INUS condition for a result.

Chapter 3
Presuppositions for causal
connectives
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a problem will be solved that most students have when
they enter an introductory course in formal semantics. This problem
can be demonstrated by looking again at the Greta Garbo sentence,
repeated here in (1).
(1) Hoewel
Although
Greta
Greta
Garbo
Garbo
de
the
maatstaf
yardstick
werd
was
genoemd
called
van
of
schoonheid,
beauty,
is
has
zij
she
nooit
never
getrouwd
married
geweest.
(been).
‘Although Greta Garbo was called the yardstick of beauty, she
never married.’
When students are asked to translate this sentence into predicate logic,
they can not find a satisfying translation. Predicate logic provides a
logical connective to represent the conjunction in (1), connecting the
two elementary propositions: ‘Beautiful(Greta)’ and ‘:Married(Greta)’.
This connective is the conjunction, ^. So, the translation must be
Beautiful(Greta) ^ :Married(Greta). In terms of truth conditions, this
is a correct translation: both conjuncts need to be true to get the com-
plex proposition true. And, intuitively, in (1) two assertions are made:
it is both stated that Greta Garbo is considered the yardstick of beauty
and that she has never been married. A student’s objection to this
analysis might be that this is not entirely what the sentence expresses.
This provides the opportunity for a lecturer to explain that the com-
positionality principle allows only the truth values of the connected
propositions and truth-functional connectives to be relevant for the
truth conditions of the whole complex proposition (cf. Gamut, 1982a,
p. 29). Connectives like because are not truth-functional (ibid.).
It will not come as a surprise that students are often not convinced
by the limitation to truth-functional connectives only, when logic is
51
52 PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR CAUSAL CONNECTIVES
used to analyze natural language. In the previous chapter of this thesis,
meaning aspects that were not incorporated in the truth conditions
of although were described. Certainly some of those aspects might be
considered to belong to the (core) semantics of although. In general,
logical connectives are not capable of expressing causality and contrast,
whereas although is expressing both.
In this chapter, a lexical semantics of causal and contrastive con-
nectives is presented. As a side effect, the analysis renders a satisfying
answer to students that have difficulties in accepting the translation of
although with a conjunction in predicate logic.
Basically, the proposal in this chapter is not new. Lakoff (1971),
Ko¨nig (1986), Lagerwerf and Oversteegen (1994), Kehler (1994) and
Oversteegen (1997) made similar proposals earlier. Van Dijk (1977) and
Sidiropoulou (1992) made proposals that are related to the proposal,
formulated in (2).
(2) A presupposition for although1
Although p,q presupposes p0 > :q0
where p and q are clauses, p0 and q0 are propositions associated
with p and q respectively, and > is a defeasible implication.
In the sentence in (1), although presupposes an implication that can be
paraphrased as: ‘normally, if a woman is called the yardstick of beauty,
she is married’. In this paraphrase, the sequence of normally, if... then...
refers to the symbol of defeasible implication > in (2), introduced in
Asher and Morreau (1991).
Clause p, Greta Garbo was called the yardstick of beauty, is associated
with the more general proposition p0: a woman is called the yardstick of
beauty, whereas q, she has never been married, is associated with q0: she
never married. q0 is negated in the presupposition: she married is the re-
sult. This presupposition reflects the expectation. In the utterance the
expectation is denied. This is not creating a contradiction, because the
defeasibility of the presupposition is making it possible that exceptions
to the rule exist (see section 3.7). This way, a denial of expectation may
represent an undeniable prejudice.
On the basis of the proposal, it can be explained to students that
translations of although sentences into logic have to correspond to truth
conditional properties of the logical conjunction, but that its causal
and contrastive meaning is represented by the assumption of (2).
Lakoff (1971), Ko¨nig (1986) and Kehler (1994) do not give an indica-
tion of the consequences of taking their proposal seriously in a formal
semantic or pragmatic theory.2
1Dutch hoewel has the same semantics as given in this definition.
2Van Dijk (1977) and Sidiropoulou (1992) are considering formal consequences, but
they have formulated other proposals. This chapter is an extension of the analysis in
Lagerwerf and Oversteegen (1994).
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Without saying what is meant with the term presupposition, and
what kind of presupposition theory is used, the claim that although
bears a presupposition is insignificant. Therefore, a short introduction
to the assumptions made in the literature on presuppositions will be
given first. Presupposition tests will be introduced, and the presuppo-
sition of although will be tested for ‘presuppositionhood’ (sections 3.2
and 3.3). The analysis will be extended, to explain the phenomena
described in the previous chapter (sections 3.4 and 3.5). The transla-
tion of causal and contrastive connectives will be addressed (section
3.6), and the defeasibility of the presuppositional implication (section
3.7). Additional evidence will corroborate the analysis (section 3.8).
Gapping phenomena that were not explained before, will provide in-
dependent evidence (section 3.9).
3.2 Presuppositions and implicatures
Before the meaning of although sentences can be analyzed as express-
ing a presupposition, implicature, assertion or entailment, definitions
of these notions should be given. This is not easy, since a lot of propos-
als have been made that involve different definitions of presupposition
and implicature. Definitions of presupposition and conversational im-
plicature will be given by presenting these notions in their most com-
mon interpretation, (using Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983), and then ad-
justing the notions to fit in a more recent, discourse oriented approach
(like Van der Sandt, 1988; Beaver, 1995).
Grice (1975) introduces the notion of implicature, distinguishing
conventional and conversational implicature. Conversational impli-
catures are non-truth-conditional inferences based on the Cooperative
Principle and maxims of conversation, defined in Grice (1975), and
represented here in table 3.1. Illustrations of the applications of these
maxims will be given below, in (3) and (4).
Grice (1975) defines conversational implicatures as inferences aris-
ing from the Cooperative Principle and maxims of conversation. In
table 3.2, three properties of conversational implicatures are presented,
discussed in order to describe differences between presuppositions and
conversational implicatures (extracted from Levinson, 1983, p. 114-
122).
These properties will be illustrated on the basis of the examples in
(3), (4) and (5). Conversational implicatures may be derived in two
ways: following a maxim of conversation, or ‘flouting’ it: either way,
the Cooperative Principle has to be obeyed. Following a maxim of
3In the original text in Grice (1975), this maxim is called relation. Since then, it is
commonly referred to as the maxim of relevance.
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Cooperative Principle
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.
Maxim of
Quantity Make your contribution as informative as required.
Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
Quality Do not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack evidence.
Relevance3 Be relevant.
Manner Avoid obscurity of expression.
Avoid ambiguity.
Be brief.
Be orderly.
Table 3.1: The Cooperative Principle
conversation is illustrated in (3) (adapted from Levinson, 1983, p. 97).
(3) A: Can you tell me the time?
B: Well, the postman has come.
The contribution of B has to be taken as relevant, and therefore A as-
sumes that the coming of the postman is an indication of the time
(namely, later than the arrival of the postman). This assumption (or:
conversational implicature) is derived from the maxim of relevance,
and consequently, the Cooperative Principle. A reply of A to the con-
tribution of B that would deny the conversational implicature, is: You
mean you don’t know. This reply would declare the contribution of B as
irrelevant to the question of A. So, the implicature can be withdrawn
without creating an inconsistency. Clearly, it is the intended mean-
ing and not the lexical or syntactic properties of the contribution of
B that invokes the implicature. If, instead of B’s contribution in (3),
the contribution were: sure, mail has just been delivered, it would have
rendered the same result. All three properties of conversational impli-
cature given in table 3.2 are present, with respect to B’s implicature in
(3).
Flouting a conversational maxim is a more complicated way to de-
rive a conversational implicature. An illustration of this is given in (4).
(4) Situation: journalist A asks politician B a question at a press
conference. B answers.
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Conversational implicature
An utterance has a conversational implicature if:
1. the implicature is not tied to a specific lexical item or syntactic
construction;
2. the implicature can be withdrawn without creating an inconsis-
tency;
3. the implicature is derived from maxims of conversation, fol-
lowing the Cooperativity Principle (or solves a conflict between
maxim and Cooperativity Principle).
Table 3.2: Properties of conversational implicature
A: Do you believe that the critical remarks made by your col-
leagues have a political motivation?
B: You make me wonder.
A is asking a yes/no-question: only yes or no are acceptable answers.
According to the Cooperative Principle, the answer B gives, has to be
interpreted as a yes or as a no (conform the maxim of relevance), and
it has to be informative (conform the maxim of quantity). Instead, the
answer is you make me wonder. This is not in agreement with either of
the maxims. The answer is not relevant, nor informative. Clearly, B’s
contribution will be in conflict with the Cooperative Principle, unless
some implicature repairs the conflict. The answer B is expected to give
is not just yes or no: answering with yes would certainly be an offensive
act towards the colleagues mentioned in the question. Combining the
failure of the maxim of quantity and the social desirability of answering
no, A’s implicature is that B’s answer is yes instead of no. This makes B’s
answer relevant.
However, B may continue his answer with: that is, I really wouldn’t
know. This continuation is inconsistent with a yes-answer. So, A’s con-
versational implicature induced by you make me wonder is withdrawn by
the second utterance that is, I really wouldn’t know. This is in agreement
with the property that conversational implicatures can be withdrawn
without causing inconsistency.
Conversational implicatures can not be conventionally tied to the
expression. If the expression you make me wonder is replaced by your
suggestion is worthwhile, the analysis of A’s implicature, as well as the
possibility to withdraw it, does not change. So, the implicature is not
tied to a lexical or syntactic pattern. Applying the criteria in table 3.2,
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B’s answer in (4) invokes a conversational implicature, derived from
(conflicts with) maxims of conversation, not tied to a linguistic expres-
sion, and free to be withdrawn.
Conventional implicatures are non-truth-conditional inferences, con-
ventionally tied to a linguistic expression. Levinson (1983) analyzes
conventional implicatures as conversational implicatures, except for
the way they are triggered in discourse: they are tied to an expres-
sion, instead of induced by a maxim of conversation. Levinson (1983,
p. 128) mentions that among others, lexical items like although have a
conventional implicature. Grice (1975) ascribes, among others, the ex-
pression of contrast in the use of but to conventional implicature. Con-
ventional implicatures are opposed to ‘conversational implicatures’.
Conventional implicatures can not be denied in a continuation of the
discourse without creating an inconsistency. Conventional implica-
tures are conventionally tied to linguistic expressions, like presuppo-
sitions, but presuppositions can be denied in some specific continua-
tions, without creating inconsistency in discourse.4
An example of a presupposition is given in (5).
(5) Jones has stopped beating his grandmother. (adapted from Sel-
lars, 1954).
A presupposition of the sentence (5) is: Jones has been beating his grand-
mother. Since this statement can not be an inference from conversation
(it may be inferred without conversational context), it is not taken to
be a conversational implicature. A reason to argue that it is a presup-
position and not a conventional implicature, would be that it can not
be withdrawn without problems, as (6) shows.
(6) a. ?Jones has stopped beating his grandmother. He never did beat
her, anyway.
b. Jones is not beating his grandmother. He never did beat her,
anyway.
The sequence in (6a) is inconsistent, for he never did beat her, anyway
is denying something that has been assumed on the basis of (5): Jones
did beat his grandmother. The sequence in (6b) is consistent, because
nothing is denied that was expressed earlier. The fact that it is the
formulation with to stop that is responsible for the difference between
4Karttunen and Peters (1979) dispensed with the term ‘presupposition’ and intro-
duced a dichotomy consisting of conventional and conversational implicature, in
order to make a clear-cut distinction between presupposition and other non-truth-
conditional implicatures. Conventional implicatures were both the original presup-
positions and some of Grice’s (1975) conventional implicatures. An adverb like too
was considered to have a conventional implicature. Whether or not but and although
were analyzed as presuppositions is unclear, for these lexical items were not taken into
consideration. Gazdar (1979, p. 40) discusses but as an example of a conventional
implicature that can not be analyzed in terms of Karttunen and Peters (1979).
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(6a) and (6b), shows that the presupposition is tied to the linguistic
expression to stop. The three properties that defined conversational
implicatures do not seem to hold for this presupposition.
A distinction between conventional implicature and presupposition
could be that the former can not, and the latter can be withdrawn
(Grice, 1975). A situation in which a presupposition can be withdrawn,
is shown in (7).
(7) Jones has not stopped beating his grandmother. In fact, he never
started beating her.
The discourse in (7) is acceptable, especially when reading stopped with
more emphasis. In the second sentence, he never started beating her de-
nies the presupposition of to stop. The discourse is still acceptable, so
this presupposition must have been withdrawn. The claim that con-
ventional implicatures can never be withdrawn is not based on spe-
cific evidence presented by Grice (1975), Karttunen & Peters (1979) or
Levinson (1983). According to Levinson (1983, p. 207), it must be in-
ferred from the claim in Karttunen & Peters (1979) that conventional
implicatures are presuppositions, that both may not be withdrawn. Al-
though this appears to be a matter of definition in Karttunen & Peters’s
(1979) plugs, holes and filters approach, it remains that with respect
to the distinction between conventional implicature and presupposi-
tion, the notion of withdrawing to avoid inconsistency has not been
defended very explicitly.
The distinction between presupposition and conventional implica-
ture becomes quite lean, this way. With respect to the three properties
used in table 3.2 to distinguish conversational implicature from pre-
supposition, presupposition and conventional implicature can not be
distinguished.5
To avoid confusion about the status of what is inferred by using
although, this inference will be called a presupposition, and it is sup-
posed to behave like a presupposition, in tests for presuppositions as
they are defined in section 3.3. Conventional implicatures will not be
considered to be a distinct group in this thesis.
Karttunen and Peters (1979) do not consider conversational impli-
catures as part of the core meaning of utterances, but as meaning in
context. Presuppositions need to be entailed by their context. This
makes it possible to define different kinds of contexts: some contexts
(defined as, e.g., classes of verbs) entail their presuppositions (‘holes’);
other contexts do not (‘plugs’), and in compound utterances, some log-
ical connectives (e.g. if...then, or) adjust a presupposition of one of the
5This conclusion is contrary to Levinson (1983), although his position on with-
drawing is not very clear. He regards conventional implicature as part of the meaning
of deictic or discourse-deictic expressions. He claims that the meaning of such items often
involves reference to processes of conversational implicature (Levinson, 1983, p. 128, fn.
22).
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connected propositions in a calculable way (‘filters’). This is demon-
strated in (8).
(8) a. John stopped smoking.
b. Mary asked whether John stopped smoking.
c. Mary noticed that John stopped smoking.
d. If John stops smoking, Mary will be happy.
e. John smoked.
(8a) has as its presupposition (8e). In (8b), this presupposition is not en-
tailed by the context of the embedded sentence (namely, Mary asked...).
Neither Mary, nor the speaker or hearer, need to believe that John did
in fact smoke, to interpret the whole utterance correctly. In (8c), this is
different: Mary, as well as the speaker and hearer, ought to believe that
John smoked, in order to understand the utterance correctly. In (8c),
the context Mary noticed... entails the presupposition of the embed-
ded sentence. In (8d), the presupposition of the if-clause is entailed in
the context of the whole sentence, only for those situations in which
John actually smoked. This way, the if...then sentence works as a fil-
ter for the presupposition of an embedded sentence. The problem of
determining which presuppositions are entailed by which contexts, is
called the ‘projection problem’. The ‘plugs, holes and filters’ approach
is an attempt to solve the projection problem. Geurts (1996) calls these
kinds of approaches to solve the projection problem the ‘satisfaction
theory’of presupposition.
Gazdar (1979) criticizes this approach by showing that the condi-
tion that a presupposition should be entailed by its context, is too
strong.6 He replaces this with the condition that a (potential) impli-
cature or presupposition should be consistent with its context, in order
to be established as presupposition or implicature. Consistency is de-
fined with respect to the ‘satisfiable incrementation’ of a discourse. The
approach of interpreting presupposition as a part of an incremental dis-
course has gained ground since. Heim (1983) and Van der Sandt (1982)
are taking discourse incrementation as the basis for two different pre-
supposition theories: Heim (1983) follows the satisfaction approach,
Van der Sandt (1982) introduces the accommodation approach. The
idea that a theory of presupposition is a theory of discourse seman-
tics, or pragmatics, has become common ground: Geurts (1995) and
Krahmer (1995) follow the accommodation approach, Beaver (1995)
the satisfaction approach.
The problem of how to identify presuppositions, and how to distin-
guish them from conversational implicatures and other inferences, has
received less attention than the projection problem, and the properties
6Gazdar (1979) distinguishes between entailments, clausal implicatures, quantity
implicatures and presuppositions. Potential implicatures arise from conversational
maxims, potential presuppositions from specific linguistic expressions.
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of presupposition on discourse level. Van der Sandt (1989) claims that
resolution of anaphors in discourse is the same as acceptance of a pre-
supposition. Especially in the case of definite descriptions (the king of
France is bald) it is imaginable that accepting the presupposition (there
is a king of France) amounts to finding an antecedent of the king of
France, or accommodating an antecedent. The question of identifica-
tion of presuppositions is left open in Van der Sandt’s (1989) theory.
There is however, some debate on the identification of the presup-
position of a particular kind of lexical items, namely specifiers that give
rise to ‘quantity scalar implicatures’. What is interesting in these im-
plicatures is, that conversational implicature and presupposition both
seem to play a role in one construction. It is, however, quite a spe-
cialized discussion. Therefore, the identification of implicatures with
respect to only will be exemplified in a small subsection.
3.2.1 Interpretations of only
The interpretation of some linguistic phenomena shows an interplay
of conversational implicatures, entailments and presuppositions. It
is, with respect to such phenomena, quite difficult to distinguish pre-
suppositions, entailments, and conversational implicatures from each
other. These difficulties are exemplified by a discussion on the interpre-
tation of only. The aim of this section is to show that in the interpre-
tation of only, conversational implicatures and presuppositions must
go together in the interpretation of linguistic phenomena. In section
3.4.1, presupposition and conversational implicature will appear to go
together in the interpretation of some occurrences of although.
Research into focus phenomena (Rooth, 1992) and specifiers like
only (Horn, 1985; Atlas, 1991; Van Kuppevelt, 1996) draws more atten-
tion to the question of identification of inferences as conversational
implicature or presupposition. Discussions of identification of presup-
positions are quite subtle and complicated. Consider, for instance, (9).
(9) Only Socrates is running.
It is difficult to determine which part of the meaning of only is asserted
in the context of (9), and which part is implicated, presupposed or
entailed. For instance, are the propositions ‘Socrates is running’ and
‘someone is running’ entailments or presuppositions? ‘Socrates is run-
ning’ entails ‘someone is running’. So, if ‘Socrates is running’ were an
entailment or presupposition, ‘someone is running’ should also be an
entailment or presupposition, respectively. Geach (1962) shows that
despite this argument, ‘someone is running’ can not be an entailment.
He assumes that the assertion of (9), ‘no one other than Socrates is run-
ning’, is an assertion about ‘others than Socrates’. Suppose that there
is a situation in which no one is running. This situation would make
(9) true, since the assertion itself does not express that Socrates is run-
ning. In terms of truth conditions, a logical form of the assertion is:
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:9x(x 6= s ^ Run(x)) (‘There is no x such that x is not s and x runs’,
or: ‘no one other than s runs’). When there is no x for which Run(x)
is true, the truth conditions of this logical form are satisfied: the as-
sertion is true. However, the entailment ‘someone is running’ is not
true in this situation. So, according to Geach (1962), ‘someone is run-
ning’ can not be an entailment for (9), whereas it is expected to be, for
‘Socrates is running’ is an entailment of (9) (which entails ‘someone is
running’).
Horn (1985) tries to solve this problem by claiming that ‘Socrates is
running’ is presupposed instead of entailed. As a consequence, someone
is running is presupposed too. The assertion is still: ‘no one other than
Socrates is running’. Both (9) and its negation presuppose the truth of
‘Socrates is running’. Atlas (1991) does not agree with this solution,
because it leads to problematic cases. One such case is presented in
(10). (10a) is an assertion utterance, (10b) is its negation, and (10c)
should be the presupposition of both (10a) and (10b).
(10) a. Only Socrates is Socrates.
b. Not only Socrates is Socrates.
c. Socrates is Socrates.
According to Atlas (1991), (10a) asserts that ‘no one other than Socrates
is Socrates’; (10b) asserts that ‘someone other than Socrates is Socrates’.
Given the presupposition that Socrates is Socrates, (10b) asserts a log-
ical contradiction: ‘someone is Socrates and not Socrates’, and as a
consequence: ‘Socrates is not Socrates’. According to Atlas (1991), it is
wrong to consider (10b) a contradiction, whereas it is an acceptable ut-
terance in language (although the meaning of (10b) is not quite clear).
Therefore, another analysis should be made.
The real problem in (9), according to Atlas (1991), is what is taken
to be expressed by the assertion. This problem is the same for Geach
(1962) and Horn (1985). The fact that the assertion is not about Socrates,
but about ‘others than Socrates’, is causing the problems. Alternatively,
Atlas (1991) assumes that the assertion is Exactly one individual, and no
one other than Socrates, is running.7 The quintessence of this analysis
is that only turns the assertion into an assertion about someone other
than Socrates. The existential quantification (‘someone’) is unique (‘ex-
actly one individual’), the referent of the variable is an alternative for
Socrates. Further, (9) has a ‘grammatical presupposition’, there is some-
one other than Socrates.
This solution solves the problems of Geach (1962) and Horn (1985).
The situation that no one is running, can not make the assertion true.
The entailments that would arise from that situation, are simply not
relevant. In case of the sentences (10a) and (10b), the solution is that
(10b) is not asserting a contradiction anymore: ‘it is not the case that
7This assertion does not assert ‘Socrates is running’, according to Atlas (1991).
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exactly one individual, and no one other than Socrates, is Socrates’.
This assertion is still very strange, for it is unclear what happens when
more than exactly one individual, or someone other than Socrates, is
Socrates. But it is the utterance in (10b) itself, that has a strange inter-
pretation.
Now, the question is, whether ‘Socrates is running’ is an entailment,
or a presupposition of (9). According to Atlas (1991), it is an entail-
ment, based on another property of the lexical meaning of only: it is an
analytic entailment of ‘only Socrates is running’ that exactly one per-
son is running. This means that Socrates must be identified with that
unique person (like a definite description has a unique reference).
It is not the case, however, that (10b) has an entailment that ‘Soc-
rates is running’ on the basis of unique reference. In this case, a prag-
matic inference (or: conversational implicature), coming forth from
the maxim of quantity, is made. Only and also are two poles on a ‘Levin-
son Informativeness Scale’ (Atlas and Levinson, 1981), which means
that asserting Socrates also is running conversationally implicates that
‘not only Socrates is running’, and not only Socrates is running conver-
sationally implicates that ‘Socrates also is running’. It is not the case,
however, that only Socrates is running implicates that Socrates also is run-
ning, since the scale <only,also> may be used to derive sentences con-
taining also from sentences containing not only and vice versa, but not
sentences with only from sentences with not also.
More subtle distinctions in interpretation are achieved when focus
intonation patterns are varied; this will not be demonstrated here (see
Atlas, 1991). So far, this discussion has shown that determining mean-
ing properties of assertion, entailment, presupposition and implicature
is quite delicate in some cases. There may be interaction between as-
sertion, presupposition and implicature. The various approaches in the
literature (where although is considered to carry a conventional impli-
cature, background assumption or still something else), indicate that
similar difficulties with respect to the determination of presupposition
and implicature of although, may be expected.
As indicated before, the discourse oriented approaches do not say very
much about the relation between the form of the expression and the
type of inference that is made. The properties of a presupposition in
a discourse oriented theory, however, differ from ‘sentence oriented’
approaches. The main difference is, that the information expressed by
the presupposition may already be available in the previous discourse.
In the sentence oriented approaches, explicit availability of the pre-
suppositional information was not considered. Presuppositions may
be consistent or inconsistent with this information. Therefore, dis-
course oriented approaches have possibly interesting things to say on
the identification of presuppositions. In the next section presupposi-
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tion tests will be discussed. They will be used to establish the possibly
presuppositional nature of connectives like although. There will be a
distinction between two kinds of presupposition tests: embedding tests
and discourse oriented tests.
3.3 Testing although
To check whether although sentences behave as presupposition-bearers,
two kinds of presupposition tests will be performed. To begin with,
it can be established that the presupposition is tied to the linguistic
item although: the logical connective and is sharing its truth conditions
with although, but does not express any implication in the form of a
presupposition.8
Embedding tests are based on ‘survival’ of the presupposition, when
it is embedded in specific contexts. An assertion implying some propo-
sition is embedded in a negation context, in a conditional context or
a possibility context. If the newly formed complex assertion is still im-
plying the same proposition (in other words, if this implication can
be ‘projected’), it is a presupposition. The embedding test may also
concern the assertion itself: if an assertion, question or imperative all
imply the same proposition (or rather: ‘project the presupposition of
its embedded assertion’), it must be a presupposition. In Ko¨nig (1986),
three of these tests are used to characterize the presupposition of al-
though: the test of negative context, of interrogative context and of
conditional context. The corresponding tests will be performed in sec-
tion 3.3.1.
The discourse oriented tests introduce a new component in the test:
the behaviour of the presupposition when the information is already
available in context. Van der Sandt (1989) argues that presuppositions
are always interpreted with respect to a context. That is, if the pre-
supposition has already been uttered, it behaves like an anaphor: it is
deriving its contents from the antecedent. If an antecedent is absent,
it may be accommodated. In both cases, withdrawing the presupposed
information is only possible under specific conditions. These tests will
be performed in section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Embedding tests
Embedding tests are based on the principle that a presupposition should
‘survive’ the embedding, since the context is not blocking a presuppo-
sition in general. So, negation and modality are contexts that a pre-
supposition should survive. Questions and imperatives are a different
form of embedding. The tests will be applied to although sentences.
8However, sentences connected with and can be understood as causally connected
(see, e.g. Kehler, 1994). How connections are understood causally, without the use of
causal connectives, will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.
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The results will be discussed. As Beaver (1995) points out, embedding
tests are sometimes difficult to apply. The purpose of such tests is, to
find out whether some implied proposition is a presupposition. This
is especially relevant in unclear cases: when the implied proposition
is not directly recognizable as a presupposition. The embedding test
is based on the recognition of the same implied proposition, but now
for a complex sentence (namely, the context it is supposed to survive).
But recognition of the implied proposition was problematic in the first
place. The embedding test is not suited, then, for those cases in which
a test is needed.
Negation
Negation is the most classical test for presupposition. In fact, the nega-
tion test follows directly from Strawson’s (1950) definition of presup-
position (taken from Levinson, 1983, p.175).
(11) Classic definition of presupposition
A statement A presupposes another statement B iff:
a. if A is true, B is true;
b. if A is false, B is true.9
The test that can be derived from the definition in (11) is formulated
as follows: if an assertion (A) implies some proposition (B), then the
negation of the assertion should imply the same proposition. If this is
the case, the definition can be applied correctly.
For instance, (12a) has the same presupposition as (12b), namely
(12c).
(12) a. Jones stopped beating his grandmother.
b. Jones did not stop beating his grandmother.
c. Jones was beating his grandmother.
(12b) is interpreted as ‘Jones is beating his mother’, with an implica-
tion that he has beaten her also before he did not stop beating. In
(12a), Jones was beating his grandmother before he stopped beating
her. The proposition implied in (12a) is also implied in (12b), so it sur-
vives a context of negation. Therefore, (12a) and (12b) have the same
presupposition, namely (12c).
The negation test is performed for although in (13).
(13) a. Although he sauntered to the university, Theo was exhausted.
b. It is not the case that although he sauntered to the university,
Theo was exhausted.
9In an interpretation more suited in semantic theory, A and B are interpreted as
sentences. The if ... then clause (11a) should in that case be read as ‘in all situations
where A is true, B is true’ (and the same goes for (11b)).
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c. Normally, if you saunter, you are not exhausted.
The alleged presupposition of both (13a) and (13b) is given in (13c).
Not in (13b) is meant to have scope over both clauses. The main prob-
lem with the negation test for (13) is to determine the meaning (and
possible inferences) of (13b). This is not only a problem for the applica-
tion of the negation test for although, but also for other constructions,
as Seuren (1985) shows. Given the assumption that although behaves
as a logical conjunction in a semantic representation, the negation can
be broken down to the parts of the conjunction, using the De Morgan’s
Law, given in (14).
(14) De Morgan's Law
:( ^  ) $ : _ : 
(14) reads: the negation of a conjunction is equivalent with the nega-
tions of the disjuncts of a disjunction. Applied to (13b), the equivalent
proposition can be paraphrased as: Theo did not saunter to the uni-
versity, or he was not exhausted. This disjunction is equivalent with
the following implication: if Theo sauntered to the university, then he
was not exhausted. So, because of the unnaturalness of (13b), it is hard
to tell whether the implication projects, but there will be no logical
contradictions when it does.
There is no logical consistency problem with (13b). Rather, (13a)
seems to contradict its presupposition, (13c). The formulation of the
presupposition, using normally, prevents contradiction: the defeasibil-
ity of the implication contained in the presupposition makes it possible
to deny its consequence, while the implication itself is not denied. In
the definition of the presupposition in (2), defeasibility is represented
as ‘>’. A definition of defeasibility will be given in section 3.7.
Still, the negation test suffers from unnaturalness when applied to
although. With respect to other presupposition phenomena, this was
already noticed by Gazdar (1979). Moreover, the problem of identifica-
tion of an implied proposition as a presupposition by having to recog-
nize this proposition in both the embedded and the complex sentence,
makes the test unreliable, as noted in the introduction of this section.
Modality
In possibility contexts, the presupposition should project too. In (15),
this is tested for to stop.
(15) a. Jones stopped beating his grandmother.
b. Perhaps Jones stopped beating his grandmother.
c. Jones was beating his grandmother.
The alleged presupposition of (15a) and (15b) is presented in (15c). A
possibility context, invoked by perhaps in (15b), makes the event or
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situation within its scope uncertain: the sentence Perhaps Jones stopped
beating his grandmother in (15b) is now true when the event of ‘Jones
stopped beating his grandmother’ is likely to happen, as well as when
it actually occurs. In (15a) and (15b), it is still assumed that Jones in
fact did beat her before he stopped. So, where the assertion of (15b)
does not imply that the event of ‘stop beating’ has actually happened,
its presupposition ‘was beating’ needs to be factual. In other words, the
presupposition of to stop is projected onto modal contexts.
In (16), although is put in a possibility context.
(16) a. It is possible that although he sauntered to the university, Theo
was exhausted.
b. Normally, if you saunter, you don’t get exhausted.
The interpretation of (16a) is that Theo is possibly an exception on the
rule expressed in the presupposition in (16b). So, the presupposition
survives embedding in a modal context.
The possibility operator has (wide) scope over both clauses. It is
possible, by using comma intonation just before the although clause, to
have narrow scope over the main clause. Narrow scope over just the
although clause is not possible. The narrow scope reading is more easily
obtained in (17), where the main clause is preposed.
(17) Perhaps Theo was exhausted, although he sauntered to the uni-
versity.
Perhaps expresses modality in (17). This time there is scope ambigu-
ity.10: perhaps has narrow scope over Theo was exhausted and wide scope
over the whole sentence. In the latter case, there is in principle no
difference with (16a). The interpretation could be paraphrased as: ‘per-
haps Theo was exhausted in spite of his sauntering to the university’. In
the former case, the interpretation could be paraphrased by ‘I only saw
him saunter, but perhaps Theo was exhausted’.11 It seems that narrow
scope corresponds with epistemic interpretation and wide scope with
semantic interpretation.
Sanders et al. (1992) claim that semantic causal relations have scope
ambiguity, whereas pragmatic causal relations may only have narrow
scope. Thus, they support the observation made with respect to (17).
Their observation that semantic causal relations may have scope ambi-
guity is not in line with the observations made with respect to (16a).
10Of course, preposing the main clause in (13) would lead to scope ambiguity in the
negation test. This is giving no interesting results, except some additional evidence for
the unnatural results of the negation test.
11The presupposition would be: ‘normally, from the fact that Theo saunters, I con-
clude that he will not get exhausted. The real world connection supporting this con-
clusion, is not obtained by abduction, but corresponds with the semantic interpreta-
tion.
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Sanders et al. (1992, p. 9) demonstrate for a Dutch example that the se-
mantic causal interpretation of (18) is ambiguous for wide and narrow
scope.12
(18) Misschien is Jan thuis omdat hij ziek is.
Maybe John is at home because he is ill.
By preposing the omdat sentence in (19a), and by splitting the omdat
sentence in (19b), they try to show that the semantic causal relation in
(18) is ambiguous between wide and narrow scope.
(19) a. [Dat Jan thuis is omdat hij ziek is] is misschien zo.
[That John is at home because he is ill] may be the case.
b. Omdat hij ziek is, is het misschien zo [dat Jan thuis is].
Because he is ill, it may be the case [that John is at home].
In (19a), the paraphrase of (18) puts the whole omdat sentence in scope
of misschien (‘maybe’) (as indicated by the square brackets). In (19b),
the paraphrase forces the main clause dat Jan thuis is to be in scope
of misschien on its own (as indicated by the square brackets). What
Sanders et al. (1992) do not remark, is that the nature of the relation in
(19b) has changed: it has become an epistemic relation. In fact, (19b)
is not as much a paraphrase of (18), as it is a paraphrase of (20).
(20) Misschien is Jan thuis, omdat hij ziek is.
Maybe John is at home, because he is ill.
As Sweetser (1990) notes, comma intonation in because sentences in-
dicates epistemic interpretation. The real world connection is not re-
versed by abduction to obtain epistemic interpretation (cf. chapter 2,
section 2.2). So, where Sanders et al. (1992) claimed that the seman-
tic interpretation of (18) is ambiguous for narrow and wide scope, the
claim should be that (18) is ambiguous for epistemic and semantic in-
terpretation, corresponding with narrow and wide scope reading, re-
spectively.
The conclusion is, that the embedding test using modality is not
only confirming the presupposition of although, but it also provides
different readings for wide and narrow scope. Moreover, similar obser-
vations have been made with respect to because sentences, which leads
to the conjecture that because should be analyzed in the same way as
although. This will be done in section 3.5.
12In section 3.5, a presupposition for because will be proposed. With respect to nar-
row and wide scope reading, there are no differences between because and although,
nor between their Dutch counterparts.
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Question and imperative
The interrogative test, already performed for although in Ko¨nig (1986),
is (re)defined in Van der Sandt’s (1988) ‘constancy under illocutionary
force’. The idea behind the test is, that a presupposition is insensitive
to differences in illocutionary meaning, contrary to conversational im-
plicatures. Both assertion and question with the same propositional
content should have the same presupposition. In (21), this is shown
for the presupposition of to stop.
(21) a. Did Jones stop beating his grandmother?
b. Make Jones stop beating his grandmother!
c. Jones was beating his grandmother.
The implication of (21a) and (21b) is the same, namely (21c). Thus, the
presupposition of to stop projects onto questions and imperatives.
Applied to although sentences, the result in (22) is obtained.
(22) a. Was Theo exhausted, although he sauntered to the university?
b. Make Theo exhausted, although he is sauntering to the univer-
sity!
c. Normally, if you saunter, you are not exhausted.
The implication of (22a) is the same as the implication of (22b), namely
(22c). In (22a), the possibility that Theo is not exhausted, and in (22b)
the possibility that he did other exhausting activities, are more pro-
found than in the asserted sentence (13a). In (22a), Theo does not have
to become exhausted, due to the question. In (22b) he has to become
exhausted, but this may fail to happen. In both cases, however, it is
assumed that sauntering to the university is not usually causing what
is asked or demanded. So, with respect to questions and imperative
contexts, a denial of expectation is presupposed when using although.
In (23), the although clause is preposed.
(23) a. *Was although he sauntered to the university, Theo exhausted?
b. *Make although he is sauntering to the university, Theo ex-
hausted!
Preposing the although clause is impossible for syntactic reasons, be-
cause the main verb of the main sentence is used to form the question
or imperative with, as (23) shows.13
The embedding test rendered positive results in those cases where re-
sult was possible. A remarkable result evolved from the possibility test,
where scope ambiguity distinguished between a semantic and an epis-
temic interpretation. The results are summarized in table (3.3).
13The presence of although blocks the forming of question or imperative (see Weer-
man, 1989, for an explanation in syntactic terms).
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Test: Negation Modality Question Imperative
although clause first
p p
* *
although clause last -
p p p
Although clause first/last: the sentence containing although was sub-
mitted to the test with the although clause in front of/following the
main clause.
-: test not performed;
p
: presupposition is projected; *: ungrammati-
cal result.
Table 3.3: Embedding tests for although
From table 3.3, the following conclusions may be drawn. Although
behaves like a presupposition in the tests of negation and modality
when the although clause comes first; in the other tests, the utterances
were ungrammatical. Although behaves like a presupposition inducer
in the tests of modality, question and imperative; for negation, the test
gave no interpretable results. The cases in which although does not
behave like a presupposition, can be explained from the fact that the
embedding tests are meant to be performed on singular propositions.
3.3.2 Discourse oriented tests
Around 1980, three theories of presupposition were developed, that
took into account the presence of information provided by context.
Not only should an embedded presupposition be capable of projecting
to its embedding context, it could also be associated with information
already available.
In the first approach, Gazdar (1979), a satisfiable incrementation of
a discourse is defined. He defines potential presuppositions: if there
were no projection problem, or other suppressing mechanisms, all po-
tential presuppositions would be member of the presupposition set of
an utterance. Implicatures.14 are then defined as potential implicatures
that survive the interpretation of an utterance in its context. Since
there are limitations to projection, only those potential implicatures
14Gazdar (1979), chapter 3, speaks of implicatures as Gricean conversational and
conventional implicatures. He is not interested in implicatures that are purely conver-
sational (i.e. are not associated with any linguistic entity), but he analyzes generalized
conversational implicatures: implicatures that come forth from one of the maxims
of conversation, but are also associated with some linguistic pattern. Since Gazdar
considers the association of an implicature with a linguistic pattern as more signif-
icant for language competence than its motivation in terms of maxims, he prefers
the term generalized conventional implicature, for both conventional and generalized
conversational implicature. Gazdar (1979, p. 40) remarks that but has a conventional
implicature, but he does not indicate what kind of implicature but would have in his
new classification.
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and presuppositions that are consistent with their context (and each
other), are realized. In the process of interpretation, implicatures are
checked before presuppositions, which makes it possible for an impli-
cature to prevent a presupposition to survive, but not the other way
around.
The second theory is the satisfaction approach (Karttunen, 1974;
Karttunen and Peters, 1979; Heim, 1983). It distinguishes different
kinds of contexts that need to entail presuppositions. Only entailed
presuppositions may survive. Heim (1983) extends this approach in a
discourse theory (File Change Semantics) that defines correctness of an
incrementation of a discourse.
The third approach is Van der Sandt’s (1989) account. In his theory,
presuppositions are in need for an antecedent. When there is no an-
tecedent, it will be accommodated (this idea stems from Lewis, 1979),
unless this results in inconsistencies in the discourse representation.
An important difference between Van der Sandt’s (1982) theory and
Gazdar’s (1979), is the way in which presuppositions come about when
a sentence is interpreted in its context. With Van der Sandt (1982),
any presupposition comes about, by accommodation, unless it creates
an inconsistency. Specific explanations, taking contextual factors into
account, may be used for those cases. In Gazdar’s (1979) theory, poten-
tial presuppositions only survive when they are consistent with context
and other implicatures. It is quite common for a potential presupposi-
tion, not to survive. There are general rules that describe circumstances
in which potential presuppositions fail to come about. This approach
has a weak side. Contexts determine to a large extent the circumstances
in which a potential presupposition fails to survive. Since contexts are
unpredictable, not every failure to survive can be described as a ‘gen-
eralized failure’. Contrary to this approach, Van der Sandt (1982) ex-
plains presupposition failure as an odd case, possibly caused by a spe-
cific context, and the anaphoric reference or accommodation as the
regular case. Beaver (1995) argues that Van der Sandt’s (1982) theory is
empirically most adequate.15
In an accommodation theory, an explanation of presupposi-
tion related inferences may be given without any direct def-
inition of what the presuppositions of complex sentences
are. This is the case in Van der Sandt’s recent theory, where
accommodation cuts and pastes the elementary presupposi-
tions into the logical form itself, until a logical form is pro-
duced containing no further presuppositions. Although we
can not say that the possible presuppositions of complex
sentences are structurally predictable, since complex sen-
tences are given no presuppositions, we may still say that
15The theory developed in Beaver (1995), however, is building on Karttunen (1974)
and Heim (1982).
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Van der Sandt has employed a structural notion of accom-
modation: what is accommodated is strictly drawn from
amongst the elementary presuppositions. (Beaver, 1995, p.119)
‘Elementary presupposition’ is in the case of although a problematic
notion. In principle, the elementary presupposition is a presupposi-
tion triggered by the linguistic expression. In the light of the projec-
tion problem, it is also a presupposition that belongs to a simple, non-
complex sentence. The presupposition of although is elementary, as it
is triggered by although, but does not belong to a simple sentence, as it
is a connective, inevitably part of complex sentences. Now, according
to Beaver (1995), Van der Sandt (1982) does not define possible pre-
suppositions of complex sentences, but he does define a logical form
of a sentence in its context, where all presuppositions fit in. In this
theory, there is no problem with the not quite elementary nature of
the presupposition of although, because the projection problem can be
avoided. Of course, the phenomena that caused the formulation of
the projection problem did not disappear. Van der Sandt (1988) sug-
gests that the filters in Karttunen (1974) can be reformulated in terms
of local contexts.16
In a discourse oriented approach, presupposition tests concern con-
text more than embedding. The essential change in developing tests
for presuppositions is that it can be made explicit in context whether
a presupposition is present or not. If the context already provides the
information expressed in a presupposition, the presupposition is re-
solved. If there is information inconsistent with the presupposition,
the presupposition fails. If there is no information, the presupposition
is accommodated. In conditionals, it is possible that the presupposition
only holds for the conditional itself, but not necessarily for its context.
On the basis of these relations between presupposition and context,
it can be shown that sentences containing although behave parallel to
sentences containing common elementary presuppositions. A sentence
that allegedly contains a presupposition, is presented in a context that
is consistent or inconsistent with the alleged presupposition. If the
judgments on sentences containing although, in such contexts, are par-
allel to sentences containing to stop, in the same kind of contexts, the
assumption of a presupposition for although is corroborated. Two kinds
of sentences will be tested: simple sentences and conditionals. A simple
sentence may not contain a presupposition that is inconsistent with its
context, but the same presupposition holds when the context already
contains the presupposed information. In a conditional, a presupposi-
16Van der Sandt (1988, p. 151) defines different ‘local contexts’ for each logical
connective: the left hand proposition of a connective has another context than the
right hand proposition, since the right hand proposition has the left hand proposition
as its context too. It is possible, then, to demand that presuppositions be satisfied with
respect to their local context.
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tion in the consequent may hold when the if-clause already contains
the presupposed information. This way, the presupposition is resolved
within the conditional, and therefore, it does not have to be consistent
with its context (the presupposition can be denied, if the information
in the if-clause is denied). It will be shown that for both simple sen-
tences and conditionals, the presupposition of although behaves like
other presuppositions.
Context and presupposition
The information a presupposition expresses may already be available
in the context. If this is the case, the presupposition is in fact already
established, and nothing needs to be done. If there is information in
the previous discourse that is inconsistent with the presupposition, the
presupposition can not be established: its antecedent is denied and it
can not be accommodated. An unacceptable discourse results. In (24),
these effects are obtained.
(24) a. John used to smoke a lot. He stopped smoking recently.
b. ?John has never smoked. He stopped smoking recently.
c. John smoked.
In (24a), a sentence containing the presuppositional information comes
before the sentence containing the presupposition (which is given in
(24c)). In (24b), information that is inconsistent with the presuppo-
sition comes before the sentence containing the presupposition. This
results in an unacceptable discourse.
The test is applied to an although sentence, in (25).
(25) a. Sauntering makes you restful. Although he sauntered to the
university, Theo was exhausted.
b. ?Sauntering wears you out. Although he sauntered to the uni-
versity, Theo was exhausted.
c. Normally, if you saunter, you are not exhausted.
The discourse in (25a) is acceptable, but the discourse in (25b) is un-
acceptable. The unacceptability can be explained by the assumption
of a presupposition for although, as given in (25c). This presupposition
is not consistent with its context, and therefore (25b) is unacceptable.
The judgments on (25) are parallel with the judgments on (24).
Zeevat (1991, p. 191) presents a pair of conditionals, here given
as (26), to illustrate that presuppositions may behave differently when
contextual information is contained in the if-clause of a conditional.
(26) a. If he was crying, then he regrets killing his father.
b. If he killed his father, then he regrets killing his father.
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In (26a), the presupposition that his father is dead, is accommodated.
In a continuation of this discourse, it will be assumed that ‘his father
is dead’. A continuation of the discourse in which his father appears to
be alive, is not accepted, as (27) shows ((27) and (28) are constructed
conform Van der Sandt, 1989).
(27) ?If he was crying, then he regrets killing his father. But if he was
happy, then his father is alive and kicking.
In (26b), the presupposition that ‘his father is dead’, is evoked by using
regrets. This presupposition is resolved by the information given in
the antecedent of the conditional. The presupposition is therefore not
accommodated in a discourse representation outside the conditional.
It is possible to continue with the assumption that his father is alive.
This is shown in (28).17
(28) If he killed his father, then he regrets killing his father. But if his
father is alive, he will be glad that his father managed to survive.
In (28), the first sentence is continued with information denying the
presupposition that ‘his father is dead’. In the consequent of this sec-
ond conditional, a presupposition that ‘his father is alive’, is triggered
by be glad. The fact that (28) is acceptable, means that the first pre-
supposition did not become part of the information accessible for all
anaphors and presuppositions in the discourse of (28) (as a matter of
fact, the second presupposition did neither). Instead, the presuppo-
sition in the first conditional is resolved by information given in its
antecedent. The presuppositional information is therefore only avail-
able within the conditional. As a result, the discourse may continue
with information inconsistent with the presupposition of regrets.
The judgments given in (27) and (28) are the same in analogous
sentences using although.
(29) a. ?If Theo is in bad shape, he is exhausted although he sauntered
to the university. But if Theo is in good shape, he is exhausted
because he sauntered to the university.
b. If sauntering makes you restful, Theo is exhausted although he
sauntered to the university. But if sauntering is tiresome, Theo
is exhausted because he sauntered to the university.
17Van der Sandt (1989, p. 284) shows that a presuppositional reading is possible, if
the context does not deny the presupposition itself, whereas it does deny (part of) the
contextual information. His example is given here in (i).
(i) If John murdered his wife, he will be glad that she is dead, but if she took those
pills herself....
In (i), the presupposition that John’s wife is dead, is still accommodated at the global
level. This example shows that contextual information is more important than calcu-
lation based on the ‘filter’ approach.
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(Readers who find (29b) odd, may try to read this discourse with some
intonational stress on because.) The first sentences of (29a) and (29b)
are made analogous to the sentences in (26a) and (26b). Without their
continuations they would both be acceptable.
In (29a), the antecedent of the conditional does not contain infor-
mation with which the presupposition of although can be identified.
So, the presupposition is accommodated. A continuation of the dis-
course may not be inconsistent with the information that ‘normally,
if you saunter you are not exhausted’. In the consequent of the sec-
ond conditional in (29a), such inconsistent information is given. As a
result, the discourse is unacceptable. The fact that the if-clause of the
first conditional is denied by the if-clause of the second, does not have
any effect on the acceptability.
In (29b), the antecedent of the first conditional contains informa-
tion that resolves the presupposition of although. The continuation
with an if-clause denying the first if-clause, makes it possible to have
inconsistent information in the consequent of the second conditional.
And indeed, the discourse in (29b) is acceptable, while the consequent
of the second conditional is not consistent with the if-clause of the
first.
The behaviour of the because sentence in (29b) is quite remarkable.
Intuitively, it seems that although and because are used in a contrastive
way. But this contrast is not made explicit. The inconsistent informa-
tion expressed in the because sentence is apparently contrastive with
the presupposition of although. It seems that because has a similar pre-
supposition, but with an interpretation that is contrastive with the pre-
supposition of although. This is exactly what will be proposed in section
3.5.
As far as discourse oriented tests are concerned, although has a pre-
supposition. Information inconsistent with this presupposition leads
to an unacceptable discourse ((25b) and (24b) are both unacceptable).
Consistent information does not lead to unacceptability ((25a) and
(24a) are both acceptable). In conditionals, presuppositions may be
accommodated. In that case, an inconsistent continuation results in
unacceptability ((27) and (29a) are both unacceptable). When presup-
positions are resolved within the conditional, a continuation denying
the previous if-clause may cause the context to be inconsistent with
the first presupposition, and still have an acceptable discourse ((28)
and (29b) are both acceptable). These results are presented in table 3.4.
The conclusion that although has a presupposition can be read from
table 3.4 by the observation that for every test the acceptability judg-
ments are the same for although and regret.
The test in (29b), the resolved presupposition of although in a condi-
tional, gives reason to assign because an analysis similar to the analysis
of although (see section 3.5).
74 PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR CAUSAL CONNECTIVES
Test: cc/ass. ci/ass. ci/cond./acc. ci/cond./res.
Regret
p
? ?
p
Although
p
? ?
p
p
: the discourse as a whole is acceptable.
?: the discourse as a whole is unacceptable.
cc/ass.: context is consistent with a presupposition in an assertion.
ci/ass.: context is inconsistent with a presupposition in an assertion.
ci/cond./acc.: context is inconsistent with an accommodated presup-
position in a conditional.
ci/cond./res.: context is inconsistent with a resolved presupposition
in a conditional.
Regret: regret triggers presupposition.
Although: although allegedly triggers presupposition.
Table 3.4: Discourse oriented tests for although.
3.3.3 Conclusion
In section 3.3, presupposition tests are performed on sentences con-
taining although. In comparison with tests performed on presupposi-
tions of to stop and to regret, tests on although show, at large, the same
results. A distinction is made between embedding tests (section 3.3.1)
and discourse oriented tests (section 3.3.2). Although does not behave
like having a presupposition on all the embedding tests, but the results
on the discourse oriented tests support a presupposition for although in
all cases. This can be explained by properties of some embedding tests
(the negation test does not always work), and properties of although:
being a connective, a complex sentence needs to be incorporated in
the test, where ordinary presuppositions can be triggered in a simple
sentence. In the case of the modality test, this leads to scope ambigu-
ity of the modal expression. The interpretations match with semantic
and pragmatic interpretation. This ambiguity, and the semantic and
pragmatic distinction, also occur with because. In discourse oriented
tests, consistency in context is judged, which leads to more stable judg-
ments for although. An interesting parallel between the interpretation
of although and because appears when because is capable of denying the
presupposition of although.
Two tests show a parallel between although and because. In section
3.5, the presupposition analysis of although will be extended to because.
Before that, in section 3.4, the interpretation of although is investigated
in more detail. The connective although is not interpreted as a semantic
denial of expectation only. In the previous chapter, other contrastive
interpretations were found as well. Are these interpretations explained
by the assumption of a presupposition?
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3.4 Extending the analysis
In the previous section, it was shown how a presupposition analysis of
although survived presupposition tests. However, only one interpreta-
tion of although was analyzed. Given the fact that interpretations of al-
though sentences differ when they occur in different contexts, it would
be premature to generalize the results of the presupposition tests in the
tables (3.3) and (3.4) to all occurrences of although. In this section,
these different interpretations with respect to their presuppositional
nature will be discussed in two clusters:
1. epistemic and speech act interpretation;
2. concession.
3.4.1 Epistemic and speech act interpretation
The canonical example in (1) was a semantic denial of expectation.
But in the previous chapter, three kinds of denials of expectation were
presented. In (30), examples of these interpretations are repeated.
(30) a. Connors didn’t use Kevlar sails although he expected little wind.
b. Theo was not exhausted, although he was gasping for breath.
c. Mary loves you very much, although you already know that.
(30a) is interpreted semantically, (30b) epistemically, and (30c) as a
speech act.
Semantic The presupposition of (30a) is straightforward: from the
two propositions a presupposition is derived by generalizing over the
subject Connors, as (31) shows.
(31) a. Normally, if one expects little wind, it is not the case that one
does not use Kevlar sails.
b. Normally, if one expects little wind, one uses Kevlar sails.
c. Exp(x;w) > Use(x; k),
where: Exp(x,y) = x expects y; w = little wind; Use(x,y) = x uses
y.18
In (31a), the derivation of the consequent renders a double negation,
because the presupposition is defined as the negation of the propo-
sition in the although-clause. In (31b), this negation is reduced to a
positive consequent.19 A translation of (31b) in predicate logic is given
18Little wind is taken to be a constant here, to keep it simple. See section 3.8 for a
discussion of these problems of derivation.
19This is not necessary, and in fact problematic, because the Law of the excluded
middle does not hold in formal models like Discourse Representation Theory. In Krah-
mer and Muskens (1995), a proposal has been made to solve this problem.
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in (31c). Generalization of Connors to one is expressed by a free vari-
able. An existential quantifier would establish a wrong interpretation
here: the interpretation of (31b) is more like a generic statement on
expectants of little wind: ‘expectants of little wind use Kevlar sails’.20
Epistemic The epistemic interpretation of (30b) is characterized by
domain restriction, as was described in the previous section. The para-
phrase: ‘From the fact that Theo is gasping for breath, I conclude that
he was exhausted’ could be a formulation of the presupposition of al-
though in (30b). The phrase: I conclude is introduced in the presuppo-
sition to restrict the domain of interpretation. This effect is obtained
by perspectivizing the conclusion to a statement for which only the lo-
cutor is responsible. The presupposition for (30b) is given in (32b) and
translated into predicate logic.
(32) a. From the fact that Theo was gasping for breath, I conclude that
he was exhausted
b. Normally, if someone is gasping for breath, I conclude that he
is exhausted
c. GfB(x) > B(i;Exh(x)),
where i=I (speaker); GfB(x) = x is gasping for breath; B(y,Y) = y
believes Y; Exh(x) = x is exhausted.
In (32a), a paraphrase of the interpretation of the sentence is given.
The speaker’s conclusion is a restriction on the consequent of the pre-
supposed implication: its truth value is restricted to the knowledge or
belief of the speaker. The presupposition in (32b) is translated into
predicate logic in (32c). B is translated as a two place predicate that
has a discourse participant as its first argument, and a proposition as its
second. The interpretation of B can be worked out as a domain restric-
tion: B restricts the interpretation of the proposition Exh(x) to a part of
the domain of interpretation. With respect to discourse representation,
it restricts the interpretation of Exh(x) to a specific participant of the
discourse.
There is another aspect of the introduction of the B operator in
(32c). This operator is affecting the interpretation of the presupposi-
tion. Does this mean that there is a new presupposition for epistemic
interpretation, independent of the original presupposition in (2)? And
if it were a new presupposition, does it have to be tied to some specific
expression? Clearly, the linguistic expression although has not been
changed.
20According to Asher and Morreau (1991), universal quantification should be used
in combination with their defeasible implication >, in order to express generic state-
ments. Thus, the generic variant of (30b) would read: 8x(Exp(x,w) > Use(x,k)). Since
the conditional aspects of the presupposition are more relevant for this chapter than
generic quantification, the quantifier will be left out.
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In section 3.2.1, it was shown that presupposition and conversa-
tional implicature were both involved in the interpretation of only (cf.
Atlas, 1991). It appeared to be quite difficult to determine which part
of the interpretation was due to presuppositions, and which part to
conversational implicatures.
With respect to the representation in (32c), B can be regarded as
the result of the application of a conversational implicature. It is part
of the presupposition for (30b), but it is derived as a conversational
implicature. There is a way to distinguish B within the presupposition.
It should be possible to withdraw the conversationally inferred part of
the presupposition in a context in which the presupposition itself can
not be withdrawn. In the case of B, a context should be created in
which B can be withdrawn from the presupposition without causing
inconsistency. An example from the previous chapter is repeated in
(33), where context played a decisive role in the interpretation.
(33) When the whole family is together, you can see how different we
are. Bill is always funny. John is shy, because he blushes very quickly.
It was shown that the epistemic interpretation (‘From the fact that John
blushes very quickly, I conclude that he is shy’) can change into a se-
mantic interpretation by changing context. Is it possible to make the
context inconsistent with epistemic interpretation, whereas semantic
interpretation still holds? In that case, it would be possible to leave the
B-operator out of the presupposition. In (34), an attempt is made to
create an inconsistency in the continuation of the discourse.
(34) Situation: A tells about family, B interrupts.
A: When the whole family is together, you can see how different
we are. Bill is always funny. John is shy, because he blushes
very quickly.
B: Well, he just has a ruddy face.
A is presenting John’s blushing as evidence for his shyness. The in-
terpretation of A’s observation is denied by B: John’s blushing is not a
sign of shyness, but has a physical background. A reaction of A can
be imagined, in which he turns the epistemic relation into a semantic
one: In fact, his ruddy face is the reason for his shyness. A justifies his
use of because by specifying the causal relationship he was - apparently
- thinking of.21 A takes B’s reaction as a denial of the evidence, not
as a denial of the semantic relation. Since the discourse does not be-
come inconsistent after A’s reaction, it appears to be possible to forget
about the epistemic interpretation while maintaining (or introducing)
a semantic one. In any case, a presupposition of although will hold.
21In (34), the epistemic relation is not obtained by abduction (given the appropriate
world knowledge). Therefore, the relation can be understood as semantic without
reversing premise and conclusion.
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However, if A would challenge B on the semantic interpretation of the
causal relation, they would end up in a disagreement. For instance,
imagine that A’s reaction to B would be: I can see from his blushing that
he is shy, then A and B would disagree on the causal interpretation of
John’s physical state. This disagreement can be seen as an inconsis-
tency in the discourse. So, when there is disagreement on the causal
relation itself (or: the presupposition itself), discourse becomes unac-
ceptable.
Is it possible to make a context inconsistent with a semantic inter-
pretation of a causal relation, without making the discourse unaccept-
able? In (35), the semantic variant of (34) is given, presented earlier in
chapter 2.
(35) Situation: A is making a statement, B reacts.
A: Some bodily reactions can have nasty effects on people. For
example, John is shy, because he blushes very quickly.
B: Well, he just has a ruddy face.
Here, B’s reaction can only be interpreted as a small correction to A’s
remark that John blushes very quickly. The presupposition: ‘Normally,
if someone blushes very quickly, he is/will become shy’ as such is not
denied. If B’s reply were instead : well, quick blushers are never shy, his
reaction would be quite odd. It should be introduced by a phrase like:
no, you’re wrong, because ... to prevent inconsistency in the discourse.
So, when the presupposition (in its semantic interpretation) is incon-
sistent with the context, the discourse becomes unacceptable.
The example in (34) shows that consistency in a discourse can be
preserved, if the context is inconsistent with just the epistemic inter-
pretation of a causal relation. The example in (35) shows that a con-
text inconsistent with the semantic interpretation of the causal relation
leads to an unacceptable discourse. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the presupposition of although is a presupposition in its semantic inter-
pretation (represented by a defeasible implication), and a combination
of presupposition and conversational implicature in its epistemic inter-
pretation (represented by a B operator in the defeasible implication).
The analysis of B as an operator in a representation of a presup-
position (as the epistemic interpretation of an expectation in a denial
of expectation) is in accordance with the insight expressed in Beaver
(1995), who attributes it to Atlas (1977), that the borderline between
conversational implicature and presupposition is not distinct, but flu-
ent. B might also be identified as an example of Soames’ (1982, p.85-
86) speaker presupposition, which is defined with respect to the par-
ticipants of the discourse, where the defeasible implication reflects ut-
terance presupposition, which is defined with respect to utterances in
their conversational context.
At the end of this section, the relation between presupposition and
conversational implicature will be discussed. For now, it is assumed
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that epistemic interpretation may be a conversational implicature, as it
is possible to withdraw the implicature in a context inconsistent with
it. A presupposition reflecting a semantically interpreted causal rela-
tion cannot be withdrawn in an inconsistent context (but results in an
unacceptable discourse).
Speech act Several conversational implicatures are used in deriving
the presupposition of (30c), the speech act variant of the denial of ex-
pectation (repeated below as (36a)). Deriving the presupposition as if
it were semantically interpreted gives an implication that is not intel-
ligible: ‘normally, if one already knows it, it is not the case that Mary
loves him’. This presupposition suggests a connection between ‘know-
ing something already’ and this something not being the case (which is
quite the opposite of a self-fulfilling prophecy). Here, a regular deriva-
tion does not catch the proper meaning of the presupposition. Intu-
itively, the presupposition could have a paraphrase like: ‘normally, if
one already knows it, there is no need to say that Mary loves you’. The
clause Mary loves you is used autonymously. In the presupposition, a
justification for not uttering this clause is given: the justification is
violated in the utterance itself. The verb know indicates that this jus-
tification refers to informativity. In fact, what seems to happen in the
presupposition is an application of a maxim of quantity: ‘do not make
your contribution more informative than is required’ (see table 3.1).
Mary loves you is the contribution that is more informative than re-
quired, because ‘one already knows it’. The instruction ‘do not make’
refers to ‘there is no need to say it’. How such an interpretation can be
derived systematically is shown in (36).
(36) a. Mary loves you very much, although you already know that.
b. (?) If one already knows [that]i, it is not the case: [Mary loves
one very much]i
c. If x already knows [that]i, I need not say: [Mary loves you very
much]i
d. K(x,Q) > :S(i;Q).22
e. where: K(x,Q) = x knows Q; S(i,Q) = speaker says Q; Q = Mary
loves you.
In (36b), it is shown how a paraphrase of a semantic interpretation of
the presupposition can not be made properly. In (36c), an attempt is
made to create a paraphrase of the speech act interpretation. In the
previous chapter, it was shown that two properties of this paraphrase
were typical for a speech act interpretation: the occurrence of a matrix
clause with a speech act verb like say, in which one clause is embed-
ded, and the occurrence of an anaphor (that) referring to the embedded
22Since Q is addressed to x, S might also be represented as a three-place operator:
S(i,Q,x).
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clause. In (36d), it is illustrated how these properties are represented.
The speech act verb is represented by the operator S, and the speaker
performing S is represented as its first argument, i. The presence of
the anaphor is reflected in the fact that the second argument of K is
identical to the second argument in the S predicate, namely Q.
It was suggested in the previous chapter, that apart from these two
properties, additional inferences were made in speech act interpreta-
tion. With respect to (36a), these inferences result in the occurrence
of the negated necessity operator (:), in (36c). The necessity to say
something when you already know it, is denied. Justifying or, in this
case, gainsaying (the necessity of) speech acts is typical for interpre-
tation in Sweetser’s speech act domain. Here, it is not the speech act
domain, but the restriction of the speaker to gainsay (the necessity of)
his own words.
The speech act operator S is essential as a marker for speech act
interpretation. In (37), another speech act example of although is given
(taken from Sweetser, 1990, where she used since. It is adjusted here for
use with although).
(37) a. The answer is on page 200, although you’ll find it for yourself.
b. ?If you’ll find it for yourself, the answer is not on page 200.
In (37a), the interpretation is that it is a bit superfluous to mention
the location of the answer, since you will find the answer anyway. If a
presupposition of although were derived straightforwardly from the ut-
terance, something like (37b) would be derived, an unintelligible con-
ditional. In the speech act variant of the presupposition, the mention-
ing of the location of the answer is gainsaid, rather than the location
itself. This can be paraphrased as: ‘if you’ll find the answer for yourself,
I do not tell you (where to find it)’. This is still quite awkward, but if
it were modalized it would be better: ‘if you find the answer yourself,
I do not need to tell you’, or even: ‘if you know the answer, I do not
need to tell you’, which might be considered a circumscription of the
second maxim of Quantity. Translated into predicate logic, something
like (38b) is possible.
(38) a. ‘If you’ll find the answer for yourself, I don’t need to say: “the
answer is on page 200”
b. Find(you,answer) > :S(i,Locate(answer,page200))
Speech act interpretation of although is the result of making inferences
from an unintelligible presupposition to an adjusted presupposition, in
which the S operator is used to gainsay (the necessity of) speech acts.
In (38b), the speech act is expressed as Locate(answer,page200). It was
mentioned in chapter 2 that the clause expressing the speech act was
used autonymously. Locate(answer,page200) should thus be identifiable
with an argument in the although-clause, since the although-clause is
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stating something about the main clause. The uttering of the answer is
on page 200 amounts to finding the answer, so it is possible to defend
autonymous use of the main clause here.
Summarizing the speech act variant of the interpretation scheme: a
speech act interpretation is, if not invoked by explicit speech act forms
in the utterance, recognized by failure of the semantic or epistemic
causality in the presupposition. A repair is made by the insertion of
S having scope over the representation of the main clause, and some
other operations on the basis of inferences that need not be specific for
speech act interpretation, in order to justify or gainsay the speech act.
With the introduction of two operators, it is possible to account for
three different interpretations of denial of expectation that were distin-
guished in the previous chapter. In a speech act interpretation one can
still assume that the causal relation is presuppositional and the speech
act operator a result of a conversational implicature. There is a problem
with this assumption, however: the causal relation is not a real world
connection anymore. In an epistemic interpretation, there was always
some real world connection supporting the epistemic interpretation. In
speech act interpretation, failure of the recognition of a real world con-
nection might be indicative for speech act interpretation. The causal
relation expresses knowledge about the reason why utterances need to
be said or may not be said. It is not possible to withdraw the speech
act interpretation, and maintain the semantic interpretation. In this
respect, speech act interpretation of although resembles concession, as
will be shown in the next section. The difference between concession
and speech act denial of expectation is that the latter still expresses a
causal relation, and will therefore be associated with a presupposition.
Conversational implicatures may alter presuppositions, using oper-
ators like B and S. The interpretation of concession involves more than
adjustment of a presupposition, as will be shown in the next section.
3.4.2 Concession: interference of implicatures
An occurrence of although does not always have to be interpreted as a
denial of expectation. There were two alternatives: semantic opposi-
tion, and concession. The interpretation of semantic opposition is left
aside, because semantic opposition can not be established by using al-
though. The other interpretation, concession, is not characterized by
a causal connection between the two propositions in the presupposi-
tional implication. Three questions are in need of an answer.
1. Does a concession interpretation of although have a presupposi-
tion?
2. If the answer to 1. is negative: how is a concession interpretation
derived?
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3. What are the differences and similarities in the derivation of both
interpretations?
In section 3.4.1, it was shown that conversational implicatures were
capable of ‘enriching’ a presupposition, such that the presupposition
maintained, but referred to another structuring of the domain of inter-
pretation.
In the previous chapter, it was shown that a concessive interpre-
tation was determined by context. Concession is not causal: it does
not establish a causal relation between the propositional contents of
its connecting clauses. Instead, a tertium comparationis is derived by
means of various inferences, or using contextual information. So, con-
cession may be affected by conversational implicatures, or even arise
from them. In this section, it will be investigated whether a conces-
sion interpretation of although should be regarded as a kind of enriched
presupposition, or as an interpretation based completely on conversa-
tional implicatures.
Is concession presuppositional?
To find out whether concession bears a presupposition, the sentence
in (39) will be investigated (taken from Spooren, 1989, using although
instead of but).
(39) a. Shall we take this room?
b. Although it has a beautiful view, there are blue coverlets on the
beds.
In (39a), the although sentence is contextualized: the interpretation of
(39b) involves a ‘yes or no answer’ to the question. This answer is not
provided: in the although-clause, an argument is given for saying ‘yes’,
and in the main clause, an argument is given for saying ‘no’. In other
words, there is a tertium comparationis saying: ‘we take this room’ (r)
which is inferred from the although-clause, and its negation (:r), which
is inferred from the main clause.
If there were a presupposition for concession, it should be a proposi-
tion that contains the tertium comparationis. There are three sensible
possibilities: the tertium comparationis itself, its negation, or a com-
plex statement containing the presupposition. The discourses in (40)
give evidence for taking neither r nor :r as a presupposition.
(40) a. We take this room. Although it has a beautiful view, there are
blue coverlets on the beds.
b. We do not take this room. Although it has a beautiful view,
there are blue coverlets on the beds.
If r were a presupposition, (40a) should be acceptable but (40b) unac-
ceptable, for the context is consistent with r in (40a) and inconsistent
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with r in (40b). If :r were a presupposition, (40a) should be unaccept-
able but (40b) acceptable, for the context is inconsistent with :r in
(40a) and consistent with r in (40b). Since both discourses are accept-
able, r nor :r can be a presupposition. So, maybe a complex statement
containing r can be a presupposition.
If it were the conjunction of r and :r, a contradiction would appear:
‘we take the room and we don’t’ (r ^:r). If it were the disjunction of
r and :r, a tautology would appear: ‘we take the room or we don’t’ (r
_:r). In the first case, sentence (39b) would not be accepted, for its
presupposition failed, and in the second case there would be no failure
possible at all. Spooren (1989) proposes to express the contrast of a
concessive opposition on a separate level, using modality markers to
form a conjunction with r and :r, as in (41).
(41) It is possible that we take the room and it is possible that we don’t
take this room.
In the concession interpretation, both derived arguments count as valu-
able arguments, although the second one (we don’t take the room) is
preferred over the first one. Spooren (1989) does not assume that (41)
should be regarded as a presupposition.
Part of the allegedly presupposed information of (41) is represented
in an assertion in (42). In (42a), contextual information, consistent
with (41), is added. In (42b), information inconsistent with (41) is
added.23
(42) a. We should not take this room. Although it has a beautiful view,
there are blue coverlets on the beds.
b. We cannot possibly take this room. Although it has a beautiful
view, there are blue coverlets on the beds.
(42a) contains contextual information consistent with (41). No incon-
sistencies should arise. Indeed, (42a) is an acceptable discourse.24 In
23Because (41) is a conjunction, denial of only one of its conjuncts will suffice to
provide an inconsistent context for (41). Note that the modalization is denied, rather
than the state of affairs itself.
24According to Sidiropoulou (1992), one argument considered in (42a) is evaluated
positively, and the other negatively. Contextual information determines which argu-
ment is considered positive, and which argument negative, if the connotations of the
although sentence do not differ amongst themselves. To this analysis, it can be added
that the pattern seems to be that a positive context gives a negative although-clause,
and a positive main clause, or a negative context is followed by a positive although-
clause, and a negative main clause. In this light, the discourse in (i) is strange, for the
context determines that the although-clause should be negatively evaluated.
(i) ?We are very pleased with this room. Although it has a beautiful view, there are
blue coverlets on the beds.
A beautiful view can hardly be regarded as a negative connotation. The discourse in (i)
is unacceptable, for it does not represent a proper argumentation.
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(42b), we cannot possibly take this room is inconsistent with (41).25 If
(41) were a presupposition, the discourse should be unacceptable. But
(42b) is acceptable, so according to the judgment in (42b), a concession
is not presupposed.
The answer to the first question is: a concession interpretation is
not due to a presupposition variant of although, at least not a presup-
position that would be in line with the tertium comparationis analysis.
Given the point of view that presuppositions need to be satisfied, and
that although is considered to be a presupposition bearer, an explana-
tion has to be given for the question why some occurrences of although
(like in (40)) do not need to have a presupposition. First, it will be ar-
gued that a cancellation approach like in Gazdar (1979) is not adequate
in this case. Then, a solution will be proposed.
Is expectation cancelled by concession?
If although is considered to be a presupposition trigger, it must trigger
its presupposition in every occurrence. If an although sentence is in-
terpreted as a concession, it must be explained why although has no
presupposition to be satisfied. A possible solution might be that a con-
cession interpretation, based on conversational implicatures, cancels
the presupposition that although has triggered.
In Gazdar (1979), it is proposed that presuppositions are derived
from ‘potential presuppositions’, and different kinds of implicatures
from potential implicatures. In deriving actual presuppositions and
implicatures it is possible that some implicature cancels a potential
presupposition. This potential presupposition will not be realized as
an actual presupposition. Is it possible that likewise, a potential im-
plicature of concession cancels a potential presupposition of denial of
expectation?
To answer this question, a next question needs to be answered: is
the interpretation of (39b) a concession because a denial of expectation
was not possible in its own right, or because the concession overruled
the denial of expectation?
First, it must be checked whether a denial of expectation is possible
in its own right in (39b). The presupposed expectation should read: ‘if
a room has a beautiful view, there are no blue coverlets on the beds.’
There is no real world connection between beautiful views and lack
of blue coverlets in the world as we know it. It is even unlikely that
someone believes that there are no blue coverlets on the beds, as he
sees the beautiful view: an epistemic interpretation is impossible. A
speech act interpretation would read: ‘In spite of the fact that the view
from this room is beautiful, I must say this: there are blue coverlets on
25This can be shown as follows: (41) can be represented in propositional logic as:
p ^ :p. This is equivalent with ::p ^ :p. We cannot possibly take this room
is represented as :p. This contradicts the first conjunct of (41), ::p, and conse-
quently the whole conjunction.
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the beds’. A presupposition, rendering this interpretation, should read:
‘normally, if the view is beautiful, you do not need to say: there are
blue coverlets on the beds.’ This would not be a possible speech act
interpretation of (39b). It is impossible to have a denial of expectation
in (39b), whatever variant is used. This impossibility is independent
of the possibility of an implicature-based interpretation of concession.
This makes it problematic to speak of cancellation, since the expecta-
tion could not be established anyhow.
Be cooperative
Cases where although is used, and concession is interpreted, appear to
be problematic. Concession does not cancel some presupposition ex-
pressing an expectation, for it is not possible to derive such an expec-
tation in the first place. But still, presupposition theory predicts that
if although triggers a presupposition, it should do so on every occasion.
There are two questions with respect to the interpretation of (39b):
1. Why does the lack of a presupposition for although not lead to
unacceptability of (39b)?
2. How does the interpretation of concession come about?
The short answer to both questions is: the Cooperative Principle (stated
in table 3.1) prevents unacceptability by turning the interpretation into
concession. In this paragraph, it will be shown that making reference
to the Cooperative Principle makes sense, and is supported by facts.
Van der Sandt (1988) already demonstrated that utterances with
definite descriptions of non-existing entities (the horrible snowman feeds
on radishes) are felicitous utterances, because speaker and hearer simply
assume the existence whenever necessary. The proposition: ‘there is a
horrible snowman’, is simply accommodated in the representation of a
discourse, shared by hearer and speaker.
Simply assuming a causal link for (39b), and accommodate it, is not
possible, for the causal link has to correspond to a real world connec-
tion. To prevent unacceptability, another way of obeying the Coop-
erative Principle is used. In Ko¨nig and Traugott (1988), an analysis is
made of semantic changes in connectives. They observe changes in the
interpretation as in the following list:
 From temporal order to causal order (e.g. after);
 From concomitance to concessivity (e.g. still);
It must be noted first, that ‘concession’ means both ‘denial of expec-
tation and concession’ in Ko¨nig and Traugott (1988). In terms of this
chapter, the development was from concomitance to denial of expec-
tation. For instance, in (43), still did have a concomitted interpretation
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first: two events occur simultaneously, and nothing more (Ko¨nig and
Traugott, 1988, p.114).
(43) It is midnight and he is still working.
The reason why still gets an interpretation of denial of expectation is,
that the mere fact of co-occurrence is not newsworthy. What happens
is the following.
[O]ne of these cases where co-occurrence is highly relevant
and newsworthy is that where there is a general incompati-
bility between two situations, where one situation does not
normally occur with the other. And this is exactly what con-
cessive connectives express (Ko¨nig and Traugott, 1988).
Again read ‘denial of expectation’ for concessive here. A regular meaning
change of a connective is often due to the Cooperative Principle. “Since
the interpretative augmentations are conversational implicatures based
on maxims of cooperative interaction which later become convention-
alized, they are also observable in the synchrony of a language” (Ko¨nig
and Traugott, 1988, p.120). The idea that denial of expectation is con-
ventionalized from conversational implicatures, might be extended to
the difference between denial of expectation and concession (in the
definition of this chapter). Is it possible to make a synchronic analysis
of a concession interpretation as an exploitation of one of the max-
ims? If so, concession can be accepted as coming forth out of a regular
meaning change. The analysis need not be the actual reflection of what
happens in actual language use, for a meaning change leading to con-
cession might have been conventionalized on its turn again.
A concession coming forth from the Cooperative Principle, can be
analyzed as a reaction on the flouting of a maxim of conversation. An
example of changing the interpretation because a maxim is flouted, is
given in (44) (taken from Levinson, 1983, p. 112).
(44) a. Miss Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely
to the score of an aria from Rigoletto.
b. Miss Singer sang an aria from Rigoletto.
The maxim of Manner: ‘be brief’ is obeyed in (44b), and its interpreta-
tion is straightforward. In the context of a review of a musical perfor-
mance, the flouting of the maxim in (44a) becomes meaningful: Miss
Singer did sing the aria from Rigoletto, but not quite so good as the re-
viewer would have wanted to hear. The interpretation of (44a), that she
only sang well in a technical sense, is an interpretation of (44a) as an
argument in favor of a negative evaluation of the reviewer. The reader
interpreted the utterance as argumentative, after the ‘be brief’ maxim
was flouted.
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Likewise, a flouting of the maxim Quality: do not say what you
believe to be false, may lead to a metaphorical interpretation of a sen-
tence.26 However, most metaphors in everyday language are not rec-
ognized as such, for their metaphorical meaning has been convention-
alized (Sweetser, 1990, applied this view to the polysemy of connec-
tives) and is often the regular meaning of words and phrases. Below,
an analysis is given of a concessive interpretation coming forth from
the flouting of a maxim. Analogue to metaphorical meaning, this does
not mean that interpretation of a concession is in everyday language
still done by flouting maxims.
In (39b), no presupposition is satisfied, because a real world con-
nection between a beautiful view and blue coverlets on the beds could
not be established. As a result, the utterance is unintelligible (it can not
have a truth value). A speaker who uses an unintelligible expression, is
flouting the maxim of manner: ‘avoid obscurity of expression’.27 Un-
der the assumption that the speaker is obeying the Cooperative Princi-
ple, conversational implicatures may change the interpretation of the
sentence, in such a way that it can be understood without the pre-
supposition. The context in which the utterance is done, in (39), is
the answer to the question: shall we take this room? In order to obey
the Cooperative Principle, the concession interpretation is performed:
the tertium comparationis is given, and two inferences from the two
propositional contents to the tertium comparationis are made. Notice
that doing this makes a concession argumentative in its context.
The argumentative value of concessions has been discussed in de-
tail by Ducrot (1980), Elhadad (1993) and others. The use of argumen-
tative scales, called ‘topoi’, accounts for the content of the contrast
that is expressed. Originally these topoi have a comparative form (‘the
more beautiful the view, the more attractive it is to take the room’; ‘the
more blue coverlets there are on the beds, the less attractive it is to take
the room’), but according to Moeschler (1990) and Oversteegen (1995),
topoi may express the tertium comparationis as an implication of the
individual clauses (‘if the view is beautiful, we take the room’; if there
are blue coverlets on the beds, we do not take the room.’). The dif-
ference between presupposed statements and topoi can be defined as
follows:
(...) the derivation of a presupposed statement can be made
by means of reasoning on the basis of linguistic knowledge,
whereas the derivation of topoi involves reasoning on the
basis of real world knowledge. (Oversteegen, 1997, p. 63)
This corresponds with the observation that a presupposition of although
can be derived ‘stand-alone’, whereas the implicatures needed for con-
26Grice (1975) claimed that flouting the maxim of Quality was characteristic for
metaphor. This is not entirely true. See (Leezenberg, 1995, p. 86-101)
27Or, in a Russellian account, the maxim of Quality, because the speaker is saying
something that he believes to be false.
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cession need context to be derived.
The argumentative approach takes a different angle to the inter-
pretation of a discourse than the Gricean pragmatic approach. From
the Gricean maxims one can infer that an objective exchange of in-
formation between speaker and hearer form the basic (or: ideal) ac-
tions in a discourse. In the argumentative approach introduced in
Anscombre and Ducrot (1976), speakers and hearers may take a state-
ment as directing towards a conclusion. This aspect of meaning is part
of the ‘rhe´torique inte´gre´’, or the ‘argumentative structure’. While the
Gricean approach seems to withhold from argumentation, Anscombre
and Ducrot (1976) make it a central issue.
It is important to see that the Gricean approach is not really aban-
doning argumentation: in fact, this approach is capable of defining
when informative statements need to be interpreted argumentatively:
when a maxim is flouted, argumentative orientation can be one of the
modes in which an interpretation is possible. In this view, the theory
of Anscombre and Ducrot (1976) is especially relevant to those cases
where informativeness on its own can not give a proper interpretation.
Levinson (1983, p. 109) speaks, with respect to the floutings of max-
ims, of overtly infringing some maxim, forcing the hearer to do extensive
inferencing to some set of propositions in order to sustain the Coopera-
tive Principle. With respect to concessive interpretation, it can not be
maintained that the maxim of manner is overtly infringed, when the
presupposition is withdrawn. That is, the maxim is infringed, but the
interpretation is not marked specifically by the hearer as deviant from
‘normal’ usage of the presupposition. Geurts’s (1995) remark that what
started off as a pragmatic regularity has been encoded in the grammar (see
the introduction of this section), might apply to this flouting too: in
some processes, the flouting has become regular, and might even be
conventionalized in time. This is in fact what happens with the phe-
nomenon Levinson (1983) mentions as forthcoming out of flouting of
maxims: ‘the figures of speech’. Many idioms started off as a metaphor,
only to be recognized by the overt flouting of a maxim.
There is one objection that can be made to the analysis above, even
when it can be accepted that argumentativity is triggered by Gricean
pragmatics, and floutings may be common and not consciously no-
ticed by hearers: concessions may have preference over causal inter-
pretations in some cases. For instance, in the example of Sidiropoulou
(1992), already discussed in the previous chapter, and repeated here as
(45), both interpretations were possible.28
(45) Although he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music.
In (45), the problem is that concession is preferred in many cases,
whereas a denial of expectation is not ‘overtly’ excluded. So, the con-
28It might be a matter of individual preference, but ‘out of context’, a denial of
expectation still seems to be the most salient interpretation.
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cession interpretation can not be established as a consequence of pre-
supposition failure (and thus flouting a maxim).
This problem can be overcome by taking an important aspect of the
interpretation procedure into consideration, namely the difference be-
tween both interpretations with respect to context. Recall that in the
discussion of (45), a concession interpretation was forced by contex-
tualizing (45) with the question: is John a regular visitor of the Viennese
Opera? Sidiropoulou’s (1992) contextualizations were that the speaker
was looking for or interested in people from Vienna who liked music.
This contextualization turns out to be crucial in the acceptatance of the
causal relation. The generic statement supporting a semantic causal in-
terpretation is: ‘Viennese people like music’. This is not a statement
that is universally accepted. Within a more specific context, like the
ones just mentioned, it becomes unlikely to assume such a generic
statement.29 Suppose that the presupposition was accommodated in
the discourse representation of speaker and hearer. The discourse has
already been updated with information on the case of (45). The ques-
tion is John a regular visitor of the Viennese Opera? is not in accordance
with a causal relation between Viennese citizenship and loving music.
However, real world knowledge might support it. In this case, more
specific information will dismiss a real world connection. The defeasi-
ble implication that forms the presupposition is defeated when more
specific information contradicts the information obtained by defeasi-
ble implication. This way, the presupposition of although in (45) is
defeated when the specific information (‘I am not sure whether John is
a regular visitor of the Viennese Opera’) is not in agreement with the
defeasible implication (‘so, not all Viennese people are music lovers’).
If the main clause defeats the presupposition, the presupposition has
been established first, for there was a real world connection and it was
not defeated by context. Defeating the presupposition has now be-
come part of the interpretation of the sentence itself.30 In section 3.7,
an analysis is given of the way in which the presupposition is defeated
by the main clause of the although sentence.
There is a crucial difference between context defeating the presup-
position, and context inconsistent with the presupposition. If context
defeats the presupposition, it is not the case that the presupposition is
inconsistent with the context: it is not the implication that is denied,
but only the consequence of the implication. So, discourse will not
become unacceptable, but the contextualization of the although sen-
29There are individual differences between speakers, concerning the kind of context
that make the generic statement impossible. The context in which someone is ‘simply
looking for’ Viennese music lovers can be interpreted in terms of expectation, but also
in terms of argument: he is from Vienna, so he might be a Viennese music lover; he is
no music lover, so he might not be a Viennese music lover.
30It might even be assumed that in this case, the defeasible implication is preserved
as a general rule, defeated only by the exception in the main clause, giving the ex-
traordinary effect that the rule is established by mentioning exceptions (cf. Lagerwerf,
1994).
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tence has changed (the presupposition is ‘resolved’ in a special way).
If context is inconsistent with the presupposition, the presupposition
is not resolved and not accommodated. According to the tests in sec-
tion 3.3.2, this would cause unacceptability with utterances containing
presuppositions. Alternatively, the utterances may be reinterpreted as
a concession (if but or although are used), due to a flouted maxim.
Thus far, two ways of deriving concession have been described: first,
a concession was derived because a presupposition could not be formed
on the basis of a real world connection; second, a concession was de-
rived because a presupposition could be formed on the basis of a real
world connection, but was defeated in context.
In the case of (45), an epistemic relation may be formed on the ba-
sis of contextual information. How is the difference between epistemic
denial of expectation and concession determined? Epistemic interpre-
tation is paraphrased as: ‘From the fact that he is Viennese, I conclude
that he is a music lover’. It was already discussed that the epistemic
interpretation needed another contextualization, namely: ‘I can recog-
nize Viennese music lovers at first sight. Take John, for example. Al-
though he is Viennese, he doesn’t like music’. The same generic statement
is needed to derive the epistemic interpretation. The epistemic inter-
pretation is possible only because the context allows the generic state-
ment to be maintained: a relation between Viennese people and music
lovers might be assumed in this context. But given the other contexts,
the epistemic interpretation is excluded for the same reasons as the se-
mantic interpretation. So, context is making it possible to prefer con-
cession over denial of expectation, but the way in which this happens
conforms exactly with the procedure that was introduced earlier. This
procedure predicts that concessions and denial of expectations have
different behavior with respect to context: although an epistemic in-
terpretation can be preferred in certain contexts, it can not be changed
by a context: the causal relationship is given, not created. Contrary
to this, concessions are created by context: finding out whether John
is a regular visitor of the opera leads to another tertium comparationis,
rather than a search for a Viennese citizen who happens to like music.31
Now that interference of the conversational implicatures of concession
with the presupposition of the denial of expectation has become more
clear, it is possible to give a more general schema of how interference
takes place in general. Beaver (1995) notices a general tendency in de-
termination of different scope readings in presuppositional utterances,
which he calls the ‘Atlas method’. It is based on a claim in Atlas (1977),
that presuppositional readings of utterances are logically stronger than
non-presuppositional readings. Beaver (1995) elaborates on this claim
31At this point, it is worthwhile to note that the two contexts Sidiropoulou (1992)
mentions, ‘looking for’, or being ‘interested in’ are not creating undeniable conces-
sions, as they are not specifically in conflict with the causal relationship.
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by proposing that the fact that presuppositions tend to project might be ex-
plained in terms of a general preference for logically stronger interpretations
over weaker ones (Beaver, 1995, p.34).32 Beaver (1995) makes use of a
notion of ‘logical strength’ to explain the fact that presuppositions can
project from elementary sentences to complex sentences, while other
inferences do not.
This notion of logical strength may be used to classify the interpre-
tations that can be made of although sentences. If presuppositions are
logically stronger than implicatures, the prediction is that presupposi-
tions are expected more than conversational implicatures by a reader,
when interpreting an although sentence. The reader’s expectations are
part of his competence as a language user. This looks like table 3.5.
Atlas method: logical strength
Most expected interpretation
semantic denial of expectation presupposition
epistemic denial of expectation presupposition adjusted
due to context or knowledge
speech act denial of expectation presupposition reformulated
due to presentational factors
concession argumentative interpretation
due to a context-defeated
presupposition
concession argumentative interpretation
due to presupposition failure
Least expected interpretation
Table 3.5: Reader’s expectations of the interpretations of an although
sentence, taking logical strength as a criterion.
The order that is suggested in table 3.5 could be expressed as a con-
sequence of the relative logical strength associated with each interpre-
tation. In terms of the analyses shown in the previous sections, another
explanation is possible: the degree of ‘inferential effort’ to come to a
reasonable interpretation. To interpret a semantic denial of expectation
the presupposition is needed, but to interpret an epistemic denial of
expectation, the presupposition has to be adjusted. These adjustments
increase with the speech act interpretation of a denial of expectation
(especially the autonymous use of the main clause in paraphrase needs
to be captured in a formulation not derived directly from the utter-
ance). To obtain a concession, the presupposition has been defeated,
or it has failed. Next, concession has to be derived from context.
There is a problem with table 3.5, and that is the fact that the or-
dering does not correspond with our intuitions in all cases: conces-
sion seems to be preferred in certain contexts, as the discussion of (45)
32In his footnote 21, Beaver attributes this preference to Henk Zeevat.
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Survival of the fittest: contextual fit
Adjustment to context is easy
concession argumentative interpretation,
context-determined
concession argumentative interpretation,
presupposition defeated in context
speech act denial of expectation presupposition adjusted and
no direct real world connection
epistemic denial of expectation presupposition adjusted and
real world connection possible
semantic denial of expectation presupposition reflects real world
connection
Adjustment to context is hard
Table 3.6: Reader’s expectations of the interpretations of an although
sentence, taking contextual fit as a criterion.
pointed out. It is formally assumed that a presupposition is defeated,
but the interpretation of (45) seems, on the whole, to take less inferen-
tial effort than an interpretation of some speech act interpretations.
Another principle of ordering interpretations might be at work too:
the way in which the context may influence the interpretation. This
principle might be called ‘survival of the fittest’, or contextual fit. The
order according to this principle is reversed to that of logical strength,
as is shown in table 3.6.
In table 3.6, the interpretation of concession after presupposition
failure is most easily determined by context, for there are no other im-
plicatures that might interfere. Context determines the tertium com-
parationis. Concession after a context-defeated presupposition is also
determined by context, but the decision to defeat the presupposition
is also a matter of real world knowledge and individual preference. A
speech act interpretation of denial of expectation, is forced by context
and explicit speech act markers. To obtain an epistemic interpretation
of a denial of expectation, the context needs a specific turn (to set the
utterance in ‘observational mode’), and a semantic interpretation can
be obtained without any context. Concession can not, but denial ex-
pectation can be interpreted ‘stand alone’, even in contexts that will
not immediately support denial of expectation.
In a corpus analysis, Oversteegen (1995) found that concessions
share a discourse topic with the previous context more often than de-
nials of expectation. Her findings support the order in table 3.6.
In the process of determining the order of implicatures with respect
to although sentences, there are two principles that thwart each other,
namely the ones in (46).
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(46) Thwarting orders of inferences
 Atlas method (logical strength)
 Survival of the fittest (contextual fit)
How to predict in which cases the Atlas method wins, and in which
cases Survival of the fittest, goes beyond the purpose of this chapter.
Given the discussion of (45), it appears that it is important for the Atlas
method that the causal relation in the presupposition is strong enough,
and that survival of the fittest counts when the context provides spe-
cific information.
3.4.3 Conclusion
In section (3.4), it has been shown that given the presupposition anal-
ysis of although, epistemic and speech act interpretations are fitted in
quite easily by defining two operators, restricting the consequence of
the expectation. These operators are the result of conversational impli-
catures. The relation between denial of expectation and concession can
be made clear, by assuming that the former is determined by a presup-
position, while the latter is not. Moreover, the analysis showed that
reader’s expectations on interpretations of connectives like although,
are restricted by two principles: a reader expects the logically strongest
interpretation, as well as the best contextual fit. These two properties
give rise to different preferences in expected interpretations.
In the next section, one more extension of the analysis will be
made. This extension will be done without any extra costs of making
additional assumptions, and is, as such, a corroboration of the analysis.
3.5 A presupposition for because
In the previous sections, it has been established that although has a pre-
supposition. It was also established that a concession interpretation
of although was non-presuppositional. In the classification of Sanders
et al. (1992), concession is marked as an additive (or: non-causal) rela-
tion. A denial of expectation is both causal and contrastive. Could it
be that typically causal conjunctions are presuppositional? This would
mean that because has a presupposition analogous to although, given in
(47).
(47) A presupposition for because
Because p,q presupposes p0 > q0
where p and q are clauses, p0 and q0 are propositions associated
with p and q respectively, and > is a defeasible implication
This idea has been expressed in Noordman and Vonk (1992), Lagerwerf
and Oversteegen (1994), and Kehler (1994).33
33Noordman & Vonk (1992, p. 377) used the term conventional implicature.
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The assumption of (47) may explain the different interpretations
of causality, parallel to the interpretations although has. This will be
illustrated using two examples with because from the previous chapter,
repeated here as (48a) and (48b); (48c) is added.
(48) a. Theo was exhausted, because he had run to the university.
b. Theo was exhausted, because he was gasping for breath.
c. Theo was exhausted, because you keep nagging about it.
In (48a), a semantic causal relation is expressed; in (48b), an epistemic
relation is expressed: ‘from the fact that Theo was gasping for breath,
I conclude that he was exhausted’. In (48c), a speech act relation is
expressed: ‘The fact that you keep nagging about it, makes me say:
Theo was exhausted’. Perhaps a paraphrase of the speech act like I will
admit sounds more natural, but using say is not giving really different
results.
Applied to (48a), the presupposition will be: ‘normally, if one runs,
one is exhausted.’ The utterance is now acknowledging the presuppo-
sition, instead of denying it, as in the case of although. This makes the
presupposition less visible, but not less important: the presupposition
serves as a warrant, of which (48a) is only one instantiation (Noordman
and Vonk, 1992, p. 377). If you agree with the speaker on the accept-
ability and informativity of (48a), you agree on the shared knowledge
on which the utterance is based. The presupposition of (48a) is repre-
sented in (480a). The presuppositions of (48b) and (48c) are represented
in (480b) and (480c), respectively.
(480) a. Run(x) > Exh(x)
b. GfB(t) > B(i;Exh(t))
c. Nag(j;Exh(t)) > S(s;Exh(t))
Run(x) = x runs; Exh(x) = x is exhausted; GfB(x) = x is gasping
for breath; Nag(x,Y) = x nags about Y; t = Theo; s = speaker; i =
I; j = you.
In (480), no new devices have to be introduced to derive the presuppo-
sitions for (48). (480a) is derived straightforwardly from the definition.
The constant representing Theo has been replaced by a free variable to
account for the generality of the claim. It would be possible as well
to formulate the presupposition as a generic statement: usually, runners
are exhausted (or rather: usually, runners get exhausted). In (480b), the B
predicate is used in the same way as in (32c), restricting the conclusion
that Theo is exhausted to the domain of i. The interpretation of (480c),
is showing that the second argument of Nag(j,Exh(t)) is the same as the
second argument of S(s,Exh(t)). This is a consequence of the use of the
anaphor it in (48c). Theo is exhausted is used autonymously again.
An interpretation of because sentences analogous to a concession is
not available. A concession interpretation leads to a contrast between
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standpoints, when it is not possible to accept the causal relation as a
real world connection. In this case, lack of a causal relation just leads to
unacceptability, as sentence (49) shows (already presented as sentence
(31) in the previous chapter).
(49) ?Theo was exhausted, because he had been resting all day.
In Dutch, there are two connectives that may both be translated with
because, but have - partly - different interpretations: want and om-
dat. Different conversational implicatures are involved in the inter-
pretation of omdat and want sentences. Preferably, want will be in-
terpreted by seeking an interpretation using a B predicate; omdat will
be interpreted by seeking a semantic interpretation, adjusting with a
B predicate whenever necessary. The difference between want and
omdat is thus interesting evidence for the conventionalization of the
B-predicate in a connective. In French, the difference between parce
que (‘omdat’) and car (‘want’) is quite similar: the B predicate has be-
come part of the conventionalized implicature for the presupposition
of car. Instead of being some peculiarity of Dutch and French, the
epistemic and semantic version of causal connectives provide support-
ing evidence for the assumption of presuppositions for connectives. In
section 3.9, a special effect of this phenomenon will be presented as
independent evidence for the analysis in this chapter.
In general, it might be expected that other causal connectives can
be characterized in the same way. However, whether it is possible to
analyze more subtle differences between causal connectives in terms
of conversational implicatures, has to be investigated. For instance,
the difference between (50) en (51) is not predicted when zodat and
waardoor have a presupposition that would be analogous to the presup-
position of because (i.e., p zodat q and p waardoor q both presuppose
p > q).
(50) Er
There
heerst
rules
griep,
flue,
zodat
so that
Jan
Jan
ziek
ill
is
has
geworden.
become.
‘The flue is about, so that John has become ill.’
(51) ?Er
There
heerst
rules
griep,
flue,
waardoor
whereby
Jan
Jan
ziek
ill
is
has
geworden.
become.
‘The flue is about, as a result of which John has become ill.’
While (50) is acceptable, (51) sounds very strange. Apparently, the
cause for Jan’s flue has to be more specific for waardoor, as the accept-
ability of (52) shows.
(52) Iemand
Someone
stak
infected
hem
him
aan,
(on),
waardoor
whereby
Jan
Jan
ziek
ill
is
has
geworden.
become.
‘Someone infected him, as a result of which John has become ill.’
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Whether or not these differences have to be represented in presupposi-
tions of connectives, is an empirical question.
3.6 Translation into logical form
In the introduction of this chapter, a problem was posed that begin-
ning students would come across, if they were trying to translate natu-
ral language into propositional or predicate logic. In this section, it will
appear that not only beginners may profit from a more satisfying an-
swer. The natural language connectives because and although, can now
be translated into logic without interpretation problems.
3.6.1 Because as a conjunction
The basic lexical semantics of because is given in (47), representing pos-
itive causal interpretation. However, this is only the presupposition.
This presupposition is not made visible in a translation into logical
form. The meaning of because in logical form is truth-conditional, that
is: it can only be stated that the connective is establishing the meaning
of a logical connective. The logical meaning of because has always been
considered to be a conditional. This posed a problem for the intuitive
meaning of because. A conditional p ! q is untrue only in one case:
when p is true and q is untrue. It is counterintuitive to assume that a
because sentence would have the same truth conditions: because John
washes the car, he gets five guilders seems to be untrue, or at least deviant
in case John in fact doesn’t wash the car.
In the literature, this has been solved by assuming that the subordi-
nate clause, introduced by because, was itself presupposed. In that case,
the possibility that the antecedent was false would be excluded. This
proposal has been formulated in Lakoff (1972). It is recurring in the
literature from time to time (e.g. Van Dijk, 1977; Pru¨st, 1992). How-
ever, it seems just a repair of the problem caused by the assumption
that because has to be translated as a conditional in logical form.
From the analysis presented in this chapter, it follows that there is
no need to make such a repair. Because has an implicational presuppo-
sition that accounts for the causality of the utterance. There is no need
to assume a conditional in the logical form for this connective: its logi-
cal meaning is conjunction, so its truth conditions specify conjunction
instead of implication. Presupposing the truth of the because-clause has
become unnecessary: its truth is asserted in the logical form.
Note that the if...then construction is still conditional and implica-
tional: if...then does not have a presupposition, it is translated as an
implication, and its if-clause is not (pre)supposed to be true.
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3.6.2 Although is more than a conjunction
The logical meaning of although has always been a conjunction: both
conjuncts need to be true, in order for the utterance to be true. In an
introduction to logic, Gamut (1982a), it was mentioned that the con-
trastive part of the meaning of but was probably couched in a conven-
tional implicature, although it was not mentioned how this implicature
was specified. In this chapter, the answer can be given for although.34
The conventional implicature is a presupposition, defined in (2).
Contrastive interpretation arises from the contrast between the con-
sequence of the defeasible implication and its denial in the main clause
of the utterance. Causal interpretation arises in the same way as with
because.
Concession does not arise from a presupposition: two standpoints
are contrasted (an affirmation and a negation of the tertium compa-
rationis), and the conjuncts each provide an argument for their cor-
responding standpoint. The logical meaning of although remains un-
changed, but its causal, as well as its contrastive meaning is accounted
for.
3.7 The exception proves the rule
Up until now in this chapter, no attention was paid to a crucial prob-
lem: how can the expectation be denied, and still be maintained? As-
suming that although bears a presupposition means that the presup-
position is true for any acceptable sentence containing although in a
denial of expectation interpretation. How can this presupposition be
true while it is denied in the utterance? Essentially, the answer is that
it is not the implication as such that is denied, but its consequence,
as a result of which the implication is defeated. This way, more spe-
cific information can overrule the generic information without causing
inconsistencies. A definition of this interpretation must be given in a
non-monotonic logic (this has been done in Asher and Morreau, 1991).
In this section, the semantics of generic sentences will be applied to the
presupposition of although.
In the definitions of the presuppositions of although and because,
the symbol ‘>’ was used to represent what was paraphrased as: ‘Nor-
mally, if... then’. Symbol and paraphrase referred to what was called
a defeasible implication. The symbol was taken from Asher and Mor-
reau (1991), who designed a truth conditional semantics for generic
sentences. Consider the sentence in (53).
(53) Potatoes contain vitamin C, amino acid, protein and thiamin.
34And in fact, for but too: it is the same, but but has an extra alternative interpreta-
tion, namely semantic opposition.
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Sentence (53) is a true generalization about potatoes. Generic sentences
do not follow valid argument forms, but they support ‘reasonable in-
ference patterns’ very well. Asher and Morreau (1991) argue as follows.
Among the things not entailed by the generic statement that
potatoes contain vitamin C is the particular conclusion that
this potato contains vitamin C. Nevertheless, the generic fact
makes it somehow reasonable to expect this potatoe to con-
tain vitamin C, without at the same time making it reason-
able to expect any number of other things which are not en-
tailed, like say that the moon is made of green cheese (Asher
and Morreau, 1991).
Generic sentences express, in other words, expectations about particu-
lar instantiations of the regularity they express. In a denial of expecta-
tion, something similar happens: the presupposition gives rise to an ex-
pectation about a particular instantiation of the regularity it expresses.
However, the expectation is violated by the particular instantiation,
instead of confirmed.
The first step in making a semantics for the denial of expectation is
to establish that the expectation of a denial of expectation is express-
ing the same as a generic sentence. To show this, compare the two
statements in (54).
(54) a. Normally, if a woman is beautiful, she marries.
b. Beautiful women marry.
There is no difference in propositional content between (54a) and (54b).
Both expressions invite a pattern of ‘invalid but reasonable generic in-
ference’ (Asher and Morreau, 1991). The definition of such an implica-
tion is shown in (55).
(55) Defeasible Modus Ponens
8x(' >  ); '() j  (),
but not 8x(' >  ); '(); : () j  ()
This rule introduces another symbol, j, which means something like:
‘validates defeasibly’. If the but-clause is ignored for the moment, (55)
reads as follows: For all x, if it is a ' then it normally is a  , and
 is a ', and these two statements validate defeasibly that  is a  .
So, 8x(' >  ) is the expectation, and '() an instantiation. From
these two statements it may be validly concluded that  (), given the
epithets normally and defeasibly. The condition is, however, that the
condition in the but-clause is obeyed. This condition states that if there
is knowledge available contradictory to the conclusion, the conclusion
is not validated. So, if besides '() also : () is known, the conclusion
of  () is not validated. That is, the expectation still exists, only the
instantiation  () is not derived, for : () is asserted.
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The rule of Defeasible Modus Ponens describes exactly what is hap-
pening in a denial of expectation. The presupposition that is derived
has two properties: it is a generalization from the asserted propositions,
and the consequent of the presupposition is the negation of the corre-
sponding proposition. The example in (1) is represented as in (56).
(56) 8x(Beau(x) > Marry(x)); Beau(g); :Marry(g) j= Marry(g),
where Beau(x) = x is a beautiful woman; Marry(x) = x marries; g =
Greta
What is stated in (56) is just that it is not allowed to conclude validly
from the observation that Greta was beautiful, that she marries. The
reason for this is that it is asserted that she does not marry. So, the
only thing that is prohibited is to assume that Marry(g) is true. The
expectation is not refuted, because the condition on defeasible Modus
Ponens is explicitly excluding the possibility that we may conclude to
Marry(g), when evidence to the contrary is available.
3.8 Expectation as presupposition
The analysis in section 3.4.2 showed that conversational implicatures
are differently employed in deriving ‘contextually fitting’ presupposi-
tions, or a tertium comparationis. Conversational implicatures could
give rise to a B or S operator to ‘save’ a presupposition; on the other
hand, failure or defeat of a presupposition in its context gives rise to
a contextually driven derivation of a concession. Two opposing pro-
cesses, the Atlas method and Survival of the fittest, were introduced
to explain the difficulties in determining the interpretations of occur-
rences of although (and other connectives). A more specific picture of
the actual relations between utterance and presupposition (or contex-
tually derived interpretation) is given in Oversteegen (1997). She ana-
lyzes the property of ‘derivational distance’ between utterance meaning
and an underlying ‘basic scheme’ of the interpretation of connectives.
A corpus analysis of Dutch connectives like want (‘because’), omdat (‘be-
cause’) and maar (‘but’) shows that differences in derivational distance
are found in relation to different basic schemes.
Specifically, one of her results points out that in terms of deriva-
tional distance, denial of expectation needs to be distinguished from
concession. A basic scheme for concession is derivationally more dis-
tant from the utterance than a (presuppositional) basic scheme for de-
nial of expectation. This result supports the analysis made in this chap-
ter, given the observation that presuppositions are logically stronger
than contextually driven interpretations.35
35Contextual fit is not interpreted as a factor in the definition of derivational distance
(cf. Oversteegen, 1997, p. 68-69).
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Oversteegen (1997) compares two possible analyzes for but as a de-
nial of expectation. In one analysis, a basic scheme is formed that
has the same properties as a basic scheme for concession, and in the
other analysis, a presupposition is assumed that leads to a causal and
contrastive interpretation. She shows that the latter analysis accounts
better for the facts.
In the next paragraphs, two aspects of Oversteegen’s (1997) analysis
are discussed: first, her analysis of relations between utterance and ba-
sic scheme, and the effect these relations have on derivational distance;
second, the difference in derivational distance between concession and
denial of expectation.
Basic schemes and derivational distance
Oversteegen (1997) investigates the ‘pragmaticality’ of the use of con-
nectives. As an operationalization of the notion pragmatic, she defines
derivational distance between utterance and basic scheme. In order to
define factors that determine derivational distance, these basic schemes
are given first.
Oversteegen (1997) distinguishes the same interpretations as pre-
sented in Chapter 2. Causal relations, expressed by the connectives
Dutch omdat (‘because’) and want (‘because’ or ‘since’), can have a se-
mantic (bare causal Basic Scheme, as she calls it), epistemic (or belief
variant) and a speech act interpretation (or speech act variant). Her
three contrastive interpretations of connectives are Semantic Opposi-
tion, Denial of Expectation and Concession. Oversteegen (1997) de-
fines a Basic Scheme (BS) for every interpretation. The BSs are presented
here in (57).
(57) Utterance contains an expression of the form: p omdat q, p
want q:
 q0 > p0 (bare causal BS)
 q0 > Bp0 (causal belief variant)
 q0 > Sp0 (speech act variant)
Utterance contains an expression of the form: p maar q,
 p0 >  < q0 (Semantic Opposition)
 p0    q0 (Denial of Expectation)
 p0    q0 (Concession)
where p0 and q0 are propositions related to p and q
respectively; > is a defeasible implication; p >  < q is read
as ‘p is in weak contrast with q’; p    q is read as ‘p is in
strong contrast with q’; B is the belief operator; S is the
speech act operator.
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In (57), the first three BSs look familiar: they are not different from the
presuppositions formulated for positive causal relations in section 3.5.
The BS for Denial of Expectation is different from the presupposi-
tion of although, stated in the beginning of this chapter, in (2). The BSs
of Concession and Denial of Expectation are both represented using the
symbol   . This symbol expresses strong contrast on an underlying
level (for contrast on the utterance level would cause inconsistency).
Oversteegen (1997) assumes (at first) a Denial of Expectation to have
a BS similar to the Concession BS. The difference between the two in-
terpretations lies in the way in which the scheme is derived. A Denial
of Expectation is derived by forming an expectation :q0 on the basis
of p and contextual information. In fact, this derivation could be rep-
resented as: (p > ):q0    q0. Likewise, a Concession BS could be
represented by introducing r as a tertium comparationis: :r    r.
Some researchers prefer to regard Denial of Expectation and Conces-
sion as being similar. They consider an expectation to be a proposi-
tion based on p and contextual information, which is denied by q (e.g.
Foolen, 1993, p. 119-122). In the analysis of Denial of Expectation in
this chapter, the expectation is considered to be an implication, the
consequence of which is derived by negating q. It is one of the goals of
Oversteegen’s (1997) corpus analysis, to find out whether this analysis
is right (see the next paragraph for the answer).
A semantic opposition is represented through a symbol of ‘weak
contrast’, >  <. Since a semantic opposition expresses alternative top-
ics on utterance level, this contrast should be ‘weak’, to prevent incon-
sistency.
Given the basic schemes, relations between utterance and basic sche-
mes can be formulated. These relations concern a clause in the utter-
ance, and its corresponding proposition in the basic scheme. So, for an
expression ‘p connective q’, p0 in Basic Scheme is derived from p, and
p0 in Basic Scheme is derived from q. Four kinds of relations between p
and p0 (or q and q0) are distinguished, see (58).
(58)  identity: p0 and p are identical;
 generalization: p contains an argument that is generalized
in p0, all other things being equal;
 implication: p0 is a logical implication of p;
 inference: p0 is related to p through an inferential step based
on real world knowledge.
The notion of distance can now be defined in quantitive terms, with
respect to the way in which q0 is derived from q, and p0 is derived
from p. Given an utterance and one of the basic schemes, the distance
between q0 and q is defined as a valuation of the kind of relation they
have.
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Identity is valued as the least distant relation, inference as the most
distant relation, and generalization and implication are valued as tak-
ing the position in-between. The reason for these distinctions is the
following. Keeping arguments identical does not take any derivational
effort. Generalization and implication do take effort, but they are sys-
tematic relations, not dependent on real world knowledge. Inference
is, in the definition of Oversteegen (1997), dependent on world knowl-
edge, and not a strictly systematic relation. In order to annotate the
distances in Oversteegen’s (1997) corpus analysis, each derivation of q0
and p0 from q and p was given a ranking number: 1 for identity, 2 for
generalisation or implication and 3 when inferences were made.
This notion of distance enables Oversteegen (1997) to measure dis-
tances between q and q0 on the one hand, and p and p0 on the other.
Since distance is determined independently of the BS and its deriva-
tional properties, it is possible to compare the distances between BSs
and their corresponding utterances.
Derivational distance can be related to the notion of logical strength
(see table 3.5): the most expected interpretation should correspond
with least derivational effort. As for the corpus analysis, it is predicted
by table 3.5 that Denial of Expectation has a shorter derivational dis-
tance than Concession (see the next paragraph).
From the ease of adjustment to the context (contextual fit, in table
3.6), no predictions on derivational distance can be made, for contex-
tual fit is not among the factors that determine derivational distance.
An example of the assignment of distance to a basic scheme will be
given with respect to (59).
(59) Milosevic will never abandon his ideal of a United Serbia - because
that is what Vance and Owen will have to ask of him.
The interpretation of (59) is a speech act causal relation, according to
Oversteegen (1997). A paraphrase, reflecting the basic scheme, could
be: ‘If Vance and Owen have to pose a certain question to Milosevic,
(it makes sense that) I tell you that Milosevic is going to give a negative
answer to that question’. The occurrence of I tell you in this paraphrase
indicates the speech act interpretation. Given this basic scheme, the
distance between p0 and p is 2: that, referring to the predicate abandon
his ideal of a United Serbia is generalized, as the paraphrase indicates.
The distance between q0 and q is also 2: a negative answer is a general-
ized description of will never abandon his ideal of a United Serbia.
In the derivational distance of (59) to the basic scheme, the S opera-
tor itself is not calculated. If S was taken into account, the derivational
distance from utterance to some bare causal BS would have been mea-
sured. Since there is no sensible interpretation of the ‘bare causal BS’
of a speech act interpretation, this would be nonsense. The relation
between utterance and basic scheme, represented by S, specifies one
interpretation of an utterance containing a certain connective. The re-
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lations defined in (58) are not specific for one basic scheme: they may
occur in every possible derivation of a basic scheme.
In this paragraph, it has been shown how the derivation of a pre-
supposition from the utterance containing a causal connective can be
specified by defining the relations identity, generalization, implication
and inference. In the next paragraph it will be shown that taking these
relations as factors determining derivational distance, interesting dif-
ferences between Concession and Denial of Expectation are found.
Denial of expectation and concession have different BSs
It is interesting to find out whether the results of the analysis do cor-
respond with the order of logical strength, proposed in table 3.5. In
table 3.5, Concession was logically less strong than Denial of Expecta-
tion. In terms of distance, Concession should be derivationally more
distant than Denial of Expectation. Is this the case? Results for Denial
of Expectation and Concession are given in table 3.7.
Denial of Expectation in a non-causal basic scheme
Relation p-p0 q-q0
Denial of Expectation 2.67 1.33
Concession 2.53 2.30
Bare causal 1.9 1.9
Table 3.7: Observed distance in relation to type of basic scheme and
utterance/basic scheme derivation (see (57); distances ranging from 1
to 3).
A conclusion on the order of Denial of Expectation and logical
strength can not be drawn on the basis of the results in table 3.7. Com-
pared with the results for the bare causal BS, using a Mann-Whitney
Rank Sum test, the distance p-p0 is significantly higher for both De-
nial of Expectation (z=4.54,p<.001) and Concession (z=4.02,p<.001).
But for the q-q0 distance, Concession does not differ significantly from
the bare causal BS, whereas Denial of Expectation is significantly lower
(z=3.93,p<.001) than the bare causal BS. The only conclusion that might
be drawn on the basis on these results, is that Denial of Expectation is
asymmetric for the derivational distance between the parts of its rela-
tion, whereas both bare causals and concessions are more symmetric.
This does not make sense in the light of a concept of logical strength
(and it was also an unexpected result in Oversteegen, 1997, p. 76).
Taking other arguments into account, Oversteegen (1997) decides
that the analysis of Denial of Expectation in the BS given in (57) is
wrong, and that a presupposition analysis as given in (2) is correct. In
the basic scheme of Denial of Expectation, the burden of derivation is
put on (p >) :q , whereas the derivation from q to q0 is very direct.
Taking the ‘Concession-like’ analysis as a starting point for measuring
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derivational distance of Denials of Expectation, the results become in-
comprehensible.
Oversteegen (1997) reanalyzed her corpus, on the basis of the scheme
as defined in (2). This time, p0 was derived from p, and :q0 was derived
from q. Since negation can be linguistically defined, it does not play
a role with respect to derivational distance, and it can be neglected in
measuring the distance. The results of the reanalysis are given in table
3.8 (taken from Oversteegen, 1997).
Denial of expectation as a presupposition
Relation p-p0 q-q0
Denial of expectation 1.8 2.0
Concession 2.53 2.30
Bare causal 1.9 1.9
Table 3.8: Observed distance in relation to type of basic scheme and
utterance/basic scheme derivation (see (2) for Denial of expectation,
and (57) for the other relations; distances ranging from 1 to 3).
A Denial of Expectation is derivational closer to its utterance than
a Concession. This means, that the order of Denial of Expectation and
Concession, as predicted by logical strength (in 3.5), is established in
Oversteegen’s (1997) corpus analysis, as logical strength predicts. More-
over, the presupposition analysis in (2), for connectives expressing a
denial of expectation, is now corroborated.
3.9 Gapping without a cause
3.9.1 Introduction
In section 3.5, epistemic interpretation of causal relations is explained
by the assumption that a B operator restricts the interpretation of the
consequence of an implicational presupposition. Given this assump-
tion, the difference between the Dutch connectives want and omdat is
explained, as well as the difference between the French connectives car
and parce que.
The placement of the B operator in the representation of the pre-
supposition has not explicitly been defended: why should B have scope
over the consequence, and not over the antecedent of the implication,
or over the implication as a whole? Specific linguistic evidence, show-
ing that the operator is making correct predictions in its present rep-
resentation, has not been presented yet. In this section, evidence is
presented for the analysis of B in the presupposition.
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3.9.2 The problem
An interesting observation on Gapping and causality is made by Levin
and Prince (1982) (cited by Kehler, 1994). They claim that Gapping
is not allowed in a complex sentence that consists of causally related
clauses. Kehler (1994) presents the facts in (60).
(60) a. Bill became upset, and Hillary angry.
b. Bill became upset, and Hillary became angry.
c. # Bill became upset, and as a result Hillary angry.
d. Bill became upset, and as a result Hillary became angry.
Kehler (1994) remarks that (60a) can not be understood causally, but
(60b) can. He presents (60c) to show that a causal paraphrase is unac-
ceptable. A causal paraphrase of (60b) is given in (60d), and its accept-
ability shows that (60b) may be understood causally. Kehler’s (1994)
conclusion is that causality is excluded in Gapping constructions.
The observations made with respect to (60) predict that Gapping is
excluded for linguistic markers of causality. An example of an unac-
ceptable Gapping construction, due to a causality marker, is (60c): the
use of as a result is not allowed.
Moreover, it is generally assumed that there is a syntactic restriction
on Gapping: it has to be a coordinative construction (Neijt, 1979). This
means that Gapping is possible only using coordinative connectives.
In fact, the assumption that syntactic subordination excludes Gapping
seems to explain the examples in (61) better than the assumption that
causality excludes Gapping (taken from Pru¨st, 1992).
(61) a. John bought a book, and Bill a cd.
b. John bought a book, so Bill a cd.
c. ?Bill bought a cd, because John a book.
Pru¨st (1992) argues that (61a) is natural and straightforwardly explained.
His rule of Rhetorical Coordination allows for (61b) (see chapter 5 for
an introduction to Pru¨st’s discourse rules). Pru¨st (1992) mentions the
unacceptability of (61c) as a problem, because his rule of Rhetorical
Subordination does not account for it. However, if syntactic subordi-
nation is considered to exclude Gapping, the judgments in (61) are ex-
plained straightforwardly: (61a) and (61b) are coordinative, and accept-
able; (61c) is subordinative, and unacceptable. Since (61b) and (61c)
are both causal, but not both unacceptable, causality does not seem
to give the right explanation for the judgments in (61). On the other
hand, if syntactic subordination were the only restriction on Gapping,
the unacceptability of (60c) would not be explained. Consequently,
neither of the assumptions explains all the data satisfactorily, nor does
a combination of both assumptions.
In French and Dutch, so is translated with donc and dus, respectively.
Using these connectives, Gapping is allowed. This is shown in (62).
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(62) a.
b.
c.
Jean
Jan
John
lit
leest
is reading
le
de
the
journal,
krant,
newspaper,
donc
dus
so
Marie
Marie
Mary
un
een
a
livre.
boek.
book.
All three cases of Gapping in (62) are acceptable. Some native speakers
of French, Dutch and English may complain that they need context to
accept the sentences in (62). More particular knowledge on the situ-
ation in which these utterances are made, would certainly reduce the
inferential effort needed for a proper interpretation. This need for con-
text does not concern a particular language.
In both French and Dutch, there is a coordinative connective that is
translated with English because: French car and Dutch want. If the rule
were that only syntactic subordination excludes Gappping, one would
expect car and want to be capable of forming a Gapping construction.
The sentences in (63), however, show that this is not the case.
(63) a.
b.
c.
?Marie
?Marie
?Mary
lit
leest
is reading
un
een
a
livre,
boek,
book,
car
want
because
Jean
Jan
John
le
de
the
journal.
krant.
newspaper.
In (63a) and (63b), Gapping is not allowed. In (63c), Gapping is not
allowed either, but this can be explained from the fact that because is
subordinative. The unacceptability of (63a) and (63b) show that the
rule ‘only syntactic subordination excludes Gapping’ is not correct for
French and Dutch: car and want are coordinative connectives, but Gap-
ping is not allowed. There must be some other restriction.
The examples in (62) and (63) lead to a dilemma. If only syntactic
subordination excludes Gapping, (63a) and (63b) (and (60c)) need to be
explained, for they form coordinative constructions, but do not allow
for Gapping. If causality excludes Gapping, (61b) and (62a-c) need to
be explained, for they express a causal relation, but Gapping is allowed.
In order to find a way out of this dilemma, the acceptability of Gap-
ping with so, dus and donc will be examined first. Under the assumption
that causality excludes Gapping, the acceptability of (61b) and (62a-c)
is problematic. Maybe, the causality restriction is too broad. There are
different interpretations of causality. For instance, causal relations can
be interpreted semantically or epistemically. To show that different in-
terpretations of a connective do in fact make a difference for Gapping,
Dutch maar is used in a Gapping construction, in (64).
(64) Jan
John
leest
is reading
de
the
krant,
newspaper,
maar
but
Marie
Mary
een
book.
boek.
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The acceptability of (64) shows that maar does not exclude a Gapping
construction. But maar can have different interpretations: semantic
opposition, concession and denial of expectation. Are these three in-
terpretations possible? Given the description of maar as a semantic
opposition in chapter 2, the parallel Gapping construction makes a se-
mantic opposition construction most likely. The other two interpreta-
tions can be enforced by using adverbs: a concession is enforced when
weliswaar (‘albeit’) is used in combination with maar; a denial of ex-
pectation is enforced using toch (‘still’)in combination with maar (cf.
Spooren, 1989). These two tests are performed in (65).36
(65) a. Jan leest weliswaar de krant, maar Marie een boek.
‘John is reading the newspaper, it’s true, but Mary a book.’
b. ?Jan leest de krant, maar Marie toch een boek.
‘John is reading the newspaper, but still Mary a book.’
(65a) is acceptable in Dutch, although it is not a preferred way of ex-
pressing concession. In chapter 2, it was argued with respect to (29)
that but sentences with different topics and parallel clauses, express a
concession in the context of a yes/no-question, or another appropriate
context. With respect to (65), such a question could be: Zijn Jan en
Marie geı¨nteresseerd in het dagelijks nieuws? (‘Are John and Mary inter-
ested in the daily news?’). The acceptability of (65a) shows that con-
cession does not exclude Gapping. In (65b), a denial of expectation is
expressed, enforced by the use of toch (‘still’). This results in unaccept-
ability. The unacceptability of (65b) shows that denial of expectation
excludes Gapping. In section 3.8, it was shown that a crucial differ-
ence between maar in a denial of expectation and maar in a conces-
sion was, that the former interpretation was causal and the latter was
not. Concession is not interpreted as having a causal relation between
its clauses, and it allows for Gapping. Denial of expectation, being a
causal contrastive relation, excludes Gapping.
Besides a confirmation that causality does play a role in excluding
Gapping, the sentences in (65) provide a key to a solution: is it possi-
ble that causality excludes Gapping in its semantic interpretation, but
allows for Gapping in its epistemic interpretation?
3.9.3 A solution
The connectives so, dus and donc used in (62) all have epistemic read-
ings: all three sentences can be paraphrased as: ‘from the fact that John
reads the newspaper, I conclude that Mary reads a book’. Apparently,
the speaker knows that John and Mary live together, share a newspaper,
and may both be reading at the same time. The acceptability of the
36Nothing will be said on French and English at this point, for a native speaker is
needed to explore such disambiguation tests.
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utterance is not dependent on this additional information, since the
speaker restricts his conclusion.
An important difference between semantic causal interpretation and
epistemic causal interpretation is, that the cause is prior to the effect
in a semantic relation (see also chapter 2, 2.4). According to Mackie
(1974), this is not an intrinsic property of causal relations, but it is
one without counterexamples. Lascarides and Asher (1991) formulate
a principle in this direction as an axiom, in (66).37
(66) Causes Precede Effects
Cause(e
1
; e
2
) ! :e
2
 e
1
,
where Cause(e
1
; e
2
) means that the main event of clause 1 causes
the main event of clause 2, and :e
2
 e
1
means that there is
no main event of clause 2 preceding the main event of clause
1.
(66) states that if an event causes a second event, the second event may
not precede the first. This axiom on causal relations refers to the real
world connection that will be inferred when a reader receives a linguis-
tic (or contextual) indication that two connected clauses need to be in-
terpreted causally. In this respect, there is a difference between seman-
tic and epistemic interpretations: semantic interpretations of causal
relations preserve the order of the events in the real world connection;
epistemic interpretations of causal relations do not necessarily preserve
the order of the real world connection. A street can only become wet
after it has started to rain, or after some other wetting event has taken
place. But observing a wet street, and then drawing the conclusion that
it has rained, is possible in an epistemic interpretation (even though it
is not a valid conclusion). The difference between semantic and epis-
temic interpretation of a causal relation is, that semantic interpretation
should obey (66), whereas epistemic interpretation does not usually as-
sociate the observation with the real world cause and the conclusion
with the real world effect. In this sense, (66) does not hold for epis-
temic interpretation of a causal relation. One might say that epistemic
interpretation does not impose an order of events on its real world con-
nection.
Gapping as it is demonstrated here, may be regarded as verb dele-
tion. As a consequence, the deleted verb must be identical to the verb
in the first clause. This means, that the event semantics of the deleted
verb must be identical, for deletion takes place under identity.38 Only
37The definition taken from Lascarides, Asher & Oberlander, 1992; in chapter 4,
section 4.3, the rule will be clarified within its system.
38Given a semantic analysis of Gapping, the following argument could be used: the
gap in the second clause has to be reconstructed on the basis of the verb in the first
clause. Copying the verb semantics creates identity of events.
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the arguments of the verb may differ.39 So, Gapping needs two similar
events, presented next to each other (these restrictions can be extended
with the restrictions on interpretation of parallel intonation, described
in section 2.3 in the previous chapter).
Epistemic interpretation of a causal relation involves a B predicate
that restricts the conclusion to a speaker’s conclusion. This makes it
possible to dodge the axiom Causes Precede Effects: the relation be-
tween antecedent and consequent in the presupposition is not inter-
preted as a real world cause and effect, but as a fact and a speaker’s
conclusion. So, the acceptability of (62a-c) is explained by assuming
that the B operator in the presupposition makes it possible to dodge
(66).
The assumption that causality excludes Gapping is now specified as:
semantic causality excludes Gapping. This explains the acceptability of
(61b), (62a-c), and the judgments in (60).40 But the unacceptability of
(63a,b) is still in need for an explanation. The causal relation expressed
by car or want is epistemic as well, and the restricted assumption that
semantic causality excludes Gapping does not exclude the sentences in
(63a,b).
In order to explain the unacceptability of the sentences in (63), the
derivation of the presuppositions of donc and car will be shown. It
is not the epistemic interpretation itself that is the problem, but the
derivation of the presupposition from its utterance. To make this more
clear, it will be shown how the presupposition of donc is derived prop-
erly. This is shown in (67) (the example might equally well be presented
in English or Dutch).
(67) Jean lit le
p
journal, donc Marie
q
un livre
Presupposition: p0 > B q0
Step 1: Lit(quelqu’un,journal) > B ; (autre,livre)
Step 2: Lit
i
(quelqu’un,journal) > BLit
i
(autre,livre)
In the derivation of the presupposition of donc (67), the representation
of the verb Lit occurs twice: once in the antecedent of the implication,
and once in its consequence, in the scope of B. The latter occurrence of
Lit is recovered from deletion (the presupposition is derived form the
39 In Sturm (1995), a restriction on ‘Subject Gap in Fronted finite verb coordinations’,
or SGF-coordination, is discussed that supports this idea: SGF-coordination is allowed
only when the events in both conjuncts are independently perceived.
40A causal interpretation in a Gapping construction with and can only be inferred,
when real world knowledge is supporting it. As a result, the real world connection will
always be the basis of a causal relation between two clauses connected with and, and it
is predicted that epistemic causal relations will not arise in Gapping constructions with
and (exclusive of epistemic markers). So, the observation that causality is excluded in
(60a) is still explained.
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utterance, so the gap has to be reconstructed). This presupposition is
formed regularly.
In the case of car in (63a), derivation of the presupposition fails,
because the verb lit can not be recovered.
(68) ?Marie lit un livre,
p
car Jean
car
le journal
q
Presupposition: q0 > B p0
Step 1: ; (quelqu’un,journal) > BLit(autre,livre)
Step 2: No extraction from restricted contexts is allowed.
The difference between the derivation in (67) and (68) is this: the pred-
icate Lit can be recovered from the antecedent in the presupposition
of (67), but not from the consequent in the presupposition in car. The
B-operator creates a restricted context and it is not allowed to recover
Lit from such a restricted context. The B operator is restricting the con-
sequent of the presupposition of both connectives, but the gap in the
consequent of the donc-presupposition has appeared in the antecedent
of the car-presupposition. Extraction of the verb from the consequent
to the antecedent of the presupposition is impossible, and the presup-
position fails.41
The assumption that the epistemic operator B does not allow infor-
mation within its scope to be extracted, is motivated by others. Sanders
and Spooren (1996) observe that epistemic modifiers mark perspective
(which leads to subjectivity in utterances containing those markers).
Spooren (1989) argues that information from perspectivized contexts
can not percolate to other contexts. This assumption is used to ex-
plain differences between Dutch want and omdat in Spooren and Jaspers
(1989). In other words, the assumption that information is not allowed
to be extracted from a B-context is not only justified on the basis of
generalizations of other linguistic phenomena, but also on earlier ob-
servations of want.
The relation between Gapping and causality can be summarized as
41The unintelligibility of (68) might lead, through the flouting of a maxim, to some
kind of reinterpretation. There is a very marked, if not unacceptable, use of want with
SGF (see footnote 39) in de Volkskrant. An example of this use is:
(i) a. ?Moest je d’r overheen klimmen, want dubbel geparkeerd.
‘You had to climb over it, because double parked.’
(De Volkskrant, 20-12-1997)
It seems that this use of want is only acceptable in the inner circle of journalists and
modern intellectuals in Amsterdam (called the ‘Grachtengordel’). Because of the im-
pact of the Grachtengordel’s language use on Dutch in the Netherlands, one might
expect to see a language change with respect to the use of want SGF.
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follows.
(69) Causality and Gapping
1. semantic causality excludes Gapping;
2. epistemic causality allows for Gapping, for the clauses express-
ing the real world cause and effect do not need to be ordered;
3. Using want or car in Gapping is impossible, for the gap in the
presupposition can not be interpreted with information con-
tained in the scope of B.
This analysis of Gapping with causal connectives supports the analysis
of causal connectives presented in this chapter. The assumption of
an implicational presupposition, with its consequent restricted by a B
operator, is motivated independently in this section.
Two questions remain, and deserve more attention and further re-
search. The first is: to what extent is syntactic subordination excluding
Gapping? Looking back at (61), it can be observed that the unaccept-
ability of (61c) is due to the use of because. Is it perhaps causality (either
step 1. or step 3.) that excludes Gapping, instead of syntactic subordi-
nation? In English, word order is the same for main and subordinate
clauses (whereas Dutch has different word orders for main and sub-
ordinate clauses), so subordinate properties depend on the connective
itself. Examination of other connectives on their meaning and syntac-
tic properties will provide an answer. And it will give rise to the second
question: is causality the only (discourse semantic) restriction on Gap-
ping? To account for causality as a restriction on Gapping, the order
of the clauses with respect to the real world connection of their events
appeared to be a crucial element. Lacking a requirement on event or-
der in the real world connection, like in epistemic causality, allows for
Gapping. Do requirements on the real world connection of events, like
the one in (66), exclude Gapping in general? For instance, temporal
connectives (or adverbs) may or may not allow for Gapping. Research
into their ordering requirements (based on, e.g. Oversteegen, 1989;
Caenepeel, 1989; Lascarides and Oberlander, 1993) might explain dif-
ferences with respect to Gapping constructions. If the answer to the
second question is, that there is a relation between ordering require-
ments on events and the possibility of Gapping, the answer to the first
question might be, that syntactic subordination is not needed to ex-
plain the behaviour of connectives in Gapping (in English, at least).
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, the claim was defended that causal and causal con-
trastive connectives have a presupposition in the form of an implica-
tion that expresses causality. Not only causality in content interpreta-
tion, but also epistemic and speech act interpretation, can be explained
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by means of this presupposition. The assumption of a B operator for
epistemic interpretation and a S operator for speech act interpretation
is interpreted as the result of conversational implicatures, executed in
order to obey Grice’s (1975) maxims of conversation. Although has a
presupposition that represents the expectation, systematically derived
from the clauses connected by although. The cases in which although
does not express denial of expectation, but concession instead, are an-
alyzed as cases in which the presupposition is defeated, or fails. In the
first case, interpretation is determined by the more specific, defeating
context. In a diachronic reconstruction of the second case, a maxim
is flouted, giving rise to an argumentative interpretation of the con-
trastive relation. Synchronically, argumentative use is conventional-
ized, and context has become more decisive for concessions than pre-
supposition failure. In general, context is much more decisive for the
interpretation of a concession than of a denial of expectation. The as-
sumption that the former interpretation is derived by inference, and
the latter by presupposition, explains this observation. The analysis
leads to a specific choice for a translation of because in predicate logic: it
is a conjunction, instead of an implication. It does nevertheless presup-
pose a defeasible implication. Likewise, although asserts a conjunction
and presupposes an implication. An analysis of Gapping gave indepen-
dent evidence for the analysis of the epistemic interpretation of English
so, Dutch want and dus, and French car and want.
Chapter 4
Inference and
enforcement
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will be concerned with differences between inference with,
and inference without connectives. The Greta Garbo sentence is re-
peated again, in (1). A minor change in the formulation has been
made.
(1) Greta
Greta
Garbo
Garbo
werd
was
de
the
maatstaf
yardstick
genoemd
called
van
of
schoonheid.
beauty.
Zij
She
is
has
nooit
never
getrouwd
married
geweest.
(been).
‘Greta Garbo was called the yardstick of beauty. She never
married.’
The interpretation in (1) is different from the interpretation of the orig-
inal sentence in the previous chapters. This has an obvious reason:
although has been left out. Accordingly, the discourse in (1) lacks a
contrastive interpretation. Instead, the second sentence is preferably
interpreted as a result of the first. This means, that a causal relation
is assumed between the two propositional contents: ‘normally, if a
woman is beautiful, she does not marry’.
The causal relation of the original although sentence, was: ‘normally,
if a woman is beautiful, she marries’. The consequent of this relation is
opposite to the consequent of the causal relation that is assumed with
respect to (1). The effect of although on the causal relation between two
propositional contents is quite strong. In theories defining coherence
relations on the basis of the propositional contents of two connecting
clauses (e.g. Hobbs, 1979; Mann and Thompson, 1988; Lascarides and
Asher, 1991; Sanders et al., 1992), connectives are considered to be in-
dicative for a coherence relation. This indication is, in these theories,
not worked out as a specific operation in the calculation. Lexical and
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world knowledge need to be explored in order to find the right connec-
tion. This is a laborious and uncertain process.
In this chapter, it is demonstrated how causal coherence is calcu-
lated by means of a causal connective. A causal relation is presupposed
when a causal connective is used. Knowledge of the world and lexical
knowledge are applied to derive the specific relation established by the
connective. Since it is already known what relation will be derived, the
process is certain and easy.
How is lexical and world knowledge explored to derive the coher-
ence relation Result in example (1)? There are three (or even more) pos-
sible backgrounds for taking ‘beautiful women do not marry’ as a plau-
sible connection. One can assume that Greta Garbo was unattainable
because of her beauty: she was too impressive for potential grooms.
Alternatively, one can imagine Greta Garbo as a femme fatale, and as-
sume that beautiful women are mostly femmes fatales (and: femmes
fatales do not marry). Or, using another prejudice: beautiful girls are
very popular in high school, but when it comes to marriage, a decent
and caring prospective mother will be chosen.1 A side effect of having
several backgrounds for the connection that beautiful women will not
marry is that the real reason for Greta Garbo remains a mystery.2
Besides the derivation of a Result, there is also another possibility
in (1): the second sentence explains the first sentence. The coherence
relation between the two clauses is Explanation. This reading is made
explicit by reading she never married as: she never married, you see. The
causal relation that supports an explanation in (1), is: ‘normally, if you
never married, you are beautiful’. One can think that an unmarried life
means freedom, and that freedom keeps you beautiful. An association
between being married and having children is possible: not having
children keeps you beautiful. Also other prejudices may be applied to
create a causal relation supporting an explanation.
Notice that the uncertainty of interpretation does not lead to an
unacceptable discourse. A causal relation between beauty and marriage
in (1) in one of both directions is assumed to yield the relation between
the clauses as result or explanation. The causal relation is not inherent
to the combination of the propositional contents: in an appropriate
context, the causal connection will disappear, as the discourse in (2)
shows.
1This prejudice is perhaps in line with the times in which Greta Garbo was in a
marriageable age - but as a movie star, the femme fatale version seems to fit better.
Being a movie star, she was of course unattainable for most people, so that would be
plausible too.
2This is not in accordance with the Gricean principle of cooperativity, but (or: so)
it gives a nice rhetorical effect.
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(2) Greta Garbo died in her apartment in New York. She had been a
great movie star. She was called the yardstick of beauty. She never
married.
In (2), a list of properties and circumstances regarding Greta Garbo is
given. The last two sentences are just contributing their part to this list,
without having a causal connection between them. The causal connec-
tion as presented in (1) can thus be replaced by an additive connection
without any problem, if the context triggers such an interpretation.
If although is left out, the resulting discourse lacks a contrastive in-
terpretation. Instead, two positive causal relations may be inferred be-
tween the two clauses (but not at the same time), unless context alters
the interpretation to some non-causal relation. With respect to (1), it
seems that both causal and additive relations between the clauses are
allowed, but not contrastive relations.
A claim generally made in literature on coherence relations, is that
connectives indicate the coherence relation between two clauses. In
this chapter, the claim will be made that causal connectives do more
than just indicate the coherence relation: a causal relation is not de-
rived from the propositional contents of two connected clauses, but
it is given in the presupposition of a causal connective, enforcing a
causal relation between the propositional contents. This way, world
knowledge and lexical knowledge do not need to construct a causal
relation, but they only have to support it. Besides, the use of a con-
nective helps to pick out the right interpretation of a causal relation.
How this should be realized will be shown within the framework of
Discourse Inference and Commonsense Entailment (DICE: e.g., Asher,
1993; Lascarides et al., 1996).
In the framework of DICE, coherence relations are calculated on the
basis of propositional contents, real world knowledge, lexical knowl-
edge and linguistic knowledge. Inferences are made by executing rules
that define coherence relations in terms of knowledge of the world and
lexical knowledge. The interaction of the rules is submitted to certain
principles. In DICE, it is not worked out what happens when a con-
nective is inserted, other than that it would indicate a relation that
may be constructed independent of the connective. It will be demon-
strated that the framework does allow for definitions of connectives, so
a difference between coherence with or without connectives may come
about in DICE.
A short overview of studies on coherence will be given in section
4.2. At the same time, the choice for DICE will be motivated. In section
4.3, DICE will be introduced. Since DICE is a deductive system, based
on non-monotonic logic, its main principles and rules are introduced.
Knowledge of this section is relevant for the sections coming thereafter.
Whenever it is relevant, in this chapter, reference will be made to the
tables containing the rules. In section 4.4, the difference between infer-
ence with and without connectives will be introduced; in section 4.5,
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it will be demonstrated that a distinct treatment of causal connectives
in DICE will result in a less laborious way of inferring coherence when
using connectives.
4.2 Coherence relations
Theories of coherence relations often deal with the problem of inferring
coherence while it is not explicitly indicated. The example in (3) is a
crucial example in the theory of Lascarides and Asher (e.g. Lascarides
and Asher, 1991; Lascarides et al., 1992).
(3) Max fell. John pushed him.
According to Lascarides and Asher (1991), the discourse relation Expla-
nation (see table 4.1, in section 4.3) holds between the two clauses,
because the contents of both clauses determine that the event of the
second sentence caused the event of the first. So, coherence is inferred
from the semantics of both propositions, and dependent on the lexical
items used in the utterance. In this case, fell and push are verbs that can
be understood as parts of eventualities that have a causal connection.
Lascarides and Asher define a system of lexical and real world knowl-
edge that determines the coherence between the two clauses in (3). In
this system, connectives do not play a distinctive role: it indicates the
inference, but there is no principled difference in the way in which the
coherence relation is inferred from the connective. This is a common
view on coherence, expressed by, for instance, Hobbs (1979) and Mann
and Thompson (1988).
Below, a short overview of different theories of coherence relations
will be presented. The choice to analyze causal connectives in DICE will
be motivated.
4.2.1 Different approaches to coherence of texts
In this section, several influential theories about coherence in text are
discussed. Theories of coherence relations can be classified in three
groups, according to their aims:
1. the analysis aims at a systematic description of coherence rela-
tions;
2. the analysis aims at the selection of the correct linguistic realiza-
tion of a coherence relation;
3. the analysis aims at an automatic recognition of coherence rela-
tions.
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In the first kind of theory, there is no principled difference between
production or perception of language and discourse. The presence of
a connective is used instrumentally. An answer to the question: ‘is
it possible to insert the connective because?’, is an indication for the
possibility of a causal relation between two clauses. In this chapter, it is
not the possibility to insert connectives that matters, but the difference
between presence and absence of connectives.
In the second kind of theory, connectives (and other realizations)
are chosen on the basis of a given coherence relation. In this approach,
the problem of the difference between coherence relation and connec-
tive is defined as follows:
(...), we need to determine how the rhetorical relations of a
text may be mapped onto the lexicogrammatical realizations
(...). (Degand, 1996, p. 107)
In this approach, a coherence relation is lexically realized as a connec-
tive (or another lexical realization). What will happen in this chapter
is the derivation of a coherence relation from the presence of a connec-
tive. This is a mapping in the opposite direction.
The third kind of theory derives coherence relations from text, by
calculating them from the propositional contents of pairs of clauses.
Perception of discourse is characteristic for this approach, perception.
It is the process of inference that is simulated by the derivation of co-
herence relations.
Below, the most influential theories will be mentioned, and they
will be classified according to the tripartition made here. An extensive
comparison between several coherence theories, and their performance
on the analysis of the same text for each theory, is given in Bateman
and Rondhuis (1994).
Hobbs Hobbs (1979) defines several coherence relations in terms of
the assertions clauses express. To infer a relation called ‘Explanation’
(Hobbs, 1990, p. 91), the state or event asserted by S
1
causes or could
cause the state or event asserted by S
0
. Applying this definition to (3),
S
0
is Max fell and S
1
is John pushed him. The event of Max’s falling is
asserted by S
0
, and the event of John’s pushing him by S
1
, and the latter
event causes the first. The definition aims explicitly at the inference of
coherence relations. It is not dependent on connectives. With respect
to the role of connectives, Hobbs (1979) informally presents a check
on coherence: in (3), it ought to be possible to connect S
1
and S
0
with
because (as in (5)). Such a check is not part of the procedure Hobbs
(1979) defines for Explanation.
Hobbs (1979) is classified in the third group. His theory will return
below, when TACITUS is discussed, based on Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt &
Martin (1993). Besides, his theory returns in other theories: Lascarides
and Asher (1991), discussed below, and Scha and Polanyi (1988), dis-
cussed in the next chapter.
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RST Mann and Thompson (1988) present a discourse structure the-
ory that has been used by many discourse analysts: Rhetorical Structure
Theory (RST). They claim that (...) RST provides a general way to describe
the relations among clauses in a text, whether or not they are grammati-
cally or lexically signalled. They do not claim that their definitions of
coherence have a cognitive status. Their aim is to develop a descriptive
framework for the analysis of text. In the discourse Max fell. John pushed
him, the first clause is characterized as the ‘nucleus’, as John pushed him
is dependent on the first clause (cf. Mann and Thompson, 1988, p.
266): the information of John’s pushing is not representing the main
information of both clauses. John pushed him is called the ‘satellite’.
The definition of Volitional Cause demands that the nucleus present a
situation that has arisen from a volitional action, which is presented in
the satellite (cf. Mann and Thompson, 1988, p. 274). This is the case
in (3). The relation in (3) is characterized as ‘Volitional Cause’. Mann
and Thompson (1988) do not give an account of connectives in their
definitions. In RST, coherence relations may exist between larger text
spans than just two clauses.
In the classification, RST is in the first group. In their definitions,
an analyst is involved to make decisions, for instance with respect to
the possibility to omit a clause in the discourse, in order to determine
nucleus and satellite. Several computational text generation theories
have implemented RST definitions of relations (e.g. Hovy et al., 1992;
Bateman et al., 1991).
Linguistic realization of coherence Martin (1992) uses proper-
ties as ‘causal’ or ‘volitional’ to define conjunctions: a connective is se-
lected on the basis of this kind of properties. Combining all the prop-
erties and all the realizations, a ‘systemic network’ is formed, that is
capable of generating text. It is not likely that Martin’s (1992) system
could generate (3), unless the lexical meanings of to fall and to push
were the linguistic realization of the properties causal and volitional.
This seems to be quite difficult to achieve. One of the problems is, that
in Martin’s (1992) framework, no distinction is made between coher-
ence and connectives. In Oversteegen (1995), a fragment of a systemic
network is presented that does not suffer from this problem, for she
does make a distinction between coherence relations and connectives.
In Degand (1996), an extensive analysis of Dutch connectives is given
in terms of the systemic functional approach, making the same dis-
tinction as Oversteegen (1995). Systemic networks fall into the second
group of theories, for selection of the correct linguistic realization is
their aim.
Knott and Dale (1994) analyze connectives in order to come to a
classification of coherence relations on the basis of a classification of
cue phrases. This approach provides an answer to the question that
was raised in Hovy (1990): how many coherence relations are there,
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and how are they classified?.3 The answer Knott and Dale (1994) give,
presupposes that the complete set of coherence relations is a subset of
the complete set of connective meanings. In other words: if there is a
coherence relation between the two clauses in (3), there must be some
connective that can be inserted between them without changing the
meaning of (3).
Knott and Dale (1994) observe coherence from an analyst’s point of
view. An analyst is able to insert connectives and check the result. The
purpose of doing so is to come to well-defined descriptions of coher-
ence relations. This makes their theory fall into group 1.
Argumentation The theory of argumentative orientation, defined
by Ducrot (1980), gives an analysis of (3) that differs from the co-
herence approach. First of all, there should be an indication that the
speaker is aimed at defending a claim. Suppose that the claim is that
Max fell. The next clause, John pushed him should be interpreted as an
argument in favor or against the claim. In order to make the argu-
ment meaningful, it has to relate to an argumentative scale (or ‘topos’)
concerning pushing and falling. These scales are formulated as com-
parative scales: ‘the more John pushes Max, the more he is inclined
to fall’. This way of representing knowledge is not very plausible, in
this case. According to Moeschler (1990), implications should be possi-
ble, next to argumentative scales. The implication would read: ‘if John
pushes Max, he may fall’. This provides the correct derivation of the
argument: the claim is justified by the implication (instead of the an
argumentative scale).
It is difficult to classify this group into one of the three categories.
Since the theory is about argumentation, the only coherence that is ex-
pressed on the level of connectives, are argument-claim relations. On
a more abstract level, the theory is concerned with the argumentative
purposes of the speaker. On this level, the theory is more about inten-
tions than about coherence.
There is an application of this theory in text generation, namely
Elhadad (1993). He makes use of the observation that (among other
linguistic means) connectives indicate argumentation. Just like Ducrot
(1980), Elhadad uses knowledge from ‘topoi’ with respect to argumen-
tative orientation to determine the selection of a connective. This ap-
proach can be connected with a presuppositional view on causal con-
nectives, as Oversteegen (1995) shows. Elhadad’s (1993) aim is to select
connectives that fit in the right context, i.e. connectives that are in
agreement with a specific argumentative orientation. His theory falls
into group 2.
TACITUS Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt & Martin (1993) developed the Ab-
ductive Commonsense Inference Text Understanding System (TACITUS),
3Sanders et al. (1992, 1993) provide an alternative answer to the same question.
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a system organizing reader’s inferences from text by formulating rules
of inferences in an automated system.
The general principle of the system is that an utterance can be inter-
preted by proving specific assumptions with respect to that utterance.
For instance, when an utterance contains a pronominal, its reference
can be established by proving that the assumed reference is correct.
Likewise, a coherence relation is established whenever a proof has been
provided that a pair of clauses.4 form a ‘segment’ (which is a composi-
tion of clauses). Applied to (3), the sequence of the two clauses needs
to be interpreted as a meaningful assertion.5 or topic. Max fell and
John pushed him create an assertion that consists of the composition of
the two basic assertions, and some relation between those assertions, in
this case the coherence relation ‘Explanation’. This assumption has to
be proved (this procedure is essentially the abductive interpretation).
One way to prove Explanation is that the assertion of John pushed him
causes the assertion of Max fell. In that case, an ‘axiom’ should ex-
ist that says that ‘pushing causes falling’. This way, the Explanation
between the two clauses is proved, and established.
Suppose there is an alternative assumption, for instance that the
coherence relation is Narration.6 Next, suppose that a proof for this
assumption was made too. Then a choice is made between both as-
sumptions by ‘weighted abduction’. All premisses are assigned certain
costs, and the total cost of a proof is determined by the sum of the costs
of the premisses. The cheapest proof wins. TACITUS is a theory from the
third group, for the calculations are made in order to recognize coher-
ence in an automated way.
DICE Lascarides and Asher (1991) introduced a system of Discourse
Inference and Commonsense Entailment (DICE), trying to achieve the
same goal as TACITUS: it systemizes reader’s inferences from text by
formulating rules in a deductive system. A comprehensive introduction
to DICE will be given in section 4.3.
DICE and TACITUS are organized differently. Both TACITUS and DICE
begin with the assumption of a coherence relation. Instead of provid-
ing a proof for that assumption, DICE formulates rules: given certain
conditions, a specific coherence relation holds between two clauses.
Several coherence relations may be assumed, as long as they are con-
sistent with each other. The assumption of a coherence relation has
consequences: assuming Explanation means that the causing event
(in the second clause) must precede the resulting event (in the first
4Hobbs et al. (1993) use the term ‘sentence’ for what is called ‘clause’ in this thesis.
5An assertion is more or less the same as a proposition: it expresses a situation or
event, but not more particular aspects of its use in context.
6Hobbs et al. (1993) do not work out the possibility of more than one coherence
relation for one conjunction; they develop an analysis of coercion that seems to be
easily applicable to coherence. They do not mention Narration explicitly as a possible
coherence relation.
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clause). The assumption of Narration has as a consequence an event
order that is reverse to the event order implied by Explanation. This
means that assuming both relations leads to inconsistency. Three prin-
ciples of deduction govern the possibilities to maintain or withdraw
the assumption of a coherence relation. Avoiding inconsistency is the
leading principle behind discourse coherence. Choices between coher-
ence relations are made taking the relation that is based on the most
explicit indications in the context. This choice might coincide with
the choice of the cheapest proof in TACITUS, but there is no systematic
correspondence between the two models. DICE belongs to group 3, just
as TACITUS.
TACITUS or DICE? In this chapter, a theory from group 3 is selected
to show how inference of coherence relations with connectives differs
from inference of coherence relations without connectives. Theories
from group 3 were suited, in principle, to show these differences. There
are two theories argued to belong to group 3: TACITUS and DICE. Of
these two, DICE is chosen. There are two arguments for that decision.
First, for DICE, inconsistency of assumed coherence relations guides
the process of inference. Different relations may be derived, as long as
they are not inconsistent with each other. When there are inconsistent
relations, they are compared with respect to the most explicit indica-
tions for one relation or the other. In TACITUS, proofs of assumptions
of different coherence relations will be compared regardless of possible
inconsistencies. It all depends on weighed abduction.
Secondly, the weights of the costs are not easily determined. Who
determines the costs of interpretations? Hobbs et al. (1993) do not ex-
plain how axioms may arise (with regard to their example, they note:
Suppose, plausibly enough, we have the following axioms: (...) Hobbs et al.,
1993, p.109). Although reasoning itself is not affected by an axiom
‘out of the blue’, the preference for one proof over another is now de-
termined without any other ground than what is supposed to be plau-
sible. Hobbs et al. (1993) suggest that psycholinguistic experiments
can determine relative plausibilities, but it would take quite a program
of experiments to establish these values, if possible at all. In DICE, the
assumptions of coherence relations, as well as consequences of these
assumptions, represent linguistic, world and lexical knowledge.7 Their
interaction is explicitly defined in three principles. In this respect, DICE
models, better than TACITUS, intuitions and knowledge on the coher-
ence of discourse.
The conclusion of this section is that DICE will be chosen. In the
next section, the system will be introduced. The subsequent sections
7It has always been considered a weak point of DICE that lexical and world knowl-
edge could not be described adequately. Recent publications like Lascarides et al.
(1996) show that the formulation of lexical knowledge and the organization of the
lexicon have been improved. Moreover, the improvement of the model that will be
proposed in this chapter is addressing the problem specifically.
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analyzes the differences between inference with and without connec-
tives in DICE. These sections might be interesting for readers who are
not primarily interested in DICE, but it is perhaps problematic to fully
understand the argumentation, without reading section 4.3 first. Still,
it should be possible to read only the introduction of the next section,
and skip the rest. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, reference will be made in the
text to relevant parts of section 4.3, whenever this may be convenient.
4.3 Deduction with DICE
4.3.1 Introduction
Discourse Inference and Commonsense Entailment (DICE) is a system
of commonsense reasoning, organized in such a way, that a model of a
reader is constructed: like a reader, DICE makes inferences when it ana-
lyzes a text. What is important in DICE, is the way such inferences are
handled. A ‘natural reader’ makes use of lexical and world knowledge
in making inferences. How this knowledge is organized, is difficult to
observe. So, a model that organizes inferences in such a way that a co-
herent interpretation of a text fragment may be derived, explains what
inferences a reader could be using in deriving a coherence relation.8
DICE provides such a model.
At large, the organisation of the model is quite simple. Three deduc-
tion principles play a crucial role in governing the interplay of different
kinds of laws and axioms. The differences between these laws and ax-
ioms are determined by their contents and by the property of being
(in)defeasible. The interaction of axioms and laws is specified in the
principles. They all have the form of an implication, so the fulfilment
of the antecedent of a rule makes the rule work. The deduction prin-
ciples govern the interaction by defining and solving inconsistencies.
One principle governs the application of the rules on the input from
the text (Defeasible Modus Ponens). The other two principles govern
the cases in which inconsistent assumptions have been made. One
of these principles states that the law expressing the most specific in-
formation, wins. The competing law is defeated (Penguin Principle).
The other principle defines a situation in which a certain combination
of assumptions has made a discourse inconsistent (Nixon Diamond).
The assumptions that have been made need to be withdrawn. What
happens next is not defined: the system may try again, making new
assumptions that may not end up in the Nixon Diamond, or the dis-
course is in fact incoherent, and the system has located a spot in the
discourse that needs to be repaired. These principles will be introduced
after all the laws and axioms, for they can be put to work only with the
whole set of rules.
8This explanation concerns the possibility for a reader to make inferences. It is not
describing what a reader does ‘on line’.
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While the overall organization seems quite simple, the system will
soon become quite complicated. The reason for this is, that knowledge
of the world needs to be incorporated. It is quite difficult to define
world knowledge in a systematic way. This makes the inference of a
coherence relation on the basis of complex and specific definitions of
world knowledge, just for one utterance, seem rather overdone. In or-
der to have a good understanding of the system, readers should, as it
were, look through the world knowledge definitions. Then it is possible
to see the interesting side of DICE: it provides a way of defining knowl-
edge of discourse processes, or linguistic knowledge, to infer coherence
in a systematic way. In the remainder of this chapter, a little piece of
such linguistic knowledge will be defined, and the advantages of doing
so will be shown.
In this introduction, the organisation of DICE will be sketched. In
the subsequent sections, different kinds of rules are introduced, end-
ing with the principles that govern the interaction of these rules. The
organisation consists of three principles, governing the interaction be-
tween several kinds of rules.
A definition of a ‘rule’ is given in the first principle: ‘Defeasible
Modus Ponens’. It defines an implication that is defeasible. When the
actual discourse would disagree with the consequence of such an im-
plication, it does not cause inconsistencies. For instance, if it is a rule
that ‘if you push someone, he falls’, and in the current discourse it is
stated that someone was pushed, and he did not fall, the rule is de-
feated for the occasion, but it still is a general rule. Defeasible Modus
Ponens features in rules that represent world knowledge, discourse pro-
cesses, and the assumption of coherence relations. The rules that define
these assumptions are read as: normally, if a discourse is extended with
a clause by connecting to a clause belonging to that discourse, some
coherence relation is assumed. It depends on information defined in
the conditions of each specific rule, which relation will be assumed.
This information is related to the propositional contents of the clauses
(or context). Every coherence relation that is allowed by the defini-
tion of its rule, may be assumed. However, inconsistencies may occur,
for assumptions of coherence relations may have contradicting conse-
quences. This is what the other two principles are used for: getting rid
of the inconsistencies (or: define inconsistencies). When inconsisten-
cies have been cleaned up, the remaining coherence relations represent
a coherent text fragment.
The second principle is capable of choosing between coherence re-
lations, when they cause inconsistencies (‘Complex Penguin Princi-
ple’). The way in which this is done seems rather complicated, but the
essence is quite simple: the Complex Penguin Principle is only stating
that more specific information overrules general information.
The third principle is capable of defining incoherent discourse, when
coherence relations are causing inconsistency in a specific constella-
tion (‘Nixon Diamond’). Again, the deduction seems complicated, but
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essentially, the Nixon Diamond only forbids contradictions, coming
forth from assumptions. Such contradictions may easily be recognized
when reading a discourse.
In most of the rules, knowledge of the world and linguistic knowl-
edge are used to make assumptions on the coherence of a text. Dis-
course relations are rules defined by Defeasible Modus Ponens, and
executed when certain conditions are fulfilled. Defeasible laws, rep-
resenting world knowledge, may specify some of these conditions. For
instance, the Push Causal Law (in table 4.3) represents the knowledge
that the relation between pushing and falling is causal. This informa-
tion is needed to assume the discourse relation Explanation in Max fell.
John pushed him.
Regarding the example just given, a reader will use this world knowl-
edge in an ad hoc manner: when certain knowledge is needed for the
interpretation of an utterance, it is invoked, and when it is not needed,
it does not play a role. This ad hoc character may be reduced in two
ways. First, the rules defining world knowledge may be derived from
the lexicon in a systematic way. This makes the occurrence of world
knowledge more comprehensible: no loose rules of knowledge are de-
fined, but a systematic relation with the lexicon is employed. The Push
Causal Law is thus nothing more than a specification of the causal rela-
tion that is derived when two lexical items to push and to fall are associ-
ated with each other. The existence of the Push Causal Law as such, as
an independently motivated piece of knowledge, is not important: it is
just the description of the knowledge people infer when the words to
push and to fall are associated with each other. The fact that the derived
relation is causal, is determined in the lexicon (and a reflection of world
knowledge, of course). Asher and Lascarides (1995) and Lascarides et al.
(1996) take the question of deriving causal laws like the Push Causal
Law from the lexicon as an important research topic. Second, linguis-
tic rules can often take over rules of world knowledge. Linguistic rules
are generally applicable, and independent of world knowledge. They
model the interpretation of a sentence, making it easier to fill in world
knowledge where its needed.
The different kinds of rules DICE employs, have an equal status to
the principles. There are discourse (i.e., coherence) relations, indefea-
sible axioms, laws on lexical or world knowledge and laws that define
discourse processes (or linguistic rules). They will be introduced in this
order, in the next sections. Only the indefeasible axioms are different:
they may not be defeated, so they play another role in the execution
of the principles (this can be read from the definitions in 4.5). The
introduction of rules ends with the three principles that organize the
system.
After this introduction of DICE, arguments will be given for the rep-
resentation of causal connectives in DICE. These arguments will be
given in an informal way, but references will be made to relevant parts
of this section. So, it will be possible to skip the remainder of this
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section, and return to it whenever necessary.
4.3.2 DICE: discourse relations
DICE starts with the assumption that discourse (or coherence) relations
are present in a coherent discourse. Given the assumption that a reader
reads a text clause by clause, a new clause must be added to one of the
clauses already read. Between these two clauses, a discourse relation is
assumed on the basis of the propositional contents of the clauses, or the
context of the clauses. The form of the rule is a defeasible implication,
with a discourse relation as its consequence. The conditional part of
the rule contains the inferences that a reader should make to conclude
to a specific relation.
Discourse relations used in this chapter are defined in table 4.1.
Every rule is formulated according to the Defeasible Modus Ponens.
Table 4.1: DICE: discourse relations
Narration h; ; i > Narration(; )
Result h; ; i ^ cause(e

; e

) > Result(; )
Explanation h; ; i ^ cause(e

; e

) > Explanation(; )
Background h; ; i ^ overlap(e

; e

)
> Background(; )
Elaboration h; ; i ^ Subtype(; ) > Elaboration(; )
The connective ‘>’ is an essential part of this formulation. > represents
a defeasible implication, meaning Normally, if ..., then... The semantics
of this connective is described in Asher and Morreau (1991), where it
is introduced to account for the semantics of generic sentences. In the
previous chapter of this thesis, it was used for the presupposition of
connectives. Here, it defines the knowledge that is needed to assume
some discourse relation.
In table 4.1, some discourse relations are defined. There are more
relations defined in DICE, but only discourse relations mentioned in
the text of this chapter are included. Every discourse relation rule in
table 4.1 is defined with respect to an update function h; ; i:  and 
are representations of clauses and  is added to  via a proper discourse
relation.  is the representation of a clause in the discourse that is
already updated (symbolized by  ), and is allowed to have a relation
with .9 In short,  is updated with  via a proper discourse relation
between  and .
The information in the condition of a discourse relation is often
expressed by ‘e

’ instead of . e

stands for main eventuality (that
is, a state or event, including processes) of  (following the format
9In the next chapter, this property of clauses will be discussed.
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in Lascarides et al., 1992). Formulated this way, reference is made to
properties that may be bound to an ordering in time, or differ in time
structures (e.g., a state is not bound to an end, but an event might be).
These properties have a strong influence on the coherence of a text.
Below, the discourse relations defined in table 4.1 will be introduced
one by one.
The defeasible rule of Narration is least demanding: Every clause 
that can attach to a clause  in the discourse  may be connected with 
through Narration. The other relations demand some extra condition.
Narration is restricted in other ways (e.g. its axiom), but it may easily
be assumed.
In an Explanation, the second clause explains the first. So, two
eventualities need to be in a causal relation, with the event of  as
the cause, given an update h; ; i. The eventuality that represents
the cause, is the last clause of  , namely . e

is the effect. So, in
Explanation(; ),  is the clause expressing the effect, and  is the
clause expressing the cause. In ‘cause(e

; e

)’,  returns as the first ar-
gument: this position is defined as the cause. These cause predicates
are defined by causal laws, like in table 4.3.
The difference between Result and Explanation concerns the order
of the clauses: in Result(; ),  expresses the cause, and  expresses
the effect. In the condition of the Result rule, cause(e

; e

) is defined as
e

causes e

.
 is a Background for  if it is the case that overlap(e

; e

). Overlap is
a predicate referring to the partial co-occurrence of two eventualities in
temporal order, as they occur in reality. These eventualities are states,
or one of them is a state. An interesting difference with the cause-
predicate is, that overlap represents linguistic knowledge, and not world
knowledge. This difference has no effect on the status of the rules.
Elaboration is a relation that is difficult to define. The history of the
rule Elaboration shows this: different definitions appear in Lascarides
and Asher (1991), Lascarides and Asher (1993), Asher (1993), Asher and
Lascarides (1995) Lascarides et al. (1996). The definition in table 4.1 is
most recent, at the time of writing this thesis.10 The subtype-predicate
in Elaboration is defined as (...) the event condition in  is a subtype
of that in  (Lascarides et al., 1996, p. 51; read for ‘event condition’:
‘eventuality’). This is supposed to capture the idea that an elaboration
extends the information given in the former clause.
10The definition of Elaboration in Asher (1993) is based on progression of the topic:
there is a group of this kind of relations, the structural relations. Structural relations are
typically not causal (Lagerwerf, 1996). The definition in Lascarides and Asher (1993)
concerns the qualia structure of lexical items (Pustejovsky, 1993, p. 86) that occur in
. The other definitions are more or less like the one in table 4.1.
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4.3.3 DICE: indefeasible axioms
Discourse relations may be easily assumed, but there are restrictions
on the assumptions. The axioms on discourse relations in DICE are
indefeasible, as the use of ‘!’ instead of ‘>’ indicates, in table 4.2. If
Table 4.2: Indefeasible axioms and laws on discourse relations
Axiom on Narration Narration(; ) ! e

 e

Axiom on Result Result(; ) ! e

 e

Axiom on Explanation Explanation(; ) ! :e

 e

Axiom on Elaboration Elaboration(; ) ! :e

 e

Axiom on Background Background(; ) ! overlap(e

; e

)
Causes precede Effects cause(e

; e

) ! :e

 e

the assumption of a discourse relation (with a defeasible rule) results
in a violation of one of its axioms, the assumption must be withdrawn
(Lascarides et al., 1992; Asher, 1993). The axiom on a discourse relation
is triggered by the discourse relation rule (in table 4.1). The condition
of the axiom is identical with the consequence of its corresponding
discourse relation.
Axioms state causal and temporal properties of eventualities. Asher
(1993) also defines axioms concerning topic formation. These axioms
are not presented in table 4.2, since they are associated with structural
relations, not discussed in this chapter. In principle, the axioms can
refer to any indefeasible knowledge on eventualities.
The logical operator ‘’ in the axioms of table 4.2 is a temporal
ordering on events: ‘e

 e

’ means that the main eventuality of 
precedes the main eventuality of .
In table 4.2, the Axiom on Narration is identical with the Axiom on
Result, and the Axiom on Explanation is identical with the Axiom on
Elaboration.
The Axiom on Background is the reverse of the Background dis-
course relation, only the axiom is indefeasible. Background is assumed
only if there is an overlap of the events of  and .
The axiom Causes precede Effects is not an axiom on a discourse re-
lation, but on rules expressing lexical knowledge, like the Push Causal
Law (in table 4.3). Explanation has cause(e

; e

) in its condition, which
is the condition of Causes Precede Effects. The latter has the same con-
sequence as the Axiom on Explanation, namely :e

 e

.11 This
makes the Axiom on Explanation a special case of Causes Precede Ef-
fects.
The axioms mentioned in table 4.2 suggest that all axioms concern
11
:e

 e

must be read as: :(e

 e

). Apparently, no other reading is possible
in DICE.
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temporal relations. It is, however, not a characteristic property of inde-
feasible axioms.
4.3.4 DICE: defeasible laws on world knowledge
In the two previous sections, discourse relations were introduced, and
their axioms. These two kinds of rules are directly involved with the
coherence of a text fragment. They define, independent of particu-
lar knowledge, what relations may be recognized, and what the con-
sequences of this recognition are (the interaction of relations, conse-
quences and laws will be discussed with respect to table 4.5). The dis-
course relation rules, however, need more specific input to be initiated.
For instance, Explanation needs a specification of cause(e

; e

) in its
condition, in order to be assumed.
Defeasible laws specify (causal) relations on the basis of world knowl-
edge or lexical knowledge. In table 4.3, world knowledge is represented
Table 4.3: Defeasible laws of world knowledge
Push Causal Law h; ; i ^ fall(m; e

) ^ push(j;m; e

)
> cause(e

; e

)
Revolt Law h; ; i ^ revolt(b; e

) ^ pacified(b; e

)
> :overlap(e

; e

)
Light Switch Law h; ; i ^ Switchoff(m; light; e

)
^ Dark(room; e

) > cause(e

; e

)
Blinds Law h; ; i ^ Draw(m; blinds; e

)
^Dark(room; e

) > cause(e

; e

)
Beautiful Women
Marry
Beautiful(x; e

) ^Marry(x; y; e

)
> cause(e

; e

)
in defeasible rules, also called laws in DICE. The most important differ-
ence between the axioms in 4.2 and laws is their defeasibility: axioms
are indefeasible and laws are defeasible. Two axioms with contradict-
ing consequences may not co-exist for the same  and ; two defeasible
laws can go together, as long as their consequences are not instantiated
as facts.
A defeasible law may be created at the moment two clauses are con-
nected, and their propositional contents need to be associated with
each other. Essentially, this is what the laws express in their condi-
tions, in table 4.3. A discourse  containing  is updated with . The
events of  and  are put next to each other, as in the Push Causal Law:
fall(m; e

) ^ push(j;m; e

). The events of  and  may be related this
way, because this knowledge is (or should be) represented in the lexi-
con. Given the information about a relation between the two events,
it may be assumed that the clauses are causally related.
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Defeasible laws of world or lexical knowledge have two properties
that make the term ‘law’ a bit pretentious: they are derived from the
lexicon, and they are context specific. This means that such a rule is
dependent on the meaning aspects of the verbs and their arguments
within their context. The Push Causal Law has been formulated explic-
itly in several publications, which makes it seem to be quite an impor-
tant piece of knowledge. And if even the Push Causal Law is important,
how many even more important Laws should be formulated in a com-
plete system of inferences? This is not how the Push Causal Law should
be regarded. In fact, this law may be derived anew on every occasion,
by lexical knowledge. An indication for this more explicit connection
between lexicon and laws is the blend of the Push Causal Law and Ex-
planation (in Asher & Lascarides, 1995 - see footnote 24). This blend
indicates that knowledge steers the assumption of discourse relations
from context directly, given the lexical knowledge of the words deter-
mining the events of  and .12
The fact that five laws are given in table 4.3, is meaningless. One
could argue that there should be thousands of similar laws, but one
could also argue that there are no specific laws of world knowledge.
Only when a specific context needs to be interpreted, a law may be
derived from the lexicon. Thus, they exist for the sake of coherence
of discourse. What matters, is not the question whether laws are per-
manent, but whether it is possible to derive them from the lexicon. It
was already indicated that this question is the main question in recent
developments in DICE (cf. Asher and Lascarides, 1995; Lascarides et al.,
1996).
In the Push Causal Law in 4.3, fall, push, m and j are directly re-
ferring to the eventualities and individuals in a discourse like Max fell.
John pushed him. The Push Causal Law results in a cause predicate, and
a cause predicate may satisfy Result or Explanation.
The Revolt Law defines knowledge that is associated with revolts
and pacification, in a discourse like: the backbenchers revolted. They were
pacified. In this definition, b refers to the backbenchers.
The last three laws are not taken from other publication. They are
defined parallel to the former ones and in service of the examples used
further on in this chapter.
The Light Switch Law states that one normally infers from the in-
formation that Max switches off the light and the room becomes dark,
that the switching off causes the darkness.
The Blinds Law states that one normally infers from the informa-
tion that Max draws the blinds and the room becomes dark, that the
drawing causes the darkness. The specific use of indices in these laws is
connected with the examples they are meant to explain.
12The alternative representations are, besides the more suggestive presentation, no-
tational variants of the original representations. The original representations will be
presented in the tables.
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Beautiful Women Marry formulates knowledge that supports the as-
sumption of a denial of expectation in Although Greta Garbo was beauti-
ful, she never married. Free variables have been used instead of constants,
because, as was explained in the previous chapter, it is just the specific
case in the utterance that defeats the law.
4.3.5 DICE: defeasible laws on discourse processes
Defeasible laws on discourse processes specify possible and impossi-
ble sequences of clauses in discourse. The (im)possibilities are based
on temporal, causal and lexical phenomena. Defeasible laws on dis-
course processes are more general and may be part of a reader’s linguis-
tic knowledge. They are not derived from the lexicon and independent
of world knowledge.
Defeasible laws specifying world knowledge are context specific and
volatile. Adding defeasible laws on discourse processes to the system
(where the defeasible laws all have the same status with respect to the
deduction rules represented in table 4.5) makes it possible to reduce the
amount of inferences.
Table 4.4: Defeasible laws on discourse processes
States Overlap (a) h; ; i ^ state(e

) > overlap(e

; e

)
States Overlap (b) h; ; i ^ state(e

) > overlap(e

; e

)
Maintain Causal
Trajectory
h; ; i ^ R(; ) ^ cause(e

; e

)
> :cause(e

; e

)
Conceptual Immediacy h; ; i ^  ! Result(; )
> :(e

 ibd(e

)  e

)
^ :(e

 fbd(e

)  e

)
Inertia (8)(open(; ) ^ ND(; ))
> (9
0
)(open(; 
0
) ^ DP ()(
0
; ))
No Cause when(; ) > :cause(e

; e

)
In table 4.4, defeasible laws on discourse processes are defined. Be-
low, the rules are discussed one by one.
In two versions of States Overlap, (a) and (b), the effect of a state in
a discourse is described: if one of two clauses expresses a state, then the
eventualities of both clauses overlap each other. Both (a) and (b) may
give rise to a Background relation.
In Maintain Causal Trajectory, a law concerning succession of rela-
tions is formulated: if a discourse is updated with a clause  related to
, and it is known (because it was stated in context) that the event of
 was caused by the event of , the event of  can not be the cause
for the event of . Maintain Causal Trajectory will be illustrated by an
example, in the next section (with respect to the deduction principles
in table 4.5).
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Conceptual Immediacy states that the Result(; ) relation in the
antecedent may not be intervened by another event  in the context
of .13 The intervention of one event between another is given in
terms of (temporal) event boundaries: the starting point (ibd) or the
ending point (fdb) of  comes ‘in-between’ the events expressed by the
clauses of Result. Conceptual Immediacy is an alternative formulation
of Maintain Causal Trajectory (presented in Lascarides and Oberlander,
1993). The relation R(; ) ^ cause(e

; e

) in the antecedent of Main-
tain Causal Trajectory expresses, in effect, a Result between  and ,
which may not be intervened by another event  (here located in the
context, but after the R relation).
In this chapter, Maintain Causal Trajectory is used instead of Con-
ceptual Immediacy. The main reason is, that it does not work for some
of the examples analyzed in the next sections.14 A more principled ar-
gument against replacement of Maintain Causal Trajectory with Con-
ceptual Immediacy is that other laws are not stated in terms of fbd or
ibd, so that interaction between laws and discourse relations through
deduction principles is not possible.
Inertia is a defeasible law that can only be activated in succession
of the application of the deduction principle ‘Nixon Diamond’ (table
4.5). A Nixon Diamond determines that in certain situations, it is not
possible to make a proper assumption of a discourse relation. In that
case, the discourse becomes incoherent. Inertia gives an alternative
move to the interpretation of the discourse by assuming that in the
specific case described below, a coherence relation is derived that fits in
the more global discourse pattern. This is only possible in cases where
attempts to shift to another level of the discourse structure fail (such
attempts are called discourse pops).
The antecedent of Inertia is thus defining a situation in which there
is incoherence, and a discourse pop can not solve the incoherence. (8)
(open(; ) ^ ND(; ) defines this situation: all open clauses  will get
a Nixon Diamond (ND) with . An open clause is a clause of  that is
(on structural grounds) available for having a relation with . So, the
antecedent for Inertia states that a Nixon Diamond will occur for every
attempt to make a discourse pop.
In case of Inertia  relates to  following the Discourse Pattern (DP)
of the discourse  . The effect of Inertia is, that the relation that should
be most likely in the global context, for instance Narration in a narra-
tive context, is assumed.
13This definition contains the phrase:  ! Result(; ). The ! has a different mean-
ing in Conceptual Immediacy: it means that discourse constituent  consists of the
clauses  and . This definition is not in agreement with the idea of clause by clause
discourse incrementation in single clauses.  is a complex constituent, attached as a
whole to the discourse. More is said about discourse incrementation in the next chap-
ter. The intuition behind the idea that causal relations be attached to the discourse as
a whole, will be the central topic of the next chapter.
14In (7),  would consist of an Explanation(; ).
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Unfortunately, this definition is quite vague as to which discourse
patterns there are, and which effect it has on the relations it allows
within its context. On the other hand, it is one of the few rules explic-
itly defining context restrictions on discourse relations.
No Cause is a law that restricts the use of the connective when
with respect to the direction of the causal relation. when(; ) reads,
when the connective when is taken as a natural language expression:
 when . The law then excludes e

to be the cause for e

. It is inter-
esting to notice that the impossibility for a causal relation is explicitly
formulated here, whereas the possibility for a causal relation expressed
by when (namely: e

to be the cause for e

) is not explicitly. This
is because in DICE, it is assumed that this knowledge can be derived
from the lexicon. And indeed, it is not necessary for when to indicate
a causal relation, so it depends on the propositional contents of the
clauses whether a causal relation will be assumed. The connective be-
cause works differently: see its definition in (15).
4.3.6 DICE: deduction principles
Having introduced the discourse relations, axioms on discourse rela-
tions, laws on world knowledge and laws on discourse processes, the
interaction between the rules needs to be established. Deduction prin-
ciples govern the interaction by defining and solving inconsistencies.
The principles are defined in table 4.5. Defeasible Modus Ponens gov-
erns the application of the rules on the input from the text. The Pen-
guin Principle states that the law expressing the most specific informa-
tion, wins. The competing law is defeated. The Nixon Diamond defines
a situation in which a certain combination of assumptions has made
a discourse inconsistent. Some of the laws on discourse processes may
define alternative interpretations of the discourse, but if these laws are
defeated too, the discourse is considered to be incoherent.
The principles will be demonstrated using an example. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that only a few properties actually determine the
principles. For instance, the Complex Penguin Principle defines that
more specific information is more important than less specific infor-
mation. Therefore, it is renamed ‘Specificity’ in Lascarides et al. (1996).
Defeasible Modus Ponens defines how discourse relations, and de-
feasible laws may be assumed on the basis of (lexical, world or linguis-
tic) knowledge. When, for instance, a causal relation is assumed on
the basis of text information, a causal law is needed and the condition
of the law needs to be satisfied. When the Push Causal Law is part of
the knowledge of the reader, and he reads: Max fell. John pushed him,
he may consider the propositional contents of these two sentences as
the satisfaction of the conditions of the Push Causal Law. The result is,
that the reader may assume that there is a causal relation between the
two clauses. Defeasible Modus Ponens requires in addition that there is
no information that contradicts the assumption ‘Max did not fall’, for
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Table 4.5: Deduction rules
Defeasible Modus Ponens
(A1)  >  
(A2) 
(A3) (not: : )
9
=
;
j  
Complex Penguin Principle
(B1) !  
(B2)  > 
(B3)  > 
(B4) ! 
(B5)  ! :
(B6) 
9
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
;
j ; but not: 
Nixon Diamond
(C1)  > :
(C2)  > 
(C3)  
(C4) 
9
>
=
>
>
;
Not: j  (or :)
that would be inconsistent.
The propositions, indicated with Greek letters in table 4.5, may refer
to complex propositions. If the Push Causal Law is taken as an example,
 in (A1) and (A2) would read ‘h; ; i ^ fall(m; e

) ^ push(j;m; e

)’.  
in (A1), (A2) and (A3) would read: ‘cause(e

; e

)’. : is, of course, the
negation of .
The assumption of  , made by knowing  >  ,  (and not: : ), is
defined by j. It makes the assumption of  non-monotonically valid.
Given a non-monotonic logic (Asher and Morreau, 1991),  is defeasi-
bly (but validly) derived from  >  and .
In fact, Defeasible Modus Ponens does nothing more than allow-
ing for any kind of assumption that can be made in the given format.
Whether or not such an assumption will actually be made, is depen-
dent on other circumstances. For the Push Causal Law, information
from the lexicon must support the relation between to push and to fall.
Discourse relations are restricted by indefeasible axioms. It is possible,
however, to assume laws and relations that appear to be wrong. In
interaction with other knowledge, these assumptions have to be ruled
out. This is done by the two other principles.
A principle that may resolve a conflict between two assumed coher-
ence relations is an extension of what is called the Penguin Principle
134 INFERENCE AND ENFORCEMENT
(Lascarides and Asher, 1991). This principle states that if two contradic-
tory statements are partly based on the same conditions (one logically
entails the other), the only conclusion that is allowed, is the one using
the most specific information. The standard example is provided by a
penguin called Tweety. Suppose that it is known that Birds fly, Penguins
are birds, and Tweety is a Penguin. Then it is allowed to conclude that
Tweety flies. However, if it is known too that Penguins do not fly, it is
only allowed to conclude that Tweety does not fly. The information that
Penguins do not fly is more specific than the information that birds
fly. His ability to fly is derived through two other generic statements,
whereas his inability to fly is derived more directly from the fact that
he is a penguin. The conclusion is restricted to the one using the most
specific information.
In Max fell. John pushed him, the Penguin Principle is not about pen-
guins and flying, but about coherence relations, axioms and laws. The
conflict is not between the two assumptions (of Explanation and Narra-
tion), but between the axioms on these assumptions: the assumptions
are connected with different orders of the events of falling and push-
ing. The application of the Penguin Principle will be more complex,
hence its name: Complex Penguin Principle (in table 4.5). In the ex-
ample, the principle is applied twice to resolve the conflict.15
The Complex Penguin Principle resolves conflicts when two dis-
course relations or laws can be assumed, and the antecedent of one
logically entails the other. Applied to the example, this logical entail-
ment is expressed by the fact that Narration only has a continuation of
the discourse as a condition: ‘h; ; i’ (see table 4.1). The Push Causal
Law has the same continuation in its condition, but additional infor-
mation too: ‘h; ; i ^ fall(m; e

) ^ push(j;m; e

)’ (see table 4.3). So,
the antecedent of the Push Causal Law logically entails the antecedent
of Narration. In table 4.5, this is formally represented in the rule num-
bered (B1):  !  .  and  can be identified as conditions of defeasible
rules, because these rules are given as (B2) and (B3). It does not mat-
ter that one of these rules is a law and the other a coherence relation.
However, there is no conflict detected yet.
Both Narration and Push Causal Law invoke their axioms: the Ax-
iom on Narration and Causes Precede Effects, respectively. And these
axioms are in conflict, because their event orders are contrary to each
other. Narration states that the event order be: ‘Max fell, and then John
pushed him’, whereas Causes Precede Effects states that the order be:
‘John pushed Max and then Max fell.’ In table 4.5, the Axiom on Nar-
ration is represented by (B4) and Causes Precede Effects by (B5). The
conflict is stated in their consequences:  (in (B4)) and : (in (B5)) are
identified as e

 e

and : e

 e

. The conflict will only be activated if
the Push Causal Law is activated by asserting its condition: this is rule
15This double application is reduced to one by reformulating the Push Causal Law
and Explanation (Asher and Lascarides, 1995).
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(B6) in table 4.5.
If all the premisses (B1)-(B6) are met (logical entailment of two con-
ditions, the rules themselves, and their conflicting axioms), the Com-
plex Penguin Principle states that the most specific defeasible rule wins.
The outcome is the consequence of the Push Causal Law: the event of
Max’s falling is caused by the event of John’s pushing. In table 4.5 this
is represented by  (i.e.: cause(; )) coming after the j symbol. It is
explicitly indicated that Narration is not selected in: but not:  (i.e.
Narration(; )).
This outcome is used to apply the Complex Penguin Principle a sec-
ond time, now between Narration and Explanation. Explanation con-
tains, next to the discourse continuation predicate h; ; i, the causal
relation that has been established by the Push Causal Law. This con-
junct makes Explanation logically entail Narration. The conflict is be-
tween the axioms on Narration and Explanation: their event orders are
not in agreement with each other (the Axiom on Explanation demands
the same event order as Causes Precede Effects). Given the discourse at
hand,  is applied in (B6) and in (B1) in table 4.5, and  is logically
implied. The rules (B2) and (B3) are entailed by (B1) and (B6), and
(B4) and (B5) are entailments of the consequences of (B2) and (B3), re-
spectively. the outcome is that the consequence of Explanation wins,
since it is more specific. The establishment of the Explanation relation
between the two clauses is chosen by the second application of the
Penguin Principle.
This derivation may seem complicated, but the observation needed
to draw the conclusion of a Penguin Principle, is quite simple: are there
any conditions of laws or discourse relations that logically entail an-
other condition? If so, the rule with the most specific condition wins.
This is by definition the condition that entails the other, so once the
observation is made, the right discourse relation is selected. The double
application of the Penguin Principle is avoided, when the definitions of
law and discourse relation are changed. With respect to this example,
this is done in Asher and Lascarides (1995).
The Nixon Diamond defines incoherence by deriving a direct in-
consistency between the consequences of two activated laws, axioms
or discourse relations. It is exemplified by a statement about Nixon:
Nixon is a Quaker and a Republican. If one knows that Quakers are paci-
fists, and Republicans are non-pacifists, the statement about Nixon is
inconsistent, for he can not be both a pacifist and a non-pacifist. The
Nixon Diamond forbids assumptions of laws and discourse relations in
a specific situation: if the assumption of a law, discourse relation or ax-
iom results in a contradiction with another assumption from another
rule, the assumptions that Quakers are pacifists and Republicans are
non-pacifists can not be made at the same time (or rather: Nixon may
not be Republican and Quaker at the same time). To obtain a Nixon
Diamond, a discourse has to satisfy the conditions of two defeasible
rules, leading to contradicting consequents. Now that these assump-
136 INFERENCE AND ENFORCEMENT
tions may not be derived, the discourse lacks a relation between the
two clauses that needed to be connected. This makes the discourse in-
coherent. There are some ways to make a new derivation, using other
assumptions (for instance, by applying Inertia, see table 4.4). There is
also the possibility that the discourse is in fact incoherent. An example
of this latter possibility will be demonstrated here. In section 4.4 and
4.5, assumptions made after the application of a Nixon Diamond will
be discussed.
An example may be provided by the rules Maintain Causal Trajec-
tory and Explanation, with respect to the discourse: # John applied a
sharp blow to Max’s neck. Max fell. John had pushed him. These three
clauses are represented by ,  and  respectively. The relation be-
tween  and  is a Result, and therefore Maintain Causal Trajectory
holds between  and .16 But also Explanation holds between  and
. Maintain Causal Trajectory assumes that  may not be the cause for
, but Explanation assumes that  is the cause for . This activates the
Nixon Diamond, and it forbids a causal relation, as well as a non-causal
relation, between  and .
Maintain Causal Trajectory (table 4.4) is specified in (C1), in ta-
ble 4.5.  refers (with respect to the example) to h; ; i ^ R(; ) ^
cause(e

; e

). The rule focuses on the update of  with  on  (the up-
date of the clause John had pushed him). In the second conjunct,  is
introduced as another clause from  .17  is the cause for , as the third
conjunct of the condition of Maintain Causal Trajectory expresses. In
(C1), : corresponds with the consequence of Maintain Causal Trajec-
tory, :cause(e

; e

). The defeasible rule  >  in (C2) of the definition
of the Nixon Diamond in table 4.5 corresponds with Explanation (ta-
ble 4.1):  is cause(e

; e

).  as well as  are established here, in (C3)
and (C4) respectively (John did apply the blow to Max’s neck, and he
pushed Max). Now, the crucial observation is made: both  and : are
established, on the basis of two rules with directly contradicting con-
sequences. The Nixon Diamond is executed, which means that neither
 nor : may be assumed. Consequently, the discourse is considered
incoherent. With respect to the example, this is the correct derivation.
In other examples, the Nixon Diamond will give rise to other assump-
tions that will not suffer from the Nixon Diamond (in the sections 4.4
and 4.5, examples will be discussed).
Summarizing, the definitions of the three principles seem compli-
cated. The intuition behind the three principles is rather straightfor-
16In Lascarides and Oberlander (1993), there is no specific law formulated that sup-
port the causal relation between  and . It is not difficult to see that it will be quite
easy to derive such a law from the lexicon. Moreover, Asher and Lascarides (1995)
generalize the Push Causal Law in such a way, that it is not necessary to formulate a
specific rule for every causal ‘physical force and fall’ relation. A Result will be assumed
here without formulating a new law.
17
 is part of  according to the first conjunct, and has a coherence relation with ,
according to the second. So  must be part of  , or  maintains coherence relations
with clauses from another discourse.
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ward: an automated reader makes assumptions on the basis of (world
and linguistic) knowledge and the text itself (Defeasible Modus Po-
nens), he selects from the possible assumptions those that do not cause
inconsistency, by selecting assumptions with the most specific informa-
tion (Complex Penguin Principle), and in case of direct contradiction,
he stops reading (the Nixon Diamond).
4.3.7 Conclusion
In this section, DICE was introduced as a system making inferences on
lexical, linguistic and world knowledge. The organisation of the sys-
tem is given by three principles (in table 4.5). The general idea behind
the rules is, that there is an interaction between world knowledge, lex-
ical knowledge and linguistic knowledge. This interaction is governed
by the three principles. Laws containing world knowledge, are in fact
context-specific rules derived from the lexicon. They may be derived
only for the occasion. How their derivation works, is not shown in
this section. Laws of world knowledge are the least interesting aspect
of DICE: more important are laws on discourse processes, defining lin-
guistic knowledge. This kind of knowledge does not exist just for the
occasion: these laws will make it easier for a reader to make inferences,
for the propositional contents of the clauses need not be taken into ac-
count. Therefore, the development of DICE is aimed at questions: like
these:
 How are causal laws systematically derived from the lexicon?
 How do linguistic rules ease the processes of assuming and rea-
soning?
In the next two sections, presuppositions of connectives will be intro-
duced as linguistic rules. It will be shown how knowledge is derived
from the lexicon when a causal connective is used, and this process
will be compared with deriving the same causal relation without the
use of a causal connective.
4.4 Connectives make a difference
In this section, the example in (3), repeated here, will be analyzed in
more detail, in order to show the differences between coherence with,
and without a causal connective in DICE.
(3) Max fell. John pushed him.
With respect to (3), it was claimed that the relation between the two
clauses was Explanation. This is not necessarily the case: given an
appropriate context, the relation is rather narrative than causal, as (4)
shows (taken from Lascarides et al., 1992).
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(4) John and Max came to the Cliff’s edge. John applied a sharp blow
to the back of Max’s neck. Max fell. John pushed him. Max rolled
over the edge of the cliff.
The relation between the two italicized clauses is Narration and not
Explanation. In section 4.3.6, an example similar to (4) was discussed,
with one crucial difference: In (4), John pushed him is used, whereas the
former example had John had pushed him. This difference is crucial, for
the pluperfect turns the clause into a cause for Max fell.
In (5), the same two sentences are connected with because.
(5) Max fell, because John pushed him.
It seems that in (5), causality is expressed much in the same way as in
(3). In (5), it is quite obvious that the relation between the two clauses
is causal. There is a difference with (3): the causality is inescapable, for
because is expressing that there be a causal relation. A consequence of
the inescapability is shown in (6).
(6) John and Max came to the Cliff’s edge. John applied a sharp blow
to the back of Max’s neck. ?Max fell, because John pushed him. Max
rolled over the edge of the cliff.
In (6), the connective because is inserted in the discourse from (4). In
this context, the sentence taken from (5) becomes unacceptable. It is
unexplained what the relation is between the blow on Max’s neck and
his fall, or: the assumption that the blow caused the fall has become
impossible. The causality expressed in (5) is acceptable, but should be
avoided in (6).
The causality in (3) can be denied in specific contexts, whereas it
is preferred in contextless presentation (or in suitable contexts). It is
one of the aims of DICE to show that there are different derivations of
coherence relations in (3) and (4). Different linguistic or world knowl-
edge is used to derive the different coherence relations in (3) and (4).
The analyses of both examples will be given below, following Lascarides
et al. (1992). Next, the examples in (5) and (6) will be included, and
it will appear that DICE needs an extension for the representation of
connectives to discriminate between (3) and (5), and between (4) and
(6).
On the basis of the Complex Penguin Principle, Explanation is as-
sumed in (3) instead of Narration. In section 4.3.6, the Complex Pen-
guin Principle has already been applied on the example in 3.
There is a problem with this choice: in (3), there seems to be a pref-
erence for one relation, and in (4) for the other. The decision must be
context sensitive, for context determines the coherence relation here.
Maintain Causal Trajectory prohibits events in new clauses to be a cause
for the event of an available clause in the existing discourse, when there
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is an event within the discourse, that is causing the available clause al-
ready. The application of Maintain Causal Trajectory to an example like
(4) has been given already in section 4.3.6, where the Nixon Diamond
has been explained.
In (7), (4) is repeated with enumerated clauses.
(7) a. John and Max came to the Cliff’s edge.
b. John applied a sharp blow to the back of Max’s neck.
c. Max fell.
d. John pushed him.
e. Max rolled over the edge of the cliff.
In (7), there is a Result relationship between (7b) and (7c), so the new
clause (7d) can not be the cause for (7c) again. However, the Push
Causal Law holds between the events of the clauses (7c) and (7d). It
has no restrictions on the context of these clauses, so there is nothing
that prevents the assumption of the Push Causal Law. The assumptions
of Maintain Causal Trajectory (John pushed him may not be a cause for
Max fell) and the Push Causal Law (John pushed him is a cause for Max
fell) contradict each other. This activates the Nixon Diamond.
Because the conditions on both assumptions are satisfied in (7) (the-
re was already a cause for Max fell, and someone pushed Max and Max
fell, respectively), the discourse is inconsistent, according to the Nixon
Diamond. More specifically, the assumption of a causal relation and
the assumption of a negation of a causal relation between (7c) and
(7d) are excluded. In section 4.3.6, where the clause (7d) was used in
pluperfect, the discourse was indeed incoherent. In this case, there has
been made some new assumption.
For instance, in order to avoid incoherence, a discourse pop could
be made: another clause, higher in the discourse structure, should be
found to be attached to. In this case, however, no other clauses are
available, since the previous clauses are all connected through Narra-
tion. Attaching to clauses on the left hand side of the rightmost clause
would give, in this case, an inconsistent result with respect to the ax-
iom on Narration: the event orders would not be sequential anymore.
It seems that a state of inertia has been reached. Lascarides et al. (1992)
define such a state. A rule of ‘Inertia’ (see table 4.4) states that if the
Nixon Diamond has occurred in such a way that the conditions of two
defeasible rules will lead to an inconsistent state of the discourse, and
no discourse pop is possible, the discourse pattern of the current dis-
course determines the relation that will be chosen, in the end. John
pushed him can not be attached to another clause (as the discourse pat-
tern is narrative), and Narration is derived, instead of Explanation.18
18It is unclear whether the discourse pattern has caused this choice, or the fact that
the condition for the assumption of Maintain Causal Trajectory was more specific than
the condition for the assumption of Explanation. Lascarides et al. (1992) give the
former as a general cause, and the latter as the specific cause for this example.
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This way (narrative) context prevails over (push) causal knowledge.
Lascarides et al. (1992) remark with respect to example (7) that
Maintain Causal Trajectory does not always prevent causal laws to come
about. There are cases in which Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeated.
In that case, a causal law is not in conflict with Maintain Causal Tra-
jectory. An example of such a case is (8), (taken from Lascarides et al.,
1992).
(8) Max switched off the light. The room went pitch dark, since he
had drawn the blinds too.
Here, there are two causes for one effect: the room went dark, both
because Max switched off the light, and because the blinds were closed.
The former cause is presented before the effect, and the latter after the
effect. In spite of this pattern, forbidden by Maintain Causal Trajectory,
the discourse is acceptable. Why is it that Maintain Causal Trajectory
is defeated in this case? Is a Blinds Law (see table 4.3) less defeasible
than the Push Causal Law, or is the Light Switch Law more defeasible
than the law that makes (7c) the result of (7b)? These questions will
not lead to satisfiable answers. Lascarides et al. (1992) suggest with
respect to (8) that (...) presentational issues will be significant in cases such
as these; (...). Presentational information should interact with domain-
specific knowledge. This presentational information is, in this case, the
presence of the connective since and the adverb too.
Lascarides et al. (1992) do not work out the cited suggestion. Given
the specific semantics of causal connectives, presented in chapter 3 of
this thesis, it is worthwhile to investigate this interaction with respect
to the connective since. This can be done in relation with the inco-
herence of the example in (6). In (7), it was Inertia that finally led to
the derivation of Narration. In (6), the unacceptability may be caused
because Inertia can not be executed: the presence of because would
block the derivation of Narration. When (6) is unacceptable, due to
the combination of causal connective and Maintain Causal Trajectory,
(8) presents a new problem: why is this discourse acceptable, while the
effect of since and Maintain Causal Trajectory may both be assumed?
In sum, the following problems need to be solved:
1. How is the difference between the unacceptable (6), with because,
and the acceptable (7), accounted for in DICE?
2. what is the difference between (6) and (8): when does the as-
sumption of Maintain Causal Trajectory lead to inconsistency,
and when is Maintain Causal Trajectory defeated?
A description of the way causal connectives might solve these prob-
lems, can only be given in detail after the semantics of causal connec-
tives is defined in DICE. The explanations given in the next section
will make crucial use of the proposed format for definitions of causal
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connectives in chapter 3. Moreover, these definitions will prove to be
of use in many other cases, and not just as ad hoc explanations of the
examples (6) to (8). In the next section, these other advantages of using
specific definitions for causal connectives will be discussed as well.
4.5 Enforced coherence in DICE
4.5.1 Introduction
In this section, an account of causal connectives in DICE will be given,
that should solve the problems coming forth from the previous sec-
tion: in order to solve these problems, DICE will be extended with only
one simple rule, that makes the distinction between inference with or
without connectives. To elucidate the discussion, (6) is reformulated as
(9), and (8) as (10), both with their clauses enumerated.
(9) a. John and Max came to the Cliff’s edge.
b. John applied a sharp blow to the back of Max’s neck.
c. Max fell,
d. ? because John pushed him.
e. Max rolled over the edge of the cliff.
(10) a. Max switched off the light.
b. The room went pitch dark,
c. since he had drawn the blinds too.
In order to formulate answers to the questions from the previous sec-
tion, it has to be established that definitions of presuppositions for con-
nectives are possible in DICE. When this has been done, and the ques-
tions have been answered, the advantage of the proposal will come
about. The main advantage of having rules for presuppositions of con-
nectives is, that no laws have to be derived from the lexicon to infer
causality. The use of, e.g. since in (10) is not made possible by the
Blinds Law, derived from the lexicon: the relation expressed by since is
given as a causal relation in a specific direction. In the lexicon, only a
very specific check is needed to approve of the given relation, instead
of having lexical semantics form a causal law out of two contextually
related notions. It will take DICE much less ‘inferential effort’ when
presuppositions of causal connectives are implemented.
In the next paragraph, it will be explained how presuppositions of
causal connectives in DICE are made possible; in the subsequent para-
graph, the problems mentioned in the previous section will be solved.
In doing so, the advantages of defining presuppositions of connectives,
will become clear.
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4.5.2 Presuppositions of causal connectives in DICE
In DICE, there is no general account of presuppositions of connectives.
However, in Lascarides and Oberlander (1993), a proposal is made to
account for presuppositions of temporal subclauses. They follow the
approach of Van der Sandt and Geurts (1991), and apply it to DICE.19
Their account runs as follows. Whenever an utterance contains an ex-
pression bearing a presupposition, this presupposition has to be inter-
preted properly in the discourse representation that was made of the
previous discourse. There are three possibilities, each with their own
consequences.
1. presupposed information is present in context: presupposition is
like an anaphor;
2. presupposed information is not present: presupposition is accom-
modated;
3. presupposed information contradicts contextual information: the-
re is no proper interpretation.
If presupposed information is already available, the presupposition be-
haves like an anaphor. The order in the three possibilities reflects the
order of processing: resolution of the presupposition is tried before ac-
commodation; proper interpretation fails after these possibilities have
been tried.
Lascarides and Oberlander (1993) add to this theory the inference
of coherence relations, by assuming that presupposition accommoda-
tion is constrained by the rules of DICE, and must be attached to the
discourse as ‘normal’ clauses. A clausal representation of the presup-
position attaches before the utterance itself, under the constraints of
DICE. This way, the contribution of the presupposition to coherence is
accounted for.20 Lascarides and Oberlander (1993) try to explain the
incoherence of, e.g., (11).
(11) a. The backbenchers were in revolt.
b. ? Major launched a charm offensive before they were pacified.
The use of before presupposes the truth of the subclause they were paci-
fied. If it is accommodated, it will appear as a constituent in a repre-
sentation of the discourse. This may be visualized in the paraphrase in
19It is important to realize that presuppositions of temporal subclauses concern the
presupposition of the subclause, not the relation between the clauses.
20The attachment of the presupposition complicates the story, since DICE is a theory
about inference, and not specifically about attachment. In this thesis, attachment
comes after establishing coherence relations. See also the next chapter.
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(12).
(12) a. The backbenchers were in revolt.
b. ? They were pacified.
c. Major launched a charm offensive before that.
The explanation for the incoherent discourse has now been localized
at the point at which coherence of (12a) and (12b) should have been
established. The reason for the incoherence is that two rules are in
conflict: States Overlap (b) and the Revolt Law (see table 4.3). States
Overlap represents linguistic knowledge, applicable in every discourse;
the Revolt Law is quite an ad hoc law, established by the association
of two lexical items in each other’s contexts. The first says that if the
first clause of two related clauses expresses a state, there is an overlap
in the duration of the events between the first and the second clause.
However, the Revolt Law says that an event expressing a revolt, and an
event expressing a pacification, can not have an overlap: they come
after each other. Since the antecedents of the rules do not logically en-
tail each other, the complex Penguin Principle is not activated. Since
their consequences contradict each other, a Nixon Diamond disquali-
fies the attachment of (12b) to the discourse. So, the presupposition of
clause (12b) explains - together with world knowledge on revolts and
pacifications - the unacceptability of (11).
Presuppositions of causal connectives can not be treated in the same
way as presuppositions of temporal subclauses. Presuppositions of sub-
clauses add a clause to the discourse that has to be related with its
context by inference of a coherence relation. Presuppositions of causal
connectives do not add clauses, but they add causal knowledge. Is it
possible in DICE to let connectives presuppose causal knowledge? There
is one connective, of which a ‘causal implicature’ is defined: when.
In fact, what has been defined is a non-causal implicature, called ‘No
Cause’ (see table 4.4; taken from Lascarides and Oberlander, 1993).
Used as a connective of two clauses in past tense, when implicates the
knowledge that the temporal connective when may not be understood
causally in one specific direction. Consider (13).
(13) Max fell, when John pushed him.
Independent of the connective, the Push Causal Law is assumed, so the
when-clause is the cause for the effect expressed in the main clause. It is
just knowledge of the world (the Push Causal Law) that invites a causal
inference here. The No Cause Law prohibits a causal inference in the
opposite direction: Max fell may not be understood as the cause for John
pushed him. Two aspects of this law will be discussed. The first is that
Lascarides & Oberlander’s (1993) No Cause Law is redundant; the other
is that the definition of the No Cause Law makes way for definitions of
other causal implicatures. The latter aspect is, of course, relevant to the
definition of presuppositions for causal connectives.
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The first aspect of the No Cause Law is that it is redundant. The
temporal semantics of when will already exclude the main clause event
from being a cause for the when clause event. In Partee (1984) (accord-
ing to Sandstro¨m, 1993), the observation is made that the reference
time of the event of the main clause is ‘just after’ the reference time of
the event in the when clause.21 If the main clause were a cause of the
when clause, the axiom ‘Causes precede Effects’ should hold, but the
temporal meaning of when will not allow for the main clause to start
before the when clause. Consider sentence (14), in which the clauses of
(13) have been reversed, thus giving the Push Causal Law the opportu-
nity to make a cause from the main clause.
(14) John pushed Max, when Max fell.
The reluctance for (14) to express a causal relation, in contrast with
the causally interpreted (13), is a result of the impossibility for Max
fell to be understood as starting before John pushed Max. Instead, Max
fell is understood to begin just after John pushed Max. This is not in
agreement with Causes precede Effects, so (14) can not be understood
causally.22 So, without the No Cause Law, the fact that (14) can not be
understood causally is easily explained. In other words, the No Cause
Law is redundant. An advantage of this analysis is, that when remains
temporally defined. The No Cause Law suggests that when may be un-
derstood causally (in the opposite direction), although a causal defini-
tion is not provided. It is not a good idea to define a ‘Cause Law’ for
when, for its causal interpretation is dependent on world knowledge,
like the Push Causal Law. When is interpreted causally due to causal
laws (world knowledge or lexical knowledge), and is restricted in that
by its temporal ‘just after’ meaning. In this respect, when differs from
because. This will be demonstrated now.
The second aspect of the No Cause Law is that it provides a way of
defining causal implicatures for causal connectives. In particular, the
definition shows that what is considered to be a ‘causal implicature’
(Lascarides and Oberlander, 1993, p. 264) associated with a connective,
can be stated in a law of DICE. Whether or not causal connectives
have a presupposition is not under discussion here (see chapter 3).23
It may simply be assumed that these presuppositions are implemented
21In the so called narrative interpretation of when, the main clause event starts before
the when clause event has started: Ajax was about to win when Feyenoord scored a goal.
This use of when is different from the meaning it is supposed to have in the No Cause
Law.
22Perhaps, Causes precede Effects needs to be adjusted in such a way that instead of
events, the initial states of events are used in the definition.
23The definition in (15) is supported by the classic definition of a presupposition:
a proposition and its negation have the same presupposition. In this case, both
because(; ) and :because(;) should indefeasibly imply: cause(e

; e

). This is true,
since cause(e

; e

) means ‘normally, e

causes e

’. In the case of negation, the pre-
supposition is still that in normal cases cause(e

; e

), only in this specific case it is
different.
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the same way as the causal implicature for the No Cause Law. In fact,
the formulation of this rule is very simple. It is stated in the Because
Law, in (15).
(15) Because Law
because(; ) ! cause(e

; e

),
where because(; ) reads:  because .
In a discourse Max fell, because John pushed him, the Because Law inde-
feasibly implies that the event of John pushed him causes the event of
Max fell.24
The indefeasibility of the linguistic knowledge that because has a
presupposition, does not mean that the knowledge itself has become
indefeasible. This can be made explicit by showing that the cause
predicate can be translated into the presupposition of because given
in chapter 3. The definition in (16) states that the cause predicate from
(15) may be translated into the defeasible implication defined for the
presupposition of because.
(16) Definition: cause(e

; e

) t (e

> e

)
The translation in (16) may be regarded as equivalent to 0 > 0,
the notation used in the previous chapter for the presupposition of
because.25
Most important in (15) is that the implication is indefeasible, as is
expressed by the !. It means that the cause predicate must hold, for
any occurrence of because. As explained with regard to (16), it does not
mean that the causality itself must be a universal truth: the transla-
tion is referring to defeasible knowledge. Even if there were no defined
relation between pushing and falling, the defeasible implication may
be derived, and the indefeasible Because Law is satisfied. Epistemic in-
terpretation is allowed too: the presupposition that was defined in the
previous chapter may represent it. What is not allowed, however, is the
case in which it is not possible to derive a defeasible implication at all
(in section 2.4 in chapter 2, this was defined as not satisfying an INUS
condition). This results in an unacceptable discourse.
24Lascarides & Asher (1995, p. 80) changed the Axiom on Explanation into
Explanation(; ) ! cause(e

; e

). They merged the Push Causal Law (table 4.3)
and the discourse relation Explanation (table 4.1) into the ‘Push Explanation Law’:
(h; ; i ^ fall(e

;m)^ push(e

; j;m)) > Explanation(; ). The consequent of this
rule is subject to Causes Precede Effects. Other axioms on causal discourse relations
may change this way too, so that constraint on temporal order of events in causal
relations is provided by Causes Precede Effects only. The Because Law in (15), is al-
most identical to the new axiom on Explanation, although the differences between
assuming Explanation and signalling because are significant.
25The equation of the main eventuality e

of a clause and the proposition 0, derived
from a clause by generalization or implication need not be the same. To describe
the differences and similarities between the two notions goes beyond the scope of
this chapter. They are assumed to be the same, but they play different roles in their
representations.
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It is interesting to compare the way in which cause(e

; e

) is de-
rived indefeasibly, with the Push Causal Law. The Push Causal Law
is repeated here (taken from table 4.3) in (17). ( and  reversed for
presentational reasons).
(17) Push Causal Law
h; ; i ^ fall(m; e

) ^ push(j;m; e

) > cause(e

; e

)
In (17), the assumption of cause(e

; e

) is dependent on the lexical
meanings of to fall and to push, and contextual restrictions. These have
to be related causally. There is no reason why the lexical meanings
should relate, other than their co-occurrence, so there must be some
lexical rule associating the relevant fields in the lexical meaning struc-
tures (cf. Lascarides et al., 1996, using Pustejovsky, 1991). In other
words, work needs to be done in the lexicon, before the Push Causal
Law is derived.
In (15), cause(e

; e

) is given in any circumstance, no matter what
the events refer to, or what context restrictions there are (although con-
text or word meaning may give rise to epistemic or speech act interpre-
tation). As a consequence, to push and to fall are connected in the lexi-
con, with the explicit instruction to find some sense of the meanings of
these lexical items that could support the causal relation. Pustejovsky
(1991) analyzes the structure of lexical items in a lexicon. Words may
have roles associated with them, specifying for instance the purpose of
a word, or the effect it may have when they are used in a certain con-
text. When the connection between two lexical items for a specific role
can be made, a causal relation is supported. The structure of the lexi-
cal items takes care of finding more common roles before less common
roles are found.
Derivation of the Push Causal Law on the basis of two sentences
without causal connectives, has to be extracted from the lexical mean-
ings of to push and to fall, without the instruction to understand it
causally.26 The only thing that can happen (if no other contextual fac-
tors play a role) is that the two lexical items each find a role that suits
the other item best. Asher and Lascarides (1995) assign to the verb
push a feature structure containing lexical meaning aspects, in a struc-
ture like Pustejovsky’s. When push is understood in a locative sense,
it may cause a patient to change its location by force (or: loc(cause-
change-force). In the case of (3), the patient is Max, and his falling is
the locative change that has been made. Meaning aspects of to push are
thus incorporated in to fall.
26Of course, there are other indicators of causality. For instance, a pluperfect in the
second clause gives rise to an Explanation, Elaboration, Parallel or Contrast. The inter-
pretation of the lexical meanings in the lexicon will be restricted by these coherence
relations. And indeed, such an implicature is defined in Lascarides and Asher (1993).
Pluperfect thus operates analogous to causal connectives (only choices for different
interpretations are rather minimal for because).
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The coherence relation that is obtained from this connection of the
roles might be causal, but it might be something else as well. Given
to push and to fall, this is a causal relation. However, when to push is
not taken in a locative sense, for instance when it means to encourage,
it will not be associated with to fall in a causal relation. Contextual
factors may determine these changes, as (18) shows.
(18) Max was afraid to do a talk. John pushed him.
In (18), there is no causal relation. John pushed him is interpreted as
Narration, as the story of Max’s talk is continued.27 The two senses of
to push mentioned here, are both subtypes of the meaning of the word
to push.
In a derivation with because, those meanings that give rise to a
causal relation are determined, whether they are preferred or not. In
the sentence: John pushed Max, because he was afraid to do a talk, the
same connotation is used for to push as in (18). The cause-effect inter-
pretation, which was not preferred in (18), is necessitated here.
The inference of a causal relation in discourse is obtained by differ-
ent processes in the lexicon: by means of a causal connective, putting
relevant senses of lexical items together, or by association of more com-
mon senses of lexical items in the lexicon, that might be causally re-
lated. These two processes have the following differences:
 Deriving a causal relation by association of common senses of lex-
ical items is more complex than selecting senses of lexical items
on the basis of a specified causal relation;
 a causal relation derived from the lexicon may be less certain than
a causal relation given by a causal connective.
That a derivation is more complex means that it takes more compu-
tational effort for a system like DICE, or, mutatis mutandis, inferential
effort for a reader. An example of a less certain causal relation is the
relation that has to be inferred in (1): not only may the relation be-
tween beauty and marriage be interpreted ambiguously, namely as an
Explanation or a Result, but the knowledge supporting the relation is
also less certain.28
These two effects are effects that come about in DICE as well as in
the observation of natural language. An extension of DICE with (15),
thus means a closer connection of DICE to linguistic facts, and an ex-
planation for the relative ‘inferential effort’.
Given the assumption that causal connectives have their own laws,
based on presuppositions, the fall and push examples in their different
27Perhaps, a causal relation could be that John pushed Max as an effect of Max being
afraid. But that would be a far-fetched interpretation.
28Less certain knowledge does not refer to an ontological status of the knowledge: it
refers to a degree of certainty that a reader will assign to its inference.
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contexts can be revisited, to see if a difference between inference with
or without connectives can be made. This will be done in the next
section.
4.5.3 Enforced and defeated
In this section, the derivations of the examples (9) and (10) are pre-
sented, making use of the Because Law. The differences with their con-
nectiveless counterparts will be discussed. It will appear that discourses
with a causal connective are interpreted differently than the same dis-
courses without such a connective. Besides, it will appear that calcu-
lating coherence using causal connectives takes the burden of deriving
laws from lexical knowledge away. This will give a considerable saving
on the inferential effort it takes to derive knowledge from the lexicon
in order to interpret a discourse.
Given the Because law, the differences between example (7) and (9)
can be accounted for. Due to the occurrence of because in (9), the Be-
cause Law is executed. This means, that when Max fell is represented as
e

and John pushed him as e

, a cause predicate cause(e

; e

) is assumed
indefeasibly. This can be done without any prior knowledge on push-
ing and falling: it is just the presupposition of because. Of course, in the
lexicon, support has to be found for e

as a cause for e

. Since this rela-
tion between pushing and falling is more preferred in the lexicon than
other relations (witness the fact that a Push Causal Law can be derived
from the lexical items), this will not give any problems. Even if there
were only weak support for a causal relation, it would be established as
such, because it is given that the relation be causal.
The assumption of cause(e

; e

), creates a problem for Maintain
Causal Trajectory has been executed as well. The assumption of Main-
tain Causal Trajectory means that :cause(; ) should be the case. This
contradicts the causal relation made on the basis of the Because Law.
An irresolvable conflict is created: the consequences of two rules are in
conflict. This activates the Nixon Diamond, and an irresolvable con-
flict is the result (see table 4.5). In (7), this caused a state of inertia,
because it was not possible to find an alternative interpretation, and
a discourse pop was impossible. In (9), the problem is worse: accord-
ing to the Nixon Diamond, cause(; ) may not be assumed (this is the
same as with the discourse in (7)), but according to the Because Law,
it may not be defeated. This makes the discourse inconsistent. The
derivation of Narration by application of Inertia is not initiated, be-
cause there is not a situation in which no coherence is achieved, but
one in which an inconsistency has occurred. Therefore, the discourse
in (9) is unacceptable.
An example of a discourse quite similar to (9), with respect to the
application of causal laws, is given in (10). The similarity of (9) and (10)
creates a problem: the discourse in (9) is unacceptable, the discourse in
(10) is not. Lascarides and Oberlander (1993) present (10) to illustrate
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that Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeasible. That this law is defeasible,
is undoubtedly true, and that it is defeated, is true when both the causes
draw the blinds and switched off the light are assumed as a cause for the
room went pitch dark. This seems to be the case. This raises the question
why Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeated in (10), but not in (9).
In order to answer this question, the laws that are involved with (10)
have to be introduced. The Light Switch Law and the Blinds Law are
laws that have been derived from the lexicon, on the basis of the occur-
rence of the lexical items that determine the events in the clauses. That
they are causal is due to the fact that the association of, e.g., switching
off the light and becoming dark results in a selection of a subtype of
meaning (or: a role) for each lexical item, such that a causal relation
between the two events is supported. Likewise, a Blinds Law is formu-
lated. These laws are formed within the context of (10), using lexical
knowledge. There is no need to define a causal law for since, since it
would be identical to the Because Law. Sharing one causal law does
not mean that since and because are identical; since has especially dif-
ferent properties in an argumentative sense (Elhadad and McKeown,
1989). Differences between since and because are not relevant for the
differences between (9) and (10).
It could be the case, that the difference between (9) and (10) lies
in the kind of knowledge that the causal laws represent. In order to
check this, it is useful to look at (10) without the connective since (or
the particle too). This is done in (19).
(19) a. Max switched off the light.
b. The room went pitch dark.
c. (?) He had drawn the blinds.
The discourse in (19) is acceptable to some, but unacceptable to oth-
ers.29 This is due to individual choice: instead of defeating Maintain
Causal Trajectory, the Blinds Law may be defeated in (19c). Defeating
Causal Trajectory means that the discourse will be acceptable. Defeat-
ing the Blinds Law will be possible only through the Nixon Diamond:
the contextual indication to withdraw the Blinds Law is given by Main-
tain Causal Trajectory that forbids he had drawn the blinds to be the
(second) cause for the room went pitch dark. In (7), the narrative pattern
caused Inertia to assume a Narration between Max fell and John pushed
him; in (19), this is impossible because the pluperfect had drawn does
not allow for Narration (cf. Lascarides and Asher, 1993). In sum, de-
feating Maintain Causal Trajectory results in an acceptable discourse;
defeating the Blinds Law results in an unacceptable discourse; individ-
ual preferences determine the acceptability in (19).
29A little survey amongst five trained linguists was held, with two native speakers
and three English language teachers. Fifteen trained linguists judged the Dutch trans-
lations, showing similar results.
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The preferences to defeat one law or another are probably based
on knowledge on darkening rooms and contextual knowledge: a room
does not darken when the lights are switched off in the daylight (whet-
her it is day or night is a matter of context, of course), but it does when
the blinds are drawn. It is the incompleteness of the first cause that
determines the acceptability of the second cause (see also section 2.4 in
chapter 2).30 In (7), giving someone a sharp blow in the neck is rather
complete, within the circumstances, as a cause for falling, so an addi-
tional cause is not easily accepted (and the narrative discourse pattern
does not encourage an additional explanation). When the observation
with respect to the acceptability of (19) is correct, the conclusion may
be drawn that the defeasibility of Maintain Causal Trajectory is depen-
dent on the completeness of the cause: the less complete the first cause
is, the more defeasible the Law gets. This is not worked out formally
here. Judgments on the completeness of a cause are very individual, so
the diverging judgments in (19) are explained this way.
In (20), the discourse is shown with since inserted, but too omitted.
(20) a. Max switched off the light.
b. The room went pitch dark,
c. (?) since he had drawn the blinds.
The acceptability judgments were mixed again: those who found (19c)
unacceptable, found (20c) even worse; those who found (19c) accept-
able, found (20c) even better. This outcome is expected, when the in-
completeness of the first cause is taken to be individually determined:
when it is judged as complete, the Nixon Diamond will ban the cause
in (20c), but it is indefeasible; when Maintain Causal Trajectory is de-
feated, an additional cause is indefeasibly assumed without any prob-
lems. That the judgments on (20) are identical to (19), only more se-
cure, is due to the presence of since. It is immediately clear what the
relation between (20b) and (20c) is, and there is no possibility to defeat
it. This latter property has the effect that Maintain Causal Trajectory
is easier defeated, or that the Nixon Diamond results in inconsistency,
rather than ‘no relation possible’.
(10) is generally judged as acceptable. It seems that Maintain Causal
Trajectory is defeated here in an explicit manner. The Blinds Law is not
defeated here. Apparently, Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeated in
order to make an acceptable discourse. The indefeasible assumption of
30The incompleteness of the first cause, relative to the second, predicts that the dis-
course in (19) will become more unacceptable (in its two causes-interpretation) when
the clauses expressing the causes are reversed: it has become harder to imagine alter-
natives for the first cause causes. The discourse with reversed causes is given in (i).
(i) a. Max had drawn the blinds.
b. The room went pitch dark.
c. (?) He switched off the light.
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a causal relation in (10), due to the Because Law (activated by since), is
not involved in an irresolvable conflict through the Nixon Diamond.
Apparently, the presence of too indicates that the second cause needs
to be an additional cause for the effect in (10b). Too indicates that the
explanation is additional to the cause in (10a). This effect is explained
by the assumption that too presupposes an event similar to the event
in the sentence in which it occurs (cf. Bos, 1994). (10a) is, due to too,
anaphorically bound as a similar event to the explanatory (10c). This
means, that Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeated, for the events in
(10a) and (10c) have been linguistically indicated as causes, thereby
defeating Maintain Causal Trajectory.
The explanation for the acceptability of (10) thus has two aspects:
the incompleteness of the cause in the first clause makes it possible to
have an additional cause, and too indicates that in interpreting (10c),
(10a) should be taken as an additional explanation. The presence of
since in combination with too defeats Maintain Causal Trajectory.
The difference with (9) is explained in three different circumstances:
the narrative discourse pattern in (9), an incomplete cause in (10) and
the presence of too in (10c). Since and because both obey the Because
Law, and both connectives play the same role in the interpretation of
the two discourses.
The introduction of an indefeasible law for causal connectives is
both necessary and possible in DICE. This assumption explains why
causal relations depend less on knowledge derived from the lexicon,
and at the same time establish causal relations that are more certain,
even with respect to the knowledge supporting the causal relation.
Causal connectives are not just linguistic indicators of coherence, but
they enforce coherence by means of the Because Law, and other laws,
as will be shown below. This enforcement gives different effects for
discourses with and discourses without a causal connective. Two dif-
ferent discourses have been shown: the discourse concerning falling
and pushing ((7) and (9)), and the discourse concerning the dark room
((10) and (19/20)). The connective in (9) made the discourse that was
acceptable without connective in (7) inconsistent, because a causal re-
lation was indefeasibly assumed where two clauses could not be con-
nected causally. In (19), the discourse without since was acceptable to
some and unacceptable to others, depending on the valuation of the
incompleteness of the first cause; adding since on a position banned
by the Nixon Diamond, makes both valuations stronger, depending on
the rejection of Maintain Causal Trajectory. In (10), addition of too
established a reading in which Maintain Causal Trajectory is defeated.
Thus, the assumption of a causal law for because and since is supported
by the facts.
More generally, it is possible to connect several kinds of implicatures
to the system: presuppositions of temporal subclauses (as in Lascarides
and Oberlander, 1993), conversational implicatures of connectives like
when (ibid.), presuppositions of causal connectives (e.g., (15)) and the
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presupposition of too (cf. Bos, 1994).31
Inference of a causal relation without linguistic marking, through
a causal law, is context dependent and derived from the lexicon. The
inference of a causal relation through a presupposition of a causal con-
nective, and to a lesser extent of implicatures of other lexical items, is
independent of context, and supported in the lexicon in a specific way.
The former kind of inference is using lexical and world knowledge, the
second kind is implied by linguistic properties of the utterance. This
means that the former kind of inference is much more expensive than
the latter kind. Presuppositions thus have an important function in in-
ferring coherence relations in DICE. More laws of linguistic knowledge
means less inferential effort for DICE.
4.5.4 Although in DICE
In the introduction, Greta Garbo was used to exemplify the problem of
deriving causal laws from propositional contents, without using laws of
causal connectives. Is the assumption of a law for although indeed solv-
ing the problem formulated there? In (21), the Greta Garbo sentences
are repeated: in (21a), without connective; in (21b), with although.
(21) a. Greta Garbo was called the yardstick of beauty. She never mar-
ried.
b. Although Greta Garbo was called the yardstick of beauty, she
never married.
Two differences between (21a) and (21b) are discussed in this section.
The first difference is concerned with the ambiguity of (21a): it may be
Result or Explanation in (21a), whereas in (21b) a denial of expectation
is obligatory.32 The second difference is the certainty of the lexical or
world knowledge used in both sentences: although in (21a), the lexi-
con itself selects relations that derive causal knowledge, the knowledge
supporting the relation in (21b) seems to be much more certain than
the knowledge supporting (21a).
A Result is derived in (21a), when lexical knowledge is used to de-
rive a causal law. This law should express that ‘normally, if a woman is
beautiful, and she does not marry, it is her beauty that causes her to be
unmarried’. This law is much weaker than, e.g., the Push Causal Law
and the Light Switch Law. The knowledge of the latter laws might be
considered rather stable: the knowledge is shared amongst the majority
of the people, and it is not difficult to derive it from the lexical mean-
ings it consists of, given a lexicon structured like Pustejovsky’s (1991):
the roles of to push and to fall that need to be selected for the ‘Push
31The presupposition is not worked out in terms of a law, but it should be, regarding
its effect on the discourse.
32In other examples, although may also indicate a concession. This problem will be
discussed later on in this section.
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Causal Law’ are easily found in each structured lexical entries. This is
different for a ‘beautiful women do not marry’ law: only in a specific
context-bound sense, this law can be derived. To associate lexical items
of to be beautiful and to marry in a way such that ‘beautiful women do
not marry’ makes sense, two roles must be selected that are not promi-
nently available: in a substructure of the lexical item to be beautiful,
the meaning aspect of ‘to be morally or intellectually impressive’ (The
concise Oxford Dictionary, 1911) might be capable of making the right
connection: ‘impressive women do not marry’ seems to be slightly bet-
ter, although it still needs to be taken very specific in a certain context.
In sum, it is not easy to derive a Result from (21a). This makes it diffi-
cult to understand why a Result is derived in the first place.
An Explanation could also be derived in (21a). In that case, a law
should be derived that says that ‘normally, if a woman never marries,
and she is beautiful, then being unmarried causes her beauty (or: main-
tains her beauty)’. Also here, the relation that is expressed is very
weak, and it is not imaginable that the lexicon would derive such a
causal relation without specific circumstance, provided by the context,
or other ‘external reasons’. Here, a meaning aspect of to marry may be
used to make two roles fit together: to marry includes ‘to be bound’. If
you’re not married, you’re free. And if you’re free, you will be beauti-
ful. This argumentation needs a meaning aspect of being beautiful that
expresses freedom. Another meaning aspect might be that to marry im-
plies ‘having children’. So, the association would be that not having
children keeps you beautiful. Also this relation is weak.
It is not possible to assign a preference to one of the two relations,
for in neither case it is likely that the combination of the two lexical
items in the lexicon will result in a causal law of significant strength.
So, there must be another reason. Lascarides et al. (1996) propose to
assume three default rules, when interpreting text: Narration, Result
and Elaboration.33 A Result is derived by default, and only in case of a
context supporting Explanation, Explanation is chosen.
This complex interpretation process of (21a) illustrates the difficul-
ties of letting the lexicon derive causal laws. Not only is the interpre-
tation itself ambiguous (or underspecified), but the knowledge used to
build a causal law is very insecure, and not prominently available in
the lexicon.
An advantage of using connectives is that the instruction to look for
a causal relation in the lexicon makes it possible to look for less promi-
nent meaning aspects in substructures: the outcome of the derivation
is already established, to a certain extent.
The causal relation that is inferred from (21b) is given by the pre-
supposition of although, and might be paraphrased as ‘beautiful women
33 It is not stated in laws of DICE, but argumentative orientation makes Result more
preferred in this case, since she never married expresses a negative connotation, more
than she was called the yardstick of beauty expresses a connotation of the speaker - due
to the distant formulation ‘was called’.
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marry’. A formulation of the law that makes such assumptions when-
ever although is used, is given in 22.
(22) Although Law
although(; ) ! cause(e

;:e

) k Conc(; )
where although(; ) reads:  although 
This law says that the occurrence of the proposition  although  inde-
feasibly leads to the assumption that either the event of  causes the
negation of the event of , or  and  are in a Concession relation.34
A Concession relation will not be worked out here. The indefeasible
implication of the cause predicate is translated into the defeasible im-
plication given in chapter 3: this translation is defined in (23).
(23) Definition: cause(e

;:e

) t (e

> :e

)
The causal law is now immediately given as ‘normally, if a woman is
beautiful, she will marry’. Because there is no lexicon involved in de-
riving this rule, the knowledge it represents seems to be much more
certain.
Meaning aspects of to be beautiful and to marry still are involved in
the interpretation of the causal law. Only this time, the relation with
respect to which they select their substructures is determined before-
hand. In this case, a meaning aspect of ‘beauty’ has to be associated
with the negation of a meaning aspect of ‘marry’. Because it is already
decided that the relation has to be causal, the knowledge supporting it
seems more certain.
An alternative explanation for the more certain relation is that two
meaning aspects from the lexical items were associated that were promi-
nently available. In that case, the connective would not be responsible
for the security of the knowledge. An argument against this alternative
can be given by considering (24).
(24) Although Greta Garbo never married, she was called the yardstick
of beauty.
(24) is an acceptable sentence. It gives rise to, again, another prejudice:
‘unmarried women are not beautiful’. As a generic sentence, it is quite
untenable: there are many young women who are both unmarried and
beautiful. Still, the prejudice is derived without very much ado. Read-
ers may wonder about the writer’s opinions, but they do not hesitate to
derive the prejudice. This can only be done because the causal relation
is given by the connective, not because the lexicon is deriving the most
salient connection between two lexical items. Two lexical meaning as-
pects do not need to be prominent, as long as there are two meaning
aspects that may support the given causal relation.
34The symbol k represents an exclusive disjunction.
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It is also possible to construct other variants of the Greta Garbo sen-
tence with although that need other implicatures again. This is shown
in (25).
(25) a. Although Greta Garbo was very beautiful, she was married.
b. Although Greta Garbo was unmarried, she was not very beau-
tiful.
Sentence (25a) is acceptable.35 The implicature that ‘beautiful women
do not marry’ is interpreted here as if beautiful women do not need
marriage: it is too much fun to remain single. Other interpretations
might suit just as well. Sentence (25b) is acceptable, having a presup-
position ‘unmarried women are beautiful’. If these four interpretations
were derived from the lexicon, only on the basis of more prominent
meaning aspects in substructures, it would have taken a laborious and
difficult selection process to obtain these relations, if possible at all. By
taking the relations as given, through the Although Law, and selecting
meaning aspects only to support the specific causal relation, the knowl-
edge supporting the assumed coherence relation is unambiguous, and
seems certain.36
The differences between (21b) and (21a) can now be explained in
terms of the way knowledge is derived from the lexicon to make a
causal law, or to support an explicitly specified causal law. In the former
case, several coherence relations may be assumed, and the knowledge
deriving the causal law does not seem certain; in the latter case, the
relation is given and the knowledge seems certain.
Ambiguity does occur using connectives: in chapter 2 and 3, se-
mantic, epistemic and speech act interpretation of coherence relations
were distinguished. A choice for one interpretation will be presented
as explicitly specified. When the lexicon is not capable of supporting
the semantic causal relation, an epistemic relation is specified again.
In every of the four interpretations in (21b), (24) and (25), a semantic
denial of expectation has been made. Apparently, the chosen meaning
aspects were enough for accepting the relation. Epistemic interpreta-
tion is not preferred. Within one interpretation, the relation is specific,
and the knowledge seems certain.
35In both (25a) and (25b), was called has been left out, because it disturbs an in-
terpretation based on ‘Garbo being beautiful’: an interpretation of ‘Garbo being called
something’ is inferred. Why this is not the case in the other interpretations is probably
due to the argumentative orientation - see footnote 33.
36The interpretation of the presupposition itself may be ambiguous: for instance, be-
tween denial of expectation and Concession. In that case, the procedure to let mean-
ing aspects support the causal relation may fail, and the lexicon is consulted a second
time, but now to support Concession. Recall from chapter 3 that often, context already
indicates which relation should be chosen. It will often be the case that a Concession
is tried immediately, because it is more in line with the context. Within the context
of DICE, it is difficult to represent such a derivation, because the argumentative use of
language is not defined in terms of coherence relations.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been shown what the differences are between
explicitly marked discourse relations and unmarked relations, within
the framework of DICE. This framework was chosen above other frame-
works because it is specifically modelling the process of making infer-
ences. This makes it possible to make the differences between inference
with and without causal connectives explicit.
Causal coherence without marking is underspecified and supported
by knowledge that seems to be uncertain. Causal relations, indicated
by a causal connective are specific and supported by seemingly certain
knowledge. This is even so using identical clauses with and without
connectives (or negation and connectives), between which some causal
relation is supposed to hold.
The difference between coherence with and without causal connec-
tives is explained by the way causality is derived from the lexicon,
within the framework of DICE and a structured lexicon as described
in Pustejovsky (1991). Without connectives, the causality has to be
initiated by the lexical items, associated with each other by the con-
catenated clauses. This means that the meaning aspects of both lexical
items have to be prominently present in the substructure of each lexi-
cal item. If there is no causal relation initiated by the lexicon, there is
no causal coherence in the text. With a causal connective like because
or since, a causal relation is given. In the lexicon, meaning aspects
between the lexical items are selected that support the causal relation,
whether these are prominent or not. The effect is, that a causal relation
with a causal connective is specifically causal in one direction (using a
B operator in epistemic interpretation), and the knowledge that sup-
ports it, collected in the lexicon, seems certain. Without a connective,
it is dependent on the lexical items which direction the relation will
have, and the knowledge supporting it looks less certain, even if it is
the same knowledge.
The system that is defined by DICE can be enriched by incorporating
indefeasible laws for causal connectives, for defining linguistic knowl-
edge with respect to discourse processes will enlighten the ‘inferential
effort’ an automated reader has when making inferences from a text.
Chapter 5
Causality in Discourse
Structure
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, it was argued that causal connectives bear presuppositions
of a conditional form. In chapter 4, a distinction was made between in-
ference with causal connectives and inference without linguistic mark-
ers. In this chapter, the effect of causal relations on discourse structure
will be investigated. The phenomenon of reference by means of propo-
sitional anaphors is used as an instrument for obtaining information
about discourse structure. It will appear that propositional anaphors
may have different antecedents if their context consists of causally re-
lated clauses, instead of additively related clauses.
A propositional anaphor takes as its antecedent relevant contextual
information. An example of this kind of reference is given in (1).
(1) The Artist Formerly Known as Prince was married yesterday at his
residence. It was a big surprise for the media.
In the second sentence of (1), it refers to the marriage of Prince men-
tioned in the first. There is no nominal phrase like the marriage present,
however. It is the event of the marriage, conceptualized in the first sen-
tence, that serves as an antecedent for it. Anaphors like it in (1) do not
always refer to events. In fact, is not very clear how the antecedent is
conceptualized. Webber (1991) calls these anaphors ‘deictic pronouns’,
Fraurud (1992) speaks of ‘situational anaphors’, and Asher (1993) calls
these anaphors ‘abstract object anaphors’. These different names all
refer to the same property of these anaphors: their antecedents are not
straightforwardly determined by means of systematic rules, but contex-
tual factors and world knowledge play an important role.
Givo´n (1992) takes the notion ‘mental proposition’ as the basic unit
of discourse processing:
The basic unit of stored information in coherent discourse
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is the mental proposition that stands for some state or event
(Givo´n, 1992, p. 7)
In this chapter, it will be assumed that mental propositions can be re-
lated to each other in a discourse structure, and that a mental propo-
sition can be composed out of several other mental propositions. The
notion of ‘some state or event’ is worked out more specifically. Thus,
abstract objects and situations will be analyzed as mental propositions,
represented as a node in a discourse structure.
The anaphor in (1) is called a ‘propositional anaphor’. An important
aspect of the identification of propositional anaphors is, that their an-
tecedent is not present as a nominal. In (1), reference is not made to
‘Prince’s wedding’, but to ‘Prince married yesterday’.
Which antecedent is selected as the actual antecedent for a specific
propositional anaphor, is not completely dependent on properties of
discourse structure. Many factors may influence the choice of refer-
ence: the type of anaphor, the meaning of the sentence containing the
anaphor, development of the topic of the discourse, relative distance
between anaphor and antecedent (cf. Givo´n, 1992) and argumentative
orientation of the writer.1 In spoken discourse, intonation may easily
alter the choice of an antecedent.
Next to all the other factors, discourse structure is important for de-
termination of the antecedent of a propositional anaphor. Two aspects
of discourse structure play an important role. The first is, that informa-
tion that subsequent clauses reveal about a topic, needs to be abstracted
into information representing the meaning of a set of clauses: this ex-
plains that reference can be made to antecedents not explicitly express-
ing (one of) the individual clauses. The other aspect of discourse struc-
ture is that it may restrict the possibilities for an antecedent to make
abstracted information accessible. Discourse structure may define a set
of possible antecedents. It is not always clear which antecedent will
actually be selected. If there is not enough specific information, propo-
sitional anaphors may be ambiguous with respect to their antecedents.
An example of such a discourse is given in (2), a garbled version of the
Greta Garbo fragment. The Dutch example is followed by its English
translation.
(2) Greta Garbo was al een legende tijdens haar leven. In 1951 werd
zij Amerikaans staatsburger, drie jaar later kreeg zij een ere-Oscar.
Greta Garbo is nooit getrouwd geweest, hoewel zij zeer mooi
was. Dat maakte haar ongenaakbaar. Zij leidde een geı¨soleerd
bestaan in een flat te New York.
Greta Garbo was already a legend during her life. In 1951 she
became an American citizen, three years later she received an
1Elhadad (1993) analyzes argumentative orientation in such a way that a discourse
structure can be built, in which argumentative orientation determines hierarchy. From
such structures, accessibility of possible antecedents can be derived.
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Oscar of honour. Greta Garbo never married, although she was
very beautiful. That made her unattainable. She led a completely
isolated life in a New York apartment.
It makes a difference for the interpretation, to which antecedent dat
(that) refers. There are, potentially, three possibilities: to the whole sen-
tence Greta Garbo is nooit getrouwd geweest, hoewel zij zeer mooi was, to its
first clause only, or to its second clause only. The choice of antecedent
has consequences for the interpretation of dat maakte haar ongenaak-
baar. Reference to the whole sentence differs from reference to the first
clause only. This has, however, no consequences for the interpretation
of the sentence containing dat: the fact that Greta Garbo never married
(although she was very beautiful) made her unattainable. Reference to
just the second clause gives another interpretation: the fact that Greta
Garbo was beautiful, made her unattainable (as a result of which she
never married). The discourse is ambiguous with respect to the choice
of antecedent. Since this choice is affected by several distinct factors,
individual preferences for one or the other interpretation may arise.2
With respect to the analysis of (2), several processes are important.
First, the identification of antecedents and the establishment of coher-
ence relations are dependent of each other. Secondly, the represen-
tation of the whole although sentence in discourse structure when it
serves as an antecedent for dat is a more abstract representation than
the connection of the propositional contents of the two clauses. And
thirdly, it has to be described how an anaphor identifies its antecedent.
Relational and referential coherence Relational coherence is es-
tablished by identification of coherence relations in a discourse. Refer-
ential coherence is established by coreference of antecedents and an-
aphors in a discourse. In an overview of the literature on coherence in
discourse, Noordman and Maes (1993) describe how referential coher-
ence and relational coherence interact (see also Hobbs, 1979; Givo´n,
1992). Coreference is dependent of relational coherence, in cases such
as (3a) and (3b) (adapted from Noordman and Maes, 1993).
(3) a. John met Pete, and he went to the bank.
b. John met Pete, because he went to the bank.
The parallel construction of the two conjoined clauses in (3a) yields a
preference for the interpretation of he as John and him as Pete. In (3b),
the identification of he is ambiguous: Pete or John is antecedent. The
main difference between (3a) and (3b) is the coherence between the
clauses of these sentences. Coherence relations influence referential
coherence. The choice of antecedent may determine the coherence
2In the case at hand, the connotation of unattainable is crucial: is unattainability
easily associated with beauty, or is it rather associated with being alone?
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relation, in case of an underspecified or ambiguous relation between
clauses.
The interactions between referential and relational coherence will
be studied with respect to propositional anaphors. The effect is not as
immediate as with the nominal anaphors in (3). If (1) is changed into
(4), the antecedent of it does not change.
(4) The Artist Formerly Known as Prince was married yesterday at his
residence, for it had to be a big surprise for the media.
Although the second sentence explains the first, instead of continuing
it as a narration or a result, it still refers to ‘Prince married yesterday’.
In this chapter, it will appear that some other effects of relational co-
herence do influence reference of propositional anaphors.
Making abstract antecedents Besides the interaction of relational
and referential coherence, the problem of the creation of an antece-
dent representing contextual information expressed in several clauses
must be analyzed. Given the assumption that it should be possible to
identify the antecedent of a propositional anaphor as a simple propo-
sition, a more abstract meaning of this sentence must be identified as
the antecedent.3 Several discourse analysts have studied how this ab-
stracted meaning is a result of combining the propositional contents of
two clauses, restricted by the coherence relation that holds between the
two clauses (e.g. Polanyi, 1988; Pru¨st, 1992; Asher, 1993). In Rhetori-
cal Structure Theory (RST, e.g. Mann and Thompson, 1988), abstracted
meaning of a group of clauses is represented as a proposition when
a coherence relation connects this group to another group of clauses.
Theories that will be discussed in this chapter differ from RST on some
important points. The most important difference is, that in this chap-
ter, abstracted meaning will be calculated from the coherence relation
and propositional contents of the connected clauses.
One way to build a discourse structure that forms and restricts an-
tecedents for propositional anaphors, is by extending already formed
structure with one clause at a time, while parsing a discourse. Adding a
clause always happens under restriction of a coherence relation. The re-
sulting representation is an incremental structure of propositions con-
nected by means of coherence relations. On the basis of the con-
structing rules, abstracted meaning may be calculated. This discourse
structure should then be capable of identifying antecedents of (propo-
sitional) anaphors.
A short introduction of the formation of the kind of structures used
in this chapter will be given here. Suppose that all positions in a struc-
3It is not a condition on propositional anaphors that they only have a single propo-
sition as antecedent. It can not be denied, however, that that does not refer to series
of propositions: it will always abstract the meaning of several clauses into a single
statement, or pick a specific clause.
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ture are called constituents, and that their meaning is represented by a
proposition. The structure in (5) contains three constituents.
(5) ‘Meaning of the whole sentence’
e


A
A
u e
Greta Garbo never married although she was very beautiful.
The complex although sentence, taken as a whole, is then repre-
sented as a constituent. It dominates two other constituents, namely
the clauses it consists of. Clauses are constituents in a terminal po-
sition: they represent the actual text. Reference to the sentence as a
whole in (5) is defined as reference to the top constituent. The mean-
ing that is represented in this top constituent is not necessarily the
concatenation of the two propositions. Dependent of the coherence
relation, the top constituent will contain meaning abstracted from the
two clauses. In the case of (5), it is not immediately clear what the
contents of the abstracted meaning should be. The coherence relation
is a denial of expectation, but it has not been established yet to which
extent the subordinative, causal or contrastive aspect of this relation
contributes to the abstracted meaning.
Polanyi (1988) has defined the incremental structures that will be
used in this chapter. The discourse structure represents the clauses in
such a way, that they retain the order in which they occurred in the
discourse. To make sure this order is preserved, clauses may be added
to the structure only on the right hand side. With respect to the tree
diagram in (5): the blank circles may be used to connect to a new
clause; the black circle may not be used to connect to a new clause.
In a larger tree, all the constituents that would occur on the branch
from the top constituent to the right hand bottom constituent, can be
used to connect to a new clause; none of the other constituents can be
used for that purpose. Constituents on the branch from top to right
hand bottom form together the ‘right frontier’. The right frontier is by
definition a restriction on extension of the incremental structure with
newly added clauses. This kind of extension is called attachment.4
Identifying antecedents In order to analyze causal relations as a
factor in the identification of antecedents of propositional anaphors,
some restrictions must be applied on the discourse structures to be stud-
ied. The research will focus on pieces of discourse that are about one
4Attachment in the sense of adding clauses to an incremental discourse structure
is not the same as the syntactic parsing strategy that is called ‘minimal attachment’
(Frazier, 1987), which amounts to assume as little clausal nodes as possible, when
creating a syntactic structure of a sentence. Here, nodes in the discourse structure are
minimally clauses, or else representations of several clauses.
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topic, contain no push or pop markers that may shift pieces of dis-
course to larger structures, and do not tell stories (generating episodic
structures). Givo´n (1992, p. 7) states that, from a text analyst’s per-
spective, (...) coherent discourse tends to maintain (...) (a) the same referent
(“topic”); (b) the same or contiguous time; (c) the same or contiguous loca-
tion; (d) sequential action. This perspective on discourse will be adopted
here.
The identification of antecedents of propositional anaphors in dis-
course structure is, according to Webber (1991), bound to a restriction.
She claims that (...) only segments of the discourse and regions of the dis-
course model that retain their identity are those that correspond to nodes on
the right frontier (Webber, 1991, p. 123/4). From the examples Webber
(1991) presents, it may be inferred that the phrase ‘retain their identity’
implies ‘may serve as antecedent for a propositional anaphor’. Infor-
mation that is not represented on the right frontier does not retain its
identity, and is not accessible for propositional reference anymore. In
other words, only constituents on the right frontier are accessible, or
‘open’. This restriction will be called here the ‘right frontier restriction’.
The right frontier restriction thus restrains relational coherence as well
as coherence established by reference of propositional anaphors.
Questions Given the examples in 1, 2, and the discourse structure
as it has been presented in this introduction, four questions will be
formulated, to be answered in this chapter.
From the three possible antecedents for that in the English version
of (2), only two are predicted by the right frontier restriction. The
blank circles in (5) represent possible antecedents, as defined by Web-
ber’s (1991) interpretation of the right frontier restriction. The black
circle (defined as ‘closed’ by the right frontier restriction) does not rep-
resent a possible antecedent. This is not corresponding with the intu-
ition that it should be possible to refer to Greta Garbo never married with
that.
Although the observation in (2) does not provide evidence in fa-
vor of the right frontier restriction, it can not be said that the right
frontier restriction must be rejected. In Polanyi’s (1988) grammar, con-
struction rules determine the calculation of abstracted meaning. These
rules determine which part of the propositional contents of a clause
will be represented in the top constituent. Given the construction rule
of ‘Rhetorical Subordination’, as defined in Pru¨st (1992), information
from the main clause is represented in the top constituent.5 Making
reference to the top constituent in (5) thus boils down to making ref-
erence to the main clause. This might solve the problem of making
5Pru¨st (1992) does not define denial of expectation. Interpreting his rules, although
indicates either Rhetorical Subordination or Contrast Pairs. With the latter rule, the
top constituent would not get the desired interpretation. So, for the moment, Rhetor-
ical Subordination is chosen.
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reference to the main clause, but it does not seem to be possible to
distinguish between reference to the main clause and reference to the
whole sentence. With respect to examples like (2), one may ask: how
can three interpretations be represented by two possible antecedents in
the structure in (5)?
In (5), a discourse structure was taken to be the relevant representa-
tion for identification of the antecedents of dat. But according to Maes
(1997), the antecedent of dat is to a large extent determined by two
other factors: its own properties as an anaphor, and the meaning of
the sentence containing dat. Anaphors like dat, and het, used as propo-
sitional anaphor, may or may not refer specifically to one clause. This is
partly determined by their own nature: het is referring non-specifically
in its common usage as a propositional anaphor; dat is usually refer-
ring to one specific clause. Applied to the tree in (5), dat refers prefer-
ably to one of the bottom circles, and rather not to the top circle. Het
refers preferably to the top node, representing the least specific mean-
ing. However, the meaning of the sentence containing dat may cause
that dat refers non-specifically, and the meaning of a sentence contain-
ing het may cause that het refers specifically. In case of non-specific
reference, the most obvious referent will be chosen. The most obvious
referent can be defined as the antecedent that is most vague and clos-
est to the anaphor. The antecedent will be, in terms of the structure in
(5), a clause from the right frontier; the vaguest antecedent will be an
antecedent with abstracted meaning (not a constituent on a terminal
level). Little is known about the behaviour of these marked (specific)
and unmarked (non-specific) anaphors. The question of interest for
this chapter is: do marked anaphors refer to clauses (i.e., terminal con-
stituents), even if a violation of the right frontier is involved?
The right frontier restriction holds by definition for attachment. As
a restriction on antecedents of propositional anaphors, it is based on
Webber’s (1991) observation. If evidence can be given that the right
frontier restriction does not hold for possible antecedents, an impor-
tant question is: what are characteristic properties of right frontier re-
striction violations?
In making discourse structure, relational coherence is crucial for
the calculation of abstracted meaning. With respect to (5), it was al-
ready suggested that assuming Rhetorical Subordination as a construc-
tion rule, made it possible to refer to the main clause via the top con-
stituent. In the construction rules of Pru¨st (1992), coherence relations
play an important role, but the notion of causality is not associated
with one of these rules. However, connectives like because are typically
associated with Rhetorical Subordination, and connectives like therefore
with Rhetorical Coordination. What is the role of causality in these
construction rules? In more general terms: what is the role of causal
connectives in abstracted meaning?
In sum, the questions are listed here.
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1. how can different interpretations of a discourse be represented by
structures like (5)?
2. do marked anaphors refer to specific clauses, irrespective of their
position in a tree structure?
3. what are characteristic properties of right frontier restriction vio-
lations?
4. what is the role of causal connectives in abstracted meaning?
The answers to these questions will lead to the claim that causality
affects the availability of antecedents for propositional anaphors in
discourse structure. Available antecedents are defined as open con-
stituents in discourse structure; other factors (e.g., the markedness of
the anaphor) determine the actual antecedent.
The first three questions will receive an answer in section 5.2, based
on facts from English and Dutch, that show that reference to a clause
in the discourse, but not on the right frontier, is possible. These facts
appear to have in common that the antecedent is always part of a causal
relation.
Question four will be answered in section 5.3, where the Linguistic
Discourse Model (LDM Polanyi, 1988; Pru¨st, 1992) is introduced. LDM
is designed to make calculations of abstracted meaning. Some improve-
ments of the model will be proposed, in order to give a better account
of the phenomena studied in section 5.2.
In section 5.4, a crucial example will be analyzed in the framework
of LDM, in order to show that the changes made in section 5.3 give a
better account of the phenomena.
5.2 Open constituents in discourse structure
5.2.1 Introduction
In this section, phenomena will be discussed that give an answer to
the first three questions formulated in the introduction of this chapter.
More specifically, the relation between causality and open constituents
in discourse structure will be investigated. First, literature is discussed
that presents apparent violations of the right frontier restriction (sec-
tion 5.2.2). Then, complex antecedents of a VP anaphor are discussed,
using rebuttals to identify the antecedent (section 5.2.3). To corrob-
orate the phenomena presented in English, a specific Dutch proposi-
tional anaphor, er (there), is taken to examine the effects of causal rela-
tions on antecedent choice (section 5.2.4) in Dutch.
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5.2.2 Propositional anaphors in discourse structure
Webber’s (1991) observation has been attacked in a few publications.
Maes (1997), Fraurud (1992) and Hellman and Dahl (1994) give coun-
terexamples to the restriction that propositional anaphors may refer
only to discourse constituents that occur on the right frontier. The
most important claim they make is, that reference of an anaphor is
determined by the propositional contents of the sentence containing
the anaphor. An example of this kind of determination is given in (6)
(adapted from Maes, 1997).
(6) a. Don’t hit other kids. It is not a nice thing to do.
b. Don’t hit other kids. It will make you more popular.
The antecedent of it in (6a) differs from the antecedent in (6b). The
event it refers to, is a hitting event in (6a), whereas it refers to a property
of non-hitting, attributed to you in (6b). It is not difficult to collect
many examples of propositional anaphors, in which the predication of
the anaphor determines to a large extent the antecedent.
In this section, the claim will be made that besides the fact that
propositional anaphors select antecedents on the basis of other infor-
mation than found in the preceding context, it is the structure of dis-
course that restricts the possibilities for these antecedents (and causal-
ity has an effect on this restriction). Discourse structure defines open
constituents; other factors determine the actual antecedent.
The identification of it in (6a) or (6b) is not dependent on discourse
structure. In both sentences, the antecedent is the same open con-
stituent: the rightmost clause, before attachment of the second clause
in the discourses in (6) took place. Why the anaphor in (6a) is allowed
to extract its antecedent from the scope of negation, is a question that
will not be answered in this chapter.
Before the data in Hellman and Dahl (1994) and Fraurud (1992)
are discussed, the difference between marked and unmarked anaphors
will be discussed in more detail. It is important to distinguish between
these two types of anaphors, because they make use of the preceding
context in different ways, according to Maes (1997).
Marked and unmarked propositional anaphors
In Maes (1997), differences between the use of Dutch het (it) and Dutch
dat (that) as propositional anaphors are discussed. In many cases, dat
and het can be substituted for each other, but in some cases they can
not. In (7a), it is possible to substitute one for the other; in (7b), dat in
the second sentence needs to preceed het in the third; in (7c) and (7d),
it is impossible to substitute one for the other (examples taken from
Maes, 1997).
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(7) a. Zou
Would
Jan
John
thuis
at home
zijn?
be?
Het/dat
It/that
valt te betwijfelen.
is doubtful.
b. Burt
Burt
Lancaster
Lancaster
is gisteren
yesterday
gestorven.
died.
Dat
That
was
was
het
the
belangrijkste
most important
nieuws
news
vanmorgen.
this morning.
Het
It
pakte
struck
me.
me.
c. Hij
He
vroeg
asked
me
me
geld,
for money,
en
and
dat/*het
that/it
terwijl
while
hij
he
stinkend
stinking
rijk
rich
is.
is.
d. Het/*dat
It/that
is
is
bekend
well-known
dat
that
politici
politicians
liegen.
lie.
In (7a), het and dat may be substituted for each other, with hardly any
difference in meaning. In both cases, an affirmative answer to the ques-
tion is the antecedent of the anaphor. The occurrences of het and dat
in the discourse of (7b) should be in this order: first dat, then het. In
(7c), it is impossible to use het as an anaphor for the previous clause,
and in (7d), it is impossible to use dat cataphorically, referring to the
subject clause dat politici liegen.
Het and dat can be substituted in (7a). The antecedent is a hypothet-
ical affirmative answer to the question in the first clause. A paraphrase
of the second clause could read: dat Jan thuis is valt te betwijfelen. (‘that
John is at home is doubtful’). In this case, the antecedent needs to be
inferred from the context, c.q. the question in the first clause, since
there are no other possible antecedents. There is no difference between
het and dat in this respect.
In (7b), the context does contain a clause that might serve as an
antecedent for a propositional antecedent. Dat refers to the previous
clause. Het in the third sentence does not refer to the previous clause:
dat was het belangrijkste nieuws vanmorgen. Het refers to the situation
that ‘it was made public that Burt Lancaster died.’ It is not a specific
clause that represents the antecedent, but a proposition representing
information abstracted from the context as a whole. Het and dat can
not be exchanged in (7b). In the discourse Burt Lancaster is gisteren
gestorven. Het was het belangrijkste nieuws vanmorgen, het refers to the
preceding clause, because it is the only context available. One can
not continue this discourse with dat pakte me, because the anaphor dat
preferably takes a specific clause as an antecedent. However, it would
not make sense to refer to het was het belangrijkste nieuws vanmorgen.
The predicate pakte me dictates that the antecedent must be an event
having some impact, and from the two sentences in the context of
dat, it is surely the first that has more impact than the second. There
is no good reason, other than the right frontier restriction, that keeps
dat from referring to the first clause. From this analysis of (7b), three
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conclusions may be drawn: Het just takes what it gets as an antece-
dent; dat refers to a specific clause; this specific clause must be part
of the right frontier (which means that it will be always the directly
preceding clause to which dat refers).6
In (7c), the construction en dat (...) gives the anaphor dat a focus
position in the sentence. The connective terwijl introduces a subordi-
nate clause that modifies a main clause. This causes dat to represent a
clause as a linguistic element rather than a semantic object. A literal
substitution of the main clause for en dat renders the same interpreta-
tion (but without the focal effect): Hij vroeg me geld terwijl hij stinkend
rijk is (‘he asked me for money, while he is stinking rich’). Het can not
occur on this focus position, regardless of the antecedent. At the same
time, the anaphor dat, in focus position, is required to have a specific
antecedent.
In (7d), het can be used cataphorically, but dat can not. In other
words: dat is in need for an antecedent, be it deictic or in context, but
it can not have a ‘postcedent’. On the other hand, het is free to take an
antecedent or a postcedent, or a deictic element. Again, the conclusion
is that het takes what it gets, but dat is more specific in its choice.
Maes (1997) analyzes the use of het as depending on the anaph-
or-context: if the context gives rise to a satisfying antecedent, het will
use it as such. The use of dat is depending on the recognition of a
specific antecedent. Dat needs an antecedent, that is preferably recog-
nized on the grounds of its linguistic properties. Het may be called an
unmarked anaphor, for it does not really need an antecedent. The an-
tecedent may be anything that fits. Dat is called a marked anaphor, for
it needs a specified antecedent in its context.7 If it is present, dat makes
a connection with it. In the analysis of Maes (1997), it is not only the
type of anaphor that determines the antecedent: other factors, like the
availability of suitable antecedents in the context, or specification of
the contents of the anaphor in the sentence that contains it, play an
important role.
Unmarked anaphors are in fact underspecified anaphors: there are
no specific constraints on the semantic content of the anaphor. There-
fore, the anaphor takes antecedents that are highly accessible. These
antecedents should be close to the anaphor, and may represent less
specific meaning than propositional contents of clauses. In terms of
discourse structure, antecedents of unmarked anaphors can be found
6Exceptions to this conclusion are formed by cases like (7b). As will be argued in this
chapter, the causal relation in (7b) (and similar cases) is responsible for this exceptional
behaviour.
7In Givo´n (1992, p. 24) the notions of marked and unmarked are used with re-
spect to the way nominal anaphors activate their referent. Unmarked means ‘take the
default referent’; marked means ‘take a non-default referent’, from the set of refer-
ents available from context. Here, an unmarked anaphor takes the default antecedent,
which is the proposition that most saliently represents a relevant part of the discourse.
Marked anaphors are non-default in that they prefer a specific antecedent, i.e. a propo-
sition that is recognized as a linguistic element, e.g. a clause in context.
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on the right frontier. These antecedents are less specific (when they rep-
resent abstractions of clauses), and they are always close to the anaphor
(there are no specific clauses between the antecedent and anaphor).
Marked anaphors prefer specific antecedents, recognizable as a clause
in context. On the right frontier, only the rightmost (terminal) node
represents such a specific antecedent. There may, of course, be other
clauses in context to which a marked anaphor could refer. The right
frontier restriction forbids such reference, however.
From Maes’s (1997) analysis, a test can be derived to check whether
or not the right frontier restriction is empirically adequate. If the pred-
ication of a marked anaphor is specifying reference to an antecedent in
the previous context that does not occur on the right frontier, the right
frontier restriction predicts that the discourse is unacceptable. An ac-
ceptable discourse, in this configuration, means that the right frontier
restriction is making a wrong prediction.
The distinction between marked and unmarked propositional an-
aphors also exists in English. That may be regarded as marked, and it as
unmarked, but these anaphors sometimes behave differently in specific
contexts, compared to Dutch dat and het.
An example of the use of that is provided in (8) (taken from Givo´n,
1992, p. 40).
(8) So I told him all about it and at the end he too agreed with me.
So we parted as friends. And that, believe it or not, was all that
happened.
Givo´n (1992, p.40) claims that the reference of this use of that is a
wide and hard to delimit thematic chunk of the stored text. Indeed,
that refers here to its context as a whole. This is not because that is an
unmarked anaphor, however. In (8), that is the subject of the sentence:
... that, ..., was all that happened. The use of all is crucial here for the
determination of the antecedent: that must refer to all that happened,
not a part of what has happened. If the last sentence were: and that was
a great relief, that would refer to so we parted as friends. The example in
(8) is thus an example of how the predication of the anaphor may alter
the antecedent of a propositional anaphor.
One may ask what referents may be assigned to the two occurrences
of it in (8) (Givo´n, 1992 does not discuss them). The first refers to a
situation that the reader is supposed to have knowledge about (but a
lack of context does not give us this referent). The second occurrence
refers cataphorically to [And that] was all that happened. Cataphoric
use of Dutch het was taken to be an indication of its unmarkedness.
Likewise, cataphoric use of English it indicates its unmarkedness. (9) is
a translation of (7d).
(9) It/*that is a well-known fact that politicians lie.
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The acceptability of using it, but not that in (9) leads to the assumption
that the English propositional anaphor it is unmarked. Compared to
that, it appears to be an unmarked anaphor, that just takes what it gets.
The propositional anaphor this seems to have the same properties
as that. A difference is that the antecedent’s referent is expected to
be closer (in space or time) to the antecedent (Swan, 1980, p. 603).
Another difference between this and that is, that it can be used cat-
aphorically, as the discourse in (10) shows (taken from Givo´n, 1992, p.
40).
(10) ...That is all I’m going to tell you. Now this is what I want you to
do...
The cataphoric use of this (referring to what comes next in (10)) does
not mean directly that the anaphor is unmarked. There is however, a
typical distinction between the determiners this and that. This is shown
in (11) (taken from Givo´n, 1989, p. 189).
(11) a. I saw this girl yesterday.
b. I saw that girl yesterday.
In (11a), this girl may be used in two different ways: it may refer to a
specific girl, identified with deictic or anaphoric reference; or it may
introduce a girl as a discourse referent. For the latter interpretation, the
determiner a could have been used instead, but the use of this intro-
duces one specific girl, where a is more indeterminate in its introduc-
tion of a discourse referent. In sentence (11), that can not be used to
introduce a discourse referent, but it can only be used deictic or anaph-
oric.
Taken the three differences between this and that together: this
wants an antecedent that is semantically closer, may be used cataphoric,
and as a determiner, it may be used to introduce a discourse referent, it
is clear that this has properties of unmarked anaphors. There is no need
to determine the reference of this in detail; this may take just what it
gets as an antecedent. On the other hand, this property is not as ar-
ticulate as it is with it. One can not say: ?this is a well-known fact that
politicians lie. The predication of this is expected to play an important
role in the determination of its type.
The difference between marked and unmarked anaphors will play
a role with almost any example that will be discussed in this chapter.
Besides examples with the propositional anaphors it, this and that, two
other anaphors will be used: in section 5.2.3, VP anaphors are used in
English examples. VP anaphors are unmarked, but they may be spec-
ified afterwards. In Dutch examples, the anaphor er (‘there’) is used.
This anaphor is also unmarked, and may be specified afterwards, as
will be shown in section 5.2.4.
In the next sections, the right frontier restriction will be tested, us-
ing specification of propositional anaphors towards antecedents that
do not occur on the right frontier.
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Violations of the right frontier restriction?
Hellman and Dahl (1994) present evidence against the right frontier
restriction. They show four different types of evidence, only two of
which are aimed at the right frontier restriction specifically. The other
two problems are aimed at the construction of antecedents, given mean-
ing restrictions of the clause containing the anaphor. Here, only the
first two problems will be discussed.8
Hellman and Dahl (1994) claim that situational (or propositional)
anaphors may structure the discourse in retrospect, when looking for
an antecedent. They regard (12) as a problem for the right frontier
restriction (example taken from Hellman and Dahl, 1994, p. 468).
(12) Interest rates have gone up. The recession may reduce inflation.
Capital taxation is lower due to the tax reform. This means
brighter times for those who have money to save.
The problem is, that the meaning of Interest rates have gone up is part
of the meaning of the antecedent, while this clause does not occur on
the right frontier. According to Hellman and Dahl (1994), the anaphor
forces the reader to structure the text. They do not discuss how this
structure comes about.
In combination with the verb mean, this refers to what the con-
text provides.9 This refers to an abstracted meaning that can be para-
phrased as: ‘economic processes show good developments’. In LDM,
this meaning can be calculated by a construction rule ‘List Extension’
(Pru¨st, 1992), that generalizes over the three clauses in the context of
this (how this meaning is calculated in terms of LDM is demonstrated
in section 5.3.3).
Given an abstract antecedent for this, (12) is not violating the right
frontier restriction. In Webber (1991), LDM was not worked out in
detail, but forming structures with List Extension is characteristic for
LDM. It creates a coordinative discourse structure, dominated by only
one top constituent: a constituent representing the abstracted meaning
‘economic processes show good developments’. This is represented in
the tree in (13).
8One problem is the use of matrix verbs:
(i) The newspapers say that the dollar is falling. This does not astonish me at all.
The anaphor this is ambiguous between The newspapers say that the dollar is falling and
the dollar is falling. This problem is the same as the problem formulated with respect
to (6).
Hellman and Dahl (1994) have called the other problem ‘split antecedents’, meaning
that the antecedent has to be constructed from different parts of the previous context.
Within the scope of this chapter, no solutions will be presented for this problem.
9It is not necessary that the verb to mean predicates over one specific state, event, or
property: a complex antecedent is allowed. This turns this into an unmarked anaphor.
See the discussion on this with respect to example (11).
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The tree in (13) represents the structure of the preceding context of
this in (12), and is made conform Webber (1991) and LDM. See sec-
tion 5.3 for a demonstration of the formation of this tree by the LDM
rules. The blank circles in (13) form the right frontier; the antecedent
of this in (12), is represented by the top constituent of (13). The tree
is made by application of the rule of List Construction on the first two
clauses, and then the List Extension rule. Besides making a tree, these
rules specify the change of the topic in a list structure. This change is
a generalization of topic and comment. This generalization (i.e., ‘eco-
nomic processes show good developments’) is represented in the top
constituent. Because the antecedent finds what it looks for in the top
constituent, which is on the right frontier, the right frontier restriction
has not been violated.
The second piece of evidence against the right frontier Hellman and
Dahl (1994) present, is a genuine violation of the right frontier restric-
tion. The example is given in (14) (taken from Hellman and Dahl,
1994, p. 472).
(14) John must have left. His room is empty. It probably happened a
while ago.
It refers to John must have left. His room is empty is not represented in
the antecedent. This is strange, for one expects that as an unmarked
anaphor, it would take the abstracted meaning of its context as antece-
dent. An unmarked anaphor takes what it gets as antecedent. Appar-
ently, the clause John must have left has a property which makes it more
salient as an antecedent than his room is empty or some abstraction of
both clauses. This might be argumentative orientation: the modality of
must have turns the first clause into a conclusion for which evidence is
provided. The evidence might be considered as less important informa-
tion. Another possible explanation might be the predication of it with
happened: the situation ‘his room is empty’ is not a possible antecedent,
for happen can only take an event, and not a state as its subject.
Whatever explanation counts for it having a specific antecedent,
one conclusion must be drawn: (14) is a violation of the right frontier,
for the proposition representing the first clause in (14) does not occur
on the right frontier.
The relation between the first two clauses in (14) is causal: the sec-
ond clause is evidence for the first. Hellman and Dahl (1994) do not
suggest that this relation might explain their observations. Neverthe-
less, it will appear to be the pattern that returns in violations of the
right frontier: causal relations allow for specific antecedents that do
not occur on the right frontier (in this case, even with an unmarked
anaphor).
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Hellman and Dahl (1994) acknowledge that it is not only the predi-
cation of the anaphor that structures the context, as they claimed with
respect to (12). A change of the predication of it, as in (15), does not
take away the possibility to refer to the first clause of the discourse
(taken from Hellman and Dahl, 1994, p. 472).
(15) John must have left. His room is empty. It is a shame.
In (15), it should be allowed to take the second clause as antecedent:
‘(the fact that) his room is empty is a shame’ is a possible paraphrase.
This is a difference, caused by the predication of it. Notice that refer-
ence to the first clause is still possible in (15), although it is not pre-
ferred. It is the abstracted meaning, representing both clauses, that
provides the most preferred antecedent for the unmarked anaphor (9).
Hellman and Dahl (1994) conclude that discourse structure plays a
role in determining the antecedent in (14) and (15). It is not the case,
however, that the right frontier restriction makes correct predictions
here. So, a change in restrictions on discourse structure is needed. In
this respect it is an important observation that in (14) and (15), the first
two clauses are causally related.
In sum, Hellman and Dahl (1994) formulated four types of prob-
lems, providing evidence against the Webber’s right frontier restriction.
Two problem types were not directly aimed at the right frontier.10 Two
other problem types were relevant for the right frontier restriction. The
formulation of the first problem presupposed that the antecedent was
created by the anaphor. In LDM, however, rules forming the trees pro-
vide abstracted meaning, thus forming the abstracted meaning that
suits the anaphor. So, the right frontier restriction was not violated.
The second type of problem was indeed problematic for the right fron-
tier restriction. In the light of this chapter, it is worthwhile to note
that in the context of the anaphor, the antecedent was part of a causal
relation.
Other violations of the right frontier restriction
Fraurud (1992) discusses properties of situational anaphors. Besides
differences between kinds of anaphors, and types of antecedents, she
10Accidentally, Hellman and Dahl (1994) do cite a genuine counterexample in their
discussion of matrix verbs (taken from Asher, 1993, p. 244).
(i) If Al believes that Pedro beats donkeys, he will yell at him. But Al doesn’t believe
that, so Pedro will escape with hearing intact.
That refers to Pedro beats donkeys. It is embedded in a belief context, but that is not
a problem for the right frontier restriction. That is referring specifically to Pedro beats
donkeys, a clause that does not occur on the right frontier. In this case, it is not the
causal relation, but the Parallel relation that causes the violation. The Parallel (con-
trast) relation is extensively studied in Asher (1993). Asher’s Parallel is a structure
assigned to discourse after incrementation. In section 5.4, an example of a Parallel
structure will be given.
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includes discourse structure as crucial for identification of the antece-
dent. She analyzes Webber’s (1991) claim, and concludes that a tree
structure alone is not sufficient for a correct representation of the ante-
cedent. Specifically, she claims that an incremental tree structure like
Webber’s can not account for facts of discourse subordination. Below,
Fraurud’s (1992) standpoint will be explained, and her examples will be
discussed, in order to argue that what has been regarded as the effect
of discourse subordination, is in fact the effect of causal coherence.
The example Fraurud (1992) discusses first, is taken from Webber
(1991), and given here as (16).
(16) a. For his part in their joint project, John built a two-armed robot.
b. He had learned about robotics in CSE391.
c. For her part, Mary taught it how to play the saxophone.
d. That took her six months.
d0 That earned them both A’s.
The sentences (16d) and (16d0) are alternative continuations of the dis-
course. That in (16d) refers to (16c) only, and (16d0) refers to the repre-
sentation of (16a-c) together. Webber (1991) argues that the structure
of (16a-c) determines these two possibilities: there are only two right
frontier positions. The impossibility of other antecedents for that in
the continuations of (16a-c) confirms the right frontier restriction.
Fraurud (1992) comments on Webber’s (1991) observation with re-
spect to the antecedent of (16d0) in the following way.
What might be questioned here is whether or not the fact
that John had learned about robotics, expressed by sentence
(b), is included in the reference of the pronoun. What earned
John and Mary’s A’s was presumably the tasks they performed
described by the sentences (a) and (c). Possibly, one could
argue that, since John’s learning about robotics serves to ex-
plain his ability to perform his task, it constitutes at least an
indirect cause of earning him an A. (Fraurud, 1992, p. 56)
It is interesting to note that Fraurud (1992) takes the omittance of (16b)
in the antecedent of that in (16d0), as corresponding to the causal re-
lation between (16a) and (16b). However, it is not certain that it was
Webber’s (1991) observation that (16b) should be included in the inter-
pretation of the antecedent (16a-c). Given a discourse structure created
by attaching (16c) to the top constituent (16a+b) (and not to (16b)),
there are two rightmost constituents, one representing (16c), and one
representing (16(a+b)+c). In the latter structure, (16b) is embedded,
and it is dependent on the information flow within the tree whether
or not (16b) belongs to the antecedent. In fact, it is possible to create
the structure (16(a+b)+c) by assuming a subordination relation between
(16a) and (16b).
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Fraurud (1992) takes the observation that John’s learning is an indi-
rect cause of earning him an A, as an argument to abandon (16b) from
the antecedent of that in (16d0). Subordination of (16b) means for her
that this clause is neglected as part of the antecedent of a propositional
anaphor.
Fraurud (1992) tries to explain why (16b) may be left out of the
(split) antecedent of (16d0). She discusses two kinds of discourse subor-
dination, namely Mann and Thompson’s (1988) nucleus and satellite,
and Hobbs’s (1985) subordination. In both cases, subordination is a
property of coherence relations, making one of two connected clauses
(Mann and Thompson’s satellite) less ‘important’ than the other. She
argues that this kind of subordination has to be incorporated in the tree
structure, in order to account for the observation that some part of the
meaning is left out of the abstracted meaning in the top constituent.
At the same time, she acknowledges that the notion of subordination
as defined by Mann and Thompson (1988) or Hobbs (1985) is not a
clear and well-defined notion. Two remarks can be made with respect
to Fraurud’s (1992) analysis.
First, the notion of subordination has already been worked out with
respect to the tree structures, because LDM provides a rule for Rhetori-
cal Subordinations (see table 1.3 in the appendix of this chapter). The
effect of this rule is, that the meaning of the subclause is left out of the
abstracted meaning of (16a+b) (this will be discussed in section 5.2.3
and 5.3). This means that leaving out the meaning of (16b) is not a
problem for Webber’s restriction on antecedents; but making reference
to the conjunction of the specific constituents representing (16a) and
(16c) is, for this is violating the right frontier restriction (that is, split
antecedents as such are a problem, but making reference to (16a) is a
violation of the right frontier restriction).11
Secondly, a notion that has not been mentioned by Webber (1991)
nor Fraurud (1992), is the parallel interpretation of (16a) and (16c). Ac-
cording to Asher (1993), parallel relations may be defined on existing
structure, and relate two constituents in similar positions in the sub-
trees assigned as parallel. The phrase for her part in (16c) indicates that
the clause is parallel to another clause in the discourse. The occurrence
of both in (16d0) indicates a split antecedent. This split antecedent can
be made through the parallel relation between (16a) and (16c). The
only problem is, that in LDM, no construction rule will create a struc-
ture that gives (16a) and (16c) similar positions in parallel subtrees. So,
it is still a problem how (16a) is part of the antecedent.
Fraurud (1992) claims that discourse subordination is responsible
for the effects discussed here. However, as long as explanations are
analyzed, it can be claimed just as well that it is causality that causes
11Making reference to (16(a+b)+c) and suppressing (16b) in this representation is in
agreement with the right frontier restriction, but it raises the question why and how
(16b) is suppressed. Fraurud (1992) does not address this problem. In section 5.2.3 and
sections thereafter, a theory will be discussed that does address this problem.
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these effects. Is it possible to decide between these two claims?
Fraurud (1992) presents another example where a clause may be
neglected in a complex antecedent.
(17) a. John didn’t turn up at the meeting.
b. He never keeps a promise.
c. Charlie was also absent.
d. That’s why we cancelled the meeting.
That in (17d) has possibly a split antecedent of (17a) and (17c). It
seems that (17b) can not be part of the antecedent. Fraurud (1992)
analyzes (17b) as a comment on (17a), which makes (17b) subordina-
tive to (17a).
Reference to (17a) is a problem for the right frontier restriction.
Fraurud’s (1992) solution is, that (17b) is subordinate. It may therefore
be overlooked in the complex antecedent of the whole context. Refer-
ence is made to (17a+b+c), but (17b) does not count in the abstracted
meaning.
At first sight, this analysis would be in line with the claim in this
chapter, if the relation between (17a) and (17b) were causal. One could
claim that this relation is an explanation, but this is not really convinc-
ing. It is more a comment on John as a person, than an explanation of
his absence. Is this a problem for the claim that causality may dodge
the right frontier restriction? A closer look at the example will learn
that in this case, it is not necessary to have (17a) in the antecedent.
The anaphor that in (17d) is not looking for an antecedent that can
be applied to two persons, such as that in (16d0): the presence of both in
that earned them both A’s, as well as the parallel relation between (16a)
and (16c), indicates a split antecedent. In (17), one reason for can-
celling the meeting could suffice. The reason that besides (17c), a sec-
ond reason is considered, is the presence of also in (17c). As a marked
anaphor, that takes preferably a specific clause as an antecedent (i.e.,
just (17c)). In (17c), also is used to incorporate given (presupposed)
information: next to Charlie, there was someone else absent (cf. Bos,
1994). The information that more people than just Charlie (namely,
John) were absent, is provided by (17c) on its own.
In (18), the reason why the meeting should be cancelled has been
made more significant (with respect to real world reasons of cancelling
meetings). It is unlikely that only (18c) is the antecedent of that in
(18d).
(18) a. John didn’t turn up at the meeting.
b. He would bring the input for the discussion.
c. Charlie was also absent.
d. ?That’s why we cancelled the meeting.
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In (18), the absence of John has become more relevant than the absence
of Charlie, for (18b) makes John’s presence crucial for the meeting (or
at least, more important than Charlie’s presence). The presence of the
marked anaphor that in (18d), now results in unacceptability.12 That
refers to a specific constituent that gives a good reason for cancelling
the meeting, namely the rightmost clause (18c). But the best reason
would be provided by the context as a whole. This is not in accordance
with the markedness of that, so the discourse is unacceptable.
An additional argument against the idea that the antecedent of that
in (17d) incorporates (17a+b), is given by another variant of this dis-
course (taken from Maes, 1997, p. 169), presented in (19).
(19) a. John didn’t turn up at the meeting.
b. Charlie was also absent.
c. He never keeps a promise.
d. ?That’s why we cancelled the meeting.
The marked anaphor that in (19d) wants a specific constituent as ante-
cedent, representing a good reason for the cancellation of the meeting.
The unacceptability of (19d) means that no such constituent is avail-
able as antecedent.
Fraurud’s (1992) claim that it is subordination that allows clauses to
be left out of complex antecedents, is not correct. If comments were
discourse subordinate, (18b) would be discourse subordinate to (18a),
just as (17b) was to (17a), and both discourses should be acceptable. But
the discourse in (18) is unacceptable (if (18b) is considered to make the
presence of John crucial). In (19), the marked anaphor that looks for a
specific clause as an antecedent, but it can not overlook the subordinate
clause (19c). The problem to be solved then, is not that subordinate
clauses can be disregarded, but that some clauses can serve as antece-
dent while they do not occur on the right frontier (also like (16a)). This
problem will now be discussed.
Until now, the meeting examples did not provide a genuine viola-
tion of the right frontier restriction. It is, however, easy to create one.
In (20), the antecedent is not part of the right frontier.
(20) a. John didn’t turn up at the meeting.
b. Charlie was also absent.
c. He was ill.
d. That’s why we cancelled the meeting.
12The only way to make the discourse acceptable with additional inferences, is to
assume that someone else has brought the key of the meeting room, or the meeting
was held somewhere else. Of course, this makes the (18b) less important, giving way
for that to refer to (18c) only.
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Clearly, the illness of Charlie was not the reason to cancel the meeting.
The absence of Charlie, and through also the absence of John, are good
reasons for cancelling the meeting. So, (20b) is the antecedent of that
in (20d). (20b) does not occur on the right frontier in the structure of
(20). This is possible, because the relation between (20c) and (20b) is
causal. (20c) is an explanation for (20b). So, the difference between
(19) and (20) confirms the idea that the antecedent of propositional
anaphors is affected by causality, instead of subordination.
In order to show that it is causality, and not only the specific co-
herence relation Explanation that is crucial here, a last variant of the
meeting examples is constructed in (21).
(21) a. John didn’t turn up at the meeting.
b. Charlie was also absent,
c. so he had other priorities.
d. That’s why we cancelled the meeting.
Taking (21b) as antecedent, while omitting (21c) from the antecedent,
does not lead to unacceptability. (21c) is a result for (21b), and at the
same time, it is not a good reason for cancelling the meeting.13 The ac-
ceptability of the discourse shows that Result behaves like Explanation.
This supports the thought that it is causality that makes a violation of
the right frontier restriction possible.
The discussion of Fraurud (1992) made more clear that constituents
in a discourse may be available as antecedent, even when they do not
occur on the right frontier. A closer look at some of her examples
learned, that this effect is not due to subordinate clauses that may be
overlooked, but by causal relations keeping clauses available as an an-
tecedent, when they do not occur on the right frontier. Evidence is
provided for the idea that causality affects the availability of antece-
dents in discourse structure.
A survey of examples used against the right frontier restriction of Web-
ber (1991) learned, that some of the examples could be reanalyzed in
such a way that they appear to be in agreement with the right frontier
restriction. In those cases that may count as real counter examples, the
context is characterized by a causal coherence relation between antece-
dent and a right frontier constituent.
In the next section, the phenomena will be analyzed within the
framework of LDM. Pru¨st (1992) analyzes VP anaphors in discourse
structure. VP anaphor may be considered as propositional anaphors
(predicates form the antecedent; the subject of the antecedent is ex-
changed with the subject of the anaphoric VP). Therefore, the right
frontier restriction will be investigated by using VP anaphors.
13Notice that this result is epistemic: from the fact that Charlie is absent, I conclude
that he had other priorities.
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5.2.3 VP anaphors and rebuttals
In this section, the right frontier restriction will be investigated within
the framework of LDM, using some of Pru¨st’s (1992) examples of an-
tecedents of VP anaphors. More specifically, an analysis will be given
of a VP anaphor, followed by a but clause. The identification of the
antecedent of the VP anaphor is strongly determined by this rebuttal.
At the same time, it appears that properties of the context containing
the antecedent, are crucial too.
In the LDM analysis, these examples were considered to represent
an exceptional non-incremental parse of the discourse, which means
that the right frontier restriction has been abandoned to analyze this
example. In the next section, it will be argued that it is possible to stick
to an incremental approach, if it is assumed that causal relations keep
antecedents available in the context of anaphors.
The discourse in (22) is ambiguous. The VP anaphor in (22c) is
referring to (22a+b) as a whole, or to (22b) (example and judgments are
taken from Pru¨st et al., 1994, p.266).
(22) a. Fred went to the dentist
b. because he needed a checkup.
c. Sara did too.
To show that their intuitions with respect to the antecedent of the VP
anaphor are correct, they continue the discourse in (22) with a rebuttal,
namely (22d).
(22) d. but she had to have her wisdom tooth removed.
Pru¨st et al. (1994) claim that (22d) excludes an interpretation of the
VP anaphor in (22c) as: ‘Sara needed a checkup’. This would give the
inappropriate interpretation: ‘#Sara needed a checkup as well, but she
needed a root treatment’. As a result, (22a) is taken to be a proper
antecedent of the VP anaphor in the context of (22d).
Pru¨st et al. (1994) argue for having the whole sentence (22a+b) as
an antecedent, as long as (22d) has not been added. On the other hand,
if the antecedent of (22d) were (22a+b) in the context of (22d), then a
paraphrase of the VP anaphor and its rebuttal would be: ‘#Mary went,
like John, to the dentist because she needed a checkup, but she had to
have her wisdom tooth removed’.
Pru¨st et al. (1994) claim that the change of the discourse structure,
due to the addition of the rebuttal, has had an impact on the interpre-
tation. (22a+b) coordinates with (22c+d), resulting in an antecedent
for the VP anaphor of only (22a) and not (22a+b). In section 5.4, this
structure and its impact will be discussed. Here, it will be analyzed
which characterizations of the discourse in (22a-d) are crucial for the
identification of the antecedent of the VP anaphor.
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It seems obvious that the rebuttal is restructuring the discourse, but
it is less obvious how the new structure is obtained. The real contrast
is between Fred needing a checkup, and Sara having to have her wis-
dom teeth removed. (22b) and (22d), however, are not connected to
each other by but. Pru¨st et al. (1994, p. 321) claim, that parallelism of
(22a+b) and (22c+d) determines the interpretation. In this case, paral-
lelism is invoked by using but as a semantic opposition. But is used as
a semantic opposition, when its clauses are built up parallel (cf. chap-
ter 2, section 2.3). Asher (1993) analyzes structures of more than two
clauses to show that parallel structures can be interpreted contrastive.
The example in (22a-d) is an example in which the right frontier re-
striction is violated. Moreover, according to Pru¨st et al. (1994, p. 321),
it is an example of a structure that has been built non-incrementally.
The discourse of (22c+d) is formed, before it is attached to (22a+b).
Adding the rebuttal to (22a-c), changes the whole structure, accord-
ing to Pru¨st et al. (1994). The possibility that (22a) is an antecedent for
the VP anaphor on its own, is a result of this non-incremental change
of structure. It is an atypical example of a violation of the right frontier
restriction, for the non-incremental formation of the structure results
in a temporal disappearance of the right frontiers (two trees have been
formed, as will be shown in section 5.3).
The most important aspects of the discourse in (22) have been in-
troduced. The VP anaphor is unmarked at first, the rebuttal restructures
the discourse and the context in which the antecedent is to be found
contains a causal relation. In the analysis of Pru¨st et al. (1994), this
causal relation does not seem to be crucial. It is the restructuring of
the rebuttal that isolates the first clause as the antecedent. However,
the causal relation is crucial in the examples. Three arguments will be
given to support the claim that causality affects the availability of the
antecedents.
First, Pru¨st et al. (1994) claim that in discourses like (23), the VP
anaphor in (23c) can only refer to (23b) or (23a+b), but not to (23a)
only (taken from Pru¨st et al., 1994, p. 279).
(23) a. John went to the library.
b. He borrowed a book on computer science.
c. Bill did too.
They claim that:
This third interpretation [reference to (23a) only] may be-
come relevant if the context makes (23b) subordinate to
(23a). For instance, (23a) and (23b) form an answer to the
question Who went to the library?. (Pru¨st et al., 1994, p. 279)
A rebuttal is not the only context in which the VP anaphor may refer
to the first clause. Pru¨st et al. (1994) claim that in those cases, (23b) is
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subordinate to (23a).14 In fact, the first clause is available in any con-
text, but the unmarked VP anaphor does not refer specifically enough
to select it. The question who went to the library? is doing exactly what
is needed to select the antecedent, namely making the VP anaphor spe-
cific.
The relation between (23a) and (23b) is a relation of purpose, which
is a causal relation.15 Pru¨st et al. (1994) claim that the discourse in (24)
has the same relation between (24a) and (24b) as between (22a) and
(22b).
(24) a. Fred went to the dentist.
b. He needed a checkup.
c. Sara did too,
d. but she had to have her wisdom tooth removed.
Like Pru¨st et al. (1994), the claim in this chapter is that the relation
between (24a) and (24b) is the same as between (22a) and (22b). So,
Rhetorical Subordination seems to be a construction rule based on the
causal relation Explanation.
Is it possible that without the rebuttal, the VP anaphor in (22c)
refers to (22a) only? In the introduction of this chapter, an example
of an although sentence was given in (2), in which three possible ante-
cedents were found for that. The most important difference between
these two discourses is the anaphor that is used. In (2), that may re-
fer specifically, as it is a marked anaphor. In (22), the VP anaphor is
unmarked without the rebuttal, so specific reference to (22a) is not pre-
ferred.
In sum, the first argument that causality is affecting discourse struc-
ture in (22), is that contrary to the claims of Pru¨st et al. (1994), the
first clause of the discourse in (22a-c) is available as antecedent, due to
the causal relation it has with (22b). It is only for the unmarked VP
anaphor, that (22a) is not used as an anaphor: the discourse (2) shows
that a marked anaphor may take the first clause of a causal relation as
its antecedent.
The second argument is that the relation between (22a) and (22b),
in the structure formed with VP anaphor and rebuttal, should be taken
to be relevant in the analysis of (22a-d). It is the parallel structure,
invoked by the rebuttal, that makes (22a) the antecedent of the VP an-
aphor, according to Pru¨st et al. (1994). There are two observations that
14It may safely be assumed that Pru¨st et al. (1994) mean rhetorical subordination
here, which is in its assumed effects the same as Fraurud’s (1992) discourse subordina-
tion.
15 Sanders et al. (1993) describe what they call Goal-Instrument relations as express-
ing two causal relations. In Renkema (1993), it is the real world connection between
the execution of the instrument and the achievement of the purpose (whether it is
actually realized or not) that is regarded as causal. Readers might assume a narrative
relation in (23a+b) as well. Narrative relations may be understood as consequential (cf.
Caenepeel, 1989, p. 77).
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provide arguments against this idea. First, it will be shown that when
the relation between the first two clauses is not causal, the VP anaphor
can not refer to the first clause only; second, it will be shown that the
parallel relation is created by virtue of the identification of the ante-
cedent, and not the other way around (parallel structure identifies the
antecedent).
If the relation between the first two clauses is a list, it is not possible
to make the VP anaphor refer to the first clause. This is shown in (25).
(25) a. John loves trains.
b. Peter loves cars.
c. Mary does too,
d. ?but she hates cars.
In (25d), the rebuttal excludes (25b) as an antecedent for (25c). The
discourse is unacceptable, so (25a) is not an antecedent for (25c). Ac-
cording to their List construction rule, connecting (25a) and (25b) (and
conform the intuitions for the discourse in (25a-c)), the VP anaphor
should refer to an abstraction of (25a) and (25b), for instance ‘Mary
loves vehicles’ (see section 5.3). The rebuttal does not allow the VP
anaphor to behave as an unmarked anaphor, so clause (25a) or (25b)
must be specifically selected, which leads to an unacceptable discourse.
In the framework of LDM, the propositional contents of (25a) and
(25b) are taken together by a topic update rule (25b) (the List construc-
tion rule). It has become impossible to refer to (25a), for its context
dependent meaning has merged into the abstracted meaning. The con-
struction rule Rhetorical Subordinations, used to form a structure for
(22a+b), copies the propositional contents of only (22a) into the ab-
stracted meaning, so reference to the abstracted meaning yields only
(22a) as an antecedent.16 The relation between the first two clauses
is therefore crucial in the analysis of Pru¨st et al. (1994). This rela-
tion might be characterized by because (Rhetorical Subordinations or,
in other frameworks, Explanation), but not by a List.
Do other relations provide a proper antecedent in this construction?
In (26a+b), an elaborative relation is expressed.
(26) a. John went to the library.
b. He went there by car.
c. Bill did too,
d. ?but he went there by bike.
The unacceptability of (26) is caused by the impossibility for (26a)
to be an antecedent for the VP anaphor, while (26b) and (26a+b) are
16Although the intuitions in Pru¨st et al. (1994) on (22) are that the VP anaphor
makes reference to both (22a) and (22b), the rule of Rhetorical Subordination only
specifies the main clause as the contextual dependent semantics of their conjunction.
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excluded by the rebuttal. The relation between (26a) and (26b) is
not causal. This is an important observation: the coherence relation
Elaboration is considered to be subordinative in Polanyi (1988), and
a nucleus-satellite relation in Mann and Thompson (1988). However,
using an Elaboration in the VP anaphor and rebuttal construction does
not result in an acceptable discourse. This means that the causality of
the relation does play a crucial role in the identification of the antece-
dent of the VP anaphor with rebuttal.
Not all Elaborations result in unacceptable discourses, however. Con-
sider (27), where an elaborative relation is used between (27a) and
(27b).
(27) a. John went to the reception desk.
b. He made a telephone call.
c. Mary did too,
d. (?)but she sent a fax.
In its most straightforward explanation, the discourse is unacceptable.
The VP anaphor takes (27b) as an antecedent, and it is not possible to
change it to (27a). However, it might be possible to interpret (27b) as
a purpose: ‘John went to the reception in order to make a telephone
call.’ Relations expressing a purpose are causal. In this interpretation,
(27a) might serve as an antecedent. Such an interpretation is blocked
in (28), because then is used in (28b). The relation between (28a) and
(28b) becomes narrative, this way.
(28) a. John went to the reception desk
b. and then he made a telephone call.
c. Mary did too,
d. ?but she sent a fax.
In (28d), the rebuttal excludes (28b) as an antecedent for (28c). The
discourse is unacceptable, so (28a) can not be an antecedent for (28c),
evidently.
The relations used in (25a+b), (26a+b), (27a+b) in the narrative in-
terpretation, and (28a+b) are non-causal. When a VP anaphor is forced
by a rebuttal to refer to the first clause of these conjunctions, the dis-
course becomes unacceptable. There is one exception: in (27), it is
possible to interpret the elaborative relation as causal. As a result of
this interpretation, the discourse becomes acceptable. In other words:
causal, but not additive relations, allow these discourses to be accept-
able. It is not just the parallel structure that explains the relation.
The third argument supporting the idea that causality is crucial for
the availability of (24a) as the antecedent of the VP anaphor, is that
it may prevent non-incremental parsing. Not every rebuttal invokes
parallel structure. In (29), no parallel structure is formed.
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(29) a. John went to the dentist.
b. He needed a checkup.
c. Mary did too,
d. but she went to a dental hygienist.
In (29), (29b) serves as an antecedent on its own. The rebuttal in (29d)
excludes (29a) as an antecedent.
Pru¨st et al. (1994) state that in (22), a parallel structure is created
by postponing the interpretation of the VP anaphor. The incremental
parsing strategy is left, and (22c) and (22d) are connected first, in order
to create the parallel structure between (22a+b) and (22c+d).
In the analysis of Pru¨st et al. (1994), the presence of the rebuttal is
needed to invoke the parallel structure. Their claim that interpretation
of the VP anaphor is postponed, can only be made true by virtue of
the presence of the rebuttal, for omitting the rebuttal means that the
VP anaphor will be interpreted regularly (referring to both preceding
clauses in the discourse). However, not every rebuttal invokes parallel
structure, as (29) shows. As a consequence, the contents of the rebuttal
must be known, before the non-incremental procedure of creating par-
allel structure can begin. In other words, the whole discourse must be
parsed incrementally first, and then reparsed to build parallel structure
in a non-incremental way. This is not an ideal procedure. Another way
of creating parallel structure may provide better results, for instance the
way like Asher (1993) describes it.
In Asher (1993), the relations Parallel and Contrast are based on
structure that has already been formed. A Parallel structure is formed
when isomorphic subtrees can be recognized in an existing structure.
Contrast is realized when isomorphic subtrees that form a Parallel re-
lation have two corresponding branches that are negatively polar. In
other words, according to Asher (1993), the discourse structure comes
first, and the parallel interpretation comes next.
An alternative analysis of the combination of VP anaphors and re-
buttals might run as follows. The rebuttal turns the VP anaphor, used
as an unmarked anaphor in (22a-c), into a marked anaphor, specifying
one particular clause. The VP anaphor is specified, given the structure
that has already been formed. It depends on the abstracted meaning
given by the construction rules that built the existing discourse struc-
ture, whether or not a specification of the VP anaphor is possible.17 If it
is possible, and if it is the first clause that is specified as the antecedent,
a parallel structure is formed, and a Contrast will be created between
the first two clauses and the VP anaphor with rebuttal. This analysis
will be worked out in detail in section 5.3.
17Another way of looking at the VP anaphor as changing from unmarked to marked
is, to regard the VP anaphor as underspecified, and specified later by the rebuttal within
the same representation.
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An analysis of discourses with a VP anaphor followed by a rebut-
tal, shows that causal relations have a different impact on the acces-
sibility of antecedents of VP anaphors than List or narrative relations
do. A VP anaphor refers preferably as an unmarked anaphor, but it
is specified by a rebuttal. When forced to refer to the first of two re-
lated clauses, discourses are acceptable only when the relation between
these two clauses is causal. Such cases dodge the right frontier restric-
tion. The way in which causal relations affect discourse structure is
thus, that causally related constituents remain available as antecedents
for propositional anaphors.
Not all possible causal relations were used in the context of VP
anaphors and rebuttals. In the previous section, and the next, other
causal relations show similar effects in other contexts. It is not always
possible to exchange coherence relations freely in every context, be-
cause there are many different factors that may influence the choice of
antecedent. In the next section additional evidence from Dutch will
strengthen the observations concerning causal relations in discourse
structure.
5.2.4 Evidence from Dutch er
In section 5.2.3, the combination of a VP anaphor, followed by a re-
buttal inconsistent with a clause in the preceding context, appeared to
be a good way to single out one specific constituent that needed to be
the antecedent of the VP anaphor. In Dutch, there are no VP anaphors
with the same form and meaning as in English. It is not possible to
translate an example like (22), retaining its effect. A Dutch translation
of Mary does too would be Dat doet Marie ook (‘That does Mary too’). In
this translation, the marked anaphor dat is used. As a consequence, a
preferred antecedent of dat is one specific clause, rather than the ab-
stracted meaning of the preceding context. In English, the rebuttal
has the effect of specifying the antecedent. Instead of the abstracted
meaning of an antecedent, a specific constituent is chosen. In Dutch,
the antecedent is already specific. A rebuttal, given a specific content,
may force the anaphor to switch from one specific antecedent to the
other specific antecedent. This gives a strange effect. Such an effect
is unwanted, for unacceptabilities may come forth from the switching
effect, which makes it impossible to test the properties of the context
of the anaphor.
There is a possibility to check for Dutch in which way causality af-
fects discourse structure. There is an anaphor that is used unmarked: er
(‘there’). There is not a correct translation for the use of er that is meant
here. In its use as an anaphor, it refers to an antecedent, abstracted
from the preceding context. In the examples that will be presented
below, parts of the context will be unsuited as antecedent. This way,
specific clauses are isolated as the only possible antecedent. The accept-
ability judgments will tell us more about constituents that may occur
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in the antecedent, or: which constituents are open.
Analyzing Dutch er does not only provide evidence from another
language, but also from another anaphor. Besides, an alternative for
the rebuttal will be presented. This will exclude the possibility that it is
only the rebuttal that is responsible for the antecedent choice. Before
relevant discourses are presented, a short introduction into Dutch er
will be given.
There are two well-described other usages of er: the use of er as ex-
istential there (as described in Milsark, 1977), and the use of er as a
partitive particle ‘kwantitatief er’ (De Jong, 1983).18 Besides these two,
there is a usage of er as the clitic of the adverb daar (there, in a locative
sense) when it is in unstressed position.
The usage of er to be discussed here is its use as a particle in a prepo-
sitional phrase. This is described in traditional grammars like Van
Bart and Sturm (1987); Geerts et al. (1984). Er refers to a nominal
constituent, but also to clauses and abstracted meaning from several
clauses, and sometimes it is used in an absolute sense, without an an-
tecedent. This may be defined as pronominal reference in the sense of
(Chomsky, 1981, p.188): a pronominal anaphor may have its antece-
dent only outside its governing category. In effect, this means that er is
allowed to refer to anything outside the clause in which er occurs. Klein
(1987) suggests that we might consider er as an ‘adverbial pronomen’.
An example of the use of er as a propositional anaphor is given in
(30).
(30) Marie
Mary
geeft
offers
Jan
John
misschien
perhaps
de
the
baan.
job.
Hij
He
hoopt
hopes
erop.
it for.
In Geerts et al. (1984), this use of er is exemplified without context
and the construction is called ‘absolute’. Er is not referring to anything
‘concrete’. This analysis corresponds with Maes’s (1997) analysis of the
unmarked anaphor.
18There is used existential, in the sense that it quantifies existentially over the NP
that is understood as the subject of the sentence. This NP may not be quantified itself,
as shown in the following pair.
(i) a. There are people on the street.
b. ?There is everyone on the street.
In (ib), there quantifies over what is referred to by everyone, but the NP everyone is
quantifies itself over its referents. This double quantification is excluded in English.
For Dutch, a similar restriction holds, as the translation of the sentences (i) in (ii)
shows.
(ii) a. Er zijn mensen op straat
b. ?Er is iedereen op straat.
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How can these anaphorical properties of er be used for determina-
tion of open constituents in discourse structure? The unmarked anaph-
or makes it possible to identify the abstracted meaning of a context as
antecedent. Consider the discourse in (31).
(31) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
an
sfeervolle
attractive
stad,
city,
b. en
and
hij
he
krijgt
gets
daar
there
een
a
tuin.
garden.
c. Hij
John
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it.
(31c) can be paraphrased with: ‘Jan verheugt zich op de sfeervolle stad
en de tuin’ (‘John is looking forward to the attractive city and the gar-
den’). An interpretation in which Jan is looking forward to just the
attractive city or just the garden, is not preferred.
It is possible to exclude the meaning of one constituent from the
meaning abstracted from the constituents that form the antecedent by
using negative and positive attitude (cf. Sidiropoulou, 1992). Clauses
like Jan zorgt ervoor ‘John takes care of it’, Jan verheugt zich erop ‘John
is looking forward to it’ or Jan hoopt erop ‘John hopes for it’, express a
positive attitude of Jan towards the state of affairs the anaphor refers
to. The antecedent, stating this state of affairs, has to express a positive
attitude, or none. An antecedent with negative attitude will be unac-
ceptable for the interpretation of anaphoric er. An example is given in
(32).
(32) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
a
saaie
dull
stad.
city.
b. ?Hij
He
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it
In (32b), the clause containing er is unacceptable, because one is not
supposed to enjoy a removal to a dull city. Now look what happens
with (33), when two constituents are used in the preceding context of
erop.
(33) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
a
saaie
dull
stad,
city,
b. en
and
hij
he
krijgt
gets
daar
there
een
a
tuin.
garden.
c. Hij
He
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it
In (33b), en hij krijgt daar een tuin has come in-between the negative atti-
tude clause in (33a), and the positive attitude anaphor in (33c). In (32),
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the only possible antecedent was the unacceptable (32a). In (33), the
unacceptable (33a) may be disregarded as antecedent. Because (33b) is
an acceptable antecedent, the anaphor in (33c) is properly resolved.
What happens in (33), is in line with the right frontier restriction:
instead of the top constituent of (33a+b), the rightmost clause (33b) is
taken as antecedent. Both the top constituent and the rightmost clause
occur on the right frontier, so it is predicted that the impossibility to
refer to the top constituent (33a+b) still allows the possibility to refer
to (33b).
In (33), the first clause did not need to be antecedent. In (34), it is
shown that it is not possible to take the first clause as an antecedent,
disregarding the second clause.
(34) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
an
sfeervolle
attractive
stad,
city,
b. en
and
hij
he
moet
has
daar
there
veel
much
huur
rent
betalen.
to pay.
c. ?Hij
He
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it.
(If (34a+b) does not seem to be acceptable, read an additive maar in-
stead of en in (34b).) In (34), it is impossible to disregard (34b) as part
of the antecedent, for its occurrence as a negative attitude clause causes
(34c) to be unacceptable.19 (34) agrees with the right frontier restric-
tion, since the unacceptability shows that (34b) can not be discarded.
In both the top constituent and the rightmost clause, the contents of
(34b) is represented.
In the examples dealt with so far, no causal relations were involved.
The demands of the right frontier restriction were obeyed. Now, con-
texts will be given that contain a causal relation.
(35) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
a
saaie
dull
stad,
city,
b. omdat
because
hij
he
daar
there
een
a
tuin
garden
krijgt.
gets.
c. ?Hij
He
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it.
In (35), (35a) is given a negative attitude, which makes it an unaccept-
able antecedent. The unacceptability of (35c) shows, that (35a) can
not be left out of the antecedent of erop. In (36), the attitudes in the
antecedent are switched.
19In one interpretation, it is possible to make the interpretation acceptable, namely
to give the discourse an ironic interpretation. In that case, the antecedent is (34b), and
its unacceptable interpretation is repaired via violation of a Gricean maxim.
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(36) a. Jan
John
verhuist
moves
naar
to
een
an
sfeervolle
attractive
stad,
city,
b. omdat
because
hij
he
verhuisplicht
obligation to move house
heeft.
has.
c. Hij
He
verheugt
is looking forward
zich erop.
to it.
Example (36) is acceptable, whereas (36b) can not be read as (part of)
the antecedent of erop. In (34), the preceding context could not provide
a suitable antecedent for erop, but in (36), it does provide a suitable an-
tecedent. This means, that the constituent representing (36a) must
be open, and that the reason for this seems its occurrence in a causal
relation. Another causal relation is given in (37), this time presented
with so instead of because.
(37) a. Marie
Mary
is
is
bang
afraid
voor
of
insecten,
insects,
b. dus
so
ze
she
maakt
keeps it
altijd
always
goed
very well
schoon.
clean.
c. Ze
She
schaamt
is ashamed
zich ervoor.
for it.
This time, a negative attitude is attributed to the anaphor in (37c).
This negative attitude can only be combined with (37a), not with the
positive attitude expressed in (37b). The acceptability of (37b) shows
that (37b) may be disregarded as a part of the antecedent, and that
(37a) is represented by an open constituent in discourse structure.20
The examples using Dutch er corroborate the claim that causal re-
lations keep their constituents open in discourse structure, even when
they do not occur on the right frontier.
5.2.5 Conclusion
In three sections, different pieces of evidence have been collected to
support the conjecture that causal relations keep their constituents
open in discourse structure, even when they do not occur on the right
frontier.
Earlier attempts to present evidence against the right frontier restric-
tion were made in Maes (1997), Hellman and Dahl (1994) and Fraurud
(1992). These proposals were discussed in section 5.2.2. Properties of
20It is quite difficult to make sentences expressing an argument and a claim, while
the anaphor refers to the argument. Argumentative orientation assigns a prominent
role to the claim and not to the argument. However, argumentative orientation is not
what is studied in this chapter. Perhaps, argumentative orientation can be identified
with Fraurud’s (1992) discourse subordination (a directive act has been identified as a
nucleus in McKeown and Elhadad (1991)). What is studied in this chapter, is availabil-
ity rather than prominence, although these notions often coincide.
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the anaphor, especially its markedness and the sentence containing the
anaphor, determine to a large extent the antecedent in the preceding
context. However, the structure of the context is important too, as
Hellman and Dahl (1994) showed. Contrary to Fraurud (1992), the
claim was made that it is causality in the context of an anaphor, rather
than discourse subordination, that provides genuine counterexamples
to the right frontier restriction.
In section 5.2.3, a test used by Pru¨st et al. (1994) was discussed. It
involved VP anaphors and rebuttals. The antecedent, formed by the
two clauses preceding the VP anaphor was antecedent, was specified
to the first clause, due to the rebuttal. Some remarks on the analysis
of Pru¨st et al. (1994) led to the conclusion that the causal relation is
involved in the interpretation. Example (22) thus gave evidence for the
idea that (22a) was antecedent on its own, due to the causal relation
between (22a) and (22b), whereas the rebuttal specified the anaphor
in such a way that this interpretation was enforced. This possibility
provides evidence against the right frontier restriction.
More evidence for the claim that causal relations keep their con-
stituents open, even when they do not occur on the right frontier, was
given by the effects of Dutch er, used as an anaphor in section 5.2.4.
By toggling positive and negative attitude of clauses in the preceding
context, while the anaphor was used in a positive attitude clause, an-
tecedents of er could be excluded from the most preferred antecedent
(namely, the abstracted meaning of the whole context). The results
showed, that constituents in non-causal relations behaved according
to the right frontier restriction. Causal relations did not: it appeared
to be possible to have the first of two causally related clauses as an
antecedent on its own for the propositional anaphor.
Taking the evidence together, the claim that causal relations keep
their constituents open in discourse structure is established.
In section 5.1, four questions were asked. The first three have been
answered:
1. how can different interpretations of a discourse be represented by
structures like (5)?
Possible antecedents are open constituents, even when they
do not occur on the right frontier. The structure in (5) should
be changed: instead of two, all three constituents should be
open, each one corresponding with an interpretation.
2. do marked anaphors refer to specific clauses, irrespective of their
position in a tree structure?
Marked anaphors like that do not violate the right frontier
restriction in order to refer to a specific clause, unless this
clause is causally related with the right frontier. Unmarked
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anaphors, like the English VP anaphor or Dutch er, may refer
to a specific clause, if other possible antecedents are excluded
by certain specific continuations of the discourse.
3. what are characteristic properties of right frontier restriction vio-
lations?
The right frontier may be violated in case of reference of a
propositional anaphor to a clause, causally related with the
right frontier.
The fourth question has not been answered yet:
4. What is the role of causal connectives in abstracted meaning?
Since causality plays a distinctive role in the context of propositional
anaphors, this question has become very relevant, for it has only been
established that causal relations keep their clauses open. What this
means for the distribution of information, restricted by the construc-
tion rules, has not been answered. This question can be answered pre-
cisely within LDM. Therefore, LDM will be introduced in more detail.
A more formal account of calculation of abstracted meaning is given
in the appendix to this chapter. Besides abstracted meaning, the tree
construction is defined in LDM.
5.3 The Linguistic Discourse Model
5.3.1 Introduction
In this section, the Linguistic Discourse Model (LDM) will be intro-
duced in more detail, and some of the insights gained in this chapter
and chapter 2, will be implemented in LDM. The changes proposed
in this section, are not radical, but will improve the descriptive accu-
racy of the model. In section 5.4, it will be shown that the proposed
changes really are improvements. Pru¨st’s (1992) analysis of the VP an-
aphor with rebuttal will be revisited on the basis of the revisions made
in LDM.
In order to describe the role of causal connectives in abstracted
meaning, the construction rules that calculate abstracted meaning, and
create discourse structure at the same time, must be introduced. In or-
der to specify exactly how tree structure and the calculation work, con-
struction rules are given in a very simplified form. The formal defini-
tions of Pru¨st et al. (1994) will be given and explained in the appendix
to this chapter.
In order to make the introduction of the construction rules relevant
for a discussion of the role of causal connectives and causal relations in
discourse structure, the following questions will be answered:
1. How is abstracted meaning of constituents calculated in LDM?
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2. What is the effect of causal relations on the calculation of ab-
stracted meaning in LDM?
3. What is the definition of open constituents in discourse structure?
The answer to the first question provides the semantics of the con-
stituents in discourse structure that represent more than one simple
clause. The answer on the second question may explain a difference
in the effect of different coherence relations in the calculation of ab-
stracted meaning on the availability of clauses in a discourse structure.
This effect can be formulated only after the answer on the third ques-
tion has been given, for the availability of constituents for coreference
and attachment is defined in terms of open constituents (it will become
clear that attachment is not applying to all open constituents). Before
it is possible to analyze precisely the role of causal relations in discourse
structure, the answers on all three questions must be given.
The answers to the questions will be provided by introducing LDM
in three sections: 5.3.3 (first question), 5.3.4 (second question) and
5.3.5 (third question). After that, a VP anaphor and rebuttal example
of Pru¨st (1992) will be examined in detail in section 5.4, in order to
show that the proposed changes to LDM are really improvements. Be-
fore this will be done, a short overview will be given of other theories
of discourse structure, and it will be indicated for which theories the
right frontier phenomena are relevant. Readers who are familiar with
these theories, and readers who do not want to know about them, may
skip section 5.3.2. Knowledge of this section is not needed for under-
standing the remainder of this chapter.
5.3.2 Different theories on discourse structure
In this chapter, the framework of LDM is chosen. This choice is mo-
tivated by the fact that the notions of ‘right frontier’ and ‘open con-
stituent’ have been developed within this framework. However, a lot
of other discourse structure theories exist, that might have something
to say about these notions. In a short overview, these theories will be
classified, and the relevance of the notions ‘right frontier’, ‘open con-
stituent’ and ‘causal relation’ will be indicated for each theory. In table
5.1, names of theories, and characteristic publications are given, and
in table 5.2, these theories are characterized by features of discourse
structure.21
The main goal of most discourse theories is to explain why a text is
more than an arbitrary set of sentences. The ‘extra’ meaning that arises
from a text is judged in different ways. When text is taken as a linguis-
tic object, the study of coherence is most important; when discourse
is viewed as the result of realising goals of participants, the study of
21The list is not complete. For instance, work on dialogue representation (e.g. Bunt,
1987) and Super Structure (e.g. Van Dijk, 1986) is discarded.
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intention (and argumentation) is most important. Causal relations are
defined in all theories that study coherence. Causality may be defined
in other theories, but not as a property of a relation between clauses (as
Sanders et al., 1992, define it).
A definition of the right frontier is only relevant in theories of in-
cremental discourse structure. The right frontier restriction defines to
which constituents a new clause may be attached. This is not directly
useful for a theory that builds a discourse structure using information
from the complete discourse. However, the insights that are gained by
the restrictions on, for instance, reference of propositional anaphors,
may be relevant for non-incremental theories as well.
Another important difference between discourse structure theories
is the difference between writing and reading, or, in more computa-
tional terms, of text generation or text parsing. In text generation,
attention is paid to the problem of arriving at linguistic expressions
from abstract thought. Selection of relevant linguistic material, on the
basis of conceptual criteria, is the most important task. The concepts
of right frontier and open constituents are not directly useful for gen-
eration, since identification of antecedents of propositional anaphors
is not a direct problem for generation. However, defining selection re-
strictions for propositional anaphors might be useful. Parsing theories
have the problem of coming to an interpretation of a discourse, on
the basis of linguistic and world knowledge, without prior knowledge
of the conceptualizations of the speaker or writer. In such theories,
identification of propositional anaphors is important, so the concepts
of open constituent, right frontier and causality are central in parsing
discourse.
By classifying theories of discourse structure, it is possible to make
a short inventory of theories that are relevant in this chapter, and the-
ories that are not. In table (5.2), they are classified with respect to
the properties that were just introduced. Theories that score a + for
the features Parsing, Coherence and Incrementation in table 5.2, may
profit from the findings in this chapter. These theories are LDM, SDRT
and PISA. But other theories may also profit from the analysis of acces-
sibility that was given in section 5.2. In order to indicate these profits
more precisely, all theories will be discussed shortly, in order of their
appearance in the two tables.
RST (...) is a linguistically useful method for describing natural texts,
characterizing their structure primarily in terms of relations that hold between
parts of texts (Mann and Thompson, 1988, p. 243). This descriptive aim
has as a result that the structures are not incremental: an expert makes
overall decisions about the structure. Still, the notion of causality plays
an important role in their coherence relations. Implementation of a
right frontier restriction will be difficult, but perhaps some notion of
accessibility may be defined for RST.
The notions of open constituent, right frontier and causality are
relevant notions in LDM. This will be shown in the next sections.
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Discourse Structure Theories
Rhetorical Structure Theory RST
(Mann and Thompson, 1988)
Linguistic Discourse Model LDM
(Polanyi, 1988; Pru¨st, 1992)
Procedural Incremental Structure Analysis PISA
(Sanders & Van Wijk, 1996)
Segmented Discourse Representation Theory SDRT
(Asher, 1993)
Discourse Representation Theory DRT
(Kamp and Reyle, 1993)
Dynamic Predicate Logic DPL
(Muskens, 1996)
Generation in Functional Grammar GFG
(Bateman and Matthiessen, 1990)
Intentional Structure IS
(Grosz and Sidner, 1986)
Argumentation in Text Generation ATG
(Elhadad, 1993)
Table 5.1: Names of Discourse Structure Theories, their abbreviations used in
this chapter and significant references.
PISA parses a text in several rounds. In each round, discourse struc-
ture may be altered. The first two rounds are incremental. First, a
clause by clause hierarchical structure is built (INSPECT) on the basis
of linguistic indication. These structures, consisting of several clauses,
are connected into structures of text segments (CONNECT). Finally, an
overall structure is formed by reconsidering the whole structure (INTE-
GRATE). In all three rounds, causality and open constituents play a role.
The right frontier may be important in the first two rounds. Schilper-
oord (1996) studies accessibility in PISA structures: he recognizes LDM
as closely related to PISA, in this respect.
SDRT is an extension of DRT (see below) that tries to incorporate
reader’s belief and coherence between propositions. To obtain coher-
ence relations, DICE is used (see the previous chapter). DRT-conditions
(and some additional devices) represent these extensions. In SDRT, an
account is given of topic update phenomena and Parallel structures.
Attachment of clauses is such, that it affects the attached constituents
(Asher, 1993, p. 272). Asher (1993) does not describe in detail how
these tree constituents are affected (as he describes SDRSs instead). As
a result, it is not possible to determine the interaction between his tree
representations and the SDRSs that are formed incrementally. All the
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Theories classified on discourse properties
Parsing Coherence Incrementation
RST  + -
LDM + + +
PISA + + +
SDRT + + +
DRT + - +
DPL + - +
GFG - + -
IS + - 
ATG - - -
Table 5.2: Discourse Structure Theories classified on three general properties,
mentioned in the head row. + = theory has mentioned property; - = theory
does not have mentioned property;  theory can not be classified with respect
to mentioned property.
constituents dominating the currently attached constituents, are de-
fined as open in SDRT (definitions of ‘open’ and ‘discourse subordi-
nate’ in Asher, 1993, p. 271). This definition of openness might be
regarded as a definition of right frontier, since the currently attached
constituent is also the rightmost constituent. However, the application
of openness to a SDRS works out differently. All concepts studied in
this chapter play a central, but differently defined role in SDRT. It falls
outside the scope of this thesis to work out all the connections between
SDRT and LDM.
DRT is a theory of semantic representation, originally developed
to account for the scope of quantifiers over more than one sentence.
Semantic or syntactic properties of linguistic items are represented in
semantic representations of discourse fragments; accessibility of anaph-
ors, and event and temporal information are represented. This is done
in terms of logical conjunctions and conditional relations in predicate
logic; embedding of discourse representation structures is possible in
the scope of quantifiers and using conditionals. Causality might be
implemented. In fact, SDRT is the result of the implementation of such
notions. Within DRT, it is not possible to incorporate the notions of
right frontier and open constituent in the representations of DRT.
DPL aims at maintaining the compositionality principle of meaning
as formulated for Montague semantics and other logical approaches
(Gamut, 1982b, p. 140-150), in representations of discourse (instead of
single sentences). Although DRT does have a well-defined semantics, it
has no one-to-one mapping between syntax and semantics (according
to DPL). Only a subset of the phenomena that DRT covers, is addressed
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by DPL. Therefore, none of the concepts discussed here, is important
for DPL.
GFG is using linguistic knowledge from Systemic Functional Gram-
mar (Halliday, 1985; Martin, 1992) to generate sentences. Selection
of lexical items on the basis of their (interrelational) lexical semantic
properties is crucial to generation. In Hovy et al. (1992), coherence re-
lations are used to make generation possible from a more abstract level
of expression of thought. Causality is an important notion in GFG, but
the notions of right frontier and open constituents are not relevant.
In IS, segments in a discourse are defined as the satisfaction of a
speaker’s purpose, which is often a participant’s task in a dialogue. The
order of satisfactions in the real world determines the hierarchy of the
segments. Used as a parsing tool, the hierarchy is supposed to predict
the accessibility of text segments in a discourse. The insights gained
in section 5.2 contain interesting observations for IS, but the analysis
of these observations will be different for IS. The concepts of causality,
right frontier and open constituents will be worked out differently.
Starting from an argumentative orientation (or standpoint) of some
speaker or writer, the planning mechanism of ATG creates a global ar-
gumentative structure, and makes lexical choices on a local level, sup-
porting the orientation. Causality and argumentative orientation are
closely related, but the concept of argumentative orientation differs
from the concept of what causality is assumed to establish: argumen-
tative orientation may define constituents as more or less prominent.
Causality defines its constituents as being available as an antecedent,
in other words as open constituents. The theories of discourse structure
and argumentative orientation should be related to each other, for they
are complementary.
From this short overview, it appears that to LDM, but also to SDRT
and PISA, the findings in this chapter may be relevant. In the remain-
der of this chapter, the focus will be on LDM. In the previous section,
three questions are formulated. The first is: how is abstracted meaning
of constituents calculated? This question will be answered in the next
section.
5.3.3 Calculation of abstracted meaning in LDM
Building trees is quite simple in LDM, if it were only for making the
branches and the nodes. Two rewrite rule schema’s are capable of mak-
ing tree structure. These are given in (38).
(38) 1. a+b ! a b
2. x
1
+ ... x
i
+ ...x
n
) x
1
::: x
i
::: x
n
Rule 1. in (38) rewrites a constituent consisting of a+b into two con-
stituents a and b. Rule 2. rewrites a constituent, consisting of the sum-
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mation of n constituents, into a concatenation of n constituents.22 The
rules must be read as follows: in rule (38.1), constituent a and b form
together a+b, and in rule (38.2), a sequence of coordinated constituents
x
1
...x
i
...x
n
together form the concatenation of n constituents.23 The !
and the) each indicate the type of rule. The former makes binary trees
and creates a top constituent; the latter makes coordinated structures
consisting of more than two constituents, and replaces the former top
constituent by a new one. In table (1.3), in the appendix, the rules are
given in their full blown unification grammar format. The way the tree
structure is formed can easily be read from the type of arrow used in the
rules. What the rules in (38) do not express is the way semantic content
is added to a+b in (38.1) and to x
1
+ ... x
i
+ ...x
n
in (38.2). These addi-
tions are very meaningful, for they organize the flow of information in
the constituents of the tree.
To introduce tree structure building, and the way information is
finding its way in the tree, a structure will be built for the example in
(12), discussed in section 5.2. First, rule (38.1) will be discussed, and
then rule (38.2). (12) is repeated here as (39).
(39) a. Interest rates have gone up.
b. The recession may reduce inflation.
c. Capital taxation is lower due to the tax reform.
d. This means brighter times for those who have money to save.
The first two clauses, (39a) and (39b), are taken together by applying
rule (38.1). A binary tree structure is formed, as shown in (40).
(40) a+b
e


A
A
u
a
e
b
This is very straightforward, but the tree structure does not give us any
information about the semantics of this discourse. Two aspects are very
important: what does (40a+b) represent semantically, and what closes
constituent (40a)?
22The rule List Extension in table 1.3 does not imply rule (38.2). Instead of x
1
+
:::x
i
+ :::x
n
, a constituent (DCU
K
) is defined that could be represented here as x
1
+...
x
i
+ ...x
n 1
. This would be the former top constituent. The semantics of the former
top constituent remains the same when x
n
is added to the discourse by List Extension.
It is a semantic condition on x
n
to fit in semantically in the former top constituent.
In the tree, a concatenation of clauses is formed, and the former top constituent is
transformed into the new top constituent. In other words, Pru¨st’s (1992) List Extension
rule does the semantics but not the tree; rule (38.2) does the tree but not the semantics.
23Because the tree is a result from parsing the discourse, the rules must be read from
bottom to top (or from right to left), whereas the discourse tree would be generated
from top to bottom. In (38.1), b is added to the discourse; in (38.2), x
n
is added.
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The meaning of (40a+b) is formed by the rules in table 1.3 in the
appendix. While most of the rules have the format of rule (38.1), c.q.
make binary trees, the way in which a rule calculates (40a+b) distin-
guishes it from other rules. In the case of the discourse in (39), the List
Construction rule is used to make constituents like (40a+b). Essential
for the List Construction rule is that a generalization takes place over
the propositional contents of both clauses. (39a) says that interest rates
have gone up. In Pru¨st’s (1992) analysis, interest rates would be the topic
and have gone up the comment. In (39b), the recession may reduce in-
flation, the recession is topic and may reduce inflation is comment. The
two sentences are interpreted in a parallel way.24 This means that the
two topics are unified, as well as the two comments. Unification in
list structures always involves application of the Most Specific Com-
mon Denominator (MSCD). Informally, one could say that a MSCD
produces a meaning that generalizes over the meaning of (40a) and
(40b), but as little as possible. Definitions of the MSCD are given in the
appendix of this chapter. A MSCD must be found for the topics and the
comments. The MSCD represents the abstracted meaning of (40a+b),
when they are connected by the List Construction rule.
A MSCD is taking two meanings together and purges them into one
abstracted meaning. This is done by making reference to a domain, in
which entities of the world are organized into sets and subsets of each
other. For instance, coffee and tea are both entities (or sorts), that both
occur in a set of hot drinks, while the set of hot drinks occurs in the set
of drinks. A common denominator of coffee and tea may be hot drinks
or drinks; the most specific denominator of coffee and tea is only hot
drinks, in a world that contains no other set including coffee and tea.
The MSCD is both a condition for, and a result of the application of
the List Construction and List Extension rule. In Grover et al. (1994),
it is argued that requiring only generalization of topics and of com-
ments (i.e., finding a common denominator, but not necessarily the
most specific one) is sufficient for obtaining the appropriate abstracted
meaning.
What does the MSCD produce for (39a+b)? This is dependent of a
knowledge domain that organizes entities in sets and subsets of each
other. This domain should cover all (concrete and abstract) entities in
the world. Of course, such a domain does not exist, so it will be as-
sumed that there is a partial domain that is sufficiently organized to
handle knowledge of economics.25 In the discourse of (39a) and (39b),
24The notion of parallel interpretation is central in Pru¨st (1992), but it can not be
identified with e.g., Asher’s (1993) notion of parallel. In Pru¨st’s eyes, any sequence of
two sentences is parallel, if they have the same topic and comment pattern. In this
chapter, list structures will be regarded as parallel, but other relations do not have to
be parallel for getting the right interpretation.
25Even if there were a knowledge of economics domain, it would not be able to rep-
resent what an individual speaker makes of the utterances in (39). Still, every speaker
seems to have the tendency to generalize over the three utterances. Therefore, it is not
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interest rates and the recession have most specifically in common that
they are (part of) economic processes; have gone up and may reduce in-
flation do not refer to entities, but to sets, and they may have most
specifically in common that they are both subsets of a set of good eco-
nomic developments. Because the clauses (39a) and (39b) form a List,
the abstracted meaning of the top constituent (40a+b) is represented by
its MSCD: ‘economic processes show good developments’.26 In LDM,
the MSCD represents context-dependent meaning: clauses that need
to be attached, can only attach to a constituent with the appropriate
context-dependent meaning (defined in the construction rules), and
propositional anaphors take the context-dependent meaning of some
constituent in the discourse structure as their antecedent.
Constituent (40a) is closed. This means that the semantic represen-
tation of constituent (40a) is not accessible for attachment, or propo-
sitional anaphors. Its semantic representation is only indirectly repre-
sented in (40a+b), namely in the MSCD. Making specific reference to
the propositional contents of the clause that (40a) represents is there-
fore impossible. The application of the construction rule ‘closes’ (40a).
Specific reference of a propositional anaphor to (40b) is possible, be-
cause this constituent is part of the right frontier. In order to make
reference to (40b) only, the clause containing the anaphor should be
attached to (40b) and not to (40a+b). The definition of open con-
stituents is thus connected with the right frontier: only right frontier
constituents are open, and the other constituents are closed. As a con-
sequence, open constituents may serve two functions: they are a pos-
sible antecedent for propositional anaphors, and they are positions on
which a new clause may be attached. In section 5.3.5, a proposal will
be formulated to modify the definition of open constituents as antece-
dents.
Now, suppose that clause (39c) is added to the discourse tree in (40).
The clause capital taxation is lower due to the tax reform may be related
to its context as a list again, mainly because of the parallelism between
the clauses (39b) and (39c). When a list is extended to more than two
clauses, rule (38.2) is used. In that case, the constituents (40a) and
(40b) are identified as x
1
and x
i
(this is what happens in the tree). Con-
stituent (40a+b) and the new constituent then form a MSCD that has
the knowledge domain that makes a speaker decide to infer a List. Instead, linguistic
clues like the parallel formation of the clauses are decisive.
26With the ‘abstracted meaning’ is meant here the context-dependent meaning that
is represented in the schema of the rules in table 1.3, which contains the MSCD (cf.
Pru¨st, 1992, p. 50). In the sem of the top constituent, the context-independent mean-
ing is represented: the conjunction of the two consem contents (ibid.). The context-
dependent meaning of a constituent restricts attachment (ibid.) and the possibility to
be available as an antecedent: Pru¨st et al. (1994, p. 312) require that the MSCD that
is contained in the context-dependent meaning of the constituent that serves as an
antecedent, and the MSCD that results from the attachment of the VP anaphor to the
antecedent, has to be non-trivial. This way, the schema values of open constituents
are crucial for attachment, and anaphoric relations.
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to contain the same information as the old one, according to the con-
dition on the rule of List Extension (this is what happens semantically).
The new top constituent is shown in (41).
(41) (a+b+c)
e



Q
Q
Q
u
a
u
b
e
c
The former top constituent (40a+b) has disappeared from the tree. List
Extension thus coordinates more than two clauses under one top con-
stituent, which represents the MSCD of all three clauses. The attach-
ment of (41c) closes (41b). (41a) and (41b) can not be used as antece-
dents for a propositional anaphor, since they are closed. (41c) can be
used specifically as an antecedent when attachment is made to (41c)
and not to (41a+b+c).
In order to make a tree like (41), two conditions have to be met: the
MSCD for (39a+b) must be the same for (39a+b+c), and the resulting
tree consists of more than two coordinated constituents. Indeed, the
List Extension rule has abstracted meaning from three clauses into a
MSCD in the top constituent. Attachment of clause (39d) to the top
constituent (41a+b+c) (probably by Rhetorical Coordinations: see the
next section) results in resolution of the anaphor this: the antecedent
is the MSCD of (41a+b+c).
In this section, it has been shown how List Construction and List
Extension make a discourse tree structure, and provide abstracted mean-
ing for the resulting higher nodes. These two rules are regarded as basic
in LDM. However, these rules do not account for causality. The second
question raised in the introduction of this section was: what is the ef-
fect of causal relations on discourse structure? In the next section, the
answer will be given by introducing the rules of Rhetorical Subordina-
tions and Rhetorical Coordinations. These rules are the only candidates
to account for causal relations in LDM. In fact, a reformulation of these
rules will be proposed, merging them together into one rule of causal
relations. Furthermore, a new rule will be formulated: Denial of Expec-
tation.
5.3.4 Coherence in LDM
In the previous sections, the basic rules of List Construction and List
Extension have been introduced. In this section, two other rules will
be discussed: Rhetorical Coordinations and Rhetorical Subordination.
Pru¨st (1992) has formulated a few other rules (Enumerations, Question-
Answer Pairs, and Interruptions), but they do not play a role in the
phenomena under discussion in this chapter.
Every rule has the same format as the List Construction rule, namely
(38.1). The difference is the abstracted meaning of the top constituent
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in the tree. And this is, at the same time, the most important property
of LDM: its rules determine the information flow of the semantic con-
tents of the clauses to the top constituents. The differences between
the rules, as Pru¨st et al. (1994) formulate them, are very small.
The rule of Rhetorical Coordinations is almost the same as the List
Construction rule in their formulation in Pru¨st et al. (1994). The only
difference is in the conditions on the application of the rules. This
difference will become clear, with the help of simple versions of the
rules in table 1.3, together with their conditions (at the same time,
these rules are different extensions of the rule in (38.1)). They are given
in (42). To make clear that the rules differ with respect to the coherence
relation, and (so) in abstracted meaning, the top constituents will not
be represented by a+b, but by list(a,b) or coo(a,b).
(42) Simple List
Construction list(a,b)! a b
 Conditions: Common Denominator is non-trivial;
relation indicated by: fand, or, ... g
Simple Rhetorical
Coordinations coo(a,b)! a b
 Conditions: relation indicated by:
ftherefore, so, thus, accordingly, ... g
In the Simple List Construction Rule, list(a,b) might be read as the total
semantic contents of the constituents a and b. This contents is split
up in a context-dependent and a context-independent semantics, in
the formulation of the rules in table 1.3. Whenever such a distinction
becomes relevant in this section, it will be mentioned explicitly. There
are two conditions on the application of Simple List Construction: a
non-trivial common denominator has to be found, and the relation
must be indicated by a connective from the set f and, or, ... g.
The calculation of a non-trivial common denominator was already
demonstrated with respect to (39). Economic processes show good develop-
ments is non-trivial, in the sense that this statement means something
different than the concatenation of the three clauses that formed it. A
non-trivial MSCD of two entities a and b refers to an entity that in-
cludes the set f a,b g. This latter entity must be defined, i.e. it must
exist in the speaker’s knowledge of all sorts and entities.27
The second rule formulated in (42) is Simple Rhetorical Coordina-
tions. In this rule, a non-trivial common denominator is not required.
It is not really clear, however, what this means. Pru¨st (1992, p. 55)
observes that Rhetorical Coordinations almost always occur without a
27The non-triviality condition distinguishes the List Construction rule from other
additive structure rules that have been formulated in the literature. It can be related
to Asher’s (1993, Ch. 7) topic based updating through the rules of Continuation or
Elaboration, in his formulation. However, Asher (1993) does not work out a notion of
topic update as generalization.
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parallel relation. He explains that the lack of a parallel relation may
result in an empty MSCD. If the abstracted meaning of Rhetorical Co-
ordinations is empty, attachment can only take place on the rightmost
clause, and not on the top constituent (for it has no context-dependent
semantics). But it seems more appropriate to assume that the MSCD
may be trivial: only the propositional contents of the two clauses are
taken together as exactly the set that consists of just the meanings of
these two clauses. There is no generalization in terms of the events
or referents expressed in the contents of the clauses. Reference to the
top constituents, in such cases, means reference to the meaning of the
whole sentence. It is not possible to specify the meaning of one of the
two clauses with reference to the top constituent.28
A simplified version of Rhetorical Subordinations is given in (43).29
(43) Simple Rhetorical
Subordinations sub(a, ) ! a b
 Conditions: relation indicated by:
f because, since, ... g
In Rhetorical Subordinations, no common denominator is calculated.
Only the semantics of the main clause is represented, as a whole, in
the abstracted meaning of the top constituent. From the condition on
connectives, it may be inferred that Rhetorical Subordinations is called
Explanation in other theories. The rule will be exemplified below.
In section (5.2.3), the dentist example (22) was discussed. The re-
lation between the first two clauses, Fred went to the dentist because he
needed a checkup, is captured by Rhetorical Subordinations. Because
the semantics of the first clause is represented in the top constituent,
Rhetorical Subordinations explains why a VP anaphor Mary does too,
followed by a rebuttal denying the second clause, may take the first
clause as antecedent: the abstracted meaning is in fact the context-
dependent meaning of the top constituent. Reference to the second
clause can be made only by attaching to it directly, as it is the right-
most clause.30
28Pru¨st (1992) does not claim that there is something like a trivial update. However,
it seems reasonable to assume one, since the meaning of the relation expressed by
non-parallel relations is often the concatenation of the two clauses.
29The top constituent has been given a context dependent semantics represented as
sub(a, ). This can be inferred from the rule of Rhetorical Subordinations formulated in
table 1.3. The schema of the rule before the arrow, beginning with sub, has a schema
C
1
. This is identical to the consem of DCU
1
. The context dependent meaning is
thus characterized by the main clause, and only the main clause is a condition on
attachment or anaphoric relation. An interesting question is what this means for the
analysis of (22) without the rebuttal, where the VP should be referring to an antece-
dent in which both clauses are represented. Pru¨st (1992) and Pru¨st et al. (1994) only
give a formal account of (22) including the rebuttal, where it should be only the main
clause representing the antecedent.
30Surprisingly, Pru¨st et al. (1994) do not seem to use this property of Rhetorical Sub-
ordinations to analyze (22): they invoke non-incrementally formed parallel structure
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Pru¨st et al. (1994, p. 310) claim that Rhetorical Coordinations and
Rhetorical Subordinations are each other’s mirror image in some senses.
However: there is a structural difference between the two relations: in
Rhetorical Coordinations, it is not the case that one part ‘dominates’ the
other. This mirror image can be formulated in terms of abstracted mean-
ing: the context-dependent semantics of the left clause is taken as the
context-dependent semantics of the whole relation in Rhetorical Subor-
dinations; the context-dependent semantics of the right clause is taken
as the context-dependent semantics of the whole relation in Rhetorical
Coordinations. The difference is, that the relevant context-dependent
semantics can not be expressed by the leftmost clause in Rhetorical
Subordinations, for this has to be done through the top constituent
sub(a,b).
The construction rules that are most relevant to this chapter have
been introduced. The rules are presented in a simplified form. As a
result, two problems with the construction rules can be made more vis-
ible. Before these problems are discussed, it has to be acknowledged
first, that a lot of the properties of LDM, focussing on List relations,
topic continuity and generalization, are not discussed here. In fact,
the problems that will be mentioned exist because the main develop-
ment of LDM has been in that direction. Causality and its discourse
structural effects have not been worked out specifically. Therefore, the
modifications that will be proposed may count as an extension of LDM,
rather than corrections of LDM.
Modifications The first modification of LDM will be a reformulation
of the Rhetorical rules. It will be argued first, why it makes sense to
reformulate these rules.
The phenomena that the rule of Rhetorical Subordinations is sup-
posed to solve are associated with causal relationship, rather than sub-
ordination. Specific properties of the rule Rhetorical Subordinations in
its present formulation are used to explain the phenomena discussed in
section 5.2.3. It is argued there, that not subordination, but causality is
the relevant property. Likewise, Fraurud’s (1992) analysis of discourse
subordination, in section 5.2.2, appeared to concern causality rather
than subordination.
The fact that some clauses appear to be more salient than others in
discourse, certainly plays a role in the degree of accessibility they have
in discourse structure: nuclei are more accessible than satellites. With
regard to the assignment of this property of constituents, argumenta-
tive orientation is decisive, according to McKeown and Elhadad (1991)
(they call it ‘directive act’). This assignment is partly a property of
causal relations, for they play an important role in argumentation, but
many other factors determine argumentation too (cf. Elhadad, 1993):
in order to identify (22a) as the antecedent. This procedure has nothing to do with the
subordinative nature of the relation between (22a) and (22b).
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for instance, expressing the attitude of the speaker by using positive
and negative connotated lexical items. In other words, the construc-
tion rules do not need to express saliency of constituents. Discourse
structure defines whether or not constituents are open (available); ar-
gumentative orientation whether or not they are salient (more less ac-
cessible). Only open constituents may be more or less accessible: closed
constituents are always inaccessible.
If the rule of Rhetorical Subordinations is changed in such a way,
that the subordinate clause is also represented in the abstracted mean-
ing, Pru¨st’s (1992) analysis of the VP anaphors and rebuttals is not
in danger: parallel structure is supposed to identify the antecedent.
However, in the analysis proposed in this chapter, availability of the
first clause should be possible without the rebuttal too, which means
that parallel structure on its own can not be the complete explanation.
Therefore, the availability of the first clause has to be arranged in an-
other way. This will be done after the reformulation of the Rhetorical
Sub- and Coordinations, in section 5.3.5.
One aspect of the formulation of the Rhetorical rules in table 1.3
is, that the condition on the application of the rules concerns causal
connectives only. Pru¨st et al. (1994) acknowledge that presence of the
connective is not obligatory. There are relations that can be recognized
as Rhetorical Subordinations while they are not marked by a causal con-
nective expressing explanation (see, for instance, (24) and (23)). These
relations do express causality. From this observation, two remarks may
follow.
The first remark is that the conditions on the Rhetorical rules are
formed by lists of explicitly mentioned causal connectives, concerning
causal relations.31 Moreover, the observed effects of these rules are
due to their causality (see the sections 15 and 5.2.3). Therefore, the
condition on the new rule of Causal Relations, defined in (44) below, is
that the relation must be recognized as causal.
The second remark is based on the discrepancy in stating an ex-
plicit condition on connectives, while admitting that the same relation
is found without connectives (Pru¨st et al., 1994, p. 279). In chapter
4 of this thesis, the inference of the causal relation, with or without
connectives, was treated. A causal relation is inferred through DICE,
creating a predicate cause(a,b). If it is assumed that DICE is executed
before the construction rule is applied, the relations are given already.
The difficulties of recognizing a causal relation have shifted to DICE. In
chapter 4, it was shown how DICE deals with these problems. If the
condition of a construction rule refers to a relevant coherence relation
31There are of course, other kinds of subordination in discourse structure: temporal
subordination, or conditional subordination. The fact that only causal connectives
are mentioned in the conditions of Rhetorical rules, is therefore meaningful: precisely
their causal property is what defines the Rhetorical rules. In order to define temporal
relations or conditional relations, other construction rules are needed, not formulated
by Pru¨st (1992) or Pru¨st et al. (1994).
204 CAUSALITY IN DISCOURSE STRUCTURE
inferred by DICE, the treatment of, for example, the difference between
explicit connectives and coherence without explicit markers has been
accounted for before the tree is built.
The rule of Rhetorical Subordinations may simply be identified with
the rule of Rhetorical Coordinations. The only real difference between
Rhetorical Subordinations and Rhetorical Coordinations was the repre-
sentation of the subordinate clause in the abstracted meaning. It has
been argued that not a subordinate clause, but a causal relation was
essential for what these rules express. This argument counts even more
for Dutch, where Rhetorical Coordinations may be expressed by sub-
ordinate clauses, for instance by using the Dutch subordinative con-
nectives waardoor ‘through by’ and zodat ‘so that’. In those cases, the
meaning of the subordinate clause will be represented in the abstracted
meaning too. Of course, rhetorical subordination is not a reflection of
syntactic subordination alone. It could be possible that something like
argumentative orientation is represented by the rule. In section 5.2.4,
however, it appeared that causal relations in context and argumenta-
tive orientation reflected different effects on antecedents. Therefore,
causal relations and argumentative orientation should not be expressed
at the same time in one construction rule. Argumentative orientation
could be represented as the assignment of a directive act, after a dis-
course structure has been formed.
Given the decision that a subordinate clause should be represented
in the abstracted meaning, the real difference between Rhetorical Sub-
ordinations and Coordinations can be represented in the formulation
of a rule of Causal Relations (in (44)): the direction of the causal rela-
tion. The rules are each other’s mirror image, because they each repre-
sent a causal relation, but in different directions. This difference will
be expressed in the conditions of Causal Relations. And given these
conditions, the rule itself may be identical for both Rhetorical Coordi-
nations and Subordinations. The rule of Causal Relations, formulated
in (44), may replace the Rhetorical rules.
(44) Causal Relations caus(a,b) ! a b
 Conditions: Cause(a,b) or Cause(b,a)
The mirror image of Rhetorical Subordinations and Rhetorical Coordi-
nations has now become the difference in the direction of the relation
in the condition of the rule. In the rule, it is not expressed how the
abstracted meaning is calculated (but it is shown in table 1.3). It is the
most free application of the MSCD possible: the MSCD may be empty,
non-trivial, or trivial. In case of an empty MSCD, reference can be
made only to the rightmost clause of the relation: reference to a uni-
fied meaning of the two clauses is impossible (cf. Pru¨st, 1992, p. 55). In
case of a parallel causal relation, the MSCD is non-trivial. Examples of
parallel causal relations are found in gapping constructions, such as the
examples in chapter 3, section 3.9 (and also in Pru¨st, 1992, chapter 4).
The most common situation is the trivial MSCD, although Pru¨st (1992)
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does not mention this explicitly: the set of just the two meanings of
the clauses taken together, without generalization. Reference has to be
made to this set as an undivided unit. This is the case in (22a-c), where
Sara did too means, within the context of (22a-b): ‘Sara went to the
dentist, because she needed a checkup’.
One thing is not governed by this rule: keeping the first clause, a,
open in case of application of Rhetorical Subordinations.32 The first
clause is not represented in the top constituent (at least, not as a spe-
cific constituent), and it is closed after application of the rule. So, in
addition to this rule, something must be arranged for the first clause.
This will be explained in 5.3.5.
The second modification is an improvement of the treatment of
contrastive relations in LDM. The only construction rule that Pru¨st
et al. (1994) mention, is the rule of Contrast Pairs. As argued in chapter
2, section 2.3, there are more contrastive coherence relations: semantic
opposition, concession and denial of expectation. The rule of Contrast
Pairs has to be identified with semantic opposition, for it needs to be
interpreted as a pair of parallel clauses. Concession and denial of ex-
pectation have not been defined. Given the rule of Causal Relations,
however, it will not be difficult to derive a construction rule for denial
of expectation, since denial of expectation is also a causal coherence
relation. In simplified version, this rule is formulated in (45).
(45) Denial of Expectation den(a,b) ! a b
 Conditions: Cause(a,:b) or Cause(b,:a)
The condition of the rule is a recognition of a causal relation, of which
the consequence is a negation of the semantics of the clause it is as-
sociated with. den(a,b) does not contain a negation. The violation of
the expectation is realized by recognizing the negation in Cause pred-
icate. The difference in order of the clauses in the Cause predicate
are needed because expressed by although, a denial of expectation can
be used in two orders: ‘although a, b’ (Cause(a,:b)) and ‘a, although
b’ (Cause(b,:a)). The condition therefore contains two possible Cause
predicates for a and b. In section 5.4, the rules of Denial of Expectation
and Causal Relations will be demonstrated.
In this section, it is explained which role coherence plays in abstracted
meaning. The rules of Rhetorical Sub- and Coordinations have been
merged into one rule of Causal Relations. Causality is a condition on
the construction rule of Causal Relations. The definition of Causal Re-
lations made it easy to formulate a construction rule that was not de-
fined before: Denial of Expectation. As a causal rule, its formulation
32Notice that the possibility for the VP anaphor to refer to (22a+b) as a whole, contra-
dicts the fact that in Rhetorical Subordinations only (22a) is represented in the context-
dependent meaning.
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is similar to Causal Relations, only the effect of contrast has to be in-
corporated. The effect of causality in these construction rules is, that
abstracted meaning is not calculated with a non-trivial MSCD, giving
a minimal generalization of the meanings of the two clauses, but by a
trivial MSCD.
In the rule of Rhetorical Subordinations, the subordinate clause has
disappeared from the abstracted meaning. In section 5.2, it has been
argued that it is not the disappearance of the subordinate clause, but
the causal relation that makes it possible to change the set of available
anaphors. Construction rules create the constituents that may serve as
antecedent. It is therefore important that the construction rules repre-
sent the relations that affect discourse structure. In other words: Causal
Relations give a better representation of the relevant relations and con-
ditions in the discourse structure.
A consequence of the rule of Causal Relations is, that the defini-
tion of open constituents has to be changed (for the left hand clause
of Causal Relations must be open). Open constituents are defined on
the tree structure: only right frontier constituents are open. The third
question raised in the introduction of this section was: what is the ef-
fect of open constituents in discourse structure? This question will be
answered in the next section, and a new definition of open constituents
will be provided.
5.3.5 Open constituents in causal relations
The rule of Causal Relations creates a tree, that allows an anaphor to
refer to two constituents in the tree: the top constituent caus(a,b),
when a trivial MSCD is assumed, and the constituent representing b
only. Reference of an unmarked anaphor in its context is by default
represented by reference to the top constituent. Reference of a marked
anaphor in its context is by default represented by reference to the
rightmost constituent b. If a marked anaphor is referring (guided by
the meaning of the anaphor’s predication or context) to the leftmost
clause a, the discourse structure creates a problem: the right frontier
restriction does not allow it.
The facts and discussions in section 5.2 have shown that it should
be possible to choose the left hand constituent as a specific antece-
dent. The rule of Causal Relations does not provide this possibility in
the context-dependent semantics of the top constituent. And this is
correct, for the top constituent provides the meaning of the whole sen-
tence and not specific reference to one clause. Instead, reference to the
left hand constituent must be similar to reference to the rightmost con-
stituent: its context-dependent semantics represents the antecedent.
Therefore, this constituent should be open, although it is not on the
right frontier.
In order adjust the effects of the right frontier restriction, a differ-
ence must be made between attachment and coreference. Attachment
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is an expression of relational coherence. Given an incremental model
like LDM, it must preserve the string order of clauses represented in the
discourse structure. Therefore, attachment is necessarily constrained
by the right frontier restriction (violating the right frontier restriction
results in a change of the order of the clauses in the representation of
the discourse).
Coreference is an expression of referential coherence. The antece-
dent of a propositional anaphor must be an open constituent. There
is no need, to preserve string order of clauses here, for coreference has
no consequences for the order in which clauses are represented in a
discourse structure.
Open constituents are used in two different ways: for attachment
and for coreference. Open constituents can be defined as clauses that
have their context-dependent meaning available. So, both attachment
and coreference need open constituents. There is a difference between
both processes with respect to the open constituents they may actu-
ally use. All open constituents are available as an antecedent, but only
open constituents that occur on the right frontier are available for at-
tachment. This difference can be expressed by defining the positions
in discourse structure that are occupied by open constituents. This is
done in the following way:
Open constituents
Constituents are open in a discourse tree structure:
1. when they are on the right frontier;
2. when they are connected with the right frontier through Causal Re-
lations or Denial of Expectation.
The reason why Denial of Expectation is incorporated in this definition
is, that it is not the construction rule as such, but its condition that a
causal relation holds between the constituents. Denial of Expectation
is characterized by the condition of a causal relation, so it has the same
effect on constituents as Causal Relations, according to the definition
(and according to the facts, as example (2) already showed).
All open constituents are possible antecedents: the cases 1. and 2.
make constituents available for coreference. Attachment still is allowed
only to right frontier constituents. Only case 1. is allowed for attach-
ment. These two aspects of tree structure are clarified below.
The right frontier of a discourse tree consists of the set of the context-
dependent semantics of each constituent on the right frontier. The
context-dependent semantics is needed to attach to the tree, or to re-
fer to an antecedent (see footnote 26). Without changing the right
frontier, there is no problem with extending the set with the context-
dependent semantics of other constituents in the tree. In agreement
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with the definition of open constituents, the context-dependent se-
mantics of a constituent is percolated to the right frontier, only if it is
connected with the right frontier through a causal relation.33
In (46), a discourse tree is made by connecting (46a) with (46b)
by caus(a,b), and this constituent with (46c) by den(caus(a,b),c). An
example of a discourse this structure could represent, would be: (a)
Cecil married Greta (b) because she was beautiful, (c) but he didn’t love her.
(46) eden(caus(a,b),c)
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Two constituents in (46) are both open and ready to be attached to by
a new clause: den(caus(a,b),c) and c. Five constituents are open, and
ready to be antecedent for a propositional anaphor: den(caus(a,b),c),
caus(a,b), c, a and b. Which of these antecedents is identified by the
propositional anaphor is dependent on other factors, such as the pred-
ication of the anaphor, or the saliency of certain antecedents (for in-
stance: right frontier constituents are closer to the anaphor than con-
stituent a and b, and the argumentative orientation of constituent c is
stronger than that of a and b). The tree structure does not predict that
there should be five propositional anaphors that all take a different an-
tecedent. It only predicts that five constituents might be antecedents,
in the right contextual circumstances. This way, the (old) right fron-
tier restriction still counts for attachment, while open constituents are
restricted by the new definition.
What happens if a non-causal relation was used instead of den, to
create (46), for instance in the structure representing the example of
the insects in (37)? In that case, the relation between (a,b) and c in
(46) would be a list. caus(a,b), a and b would be closed, and only the
right frontier constituents list(caus(a,b),c) and c would be open. Con-
stituents representing a non-causal relation close every constituent in
reach of their left hand branch. Closed constituents can not be repre-
sented with their context-dependent semantics on the right frontier.
It has been made clear how constituents in discourse trees may be
open and closed, independent of the right frontier restriction. A def-
inition of open constituents defines which constituents are open; the
right frontier still restricts attachment; and constituents are closed on
the left branches of constituents representing non-causal relations.
33In Gardent (1994), it is described how the right frontier provides the information
that is available on a certain parsing stage. She does not claim that information is
percolated from within the tree; this is just a matter of definition, however.
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5.3.6 Conclusion
In the introduction of this section, three questions were formulated.
1. How is abstracted meaning of constituents calculated?
2. What is the effect of causal relations on discourse structure?
3. What is the effect of open constituents in discourse structure?
The answer to the first question is that the calculation of the MSCD
results in the abstracted meaning of a constituent representing two
connected clauses. This calculation is different in different construc-
tion rules. It must be non-trivial for lists, which means that it is the
minimal generalization of the meanings of two clauses. The answer to
the second question is, that the MSCD may be trivial with causal rela-
tions. This is not strictly conform LDM: it is argued that their rules of
Rhetorical Sub- and Coordinations should be replaced by one rule of
Causal Relations. The condition on this rule is that a causal relation
be recognized. Output from DICE may thus deliver input for LDM. The
answer to the third question is that open constituents are available as
antecedent for propositional anaphors. They may be more or less ac-
cessible, dependent on other factors of discourse, such as distance and
argumentative orientation. Open constituents are right frontier con-
stituents and constituents connected with the right frontier through
a causal relation. Attachment is still restricted by the (old) right fron-
tier restriction. This restriction is concerned with a subset of the open
constituents.
In section 5.4, it will be shown that the new definition and the new
rules give better results than those given in Pru¨st (1992).
5.4 Anaphors, contrast and discourse trees
5.4.1 Introduction
In this section, the construction of VP anaphor and rebuttal, already
discussed in section 5.2.3, will be revisited within the framework of
LDM. Pru¨st’s (1992), and Pru¨st et. al.’s (1994) analysis of this construc-
tion is not justified by the observations made in this chapter, and it is
damaging one of the main features of LDM itself: the incremental pro-
cedure. In section 5.2.3, three objections were made against the LDM
analysis of the VP anaphors and rebuttals combination. First, why is it
impossible to refer to (47a) without the rebuttal? This is only because
the VP anaphor is unmarked. But if a marked anaphor is used, it should
be possible. Second, the relation between (47a) and (47b) is crucial to
the analysis: whether or not the rebuttal is invoking a parallel relation,
the first two clauses ought to contain a causal relation. The fact that
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Pru¨st (1992) assumes a List between (47a) and (47b) (whereas a pur-
pose is expressed in (47b)) underlines that it is not considered a crucial
property in his analysis. Third, the idea that the parallel structure is in-
voked by the rebuttal, and derived by non-incremental parsing, is not
attractive and not necessary.
In the previous section, some improvements of LDM were proposed:
new construction rules of Causal Relations and Denial of Expectation,
and a new definition of open constituents. In this section, it will be
shown that the improvements make it possible to give a reanalysis of
the VP anaphor with rebuttal construction that does not suffer from
the disadvantages of the analysis in Pru¨st (1992) or Pru¨st et al. (1994).
Pru¨st (1992) does not give a detailed derivation of the dentist exam-
ple in (22), but he uses (47) instead.
(47) a. John went to the library.
b. He borrowed a book on computer science.
c. Bill did too,
d. but he borrowed two books on French.
It seems obvious that this example should have an analysis similar to
(22) in section 5.2.3. However, there is a difference between (47) and
(22) from section 5.2.3: Pru¨st (1992) claims that the relation between
(47a) and (47b) is taken to be a list, instead of a sub.
To make the analysis and the improvements on the analysis more
precise, Pru¨st’s (1992) derivation of example (23), discussed in section
5.2.3, will be demonstrated in section 5.4.2. After a discussion of Pru¨st’s
(1992) derivation, an alternative will be demonstrated in 5.4.4, con-
form the open constituents definition and the new construction rules.
5.4.2 Looking ahead with VP anaphors
Pru¨st (1992) tries to account for the observation that in (47a-d), (47a)
is chosen as the antecedent for the VP anaphor. In Pru¨st’s analysis of
the first three clauses of (47), there were two possible antecedents for
the VP anaphor in (47c): (47b), or (47a+b). When (47d) is added to
the discourse, (47b) is not a possible antecedent anymore. (47a+b) (or:
list(a,b)) is the only possible antecedent. A parallel interpretation is
formed between (47a+b) and (47c+d), so that (47a) is an antecedent for
(47c).
The sequence of four clauses is parsed in three steps: first (47a+b),
then (47c+d), and then the attachment of these two conjunctions to
each other. The second and the third step are non-incremental.
(47a) and (47b) form a list, generalizing over the activities of John:
he is ‘borrowing books from the library’. (47c) and (47d) form a tree,
but since there is no contrast between these clauses, no semantic inter-
pretation is realized. The rule of Contrast Pairs is the same as Pru¨st’s
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formulation of List Construction. The element of contrast is assumed
to be present in the rule (cf. Pru¨st, 1992, p. 54), but this is not worked
out explicitly. The rule of Contrast Pairs forms a relation con(c,d),
without resolution of the VP anaphor, and without a specification of
contrastive elements between the clauses c and d (which is needed to
use Contrast Pairs properly).
The last step is that (47a+b) and (47c+d) are connected. These com-
plex constituents are put together by List Construction. This rule re-
quires parallel interpretation, which means, in this case, that the VP
anaphor in (47c) is resolved as the predicate of (47a) (‘went to the li-
brary’), with Bill as a new subject. The contrast in (47d) is realized with
(47b) (‘John borrowed a book on computer science, but Bill two books
on French’). Given these resolutions, common denominators are found
on the higher level of list((47a+b),(47c+d)): ‘boys go to the library and
borrow books’.
The last step of merging the two trees is shown in (48). In (48i),
two trees have been created. The arrow in (48i) is indicating the at-
tachment that is about to take place. For reasons of presentation, the
identification of constituents formed by a construction rule is done by
assigning a Greek letter to the nodes in the tree, corresponding with
their semantic representations outside the tree.34
(48)
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=con(c,d);
=list(; )
i.
e
ii.

c
c
c
#
#
#
e u
 












J
J
J
J
J
J
u u
a a
e u
b b

e e
 












J
J
J
J
J
J
u u
c c
e e
d d
The attachment of (48i) to (48i) results in the construction of the
constituent (48ii) through a list relation.
Pru¨st (1992) calls the procedure of making a tree before attaching
it to the main structure ‘looking ahead’. Such a procedure is not in-
cremental anymore: forming the Contrast Pair first in order to resolve
the VP anaphor, is not an incremental step. Especially the postpone-
ment of resolution of the VP anaphor, and the assumption of a con(c,d)
without a realized contrast between these clauses, are violating incre-
mentality. Pru¨st (1992) acknowledges this violation, but claims that
this is the only way to arrive at a correct representation.
The three problems already mentioned in the introduction of this
section, will be discussed in the next section.
34These representations may contain Greek letters again: in (48), =list(; ) is read,
by substitution of  and , as: =list(list(a,b),con(c,d)).
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5.4.3 Discussion
Three problems were mentioned in the introduction: the first clause
must be available as constituent, the relation between the first two
clauses must be causal, and the non-incremental procedure should be
avoided. These problems will be discussed in detail in this section,
within the framework of LDM.
The analysis of the VP anaphor is not accurate. Pru¨st (1992, p.
107) takes (47a+b) or (47b)as possible antecedents of the VP anaphor,
in the case of absence of the rebuttal. Since the rebuttal is inconsis-
tent with (47b), and both antecedents contain (47b), the resolution
of the VP anaphor is withdrawn, incremental parsing is stopped, and
a non-incremental parsing of a parallel structure is started. This is a
rather bold solution, that should be avoided, if possible. It is easier,
and more according to the facts, to assume a third possible antecedent,
namely (47a). The rebuttal is selecting from three possibilities, and the
only thing that happens is that the underspecified reference of the un-
marked anaphor, (47a+b), is replaced by a specified reference, (47a), due
to the marked combination of VP anaphor and rebuttal. This makes a
generalization possible between the VP anaphor and other anaphors,
like that: these anaphors are also capable of referring to the first clause
without rebuttal. The change that is needed to obtain this solution, is
to claim that (47a) is an open constituent.
The causality between the first two clauses (the second problem) is
not an essential part of the analysis in Pru¨st et al. (1994). In the anal-
ysis of Pru¨st (1992), it is even a list. According to intuitions on causal
relations, the relation between (47a) and (47b) is not a list. It can be
understood causally without any problems: John went to the library in
order to borrow a book on computer science might reflect a correct interpre-
tation of the sentence.35 In (47b), a purpose is expressed. Purposes, or
Goal-Instrument relations, are considered to be causal (Renkema, 1993;
Sanders et al., 1993, cf. footnote 15)
The third problem is that the process Pru¨st (1992) calls looking
ahead, is not necessary. The assumption that (47a) is not a possible
antecedent for the VP anaphor on the moment that the rebuttal has
not been attached, is crucial for the non-incremental parsing strategy:
if it were a possible antecedent, there would be no need to restructure
the discourse with a non-incremental parse. In this chapter, evidence
has been presented that (47a) is a possible antecedent, and as a con-
sequence, there is no need for a non-incremental parse. The parallel
structure, needed for the parallel interpretation can be created with in-
cremental parsing. In their analysis of the parallel Contrast between
the two pairs of clauses, Pru¨st et al. (1994) refer to Asher (1993). He
defines Contrast relations on Parallel structures, but the way paral-
lel structures are derived, differ from the non-incremental approach.
35It is hard to imagine that John did not go to the library to borrow a book, while he
in fact did borrow one.
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Asher’s (1993) approach will be used in the next section.
Rebuttals that exclude another antecedent than the first clause do
not create a parallel structure. In (49), a rebuttal is not denying the
second, but the first clause.
(49) a. John went to the library.
b. He borrowed a book on computer science.
c. Bill did too,
d. but he went to another library.
Providing a structure for (49) is not problematic for Prust (1992), for
(49b) is taken to be the antecedent of the VP anaphor, and a non-
parallel structure is derived. However, a parallel structure is needed for
the interpretation of but in Contrast Pairs. Pru¨st (1992) refers to Asher
(1993) for his definition of Contrast, but this definition is defined on
Parallel relations. The definition of Contrast Pairs given in Pru¨st (1992),
is identical to the List relation except for a negative element in one of
the related constituents. This means that Pru¨st (1992) regards Contrast
Pairs as Parallel. This analysis of (49) gives a fourth problem for Pru¨st’s
(1992) analysis, for the relation between (49c) and (49d) is not a se-
mantic opposition, in terms of chapter 2 of this thesis, but a denial of
expectation. Bill did too takes (49b) as its antecedent, and the result
of that is paraphrased as: ‘Bill borrowed some books too, but he went
to another library’. There is a causal relation ‘normally, if you borrow
books, you go to a library’, that may serve as an expectation. The denial
he went to another library does not seem strong enough, but the context
in (49a) gives us the library Bill is expected to go to.36 Whereas the
interpretation of the rebuttal is both crucial and problematic in (47),
Pru¨st (1992) does not analyze contrast at all:
(...) the relation of contrast [between (47c) and (47d)] can-
not be justified. (As indicated before, I shall not attempt to
spell this relation out in detail). (Pru¨st, 1992, p. 107)
Four problems are discussed with Pru¨st’s (1992) analysis of VP an-
aphors, specified by rebuttals. The first three problems were already
addressed in the introduction of this section: the first clause must be
available as constituent, the relation between the first two clauses must
be causal, and the non-incremental procedure should be avoided. In
a more detailed analysis, it appeared that the discourse in (47), which
seemed unproblematic at first sight, poses a fourth problem: the rela-
tion between VP anaphor and rebuttal is a denial of expectation, and
not a semantic opposition.
In the next section, it will be shown that an alternative analysis can
solve these problems.
36There must be some referential link between the library in (49a) and in (49d). How
this link is established, is not relevant for the discussion, for it is not an aspect of the
propositional anaphors studied here.
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5.4.4 Looking back with rebuttals
In this section, an alternative analysis is given for (47), in which the
four problems discussed in the previous section are solved. The first
problem is solved if it is assumed that the VP anaphor is unmarked, and
later specified by the rebuttal: in fact, there are three possible referents,
and the rebuttal excludes two of them. An unmarked anaphor just
takes the obvious antecedent; a marked anaphor takes a specific clause.
The second problem is solved by the assumption of a causal relation
between (47a) and (47b): instead of a List, Causal Relations is assumed
(defined in section 5.3.4). The third problem is solved by dropping
the looking ahead strategy, replacing it with a strategy of looking back,
when the interpretation of Contrast is applied. The fourth problem
is solved by analysing the relation between the VP anaphor and the
rebuttal as a Denial of Expectation in cases where this relation is most
likely.
The structure leading to the interpretation of (47) will be built in-
crementally. The caus relation joins (47a) and (47b). According to
the definition of open constituents, no constituent will be closed at
this point. To this structure, (47c) is added at the level of the top con-
stituent. This means that the interpretation of the VP anaphor is deter-
mined by caus(a,b). This way, the structure in (50ii) arises.
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Bill did too has been attached to (50i). This attachment corresponds
with two possible interpretations of the VP anaphor: the context-dep-
endent semantics of (50i) or (50ia). (50ic) could have been attached to
(50ib). This corresponds with the interpretation of the VP anaphor in
(50ib). It is only at the moment of attachment of the rebuttal that this
possible structure is in fact excluded, but to keep the presentation sim-
ple, only the possibility in (50)is presented here. Because (50ia) is still
open, its context-dependent semantics is available at the right frontier
through the left branch of (50i). The VP anaphor is unmarked, so it
will prefer to take (50i) as an antecedent. However, two other antece-
dents are possible too: (50ia) and (50ib). Given the tree structure, the
context-dependent semantics of (50ia) can only be reached by (50i),
since its left branch is connected with (50ia) (and (50i) expresses a
causal relation).
In (50ii), the constituent (50ii) and its daughters below are closed.
As (50ii) is an additive relation, it will close all of the constituents
under its left branch.
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The attachment of the rebuttal is shown in (51). The rebuttal is
connected with the VP anaphor in (51c), so it is attached at the level of
(51c).
(51)
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Attaching (51d) to (51c) gives (51). The VP anaphor is interpreted as
(51a) or (51a+b) (on the basis of its attachment in (50i)), but the lat-
ter interpretation is inconsistent with the rebuttal. So, the VP anaphor
is interpreted specifically as (51a). This gives the following interpreta-
tion: ‘Bill went to the library as well, but he borrowed two books on
French’. In this interpretation, the contrast may be seen as a denial
of expectation. The expectation is: ‘if Bill does the same as John, he
borrows a book on computer science’. This denial of expectation in
(51c+d) is based on an expectation just formulated in (51a+b). These
pairs of clauses form a semantic contrast on a higher level, where they
are recognized as parallel in discourse structure.
In Asher (1993), a parallel relation is always dependent of isomor-
phic subtrees. In the structure in (51), such subtrees can be found:
(51) and (51) have isomorphic subtrees.37 Following Asher (1993),
this is graphically represented by drawing a rounded square around the
isomorphic subtrees.
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The constituents (52) and (52) form isomorphic structures, so they
may be interpreted as parallel. This is not expressed in an extra con-
stituent, but in a condition on a SDRS: Parallel(; ). Parallel interpreta-
tion is not establishing coherence between clauses, but rather ordering
structures (notice that the relation is not involved with terminal con-
stituents, i.e. clauses).
37The fact that  and  express different coherence relations, is not crucial in Asher
(1993). And yet, these relations do express exactly the Parallel on which the Contrast
is based: what was a denial first (namely, (52d)), has become a semantic opposition
with respect to the clause on which the expectation was based (namely, (51b)).
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According to Asher (1993), two constituents that take the same posi-
tion in two isomorphic subtrees, may be assigned opposite connotative
values. In this case, (52b) and (52d) express Contrast this way.
Interestingly, the Contrast relation is using a closed constituent,
namely (52b). This is possible because Contrast is defined on a Par-
allel structure. In Asher (1993), more examples of Parallel and Contrast
relations are analyzed, in which clauses occurring in a closed position,
may be re-used in interpretations with isomorphic subtrees.
The other rebuttal, in (49), will render another discourse structure,
because another antecedent is chosen: from the three possible antece-
dents, both (49a+b) and (49a) are excluded. If (49b) is taken as an ante-
cedent, attachment of the VP anaphor takes place at rightmost clause
(i.e.,(49b)), and not a higher level (i.e., the top constituent of (49a) and
(49b)). This is shown in (53).
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In (53i), the clause containing the VP anaphor is attached to the lower
level of (53ib), which has as a consequence that the VP anaphor un-
ambiguously takes (53ib) as an antecedent, before (53ib) is closed. The
other possibility, attachment to (53i), would result in two possible an-
tecedents for the VP anaphor, namely (53ia) or (53i). The rebuttal is
inconsistent with these antecedents of the VP anaphor, so attachment
of the rebuttal will exclude these two possibilities (but until then, the
other discourse structure is possible: it is the structure that leads to
(52)). The structure in (53i) is not underspecified with respect to the
reference of the VP anaphor. In (53ii), the rebuttal is attached to (53iic)
as a denial of expectation. The expectation is paraphrased by: ‘if Bill
does the same as John, he’ll do this in the library.’ The first clause,
(49a), is used in the interpretation by making an identification possi-
ble for a nominal referent the library: the use of another library in (49d)
presupposes the existence of a library. This nominal reference is not
represented in the discourse trees discussed in this chapter. Notice that
the denial of expectation does not result in a Contrast. No semantic
opposition is expressed between (53iia) and (53iid).
Denials of expectation are causal and contrastive, which means that
(53iic) remains open. As a remarkable result of the analysis, also (53iia)
remains open. This does not affect the interpretation. It should be a
possible antecedent for another propositional anaphor. However, the
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topic shift of John to Bill in (49c) makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
present an acceptable example.
The difference between Pru¨st’s (1992) analysis and this revisited
analysis is minimal. The difference is, that the relation in (53) is not
Contrast Pairs, but Denial of Expectation.
The advantages of the analysis in (52), compared to Pru¨st’s (1992)
analysis, are significant. The structure in (52) is made possible by the as-
sumption that a causal relation between the first two clauses made the
first clause a possible antecedent for the unmarked VP anaphor, refer-
ring to the first two clauses without the rebuttal. The rebuttal enforces
a specification to the first clause, which can be achieved within the
same structure (percolation of the context-dependent semantics of the
first clause). This takes away the need for a non-incremental procedure.
The rebuttal is connected with the VP anaphor. The interpretation is
a denial of expectation. But at the same time, isomorphic subtrees are
recognized, forming a parallel relation between the first and the second
pair of clauses. Then, a semantic opposition between the second clause
and the rebuttal is created. This way, a parallel structure expressing
Contrast is formed with incremental parsing. Instead of VP anaphors
looking ahead, rebuttals are looking back.
The proposed changes in LDM, done in section 5.3.4, make it pos-
sible to provide a better analysis of VP anaphors with their rebuttals. A
new definition of open constituents, together with the formulation of
caus and den, give a more accurate derivation of (47). In general, the
idea to let the conditions on connectives be conditions on the output
of DICE, takes away the difficulty of making the construction rules work
without connectives. Moreover, the condition that a Cause predicate
must be found for caus and den provides the right condition for the
cases in which the rules are supposed to work.
5.5 Conclusion
Propositional anaphors may refer to meaning abstracted from several
preceding clauses. This phenomenon plays a central role in a theory of
discourse structure: the Linguistic Discourse Model. Calculation of ab-
stracted meaning creates proper antecedents for a propositional anaph-
or. In LDM, it is assumed that the right frontier restriction holds. Maes
(1997) distinguishes between marked and unmarked propositional an-
aphors. Unmarked propositional anaphors take just what they get;
marked anaphors refer to a specific clause. Some observations in the
literature, e.g. Fraurud (1992) and Hellman and Dahl (1994), seem
to provide counterevidence for the right frontier restriction. Several
examples are re-analyzed as examples of reference of unmarked refer-
ence; other examples were indeed violations of the right frontier re-
striction. Contrary to Fraurud (1992) (and later, to Pru¨st et al., 1994),
it was claimed that the causality of the relations was crucial, and not a
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notion of discourse (or: rhetorical) subordination.
The observation that propositional anaphors may refer to specific
constituents that do not occur on the right frontier, has been repre-
sented in LDM. LDM’s construction rules were changed slightly, and
extended. Conditions on construction rules may refer directly to DICE
predicates. This way, the inferences made by DICE are the input for
making discourse structure. Rhetorical Coordinations and Rhetorical
Subordinations can be merged into one rule of Causal Relations. The
characteristic property of these two rules is causality. A new construc-
tion rule, for Denial of Expectation, has been formulated. Given these
changes, an example that Pru¨st (1992) has used for his analysis of VP
anaphors, is revisited. It appears that given the proposed changes, the
role of the rebuttals, as well as open constituents in the preceding dis-
course, can be represented more accurately. There is no need to in-
troduce a non-incremental ‘looking ahead’ strategy, since a ‘looking
back’-strategy (based on Asher, 1993) gives the right result.
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Appendix: Construction rules in LDM
Discourse Constituent Unit
In LDM, constituents of a parse tree are called Discourse Constituent
Units (DCUs). Construction rules analyze semantic and pragmatic in-
terpretation of every clause and construct a new DCU out of two coher-
ently connected DCUs. While clauses are interpreted truth-condition-
ally, DCUs in trees do not have truth conditions.
Topic/Comment pattern
Clauses are not analyzed as predicate-argument patterns, but as Topic/-
Comment patterns.
Unification
The algorithm used to make the trees, is based on the unification of cer-
tain properties of the clauses in their Topic/Comment representation.
In order to make a (binary) tree, the value for consem in DCU
1
is uni-
fied with the value for consem in DCU
2
. The result of this unification
is the value of sem in the top constituent. In schema, the common
semantics of the two DCU’s are represented.
consem
The value of consem defines the context-dependent semantics of each
constituent.
sem
The value for sem defines the internal semantics of each constituent.
schema
Schema introduces a value that represents common properties of the
constituting constituents DCU
1
and DCU
2
. The value for schema
functions as the new consem value of this constituent. Applicability
of the [construction] rule depends on the value of the schema attribute,
the MSCD [(in a List Construction)] (Pru¨st, 1992, p. 49). (...) Important
aspects of context-dependence (such as anaphoric links and dependence of
lexical items) are detected by MSCD calculation (ibid.).
MSCD
The Most Specific Common Denominator (MSCD) is a characteristic
generalization of two topics (or comments), represented in the consti-
tuting DCUs. The MSCD is represented as: C
1
c= S
2
. What this means
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exactly, is defined in table 1.4. The calculation is defined in the section
‘Calculation’.
Non-trivial MSCD
There is a condition on Lists that the common denominator be non-
trivial. With respect to this example, this means that the characteristic
generalization is defined in the knowledge base that is used to calculate
the MSCD. A common denominator is not always represented as an ob-
ject in the knowledge base. This is, of course, dependent of individual
knowledge of speakers.
If a speaker were supposed to make an MSCD of the topics cof-
fee and cat, he would have problems to find an object that general-
izes over these entities. It is, of course, always possible to define a set
fcoffee,catg, but that would be trivial.
Construction rules
Table 1.3 consists of two parts: rules defined by Pru¨st et al. (1994), and
rules defined for chapter 5 of this thesis.38 The rules work as follows:
always combine the consem values of DCU
1
and DCU
2
, and unify
them into the sem value of the constituent preceded by the list, coo
or sub predicate. schema represents the common meaning of the two
DCUs. R represents the relation that binds the two constituents, often
expressed as a connective.
List Construction
Under the conditions that the MSCD is non-trivial and that R can be
expressed by and or or, DCU
1
and DCU
2
form a binary tree, with a top
constituent of which the internal semantics is the context-dependent
semantics of DCU
1
, related with the MSCD of both constituents, and
the internal semantics of DCU
2
. The common meaning of both DCUs
consists of the MSCD.
List Extension
Under the conditions that the MSCD of the top constituent of DCU
K
and the internal semantics of DCU
n
is incorporated in the MSCD of
the top constituent of DCU
K
, and that R can be expressed by and or
or, DCU
K
and DCU
n
(K  2, n = K+1) form a top constituent of which
38In Pru¨st (1992), rules are more specified: a consem and schema have to occur
in every DCU. In Pru¨st et al. (1994), given in table 1.3, the simplified Rhetorical
Coordinations rule looks exactly like the List Construction rule. Only a condition
on the rule, stating that the List-MSCD may not be trivial, makes them different. In
Pru¨st (1992), not given in table 1.3, this difference is represented within the rule, by
specifying the consem of DCU
2
differently in both rules.
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Rules defined in Pru¨st et al. (1994)
List Construction
list [sem : C
1
R ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
); schema : (C
1
c= S
2
)]
!
DCU
1
[sem : S
1
; consem : C
1
]
+ DCU
2
[sem : R S
2
; consem : ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
)]
Conditions : C
1
c= S
2
is non-trivial;R 2 fand, or, ...g
List Extension
list DCU
K
[sem : S
1
R ((S c= S
n
) u S
n
), schema : S]
)
DCU
K
[sem : S
1
, schema : S]
+ DCU
n
[sem : R S
n
, consem : ((S c= S
n
) u S
n
)]
Conditions : S c= S
n
4 S;R 2 fand,or:::g
Rhetorical Coordinations
coo [sem : C
1
R ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
); schema : (C
1
c= S
2
)]
!
DCU
1
[sem : S
1
; consem : C
1
]
+ DCU
2
[sem : R S
2
; consem : ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
)]
Condition : R 2 ftherefore,so,thus,accordingly,...g
Rhetorical Subordinations
sub [f
1
: v
1
; :::; f
i
: v
i
; index : K;
sem : C
1
R ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
); schema : C
1
]
!
DCU
1
[f
1
: v
1
; :::; f
i
: v
i
; index : K; sem : S
1
; consem : C
1
]
+ DCU
2
[sem : R S
2
; consem : ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
)]
(pop-marker)
Condition : R 2 fbecause,since, ...g
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Rules defined in chapter 5
Causal Relations
caus [sem : C
1
R ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
); schema : (C
1
c= S
2
)]
!
DCU
1
[sem : S
1
; consem : C
1
]
+ DCU
2
[sem : R S
2
; consem : ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
)]
Condition : C
1
R S
2
 cause(C
1
; S
2
) k cause(S
2
; C
1
)
Denial of Expectation
den [sem : C
1
R ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
); schema : (C
1
c= S
2
)]
!
DCU
1
[sem : S
1
; consem : C
1
]
+ DCU
2
[sem : R S
2
; consem : ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
)]
Condition : C
1
R S
2
 cause(C
1
;:S
2
) k cause(S
2
;:C
1
)
Table 1.3: Construction rules of discourse trees in LDM. C
1
c= S
2
= common
denominator of C
1
and S
2
; C u S = C unifies with S; R 2 f:::g = the coher-
ence relation R is marked by the set of connectives ...; R  cause(C,S) = the
coherence relation between C and S is causal; X k Y = either X or Y.
the context-dependent meaning remains the same, and the internal
semantics represents one DCU more. In the tree, one DCU is added to
a set of coordinated DCUs.
Rhetorical Coordinations
The rule of Rhetorical Coordinations is similar to the List Construction
rule, except for the Condition: lexicalization of R concerns other con-
nectives than the connectives of R in the List Construction rule. From
the omittance of any condition on the MSCD, it can be inferred that
the MSCD may be trivial.
Rhetorical Subordinations
Under the conditions that R can be expressed by because or since, DCU
1
and DCU
2
form a binary tree, with a top constituent of which the
internal semantics is the context-dependent semantics of DCU
1
, re-
lated with the MSCD of both constituents, and the internal semantics
of DCU
2
. The common meaning of both DCUs consists of only the
context-dependent meaning of DCU
1
. The rule of Rhetorical Subor-
dinations further contains the features f and v in the top constituent
and DCU
1
. The indexes refer to knowledge specified as K, specifying
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knowledge of the world, that determines causality and makes it possi-
ble to make inferences from the propositional contents of clauses (cf.
Pru¨st, 1992) .39
Causal Relations
Under the conditions that R reflects a causal relation, DCU
1
and DCU
2
form a binary tree, with a top constituent of which the internal se-
mantics is the context-dependent semantics of DCU
1
, related with the
MSCD of both constituents, and the internal semantics of DCU
2
. The
common meaning of both DCUs consists of the MSCD, which may be
trivial.
Denial of Expectation
Under the conditions that R reflects a causal relation between one DCU
and the negation of the other, DCU
1
and DCU
2
form a binary tree,
with a top constituent of which the internal semantics is the context-
dependent semantics of DCU
1
, related with the MSCD of both con-
stituents, and the internal semantics of DCU
2
. The common meaning
of both DCUs consists of the MSCD, which may be trivial.
Calculation
The calculation of the unification of the two DCUs, using the MSCD,
will be defined more specifically below. C
1
in DCU
1
and S
2
in DCU
2
are unified by the algorithm ((C
1
c= S
2
) u S
2
). This default unification is
made by finding the Most Specific Common Denominator (MSCD) of
the topics or comments. A MSCD is built up out of two other mech-
anisms, one for the (ontological) generalization, and the other for the
(computational) unification. If the two topics were cat and dog, their
MSCD would be: pet, for this is both the Most Specific Generalization
(MSG) and the Most General Unification (MGU), given a domain of
entities with a structured ordering of sorts.
,  ,  and  are variables referring to objects. Those objects may be
represented as sets or entities. For instance, a dog is on the one hand an
object, for it may refer to a specific dog, but it also may refer to a set of
different kinds of dogs, in an appropriate context. In the definitions,
the predicates ‘at least as general as’ and ‘at least as specific as’ are best
understood in set-theoretic terms.
39The role of these features in the construction rule is not explained. These features
are probably associated with the coherence relation Explanation, as the lexical choices
for R in the condition suggest. Rhetorical Coordinations is, just like Rhetorical Sub-
ordinations, restricted by causal connectives. This raises the question why Rhetorical
Coordinations does not have features like f and v. In Causal Relations and Denial
of Expectation, the whole problem has disappeared, for causality is supposed to be
inferred in DICE.
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Most Specific
Generalization
The MSG of  and  , written as  t  , is an
object  that is at least as general as both  and
 , such that any  that is at least as general as
both  and  is not more specific than .
Most General
Unification
The MGU of  and  , written as  u  , is an
object  that is at least as specific as both  and
 , such that any  that is at least as specific as
both  and  is not more general than .
Most Specific
Common Denomi-
nator
The MSCD of  relative to  , written as  c=  ,
is an object  such that  is at least as general
as , and unifies with  , and such that any 
which is also at least as general as  and unifies
with  is not more specific than .
Table 1.4: Calculation of MSCD, split up in calculations of MGU and MSG.
MSG
Suppose there is a set of ‘domestic animals’ that consists of the ele-
ments dog, sheep, horse and cat. There is another set of ‘pets’ that
consists of a cat and a dog.
The MSG of dog () and cat ( ) must be an object (or a set) that is
at least as general as cat and dog. This is true for domestic animals as
well as for pets, because both sets are more general. But only pets can
be the MSG, because for domestic animals (in the definition ), there
is a , namely pets, that is more specific. So, dog t cat gives pets.
MGU
The MGU of dog and cat is an object (or a set) that is at least as specific
as both dog and cat. This is a pet, since it is the smallest set of which
both dog and cat are a member. It is not a domestic animal, since that
set contains also other members, i.e. it is more general. So, dog u cat
gives a pet.
MSCD
The MSCD of dog and cat is a pet, since both the MSG and MGU of cat
and dog are pets. So, dog c= cat gives pets.
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Information state
Determination of the information state (As described in Gardent, 1994)
can be done by reading off the tree the information at any moment in
the incrementation process. In the original version of LDM, only infor-
mation from right frontier constituents, and read their semantic con-
tents (the sem and schema or consem values) from the top of the tree
to the bottom. These contents represent together (in conjunction with
each other) the information state of the discourse. The constituents
that do not take part in the right frontier, are not part of the informa-
tion state of the discourse in that moment. This effect is what may be
called being closed.
Open constituent
In the revised LDM, causal relations may keep their constituents open.
This means that reading the sem and schema or consem values is
extended to constituents that have a connection with a constituent on
the right frontier through a causal relation. It is at this right frontier
constituent that the information is read off the tree. So, the informa-
tion is read from bottom to top, and at some constituents (marked by
caus or den), an extra set of variable values is added.
Attachment and coreference
There is a difference in the information that is used by propositional
anaphors, and by clauses that want to attach. The value of sem is not
used by a propositional anaphor. Attachment uses the sem value, for it
forms the new C
1
from this information. A propositional anaphor just
takes the consem, c.q. schema value.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Causal connectives: meaning and effects
In the first chapter, the following question was formulated as the lead-
ing question in this thesis:
how does lexical meaning of causal connectives affect discourse
coherence and structure?
The central question was split up into more specific questions:
1. what interpretations of causal or contrastive relations should be
distinguished?
2. how is lexical meaning of causal connectives represented?
3. how is lexical knowledge exploited when a causal connective is
used to indicate causal coherence?
4. how do causal relations affect discourse structure?
In order to prepare for a formal analysis of the meaning of causal con-
nectives, the first question was answered in chapter 2. A description
was given of epistemic, speech act, causal, and contrastive interpreta-
tions of coherence relations expressed by connectives such as Dutch
hoewel and maar, English although and but, Dutch want and omdat and
English because. Their causal interpretation can be epistemic, speech
act, or semantic.
Epistemic interpretation of these causal connectives represents a
speaker’s conclusion. Epistemic interpretation can be marked or in-
dicated in context. Unmarked relations can be recognized as epistemic
when abduction is needed for the acceptance of the relation as causal.
In a systematic paraphrase of epistemic interpretation, it is possible to
introduce one clause with the phrase from the fact..., and the other with
I conclude....
In speech act interpretation, the uttering of a clause is justified (or a
justification is violated) by the other clause. Speech act interpretations
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are linguistically marked. In a systematic paraphrase of speech act in-
terpretation, the speech act clause is embedded by a speech act verb;
the other clause refers to the speech act clause, taking it autonymously.
Semantic interpretation expresses locutionary meaning only. Epis-
temic and speech act interpretation are similar in their expression of
illocutionary meaning instead of locutionary meaning. These two in-
terpretations may be classified as pragmatic.
Relations of contrast were described in three different interpreta-
tions: denial of expectation, semantic opposition and concession. In a
denial of expectation, an expectation is derived from the sentence and
then violated, because the main clause in an although sentence or the
but clause negates the second part of the expectation. The expectation
is an implication: a denial of expectation is not only contrastive, but
also causal.
A semantic opposition is characterized by parallel intonation and
structure. The parallel form makes the predicates look for a contrast
in their lexical meanings. This contrast is applied to the topics of the
parallel clauses.
The interpretation of concession needs the inference of a tertium
comparationis on the basis of contextual information. The utterance
consists of an argument against, and an argument in favor of the ter-
tium comparationis. A concession may occur in the parallel form of a
semantic opposition, as well as the non-parallel form of a denial of ex-
pectation. The interpretation of concession is by definition epistemic:
the tertium comparationis may be regarded as a speaker’s conclusion,
for which a positive and a negative argument are given in the utterance.
Since there is no causality between the connected clauses, concession
is not causal, but additive.
The causality of a coherence relation depends on the acceptance of
a sufficient condition for a result. If this condition contains a neces-
sary part (if it is an INUS condition), the relation is semantically causal.
The necessary part is causally prior to the result. If the condition does
not contain a necessary part, the relation between condition and result
can be interpreted as a relation between a fact and a speaker’s conclu-
sion. This yields an epistemic causal relation. By definition, a fact is
causally prior to a conclusion (the result). The conclusion can be drawn
from the fact, because it is supported by a causal relation, in which the
causal relation is reversed: the former result is an INUS condition for
the former sufficient condition. In other words: if causal priority ap-
pears to be reversed in the utterance, the causal relation is interpreted
epistemically.
The description of the meaning of causal connectives in terms of
the different interpretations of the coherence relations the connectives
express, was explained by a linguistic analysis in Chapter 3, where the
second question was answered. The claim was defended that causal
and causal contrastive connectives have a presupposition in the form
of an implication that expresses causality.
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Not only causality in content interpretation, but also in epistemic
and speech act interpretation, can be explained by means of this pre-
supposition. The assumption of a B operator for epistemic interpreta-
tion and a S operator for speech act interpretation is interpreted as the
result of conversational implicatures, executed in order to obey Grice’s
(1975) maxims of conversation.
Although has a presupposition that represents the expectation. From
the although clause, the antecedent of a defeasible implication is de-
rived; the negation of the main clause is derived to form the conse-
quence of this implication. There are cases in which although does not
express denial of expectation, but concession. How concessions are
derived can be explained by analyzing the interpretation in detail. In
the concession interpretation, the presupposition has failed: it is de-
feated by its context, or it fails because it can not be interpreted with
respect to lexical or real world knowledge. Instead of an interpretation
based on a presupposition, an argumentative interpretation of the con-
trastive relation is derived. This argumentative use is a repair, needed
because a maxim of conversation is flouted by presupposition failure.
This repair has become conventionalized in the course of time. Just like
conventionalized metaphors, flouting a maxim is hardly noticed in the
actual use of concession. Context has become more important in the
derivation of concessions than presupposition failure.
The analysis leads to a different translation of because in predicate
logic: like although, because asserts a conjunction and presupposes an
implication.
Corroboration for the implicational presupposition was found in
the account of a corpus analysis, in which denial of expectation ap-
peared to behave like a causal relation rather than a concessive rela-
tion. Independent evidence was found in an analysis of Gapping with
epistemically interpreted causal connectives.
The analysis that causal connectives bear presuppositions shows
how causal connectives indicate causal relations. It also predicts that
there is a difference between inferring coherence using connectives and
inferring coherence without connectives. Whether this prediction is
borne out, was investigated in chapter 4, where an answer could be
given to the third question. The framework of DICE was chosen to
make the differences between these derivations clear. Causal coher-
ence without linguistic marking is often underspecified and supported
by knowledge that seems to be uncertain. The use of a causal con-
nective makes the inference of a specific causal relation obligatory.
The enforced causal relation is allowed to be interpreted in different
ways, as described in chapter 2. This difference between defeasible and
obligatory inference is not explained by difference in knowledge: given
the same causal relation, causal connectives make the inference of the
causal relation more certain. Without connectives, the causality has
to be derived from the proposition and world knowledge, associated
with the relevant lexical items in concatenated clauses. Using a causal
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connective like because or since, the relevant lexical items are forced
to derive a specific causal relation, which makes another selection of
meaning aspects of these lexical items possible. DICE may profit from
the incorporation of indefeasible laws for causal connectives, for ‘infer-
ential effort’ will decrease in understanding the relation between sen-
tences.
Causal coherence appears to have specific properties: causal con-
nectives bear presuppositions and causal relations need to be estab-
lished with respect to knowledge of the world or lexical knowledge.
Coherence relations also build discourse structure. Do causal relations
have different effects on discourse structure than other relations? This
question was investigated in chapter 5. The answer was given in the
framework of LDM. Unmarked propositional anaphors refer to con-
stituents representing their abstracted meaning, and marked proposi-
tional anaphors refer to constituents representing clauses. In the for-
mer case, antecedents need to occur on the right frontier. In the latter
case, antecedents should occur on the right frontier as well, unless they
are connected with the right frontier through a causal coherence rela-
tion.
An anaphor is marked or unmarked, but an unmarked anaphor may
be specified by predication of the anaphor or properties of its context.
Anaphors like that are marked, and anaphors like it are unmarked. Un-
marked VP anaphors may be specified, when part of the antecedent is
excluded by a rebuttal. Unmarked anaphors like Dutch er may be spec-
ified by using disagreement in attitude between part of the antecedent,
and the predication of the anaphor.
Analyses of discourses with different types of propositional anaphors
and different contexts showed that the existence of a causal relation
between the first and second clause makes it possible to find an an-
tecedent for a propositional anaphor that is specific, and yet does not
occur on the right frontier. It was argued that it is not subordination,
but the causality of the relation that is responsible for this effect. In the
specific construction of a VP anaphor with a rebuttal, the possibility of
reference to a clause that does not occur on the right frontier is not an
immediate effect of the Parallel relation.
Construction rules of LDM were changed, and extended. Condi-
tions on construction rules may refer directly to DICE predicates. This
way, inferences of causal relations made by DICE are the input for creat-
ing discourse structure. Rhetorical Coordinations and Rhetorical Sub-
ordinations are merged into one rule of Causal Relations. The charac-
teristic property of these two rules is causality. A new construction
rule, for Denial of Expectation, has been formulated. The analysis
of VP anaphors with rebuttals is revisited. There is no need to in-
troduce a non-incremental ‘looking ahead’ strategy, since a ‘looking
back’-strategy gives the right result.
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6.2 Looking ahead
In this book, a lot has been explained about causal relations. One as-
pect of causality has been left out of the analysis, even when it was
obvious that the explanations should go in that direction. Argumen-
tation appeared to have significant effects on the discourses that were
analyzed. In chapter 2 and 3, argumentation was intrinsically con-
nected with concession, and also epistemic interpretation was consid-
ered to be argumentative rather than semantic. In chapter 5, argu-
mentation disturbed some of the examples that should account for
the availability of certain antecedents. In Argument-claim relations,
claims are often too prominent in comparison with their argument:
this makes the argument less accessible. Linguistic indication of argu-
mentation and prominence of claims, relative to arguments, were not
investigated in this thesis, but both phenomena form interesting re-
search topics. Which connectives indicate argumentation, and do they
indicate argumentative orientation? How does the prominence of the
claim influence the accessibility of argument or claim?
Related questions from the field of argumentation to the processes
investigated in this thesis, will become even more interesting when it
is possible to show that argumentation needs coherence and discourse
structure. That is, epistemic interpretation of coherence relations is
used to indicate argumentation, and discourse structure is used to de-
fine more or less prominent constituents by means of argumentative
orientation. Speakers thus use argumentation to achieve their commu-
nicative goals.
Argumentative orientation can be looked at as the desire to achieve
a communicative goal. In general, the analysis of communicative goals
is made in terms of intention, and intentional structures. It is interest-
ing to analyze the differences and similarities between argumentation
and intention, and their effects on coherence.
The notion of subordination in discourse is discussed mainly in
chapter 5, but the Gapping examples in chapter 3 showed other in-
teresting facts connected with subordination: coordinated structures
like Gapping do not express causality. Only epistemic causality may
be expressed in Gapping. At the same time, subordinative connectives
appear to be causal or temporal. If coordinating connectives are causal,
their interpretation is epistemic. In other words, Gapping and the dis-
course function of connectives are strongly related. Not shown in this
thesis are data that provide evidence for the fact that Gapping con-
structions do not occur with causal or causal contrastive adverbs like
namelijk (‘namely’) or toch (‘yet’). Temporal adverbs like tegenwoordig
(‘nowadays’) do not allow for Gapping, but temporal adverbs like toen
(‘then’) do allow for Gapping. Research into the discourse function of
subordinative connectives and causal and temporal adverbs might de-
termine characteristic properties of Gapping. Moreover, a definition of
discourse subordination in terms of causal or temporal terms might be
232 CONCLUSION
drawn from these facts.
Another question is the generalizability of the analysis in chapter 3:
do connectives like Dutch zodat (‘so that’) or waardoor (‘through by’)
express the same causality as dus (‘so’) or daardoor (‘therefore’)? And if
not, are the differences related to differences between their presupposi-
tions?
In chapter 5, it appeared that causality affected antecedents on pro-
positional anaphors. Effects of causality in discourse structure might be
investigated in another way, by looking at other phenomena. Do causal
relations show comparable effects on the availability of constituents in
discourse structure for other phenomena than propositional anaphors?
A difference was found between semantic and epistemic interpretation
with because sentences under the scope of a modal operator. Are there
other differences in interpretation as a result of scope differences in
causal relations? Or are there differences between causal and additive
relations with respect to scope ambiguity?
The question of marked and unmarked anaphors has not been ana-
lyzed in detail. In combination with a theory of abstracted meaning in
discourse structure, it might be possible to classify types of anaphors.
It will be possible to describe the differences and similarities with nom-
inal anaphors too. What are the properties that determine the marked-
ness of an anaphor? In which contexts has an anaphor a nominal
antecedent, and in which cases a propositional antecedent?
6.3 Looking back
In the first chapter, the central question was motivated by pointing out
important issues in the field of discourse analysis. The study of causal-
ity is not only an important issue for philosophers, but also for dis-
course analysts, as recognizing causality is crucial for the understand-
ing of discourse. By defining causality in terms of an INUS condition, it
can be made explicit how coherence relations are interpreted as causal.
Two problems can be solved.
The first problem is that recognition of causality is difficult in (our
knowledge of) the real world: many causes are incomplete, and often a
causal relation is not expressing undoubtedly certain knowledge. This
is solved by assuming the INUS condition: an insufficient but neces-
sary part of a condition that is, within the context of the utterance,
sufficient for the result.
The second problem is that in natural language epistemic interpre-
tation does not seem to refer to valid causal relations. This problem is
solved by assuming that abduction may reverse condition and result,
which gives a causal relation that contains an INUS condition. Epis-
temic interpretation is characterized by the relation between a fact and
a speaker’s conclusion, and this relation is supported by abduction.
Causal relations are thus defined in their semantic and epistemic
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interpretation. But not all relations between fact and speaker’s conclu-
sion are supported by abduction. Sometimes, the fact contains a neces-
sary part itself. The epistemic interpretation is, in that case, created by
context. The context indicates that a speaker’s conclusion should be
interpreted, rather than a relation between facts. So, the interpretation
of a speaker’s conclusion is essential for epistemic interpretation. This
observation is important for the study of coherence relations: there is
a connection between epistemic interpretation and the introduction of
the speaker in the interpretation. This might be an indication of a re-
lation between the assignment of the value ‘pragmatic’ (for the Source
of Coherence) and the recognition of perspective. Another indication
is given too: the speaker’s conclusion is an indication of argumentative
use of the causal relation. This may be an interesting observation for
the study of argumentation.
In the field of formal semantics, the meaning of causal and con-
trastive connectives is not represented in a satisfying way. The solution
of presupposing an implication has not been proposed in a formal and
comprehensive way. The development of discourse oriented presup-
position theories makes such an extension possible. Formal semantics
may extend its empirical scope in the meaning of natural language by
incorporating presuppositions of causal connectives.
A consequence of the semantic ‘visibility’ of causal connectives,
achieved in chapter 3, is that they become visible in other formal sys-
tems too. In DICE, it has become possible to make an obligatory causal
inference in case of the occurrence of a causal connective. This obliga-
tion gives insight into an alternative process of deriving causal relations
from the lexicon. In the normal case, the common meanings of lex-
ical items are supposed to be related on their own, in order to derive
a causal relation. In the case of obligatory causal inference, causally
related lexical items are selected first, and less common meanings may
be taken to form the causal relation. The latter process gives more
seemingly certain knowledge, and takes less inferential effort. And this
is precisely the intuition one has about the difference between using
connectives and omitting them. DICE is not only improved on its re-
flection of linguistic knowledge, but it might also be improved on its
properties as a system: less time is needed to compute an inference.
Theories of discourse structure have tried to define accessibility by
applying a notion of discourse subordination. The right frontier re-
striction could be dodged by assuming that a subordinate clause could
be skipped from a complex antecedent. In chapter 5, it was argued
that instead of the notion of subordination, the notion of causality ex-
plained the availability of antecedents. Argumentative orientation can
define constituents in a structure as more or less accessible. Although
this analysis was applied in LDM only, it is relevant for every discourse
structure that makes use of coherence or argumentation. In fact, the
proposition is made to refine the notion of discourse subordination,
by analysing it as a combination of two notions: causality (and right
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frontier), making antecedents available, and argumentation, assigning
a degree of accessibility to available antecedents.
In studying antecedents of propositional anaphors, a field was en-
tered that has not been explored extensively. This is the study of prop-
erties of the anaphors themselves, choosing between antecedents on
the grounds of their own properties, or the meaning of the sentence
in which they occur. Propositional anaphors are not only marked or
unmarked, but unmarked anaphors may also be specified afterwards. It
is difficult to obtain precise data for these propositional anaphors, but
further studies in this field may give rise to much insight.
Lakoff (1997) points out that a formal study of natural language in
itself does not make very much sense: as long as the formal symbols
do not refer to cognitively realistic entities, formal approaches do not
achieve anything more than making (too many) generalizations over
phenomena. Explanations for linguistic phenomena can not be given
by symbols alone, according to this cognitively realistic approach.
In this thesis, symbols have been used to explain linguistic phenom-
ena. For instance, the B operator was used to indicate epistemic inter-
pretation and generalizes over epistemic interpretation with or with-
out abduction. However, B is not considered to exist physically in the
brain. Still, as a part of a formal system that analyzes natural language,
it explains how people may represent language and use language. In
fact, one of Lakoff’s older approaches has been followed in this thesis.
Formal semantic analyses should be more concerned with the mean-
ing of natural language: this was the approach of natural logic (Lakoff,
1972). Presuppositions of denials of expectation, and the because-clause
(establishing the truth of the subordinate clause), are examples of a bet-
ter fit of formal semantics to natural language. Since then, the possi-
bilities to do natural logic have been increased considerably. Formal
theories of discourse representation, as well as theories of presupposi-
tion in discourse, made it possible to specify the intuition that causal
connectives have presuppositions. In different chapters, the formal ap-
proach proved to be successful in finding explanations for complicated
linguistic phenomena.
In chapter 3, the meaning of causal connectives was represented by
using presuppositions. The restrictions and the tests that follow from
these restrictions do not allow the meaning of additive connectives to
be represented by presuppositions. The analysis of a concession as bear-
ing a presupposition is impossible, for the presupposition tests failed.
This formally defined problem could be solved in an interesting way:
concession, in origin, is due to a repair of a flouted maxim, due to
presupposition failure. This also explains why concessions are always
epistemic (and argumentative): there has never been a concession that
could be interpreted semantically.
In chapter 4, the formal analysis of presuppositions for causal con-
nectives could be extended in another formal framework: difference
was made between defeasible and obligatory inference of causal rela-
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tions. This extension posed a formal problem again: the difference
in inference should have consequences for the interpretation of the
inference. A difference in lexical derivation was found: defeasible in-
ference was in need for ‘spontaneous’ causality arising from common
meanings of lexical items in each other’s context; obligatory inference
just puts two lexical items together, forcing them to select appropriate
meanings. This insight into lexical processes could not be made visible
without formal representation of linguistic phenomena.
In chapter 5, the right frontier restriction made it possible to define
precisely how causal relations behave differently, compared to additive
relations in discourse structure. Thus, the formal model of LDM is used
to gain linguistic explanation.
Applying formal approaches in order to analyze discourse thus of-
fers specific explanations for delicate phenomena. This thesis proves
the approach of Lakoff (1972) to be successful. It suggests furthermore
that the formal semantic analysis of lexical markers of coherence de-
serves a place at the core of the study of discourse.
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Samenvatting
In een necrologie van Greta Garbo stond op 17 april 1990 het volgende
stukje tekst in de Volkskrant:
(1) Zij was al een legende tijdens haar leven en haar mythe groeide
door haar volstrekt geı¨soleerde bestaan in een flat te New York.
In 1951 werd zij Amerikaans staatsburger, drie jaar later kreeg
zij een ere-Oscar.
Hoewel Greta Garbo de maatstaf werd genoemd van schoon-
heid, is zij nooit getrouwd geweest.
De laatste zin van de tekst in (1) deed enkele lezers en lezeressen in
woede ontsteken: was de journalist werkelijk van mening dat mooie
vrouwen trouwen? Ingezonden brieven getuigden van hun veront-
waardiging. Nu is het merkwaardig dat de journalist nergens in de
necrologie de bewering heeft geuit dat mooie vrouwen trouwen, terwijl
de meeste lezers zullen erkennen dat die mening wel voor het voetlicht
wordt gebracht. Uit de zin hoewel Greta Garbo de maatstaf werd genoemd
van schoonheid, is zij nooit getrouwd geweest, kunnen we het vooroordeel
van de journalist dat mooie vrouwen trouwen blijkbaar afleiden. Deze
afleiding wordt mogelijk gemaakt door de betekenis van het woordje
hoewel. Woorden als hoewel en maar, maar ook omdat en want hebben
een bijzondere betekenis.
In dit proefschrift wordt die betekenis, en zijn effecten op de samen-
hang en structuur van een tekst, geanalyseerd. In hoofdstuk 2 gebeurt
dat door een beschrijving te geven van de soorten betekenisrelaties tus-
sen zinnen die met behulp van deze connectieven verbonden worden.
In hoofdstuk 3 worden presupposities voor de connectieven geformu-
leerd die vooroordelen als die van de journalist afleiden, en die ook de
betekenisrelaties uit hoofdstuk 2 kunnen representeren. In hoofdstuk 4
wordt vervolgens de vraag behandeld of er verschil is tussen het aanne-
men van een betekenisrelatie met, of zonder de aanwezigheid van een
connectief. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt beschreven hoe tekststructuur wordt
beı¨nvloed door causale betekenisrelaties, door te analyseren wat de an-
tecedenten zijn van diverse propositionele anaforen in diverse soorten
contexten.
In hoofdstuk 2 worden verschillende betekenisrelaties tussen zin-
nen beschreven die uitgedrukt kunnen worden met de hierboven ge-
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noemde connectieven. Deze zogeheten coherentierelaties drukken cau-
saliteit uit, of een contrastrelatie, of een relatie die zowel causaliteit als
contrast uitdrukt. Bovendien kunnen deze drie soorten relaties episte-
misch, als speech act en semantisch worden uitgedrukt.
Epistemische interpretatie van causale connectieven representeren
de conclusie van een spreker. Dit type interpretatie kan talig gemar-
keerd worden, maar dat hoeft niet. Een epistemische relatie kan wor-
den herkend aan de mogelijkheid om een parafrase van een zin te ma-
ken die systematisch aan een deelzin de frase uit het feit dat ... toekent,
en aan de andere deelzin de frase: concludeer ik dat ....
Bij de speech act interpretatie van een coherentierelatie wordt het
uiten van een deelzin gerechtvaardigd (of juist ontkracht) in de andere
deelzin. Speech act interpretaties zijn altijd linguı¨stisch gemarkeerd.
In een systematische parafrase van een uiting met een speech act in-
terpretatie wordt een deelzin ingebed in een speech act werkwoord, en
de andere deelzin verwijst naar de eerstgenoemde deelzin, die op die
manier in zelfnoemfunctie wordt gebruikt.
In een semantische interpretatie van een coherentierelatie worden
uitsluitend de betekenisinhouden van de zinnen zelf met elkaar in ver-
band gebracht. Dit onderscheidt semantische interpretatie van episte-
mische en speech act interpretatie. De laatste twee interpretaties bren-
gen de betekenisinhouden met elkaar in verband op een ander niveau:
dat van de speech acts, of dat van de houding van de spreker ten op-
zichte van betekenisinhoud. Ze worden daarom ook wel samengeno-
men als ‘pragmatische interpretatie’.
Er zijn drie soorten betekenisrelaties die ieder contrast uitdrukken:
ontkenning van verwachting, semantische oppositie en concessie. In
een ontkenning van verwachting wordt een verwachting afgeleid van
de zin, en vervolgens weersproken. De verwachting wordt systematisch
afgeleid uit de hoewel-zin. Twee afgeleide proposities worden gevormd.
Uit de bijzin wordt een propositie afgeleid die een generalisatie of im-
plicatie is van de bijzin. Uit de hoofdzin wordt op eenzelfde wijze een
propositie afgeleid, zij het dat de propositie tevens een ontkenning van
de hoofdzin inhoudt (er wordt bij de afleiding een negatie toegevoegd).
Naast een generalisatie of implicatie, kan de afgeleide propositie ook
identiek zijn aan de corresponderende zin, of een contextueel bepaalde
inferentie inhouden. De twee afgeleide proposities vormen een impli-
catie: de propositie die is afgeleid van de bijzin vormt het antecedent,
de propositie die is afgeleid van de hoofdzin het consequent. Gege-
ven deze afleiding van de verwachting, wordt de ontkenning van de
verwachting wordt gerealiseerd door de hoofdzin (bij een ontkenning
van verwachting met maar: de deelzin die met maar begint). Omdat
de gevormde verwachting een implicatie is, is een ontkenning van ver-
wachting zowel contrastief als causaal.
Een semantische oppositie wordt gekarakteriseerd door parallelle in-
tonatie en structuur. De parallelle vorm is een instructie voor de pre-
dicaten in de deelzinnen om een contrast te vinden tussen hun beider
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betekenisinhoud. Dit contrast wordt vervolgens toegekend aan de zins-
delen die door de parallelle structuur als topic zijn gekenmerkt.
Voor de interpretatie van een concessie is de afleiding van een zo-
geheten tertium comparationis nodig, op basis van contextuele infor-
matie. De twee deelzinnen die concessief verbonden zijn, vormen ver-
volgens een argument voor en een argument tegen de aanname van
de tertium comparationis. Een concessie mag zowel in de parallelle
vorm van de semantische oppositie, als in de non-parallelle vorm van
de ontkenning van verwachting voorkomen. De interpretatie van een
concessie is per definitie epistemisch: de tertium comparationis kan
worden gezien als een conclusie van de spreker, waarvoor zowel een
positief als een negatief argument wordt gegeven in de deelzinnen. De
ontkenning van verwachting was zowel causaal als contrastief. De con-
cessie is echter niet causaal, omdat er geen sprake is van een implicatie
tussen twee afgeleide proposities: de relatie tussen de deelzinnen en de
tertium comparationis (een contextueel afgeleide propositie) kan soms
causaal worden geı¨nterpreteerd, maar dat is niet wat de concessieve be-
tekenisrelatie uitdrukt.
Een causale relatie tussen twee zinnen wordt gedefinieerd door te
beoordelen wat de relatie is tussen de van die zinnen afgeleide pro-
posities. Als e´e´n van beide afgeleide proposities een zogeheten INUS-
conditie vormt voor een resultaat, uitgedrukt in de andere afgeleide
propositie, dan is de relatie tussen de zinnen causaal. Een INUS-conditie
houdt in dat de conditie voldoende is voor het resultaat, en dat van een
onderdeel van die conditie vastgesteld kan worden dat het causale pri-
oriteit draagt ten opzichte van het resultaat. De INUS-conditie mag
onvolledig zijn als alle mogelijke oorzaken voor het resultaat worden
overwogen: het gaat om de causale relatie in het specifieke geval dat
wordt uitgedrukt in de de zinnen waartussen de relatie bestaat. Ge-
geven de definitie van de INUS-conditie is het mogelijk niet-causale
relaties van causale te onderscheiden, en semantische causale relaties
van epistemische causale relaties.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt aangenomen dat connectieven die een causale
betekenisrelatie uitdrukken een presuppositie dragen in de vorm van
een implicatie. Met deze aanname kunnen ook de epistemische en
de speech act interpretatie worden verklaard. De afleiding van een B
operator voor het consequent van de implicatie levert een epistemische
interpretatie op; de afleiding van een S operator voor het consequent
van de implicatie levert een speech act interpretatie op. B en S worden
afgeleid door toepassing van conversationele implicaturen.
Hoewel heeft een presuppositie die de verwachting representeert.
Van de hoewel-zin wordt het antecedent van de verwachting afgeleid;
de consequent van de verwachting wordt afgeleid van de negatie van
de hoofdzin. Er zijn gevallen waarin hoewel gebruikt wordt in een con-
cessieve interpretatie. In die gevallen is er geen sprake van een presup-
positie. Wat als presuppositie zou moeten gelden, wordt in die geval-
len afgewezen: het kan niet worden geaccepteerd in de context, of het
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kan niet als een causaal verband worden begrepen. In plaats van een
interpretatie als ontkenning van verwachting, wordt de relatie nu ar-
gumentatief geı¨nterpreteerd als een concessie. Dat is mogelijk doordat
de afwijzing van de presuppositie een grove schending van de maximes
van conversatie oplevert. Als alternatief voor onacceptabiliteit van de
zin, kan een taalgebruiker een nieuwe interpretatie wagen, maar nu als
een argumentatief gebruikte uiting. Deze argumentatieve interpretatie
leidt tot de concessie. Het gebruik van concessies wordt in het alle-
daagse taalgebruik niet ervaren als een grove schending van maximes
van conversatie, omdat de interpretatie van concessie geconventiona-
liseerd is in het Nederlands, net zoals de interpretatie van ingeburgerde
metaforen: veel idioom wordt niet meer als metafoor herkend, omdat
de interpretatie ervan direct gekoppeld is aan de uiting. Context speelt
daarom een belangrijker rol bij het desambigueren van relaties uitge-
drukt door hoewel, dan het op grove wijze schenden van een maxime.
De analyse van hoewel kan eenvoudig worden toegepast op omdat:
net als hoewel, representeert omdat een logische conjunctie op het ni-
veau van de betekenisinhoud van de zinnen, en implicatie op het ni-
veau van de presuppositie van omdat.
Een versterking van de analyse van causale connectieven in termen
van presuppositie is gevonden in een rapportage van een corpusana-
lyse, waarin een ontkenning van verwachting zich eerder leek te ge-
dragen als een causale relatie zoals omdat die uitdrukt, dan een con-
cessie. Een analyse van samentrekking van het werkwoord in zinnen
die verbonden zijn met een causaal connectief, levert onafhankelijke
evidentie voor de analyse van causale connectieven op.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een consequentie uitgewerkt van de analyse
dat causale connectieven presupposities dragen. Causale connectieven
expliciteren causaliteit door middel van hun presupposities. Causali-
teit hoeft echter niet expliciet gemarkeerd te zijn. Ongemarkeerde re-
laties kunnen echter ook causaliteit uitdrukken. De verschillen in aflei-
ding van de causaliteit zijn onderzocht binnen het computationele mo-
del DICE, dat coherentierelaties kan berekenen uit de betekenisinhou-
den van met elkaar verbonden zinnen. Ongemarkeerde causale relaties
zijn vaak ondergespecificeerd en ondersteund door kennis die onzeker
lijkt. Causale relaties, uitgedrukt door een connectief, dwingen een
specifieke causale relatie af (die overigens wel op verschillende wijzen
geı¨nterpreteerd kan worden, zoals hoofdstuk 2 beschreef). Dit verschil
tussen annuleerbare en verplichte inferenties wordt niet verklaard van-
uit een verschil in kennis: dezelfde causale relatie tussen dezelfde pro-
posities wordt als minder zeker ervaren als die niet is gemarkeerd door
een causale relatie. Zonder connectieven moet de causale relatie wor-
den afgeleid uit de betekenisinhouden en kennis van de wereld, ver-
bonden met de corresponderende lexicale items in het lexicon. Alleen
voor de hand liggende betekenisaspecten van de lexicale items kun-
nen worden gebruikt. Met het gebruik van een connectief als omdat of
want zijn de relevante lexicale items veroordeeld tot een specifiek cau-
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saal verband, waarin minder in het oog springende betekenisaspecten
van die lexicale items met elkaar in verband kunnen worden gebracht
om de causale relatie te ondersteunen. Zonder causaal connectief zijn
het alleen de in het oog springende betekenisaspecten van de lexicale
items die een causale relatie kunnen oproepen.DICE kan profiteren van
het incorporeren van niet-annuleerbare inferenties voor causale con-
nectieven, omdat er niet-annuleerbare inferenties minder inferentie¨le
arbeid vereisen.
Causale coherentie heeft specifieke eigenschappen: causale connec-
tieven dragen presupposities en causale relaties moeten gevormd wor-
den in overeenstemming met kennis van de wereld of lexicale ken-
nis. Coherentierelaties bouwen ook een structuur van de discourse. De
vraag of causale relaties daarin een andere rol spelen dan additieve re-
laties, is beantwoord in hoofdstuk 5. Een computationeel model, LDM,
dat discourse structuren bouwt vanuit de coherentierelaties die tussen
zinnen bestaan, is gekozen als het kader waarbinnen de vraag beant-
woord wordt. Het model bouwt structuren door steeds een volgende
zin toe te voegen aan al bestaande structuur, waarbij de aanhechtings-
mogelijkheden beperkt worden door de rechtergrens van de structuur
(gevormd door die tak van de structuur die de hoogste knoop verbindt
met de terminale meest rechtsgelegen knoop). Volgens Webber (1991)
worden niet alleen de aanhechtingsmogelijkheden, maar ook de ver-
wijzingsmogelijkheden voor anaforen door deze grens beperkt.
Zogeheten ongemarkeerde propositionele anaforen verwijzen naar
constituenten die geabstraheerde betekenis representeren, en gemar-
keerde propositionele anaforen verwijzen naar constituenten die en-
kelvoudige zinnen representeren. Anaforen zoals het, er en de Engelse
VP-anafoor zijn ongemarkeerd, anaforen zoals dat zijn gemarkeerd. Een
ongemarkeerde anafoor kan door het predicaat van de zin waarin hij
voorkomt, nader gespecificeerd worden. Deze eigenschap is gebruikt
om tests te ontwikkelen die eigenschappen van de voorgaande context
van die anafoor naar boven kunnen halen. In deze tests bepalen ac-
ceptabiliteitsoordelen welke onderdelen van de voorafgaande context
kunnen behoren tot het antecedent van de anafoor.
De tests leiden tot de conclusie dat de rechtergrens van de structuur
van de voorafgaande context niet kan worden doorbroken als de con-
text is gevormd door additieve relaties, maar wel als die is gevormd door
causale relaties. Als de anafoor zich bevindt in een parallelle structuur,
is deze rechtergrensconditie eveneens niet van toepassing.
De resultaten van de tests zijn uitgewerkt in LDM. Daarvoor zijn de
constructieregels veranderd en uitgebreid. De voorwaarden op de con-
dities zijn veranderd, zodanig dat ze verwijzen naar de coherentiepre-
dicaten uit DICE, zoals die in het vorige hoofdstuk zijn geformuleerd.
Bovendien zijn de regels die retorische subordinatie en coo¨rdinatie be-
schreven, vervangen door een regel die causale relaties beschrijft. Daar-
naast is een regel voor ontkenning van verwachting geformuleerd. Met
gebruikmaking van deze wijzigingen is een eerdere analyse van de En-
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gelse VP-anaforen opnieuw verricht: de nieuwe analyse doet de taal-
kundige feiten beter recht.
Vrij complexe intuı¨ties over de precieze betekenis van causale en
contrastieve connectieven, en over de inferenties die ze in het gebruik
in teksten teweegbrengen, kunnen aldus in een formele benadering van
tekstbetekenis ingepast worden.
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